In the past ten years of war, the Soviet-backed regime has used mines as a means to secure their position and as part of their plan to disintegrate Afghan society.

A testament to this disintegration is the displacement of people to bordering countries or urban centers controlled by the aggressor. In both cases, these people have become refugees in order to survive.

The intention of the "plan" is captured in a statement made by an Afghan communist official: "We don't need 15 million Afghans to create a marxist society. One million will suffice."

The resistance also uses mines. Their intention is to impede the advance of government forces into liberated areas. In certain regions this tactic started as a means of destroying communication routes.

The tactic employed by the Soviets consists of establishing government posts along trunk roads. They are backed by Red Army artillery posts which, in turn, rely on large expeditionary bases in Jalalabad, Bagram, and Kabul, which intervene when needed.

As a result of this twofold situation, most towns and military posts are ringed by a double series of mines. The first set, deployed by the aggressor, is intended as a defensive measure as well as to discourage desertion. The second set, deployed by the resistance, is to contain the enemy.
Since the start of the war, there have been an estimated 40,000 deaths caused by mines. This represents 4% of the total fatalities caused by the war. In addition there have been 400,000 severely wounded, a large number of them children victimized by mines.

Mines present a psychological as well as a physical obstacle to the refugees' repatriation. Should Pakistan, through Soviet pressure and the West's consent, cut off aid to the Afghans and accelerate the return of the refugees, 4 million destitute men, women, and children would find themselves walking a tight rope in the midst of millions of mines.

These mines represent the final strategy for longterm destabilization of Afghanistan, in case of a complete Soviet withdrawal.

**INFORMATION ON THE MINES USED IN AFGHANISTAN**

There are 13 types of anti-personnel mines and 7 types of anti-tank mines currently in use in Afghanistan.

Four of the anti-personnel mines can be dispersed from the air, the rest must be hand-laid.

(See annex 1 for details concerning the general characteristics of these mines.)

A large number of mines have been used in Afghanistan. According to research conducted by military experts, and to the accounts of people who have to date experienced the situation in Afghanistan, there could be anything between 15 and 50 million mines spread out over the country.

Uses of the mines:

- The regime uses mines as a form of protection around its military emplacements. The danger zones are more or less known to the resistance.

- "Spraying" of mines from the air or with mortars. It is impossible to evaluate the extent and limits of these danger zones.

- Laying of mines by the Soviet commandos (the Spetznaz) or the collaborators. It is difficult to evaluate their objectives.

- The resistance also lays mines, either along roads when attacking convoys (mines that have not been exploded are recuperated after the attack), or around towns and posts.
controlled by the government. In some cases, no one knows where they have been placed, those who laid them having died, plans never having existed.

Anti-tank mines are easily defused by someone possessing basic knowledge of mines. Those that are booby-trapped to prevent dismantling are detonated with bullets. These mines can easily be made into all kinds of booby-traps.

Anti-personnel mines are used to inflict more or less serious wounds on people moving about on foot. They come in varying sizes and shapes, to make recognition more difficult. They inflict damage either by their blast, by fragments of their casing, or by the nails, glass beads, bits of steel etc., that they contain.

Some mines jump into the air before blowing up and injuring different parts of the body. The height of the jump can be regulated when the mine is laid.

Some mines are linked by fine wires or strings which, when broken or stretched, detonate the mines wherever they happen to lie, around a single person or a group.

Missions into Afghanistan are planned to gather more information on this subject.
(See annex 1 for more precise details on the types of mines used in Afghanistan)

MINE CLEARANCE TECHNIQUES IN AFGHANISTAN

The resistance has generally very little modern mine clearance equipment and expertise. The men do the best they can at great loss to human life and only scratch the surface of the mine problem in Afghanistan. Sometimes they cordon off the danger areas and wait. This usually means a loss of valuable agricultural land.

When they do try to clear the mines, they either use their hands, or send animals (goats, sheep, dogs or donkeys) over the area. The former method often leads to severe wounds, and the latter is very expensive. To clear roads, they often use tractors, guaranteeing to compensate for the damage. The driver's life is left in God's hands. When they know the mine is particularly dangerous, they try to detonate it by throwing stones onto it, or by firing on it with automatic weapons.

The mujahideen tread very carefully in newly liberated areas, but despite this, figures show that wounds and death caused by mines increase dramatically in these areas. This is due to
the fact that the communists leave many booby-traps behind, and there tends to be more movement and activity at such times.

Mines that have been in the ground for a long time are difficult to clear, as the earth around them becomes very compressed.

OVERVIEW OF MINE INJURIES

Injuries, at times fatal, are caused either by the blast of the explosion or by mine fragments. The heavier the explosive, the more serious the damage.

Injuries caused by anti-tank mines are often fatal. In this case, it's the fragments of the vehicle that cause the injuries. The effect of these mines can be minimized by placing sandbags over the floorboards of the vehicle.

