THE SOVIET MILITARY AS A VEHICLE FOR CENTRAL ASIAN ASSIMILATION

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Harvard University
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INTRODUCTION

The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 sparked western attention to the position of the Turko-Iranian people living under Soviet rule. More specifically, questions were raised which continue to be studied in relation to the reaction in Soviet Central Asia to the invasion of Afghanistan, the participation of soldiers of Muslim background in the invading forces, and the extent to which the invasion was motivated by the growing and qualitatively restless Soviet Muslim population located just north of Afghanistan.

The following article is an attempt to describe the nature of the participation of Muslims in the Soviet military apparatus. The author pursues the question of the reliability and function of the Muslim elements in the Soviet military and, by implication, the extent to which Soviet Muslim soldiers can be deployed successfully in promoting Moscow's military aims in the Middle East. Mr. Donnantuono has relied on a cluster of new publications available in English at good research facilities. Neither the research nor the study is intended to be exhaustive. Rather, the article points to certain trends apparent in the assimilative process which should be further studied as background to the evaluation of the Afghan-Central Asian connection. In particular, the withdrawal of Central Asian reservists in March 1980, widely attributed to the routine rotation of reservists after a three-month tour of duty, may be questioned in light of information furnished in this article and the fact that these reservists were not replaced by units with proportional Soviet Muslim representation but by troops drawn from western regions of the USSR. (A parallel situation occurred in recent Soviet military history during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 when, rather than western military units, large contingents of more alien eastern [Muslim] troops were deployed.) A further note on the reliability of Soviet Muslims in fighting fellow Muslims is contributed by the Afghan resistance which perceives itself aided by Soviet Muslims. Most, if not all, resistance members believe that the Soviet Muslims were withdrawn because they sympathized actively with the Afghan opposition to Russian rule. They believe that their struggle is perceived by Soviet Muslims at the very least as a common struggle against a European colonial power, if not as a holy war against Marxist atheists.

We may question the proofs the Afghans offer for their position regarding Soviet Muslim soldiers. We may even voice suspicion about the lift to their morale that such perceptions offer. However, there are few sound grounds for disputing the growing importance of Soviet Muslims in the Soviet Union as a whole and the lack of institutions which succeed in assimilating them into the widely touted "Soviet man."

Eden Naby
THE SOVIET MILITARY AS A VEHICLE FOR CENTRAL ASIAN ASSIMILATION

Any study of Soviet policies is hindered by several factors endemic to the nature of Russian rule. As an authoritarian regime, the Soviet government exercises considerable control over information released to the outside world in order to safeguard its ideological positions by preventing disclosures of contradictory policies. To maintain the appearance of efficacy in uniting the many peoples subject to its rule, the Soviet central authorities consistently suppress statistics which reveal the failure of policies designed to justify its oppressive rule.

These problems are magnified when dealing with information and statistics relating to the armed forces which are particularly subject to rigorous censorship by the Central Party of the Soviet Union. The sensitivity of some material results from obvious security considerations, while other data is guarded because of the Soviet use of the military as a vital link in its integration policy, in which case selectivity is again dictated by Soviet unwillingness to provide evidence of self-contradiction.

Obviously, to conduct research on this topic requires the use of possibly biased Soviet data sources and Western intelligence information of an equally tenuous nature. To achieve optimal legitimacy in reaching conclusions, each reference must be considered with an attentive eye to possible manipulation for ideological or security reasons. Consequently, it is necessary to preface this essay with a discussion of the relative validity of some of the sources that will be used.

Soviet census figures are subject to distortion first by problems inherent to the method of acquiring information. Since many census workers are probably Russian, it is conceivable that data concerning minorities is affected by these peoples' distrust or dislike of Russians. It is possible that some, suspecting that the poll is a guise for gathering information to be used against them, respond to inquiries with answers which they perceive to be "correct." On the other hand, some individuals, motivated by disdain for what they view as Russian pretensions to superiority, may respond by demonstrating fictitious qualities in a kind of groundless bragging. Either of these reactions could lead to inaccuracies, particularly by inflating statistics on educational achievement and Russian language acquisition.

Since census data must be scientifically applied to programs and used in solving social problems, it is improbable that manipulation occurs at high party levels; rather, selectivity is exercised concerning whether certain figures are to be released at all. However, it is possible that a favorable margin of error is introduced for propaganda purposes and that data is readjusted when used for policy analysis. Local administrators are more likely to alter statistics to create the appearance that specific policies have been highly successful in their regions. Because these last two considerations may apply to any Soviet quantitative material, including journals and newspapers cited in this study, I shall explain the specific reasons for suspicion wherever obvious exaggerations appear. Less blatantly fixed statistics should be viewed as potentially more supportive of particular criticisms of Soviet policies than they first appear to be, precisely because of possible, though less extreme manipulations.
Military and political writings can be somewhat accurately interpreted despite their intensely dogmatic tendencies. Due to Soviet propaganda philosophy, bothersome problems are often revealed by repetitive claims, made within a short period of time, that an opposite, ideal situation exists. Statements concerning minority integration in general reflect this practice. Conversely, any Soviet statement that is self-critical assumes overwhelming credence in identifying policy failures.