Most of the damage caused by anti-personnel mines consist of limb injuries. The wounds tend to be very jagged.

In order to make proper diagnosis of the urgency of wounds, extensive experience with war surgery is required. Besides surface lesions, the blast of the explosion often causes internal injuries (cerebral contusions, respiratory damage, etc.) which necessitate intensive and immediate care. (See annex n°2 for further detail re. wounds)

Certain factors must be considered if the wounded are to be properly dealt with in such a war situation. First, the victim must be stabilized for transport to the nearest available medical facility. Since most of readily available medical clinics can only provide basic first aid, in most cases, it will be necessary to transport the victim to a more comprehensive medical facility. There the victim will require clinical examinations for proper diagnosis, rehabilitation (in case of bloodloss, respiratory care, etc.), or surgery if necessary. Afterwards, the victim needs to be sent to a specialized medical facility, with recuperative and therapeutic care. It is imperative that experienced practitioners be available all along the system if it is to function effectively.

Mines have created a large number of handicapped and will probably be the cause of many more. The problem will have to be dealt with to help these people to adjust to a normal and productive life. So far, one of the only efforts made in this direction is the ICRC physiotherapy centre in Peshawar, which is too small to meet overall demands.
More than mere good will is needed if the handicapped are to be assisted properly to resume a more active, normal life. AVICEN has begun a study of the possibilities within each NGO for making jobs available to the handicapped, and the assessment of tasks which their handicap does not prevent them from accomplishing efficiently. These studies include necessary architectural modifications to enable the handicapped to move around without being dependent on others. (See annex 3 for details re. prothesis)

THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF MINES

Mines are a constant source of fear for the population. The noise of bombardments and artillery fire is always a form of advanced warning as to what is to come. It enables the individual to prepare mentally (for potential injury) and physically (taking the necessary precautions) for the forthcoming onslaught. In contrast, mines are unpredictable. They give no prior warning; the danger is always present, always hidden.

Mines have reinforced hatred and distrust towards the common enemy, helping to bridge the gap between the civilian population and the resistance.

Mines can be considered a terrorist tactic. Although they do not claim as many lives as bombing attacks, they create a much greater atmosphere of insecurity.

Given the number of mines in Afghanistan, it is imperative that Afghans be trained in mine clearance and "depollution"(1), as they present one of the greatest obstacles to the successful reconstruction of the country.

FACTORs TO CONSIDER IN ASSISTING THE MINE CLEARENCE EFFORT

After years of war and destruction, political conditions finally permit an international effort to bring humanitarian and material aid inside Afghanistan. In spite of all the good intentions, myriad difficulties could lead to failure and destroy the realization of all this assistance.

1 Depollution, clearance of war debris, defusing of bombs, shells, etc...
A ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED

1) A number of specialized UN agencies have taken an interest in cross border work since the signing of the Geneva Accords. These agencies have undergone strong political pressures to come to quick decisions on large assistance programs, despite the fact that the overall situation is still very much in flux.

These agencies face the problems of understanding the roles of the various NGO's and Afghan groups involved (parties, fronts, local commanders, the ethnic groups, clans, sub-clans, etc), all of which seem to present their own complications.

One of the UN's first requests was for the establishment of a single liaison group (the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, ACBAR), this despite the fragmentation and diversity of Afghan culture and the attendant diversity of its relationships with the NGO's.

It must be understood that the diversity of the Afghan socio-political structure is not a flaw to be corrected. It is one of the major factors of the problem, and needs to be taken into consideration. It has also been a contributing factor to the resistance's success. It appears that the UN experts and consultants are now aware of the complexity of Afghan society and of the resistance, and are prepared to try to understand it.

2) Bilateral Aid Groups have been involved in cross border work for some time now. They avail themselves of the resistance groups and of the Alliance (Itehad) as "vectors" for their work. The NGOs rely on them as their primary interface with the country. The resistance gives them access to services, facilities and knowledge that would be difficult to acquire independently. It is with this assistance, and with the pressures that accompany it, that the NGOs are trying to institute administrative systems that may serve as the progenitors of future government ministries.

3) Refugee Relief NGOs have established economic and social programs in the refugee camps in Pakistan. A half dozen of them are quite large. Most have expressed a desire to participate in repatriation, reconstruction, and economic development work.

4) Cross-border NGOs, most of them European, have acquired a great deal of knowledge and experience with regard to relations with Afghans inside
Afghanistan. The information which they bring back, though often regional and limited, is more reliable than that coming from other sources. Many of these NGOs, however, lack the administrative structure and resources to support large programs.

5) There are a number of countries (Egypt, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States), whose governments want to participate in the mine clearance of Afghanistan. Effective coordination between these countries is essential, as well is consistancy to the programs they institute.

It should be anticipated that the number of problems to be encountered in mounting such a program will vary in direct proportion with the number of organizations involved. It is hoped, that the inadequacies addressed in Afghanistan and the means used to "correct" or adapt are not a mere repetition of the mistakes made by the inefficient bureaucracy of Kabul.

The motivation for each of the participants should not go against and beyond the needs of the Afghans, as such disparities risk having the door closed on those who are sincere in their assistance to the Afghan people.

B COORDINATION IN THE FIELD:

As already emphasized, coordination and consistency of the various participants is essential throughout the program.

Expedient and dynamic coordination is necessary. To avoid redundancy and excessively heavy, slow bureaucracy. Attrition, competition and territoriality between the various participants must also be foreseen.

It would perhaps be best if at the beginning of the implementation, each participant take responsibility for specific provinces. The selection may either be carried out randomly; as it is a less contentious process, or through discussion of preferences. Regional responsibility is key to avoiding national interests getting in the way.

In addition to coordination of efforts in Islamabad and abroad, it would be helpful if a central coordination of field work were to be established in Peshawar to facilitate the process. It would also be helpful if this coordination consisted of representatives from all the participants who could stay throughout the duration of the
mine clearance effort. All of the work dealing with the Afghans demands consistency and understanding on the part of the people who are in direct contact with them, as well as the building up of trust. The field coordination centers in Peshawar and Quetta could go a long way towards making the program effective.

C EDUCATIONAL METHOD OF PROGRAMS:

The refugee relief programs in the camps in Pakistan are exposed to great fluctuations based on population movements, combat in Afghanistan, the season, as well as the political, cultural and logistic factors.

Extensive standardization of large scale programs currently conducted in the refugee camps in Pakistan does not exist.

Some of the reason for this are due to:

- variance in the relief agency motivations.
- lack of coordination and communications between relief agencies.
- lack of coordination of decisions at the high executive level of the major organizations.
- inability of "small scale" programs to be extended into large professional operations.
- lack of equity in the means and resources available to various agencies working in the camps.
- lack of effective supervision and control of the work in the camps.

The reasons stated above, in the case of work in the camps, imply that extension of programs to cover a maximum number of camps would be hard to realize. Suggested recommendations for solutions include:

- Adaptability of executives and implementers of projects to the Afghan way of thinking.
- Flexibility of the programs based on critical study of their success and environment.
- Choice of partners in the field
- Coordination between participants
- Precise goals and measures to be achieved.
Motivated, resourceful and well supported participants

- preparation for failure
- proper and effective communication through translators
- an original, flexible political structure.

In the absence of expedient and effective action, the mine clearance program risks having time become its only solution. There is an increasing number of refugees returning to the liberated areas, nothing has happened yet...

D MINE AWARENESS PROGRAMME FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

If such a programme is to be effective, it will have to take into account Afghan culture and social mores, as well as the politico-military situation in the camps or in the regions concerned.

Dissemination of the information will be spearheaded by the media and word of mouth: newspapers, posters, videos, radios and campaigns in the schools.

However, the information should always be channeled through the traditional hierarchy: the notables, elders, commanders, heads of families, then the families. The Mullahs should also be taken into account. Circumvention of this hierarchy is the surest means to failure (even in the case of direct information to the women).

Due to the nature of their chores, the women in Afghanistan are frequent victims of mine explosions. It is thus extremely important that women be trained to inform them thoroughly of the dangers to expect in Afghanistan, especially as it will not always be possible to inform the men.

Many of the children living in the camps have never seen Afghanistan, and this will have to be taken into account when they are informed of the dangers presented by mines.

NEWSPAPERS

80% of the population are illiterate. Outside the towns, the only newspapers available are party papers. They are distributed from Pakistan and Iran. Once again, the programme
will have to be aware of the political tendency of the parties concerned. It will also have to present the information in such a way as to make it easy for the literate population (20%) to pass it on to those who are illiterate.

SPOKEN WORD

This remains the best means of dissemination of information in Afghanistan.

Anyone who makes an effort to adapt to local social mores and culture will command the attention and respect of the notables, and consequently that of the population too.

Songs and poems make up an important part of Afghan entertainment. Writing songs and poems about the danger of mines is one of the most efficient means of getting the message through to all the strata of Afghan society.

POSTERS

From our own experience with posters inside Afghanistan (used for the prevention of various diseases), we found that they are only effective when explained, or used to reinforce an explanation. Once again, the spoken word is all important.

Pictures that could be considered shocking should not be used, as they could frighten the children.

There should be some form of uniformity in the symbolic representations on all the posters to be used in this programme. There is no international symbolic representation for mines; we have therefore asked some Afghans to come up with an image of a mine that could easily be understood by the population. (See annex 4 for further information on poster designing in Peshawar.)

SCHOOLS

Children are amongst the most exposed to mines through their games and daily chores. It is thus extremely important that they should learn to recognize mines, and be aware of the danger.

The Mullahs in the schools (Madrasa) are the best vehicle for this information, as not only are they the local teachers, but they are also very respected, and have a lot of influence in the community.
This way the hierarchy will also be respected, and people will pay more attention to the message.

**RADIOs**

Afghans enjoy listening to the radio, not only as a form of entertainment but also as a source of information. Radios can be found more or less everywhere.

In Peshawar, both men and women have volunteered to write songs, texts, and poems concerned with the danger of mines, which could then be broadcast in Afghanistan by, for example, the Pashto service of the BBC. Adam Gordon, who is in charge of the BBC in London, made a similar proposition to the subcommittee in November.

It would be a good idea if such programmes could also be broadcast by other radio services in Islamabad, Iran, by the VOA etc.

Such programmes should be set up and broadcast long before the war comes to an end.
(See annex 5 for examples of the texts to be broadcast.)

**VIDEOS**

Videos are what would probably catch the refugees' attention the most. However, the videos should be customized to the comprehension of the target population, keeping cultural and religious considerations in mind. The actors should appear in local garb and communicate in local dialects so that the target population can best relate to it. It is critical that the productions do not lead to sensationalization of mines which could lead to children exposed to these videos consequently seeking to deal with mines.

**E MINE AWARENESS PROGRAMMES FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN:**

The mujahideen will, and must play a central role in the actual mine clearance of the country. The mine problem in Afghanistan must be resolved by Afghans. However, they will need foreign help in the form of expertise.

The mujahideen, who are used to handling modern weapons, can easily be trained in mine clearance.

The training will be conducted by the military teams of the various countries that have come forward to this end. It should be organized in the refugee camps well before the war comes to an end in Afghanistan.
The commanders will choose the number of men required for their respective areas. The demands vary from region to region; some areas are less densely mined than others.

Maps with the indications of the mine emplacements have been requested. However, it is unreasonable to expect such a task of a country in which 80% of the population is illiterate, and which is not familiar with the Western, Cartesian-based sense of logic and organization. In any case, the mujahideen know quite precisely where the mines are laid around the government controlled towns and posts, and have no need for maps.

Furthermore, maps of mountainous areas would not be precise enough for the purpose of mine clearance.

Will cartography be part of the training programme for the mujahideen?

As far as the areas widely "sprayed" with mines from the air are concerned, all we can do for the present is fall back on the old Pashtun saying: "There is no insoluble problem that time will not resolve." No one knows the precise location of these mines, and there is nothing that Western expertise and modern equipment can do to help. The problem will have to be left to the Afghans to solve. It is better to wait a while than to forge ahead and commit irreparable blunders.

Once the country has been liberated, the second phase of the programme can take place. It can be divided into two main elements:

1) Sending of the various expatriate mine clearance experts into Afghanistan. Such a move is inevitable, as the complexity of the programme and technology used will require Western expertise. However, an unjustified length of stay could lead to serious problems. Afghans will have very little tolerance for foreign advisers after their experience with them over the last 10 years.

2) Integration of the mine clearance programme into a national reconstruction programme for Afghanistan. This is to avoid the type of culturally blind foreign assistance that has only too frequently caused more problems than it has solved.

It should also eventually lead to a high degree of autonomy for the Afghans. In other words, Afghans should be trained to solve their own problems, rather than sending foreign experts in to do all the work and then depart with all their knowledge and
experience, leaving the Afghans just as dependent on foreign "charity" as before.

The foreign assistance will have to be chosen very carefully, if the excesses and short-sightedness mentioned above are to be avoided.

The new government will choose the mujahideen who are to be trained in mine clearance.

Failure by the foreign experts to impart their knowledge because of so called military secrets will not profit them in any way; the Afghans will eventually manage to carry the task out by themselves, but at a greater loss of innocent lives.

Care should be taken in the choice of expatriates participating in the programme; below is a list open to suggestions:

Profile of the type of expatriates required:
- Young adult
- Healthy and physically resistant
- Basic teaching skills
- Speaks English
- Basic knowledge of Islam
- Patient, natural, sympathetic
- Ready to adopt local attire
- Tolerant and humble
- Capable of being a teetotaller!
- Available over a long period of time

It is worth mentioning that Ramadan begins in April this year. The local population is often tired during this period, which can make work a little difficult.

THE USE OF SIGNS TO INDICATE MINED AREAS

It is extremely important that these signs should be identical, from the point of view of the symbol, the colour and the shape.

These signs should be raised on posts that are high enough not to be submerged by snow, which can get quite deep in some regions of Afghanistan, where the winters are long.

These signs could for instance consist of small triangular flags on the end of long poles, with a skull or explosion symbol stamped on both sides.
Once the design for the signs has been chosen, it will have to be communicated to the radio stations so that the whole country can be informed as quickly as possible.

The signs could be distributed by the parties and NGOs working in the interior of Afghanistan as well as in the refugee camps at the end of information sessions.

At present, we have no information concerning the fabrication of signs in Pakistan.

Piles of stones are currently being used to indicate paths through minefields.

AFGHAN VALUES, CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS.

Three quarters of the Afghan refugee population are women and children. The majority of them are Pushtun. Their values, inter-personal relations, behaviour etc., are based on a code of honour, the Pushtunwali.

The Pushtunwali is centred around three principal concepts: hospitality, refuge and revenge. Other important values included in this code are equality, respect, bravery, Purdah (reclusion of the women), friendship and devotion to God.

The Pushtuns live very much in the present. They make use of their present resources, without worrying about the future, which is in God's hands. They have a fatalistic, stoic approach to misfortune. Unchangeable circumstances are accepted passively. Life and death are totally dependent on God's will. It is Inshallah.

Strangers are considered dangerous a priori.

A family's honour depends very closely on the strict adherence to Purdah by the women.

The Tajiks' principal values are: mutual aid, truth, respect of the members of the family, family honour, honesty and hospitality, beating of wives and children is strictly forbidden.

Life in refugee camps has broken up the family, clan and tribal unity that they had previously experienced in Afghanistan. The refugees have fallen back onto their traditional values and customs, which they have strengthened, to compensate for the fragmentation of their social structure.

All three principal elements of the Pushtunwali are especially relevant at the moment: refuge and hospitality abroad (more
than 5 million have fled Afghanistan), and revenge in the form of Jihad against the invader.

Cultural sensitivity is of paramount importance when setting up a programme in Afghanistan. Failure in this domain could have a damaging effect on the future Afghan society. (See Annex 6 for life of refugees in the camps.)

PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE NOMADS

There were approximately 2 million nomads before the Soviet invasion took place. Today, many of them are living in the refugee camps in Pakistan, their lifestyle having been disrupted by the war. Others have collaborated with the regime or helped the resistance, and many have been killed in bombardments, during military operations or by mines.

The nomads will find it harder to resume their way of life. Due to the fact that they are almost continually on the move, they are more exposed to mines.

One of the few specialists on Afghan nomads has been contacted with a view to trying to find a solution to this problem. A map indicating the routes used by the nomads has also been sought.

Some nomads are still moving about despite the risks involved; they could be a useful source of information on the current state of the routes they regularly use.
4. Road Security

The single biggest problem affecting assistance programs in this region, if not country, is the lack of road security with respect to transit cargo.

The cause of these security problems are not groups of down and out bandits but, typically, well organized, wealthy, and heavily armed Mujahideen groups who inform the mission that they are merely "collecting taxes for the maintenance of road security".

When the private sector truck drivers, on occasion have refused to pay the demanded sum, calculated to no known formula, at gun point their bodies have been beaten and their trucks broken.

To stay healthy and in business, the truckers say they have learned to simply pay-up, and then pass the cost of these "taxes" onto the consumers at the end of the road.

In April '90, each single truck driving from Herat city to Qala-i-Now via the Subzak Pass had to pay a minimum of Afs 350,000 in taxes to reach its destination. The worst of this route's 15 odd offenders is the charming, Hekmatyer Commander, Abarb Karim, of Karrukh.

Alone, this man was monitored by the mission to be taking a minimum of Afs 120,000 from each truck.

When questioned after tea about this addictive little habit, the Abarb merely laughed and took the mission up to a point in the road were, still smiling, he exclaimed "and this is where I will take money from the UN shipments to Badghis".

A similar situation has developed along the only other access route into the province of Badghis, the Chel Dukhtar route along the Soviet/Afghan border. Here the worst of some 5 odd offenders is the similarly charming, NIFA Commander, Mir Hamza, of Kushk-i-Kohnar.

Reportedly, his posts are taking a minimum of Afs 40,000 per truck.

This daylight robbery is estimated to be adding a staggering Afs 30 to the cost of every kilogram of food delivered into Badghis from Herat city.
Type TM-46 and Type 72:
This standard anti-tank mine is circular shaped and has a metallic case with either a pressure or tilt-rod fuse. These mines have an anti-lift fuse. The charge is 5.3kg. is capable of very extensive damage to unarmoured vehicles such as trucks and Land Rovers.

Type TM-38:
This anti-tank mine contains a thin sheet steel box, with a 3.6kg. charge in the lower half, and a pressure fuse in the lid section.

Type TMD-B:
This anti-tank mine consists of a wooden box approx. 30cm. x 30cm., with wooden pressure boards on the top. This type of mine can be easily altered, enlarged and booby-trapped.

Type TM-41:
Identical to the type TM-46 except for the universal pressure/pull fuse. Basically of cylindrical construction, this mine has a main charge of 3.8kg. boosted by 74g. of picric acid.

Type TS-50 and T/79:
This circular plastic anti-personnel mine is pressure detonated, with a main charge of 50g. Large numbers of these mines have been laid on rural access roads and paths.

Type VS-50:
The anti-personnel mine is sometimes fitted with anti-handling and self-neutralization devices.

Type SB-33:
This plastic anti-personnel mine is irregularly contoured, and its low height (3cm.) makes visual detection hard. This type of mine has been widely deployed.

Type V-69:
This bounding mine is detonated by direct pressure on any of its five "horns", or by trip wire. The main charge is surrounded by over 1,000 metal splinters, producing a lethal casualty radius of 25 metres.

Type AT:
This anti-tank mine is non-metallic and anti-lift.

Type AP:
This anti-personnel mine has minimal metal content and is pressure detonated with a main charge of tetryl.
Type AT:
This non-metallic anti-tank mine is pressure activated, with the above type AP mine placed between pressure plates and the main charge.

Type M14:
This small circular blast anti-personnel mine is of total plastic construction with integral plastic fuse, with a charge of 28 tetryl.

Type M3:
This fragmentation anti-personnel mine in a rectangular case of cast iron with a 400g. charge is detonated by pressure or pull.

Type M16:
This 500g. anti-personnel bounding mine has also been widely deployed.
ANNEX 2

PATHOGENIC STUDY OF LESIONS CAUSED BY EXPLOSIVES

1 Effects of Blast Injuries:

It is the sudden release of energy that causes the "blast effect". Wounds are caused by a shock/compression wave, emanating from the epicenter of the blast, which attains a pressure of 1 to 500 tons/cm² (nuclear bombs emit 1 to 6 million tons/cm²). The lesion incurred by the blast is primarily a tissue or visceral contusion, this lesion does not penetrate the tegument which in principal remains intact. Unfortunately, very often other damage incurred as a result of the explosion augments the blast effect. The nature of this damage may be segmentary deterioration of limbs, burns and at times toxic contamination.

2 Thermal Effects:

Thermal burns are due to the metallic fragments which contain white heat which cause local but deep burns. The classification and treatment of these injuries are the same as in the case of burns caused under any other conditions. Unfortunately, the thermal effect is not limited to burns but at times associated with the mechanical, physical, and chemical effects. The burns are accompanied by lesions therefore accelerating the victim's risk of going into shock and accentuating the danger of post-aggressive reaction. This situation aggravates the prognosis. The burn victim is thus multi-traumatized.

3 Toxic Effects:

The toxic agents utilized are caustics which possess a double action, localized and general. The phosphorus which is used to confect of a number of mines (Afghanistan ?) penetrate the skin. It then affixes itself rapidly due to its liposolubility. Very adhesive, the phosphorus burns spontaneously at 34° celsius (86° far.) when exposed to oxygen producing a intense yellow smoke. The phosphorus creates a double lesion.

Localized: due to the combustive heat and the release of inorganic acids.
- due to the toxicity produced in the main visceral tissues (kidney, liver, myocardium).

4 Traumatic Effects:

The wounds caused by fragments are caused by projectiles possessing low kinetic energy and relatively weak. These projectiles are of various sizes and jagged. They often move rotationally. Their penetration leads to critical deterioration with the tearing and laceration of tissue. This particularly leads to the tearing of tendons (it reaches the muscle/tendon junction of the flexors and extensors) severe muscular damage and comminutive bone fractures or critical cutaneous detachment. Most of the fragments are metallic but it should be kept in mind that currently plastic fragments are increasingly encountered, and they do as much damage as metal fragments.

Fragment Wound Characteristics:

The main characteristic of fragment wounds is the perilesional damage. It will form a cavity containing hematomata, damaged tissues, localized hemorrhaging, and foreign bodies. This damage may be increased by bone lesions or further explosive fragments which occur internally, creating new lesions away from the point of entry (such as dumb-dumb bullets).

Consequences of fragment wounds:

The state of shock linked to the haemorrhage leads to an impairing of the vital organs, the consequences of which are often fatal.

Infection progresses in stages. The first stage is the infection caused by the various debris that are projected by the blast that follows the explosion. Mines fragments tend to cause the worst infections as they carry dirt from the ground with them into the flesh.

If nothing is done about this, suppuration sets in after approximately ten hours.

There are two possibilities for the third stage:

- either the forming of scar tissue, and the wound heals,
- or, as is more common when the wound is not attended to, the infection spreads to what was healthy tissue. Gaseous gangrene often sets in at this stage, and tetanus too can be expected.
Healing methods.

The healing up of a wound depends on local as well as generalized protection against infection on the one hand, and on the efficacy of the primary surgical treatment, on the other.

The surgical treatment is done in three stages:

- First comes the cleaning of the wound. This is done by working inward from the surface, layer by layer.

- Next comes the covering up stage. Stitching up of a wound is prohibited in war surgery, unless any noble elements are exposed (such as nerves, vessels, tendons and joints). The closing up of the wound will always be a retarded primary closing which takes place on the fourth and the tenth day, once the ongoing infectious process has been eliminated.

- Lastly comes the immobilisation stage. This is extremely important, even when there are no fractures. It still remains the best way to fight infection. Makeshift contraptions such as the splint will do, but plaster is better where limbs are concerned. The only way of achieving effective immobilisation of osteo-joints is osteo-synthesis with pins or with an external frame.

In Afghanistan, as in many war-torn countries, amputation tends to take precedence over more conservative methods, when serious wounds are inflicted on limbs. This is due to the lack of adequate means of transport, hospital infrastructure, surgical teams, and osteosynthesis equipment.

CONCLUSION

Fragment wounds, as with many other war lesions, require specialized staff and equipment. We hope that a solution will be found with the help of such agencies as the ICRC.
ANNEX 3

FURTHER DETAILS ON PROTHESSES

The price of a BK prothesis (below the knee) costs between Rs.1200 and Rs.1600, and an AK prothesis (above the knee) costs Rs.2000 and Rs.4000, depending on the material used, and the quantity that has been imported.

According to WHO figures, there are approximately 640,000 people suffering from mobility problems.

- 32,000 need protheses
- 20,000 need orthoses
- 15,000 need orthopedic shoes
- 10,000 need wheel chairs.

Protheses have to be replaced every 6 months for children, and every three years for adults. There is thus a demand for about 24,000 protheses and 7,000 orthoses every year.

At least 200 orthopedic technicians who have undergone full training will be needed to meet the requirements of the handicapped. More people will be needed for the fabrication and distribution of these protheses.
ANNEX 4

DESIGNING POSTERS IN PESHAWAR.

Designing and producing posters in Peshawar should not present any problems.

One specialist is already working on numerous designs. All he needs is a photograph, a rough indication or a sketch of the design required.

A poster usually takes 8 hours to design, give or take a little depending on the size of the poster and the complexity of the design.

Several examples of these posters have been sent to the coordinating body in Geneva.

These posters have been drawn and coloured in by hand, and can be altered and corrected until desired effect is achieved.

The advantage of having them made in Peshawar is that local Afghan staff is employed and, more importantly, the designs and imagery are drawn by those who are concerned with the matter, and who are thus in a good position to know what will have the best effect on their fellow countrymen.

Printers capable of ensuring large scale production are available in Peshawar.
ANNEX 5

TEXT FOR THE MINE CLEARANCE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN.

To be translated into Dari and Pashtoo by the BBC news service.

MINES IN A FARMER'S FIELD.

Characters:
Mohammed Sabir - A farmer who is the patriarch of his family.
Rahim - The farmer's young son.
Children - A group of three or four children between the ages of 6 and 12.

Setting:
A farmer is ploughing a field. One can hear the sound of his plough being dragged through the soil. Sound of chickens, cows, goats and the voices of children playing in the background. The scene opens with the farmer moving his cow along.

Mohammed Sabir
Move, you stupid animal.
(The sound of the plough hitting stone. The farmer stops the plough.)
What is this?
(pause.)
I thought it was a stone.
(Sound of farmer sighing as he lifts the stone.)
Oh God. There is a mine here.
(The farmer hesitates, only the sound of his heavy breathing.)
Commander Abdul Karim said that if we find a mine we should move away, retracing our steps. First, I will just leave the stone here as a marker.
(Sound of the farmer taking the reins of the plough.)
Come. Backwards you beast, or you will have both of us killed.
(Sound of the farmer taking a few steps back.)
I will tie the cow here and walk back to the house on the line I've sown.
Rahim
(We hear the boy come closer as he calls to his father.)


Mohammed Sabir
(He yells back in a loud commanding voice.)

Stand where you are, my son!

Rahim
(The boy stops running towards his father.)

What is it, Padar Jan?

Mohammed Sabir
Follow me step by step. Here, give me your hand.

(They start to walk.)

I found a mine in the field. Do you remember what to do if this happens?

Rahim
Yes. First you retrace your steps and mark the place as carefully as possible from a safe distance.

And what do we do afterwards?

Mohammed Sabir
Send some goats to walk over the mine.

Son, do we need to kill a whole goat for one mine? There may be other mines too. You know they can be anywhere. A goat for every mine. We only have 5 goats.

Rahim
It is better than getting hurt ourselves. Jemal, the son of Haji Allam picked one of the mines up and lost all the fingers on one hand. A piece damaged one of his eyes as well.

Mohammed Sabir
What is the right thing to do after marking a mine and telling people not to go in its direction?

Rahim
Wait for it to get old?

(He asks in a questioning tone.)

Mohammad Sabir
Son, mines only get more dangerous when they get old. They become more sensitive. I will explain to you what to do. Since you are the eldest among your sisters and brother, you will have to explain to them, remind them all the time, and make sure they understand.
Rahim
(The voices of children playing in the background have grown louder as they approach the house.)
Yes, Padar Jan.

Mohammed Sabir
Bring the children into the courtyard. I will explain to you all at once, the first time. That way they will remember some of it as well.

Rahim
Yes, Padar Jan.
(Rahim changes his tone of voice to that of an older brother.)
Come, Padar Jan, found a mine. You are all in danger. Remember Jemal. You will be like him if you don't listen.
(We hear Rahim open the courtyard door.)

Mohammed Sabir
(We hear the children entering the courtyard. Whispers and shuffling.)
Children, I found a mine in the field. You know what a mine is from the stories you have heard, and there is also Haji Allam's son who lost his fingers. The same or much worse can happen to you, God forbid. Firstly, I do not want you wandering around the area near the mine. You should only walk and play in the areas I have already told you. You should ask Rahim's permission before you go anywhere else.

Children
Yes, Padar Jan.

Mohammed Sabir
I will get a flag from the commander and mark the place. Alright. For now you stay inside the courtyard. Secondly, if you see anything that looks unfamiliar, don't touch it! Just walk away the same way you came, and come and tell me. Is that understood?

Children
Yes, Padar Jan.

Mohammed Sabir
Thirdly, you must remember that there can be mines anywhere and they can go off at any minute.

Children
Yes, Padar Jan.

Mohammed Sabir
You must also remember not to do anything with the mine. I too will not touch it. I will go and ask the Mujahideen to send an expert to come and take it away or blow it up. He will also look for other mines. Until then, you stay clear of the area.
Finally, every night before you go to sleep, from now on, Rahim will remind you of all this. Every morning before you go out of the courtyard Rahim will tell you where you can go and where you cannot. Is that understood?

Children

Yes, Padar Jan.

Mohammad Sabir

Now I will send for the mujahid mine expert. I want you children to stay in the courtyard. Someday the area will be safe, until then you will have to remember these things I have told you.
DAILY LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN.

Afghans get up at about 5 o'clock in the morning. In winter, the women heat up some water for the ablutions. The first prayer takes place at 5.30, and breakfast is at approximately 6.30. One of the women of the family then folds up the "liafs" (cushions and blankets) into a piece of cloth which she places in the corner of a room.

The men go off to work or to the bazaar while the women do the cleaning and prepare lunch. The children who are old enough to receive an education go off to school, while the younger boys hunt for wood or dry bushes, and the younger girls go to the river to fetch water, wash themselves, the linen or the dishes.

The riverside, or "godar", is a very important spot for the women; it's here they meet and talk, and take a break from seclusion and male domination. It's also the place where secret love affairs take place, the other women turning a blind eye. The Godar is also the favourite setting for poems and popular literature.

Women and men have lunch separately. Men and boys over the age of 6 eat first, the women, girls and small children waiting until they have finished.

During the afternoon, the women do their embroidery and sowing, the men build or repair houses or work in the fields, depending on the season.

After supper at 6 o'clock, everyone comes together to listen to the older men's stories or the radio. They go to bed at around 10 o'clock.

On fridays, the men go to the mosque, where problems and projects are discussed.

DAILY LIFE IN THE CAMPS

The daily routine has undergone some changes since the Afghans have settled in the camps. There are considerably fewer men, as they have either died in the struggle, or are still fighting in Afghanistan. The women thus have to carry out certain tasks which had previously been reserved for the men, such as the family's administrative matters.
The few men who are in the camps collect the "rations" distributed by the UNHCR or other international organizations. Women also fetch the rations when men are not available.

The work is not divided up between the sexes as it was in Afghanistan, but on the basis of age. Women's daily routine has considerably changed. Instead of meeting at the "Godar" as they used to in Afghanistan, the only place they can talk freely amongst themselves are the waiting rooms of clinics and hospitals. Girls are often taken out of schools after their third year, when they are considered young women.

Giving birth in Pakistan is also a great disappointment for the parents. There is a certain loss of clan and tribal identity, which is symbolized in the names given to the children: the word "refugee" has become the first name for many Afghan children born in Pakistan.
When the mission vehicles entered Chel Dukhtar on 8 April, on trucks had travelled this route since January. A total of 65 trucks stood idle awaiting a solution. Fully laden with food and other essential commodities, their destinations were the bazaars of Badghis.

If the route remained blocked, there would be no economical way to get supplies of wheat to the deficit areas of Badghis. Against warnings of high risk, the mission vehicles became the first trucks to travel the blockade route since the beginning of the dispute.

The objective was to find a way to re-open the route. For this to be possible, the mission would have to meet the robbers, and get a better understanding of the reason behind their excessive indulgences.

By the end of the mission, extensive discussions had taken place between the two villains, Abdul Spin of Kushk-i-Kohnar and Laywanai of Qoulu Uzbek. It transpired that the two neighbors were, typically to the region, the deadliest of enemies.

However the mission was able to get the individual agreement of both Commanders that they would not stop or rob (but for taxes) any further vehicles.

To validate this agreement, and to get the trucks rolling, one further meeting needed negotiating.

On the 5 May '90, the two Mujahideen Commanders, Dastigir, and the Presidents of the affected transport companies sat down to a UN monitored meeting, and talked their way through to an understanding that re-opened the road.

Since that date, private sector trucks have delivered the 800 MT of obstructed goods and a further 1,000 MT of UN/Wheat to Badghis via the Chel Dukhtar route.

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PS. Photos covering some aspects of this mission are available from the UNOCA, Kabul.