The only other source which must be specifically qualified is a survey of former military men conducted by an American, Richard Gabriel. Those interviewed were predominantly Jewish emigres from the Soviet Union, which raises suspicions concerning the sample's bias. First, the fact that they have left the USSR seems to indicate a great degree of discontent with Soviet ideas. But Gabriel claims that most of the emigres demonstrated, in personal interviews, a peculiar lack of hatred for the regime. Rather, he claims, the opportunity to leave in itself motivated their movement, for it provided them with a perceived chance to improve their general lots.¹ Second, because the sample is comprised of mostly Jews, their "outsider" status seems to preclude fair judgement of the Soviet military. This argument is weakened by a factor which will evolve into a basic premise of this study - that all nationalities but the Russians are outsiders to some degree. The Central Asians, the minorities on which this study is focused, share with the Jews similar cultural and religious differences from the Russians. In fact, the Jews might be even less biased for they do not have a homeland that may be considered under Russian occupation, while the Central Asians have been made aware of their territorial roots by the formation of national republics. I have taken steps to attain a reliable level of objectivity, including the selective use of only those questions which seem least likely to be affected by possible prejudices. By using exclusively responses that reflect an overwhelmingly consistent consensus, the bias factor is decreased still further. Finally, this essay refrains from drawing conclusions from the poll which cannot be supported by some attitude, policy or statistic documented in other sources.

In 1975, Marshall A.A. Grechko, then Minister of Defense of the USSR, described the Soviet central government's conception of the diversified function of its army, the largest in the world:

"Military service for us is not just a school of military expertise, but also a school of ideological... conditioning, discipline, and organization. In essence, our army plays the role of a unique nationwide university which is completed by practically all young men who are citizens of the Land of the Soviets." ²

To guarantee the greatest possible dissemination of the lessons of this nationwide university, the Military Reforms of 1967-68 shortened the required periods of service from three to two years. This decision was designed to increase the total number of young citizens who would be called into the armed forces. Although Soviet law requires that all citizens (except those eligible for specific deferments) of all nationalities are subject to conscription, the Soviets have a surplus of 18-year olds; only 1.3 million conscripts per year are needed under the two-year requirement, as compared to less than 1 million when three years was compulsory, while the USSR's total 18-year old cohort promises to remain above 2 million for decades to come.³ To further the impact of the military as an ideological school, national units were abolished prior to WWIII. By placing

2
minority soldiers in ethnically mixed divisions, which are overwhelmingly com-
prised of the majority Russians, their exposure to ideological and Russian in-
fluences is theoretically more complete. The question remains whether ensuring this contact guarantees the success of Soviet nationality policy goals: "the development of a true people's culture, national in form and socialist in con-
tent." 4

The actual implementation of Soviet nationality policy in the USSR as a whole necessitates an interpretation of the above quotation which is not at first obvious. Several features of Soviet rule, particularly attempts to proliferate the use of the Russian language, define "people's culture" as "Russian culture." The phrase "socialist in content" seems to coincide with the leadership's ten-
dency to glorify the "Great Russian people" as the historical guardians of the Socialist system:

"All the nations and nationalities of our country, above all the Great Russian people, played a role in the formation, strengthening and de-
velopment of this mighty union of equal peoples that have taken the path of Socialism. The revolutionary energy, selflessness, diligence, and profound internationalism of the great Russian people have rightly won them the sincere respect of all the peoples of our socialist homeland." 5

Such ambiguous claims of equality appear to be merely rhetorical in light of reality. The Russian presence in local parties and governments is dispropor-
tionate to the ethnic compositions of many areas. 6 Constant attempts to under-
dine local cultures and histories are reflected in the resolution of 1972 entitled "On Literary and Art Criticism," which condemned "deheroization" of Soviet history, "extreme" nationalist tendencies and "Poeticization of any traditional qualities, allegedly eternal and unchanging" in local media, pub-
llications and literary and art institutes. 7 These facets of Soviet rule portray the Russians as most equal of equals and are potential sources of resentment, rather than respect, among minorities.

The case of the Central Asians is particularly essential in evaluating the suc-
cess or failure of the Soviet armed forces as a vehicle for national integration, due to unique demographic and nationalist tendencies. As concerns the first of these trends, the birth rate of the Moslem minorities has been substantially higher than that of the Russian majority. This relationship is depicted below: 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Tadjik</th>
<th>Turkmen</th>
<th>Kirghiz</th>
<th>Kazakh</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-70</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-79</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 52.9, 52.9, 52.2
- 49.8
- 46.3
- 13.1
- 6.5
Despite the fact that Central Asian birth rates are slowly decelerating, they are expected to remain considerably higher than the Russians' for an indefinite period. One clear consequence of this gradual shift in the ethnic composition of the USSR will be an escalating reliance on the Central Asians in meeting military manpower demands.

The second factor is the particularly great distance between the Russian and Central Asian perceptions of the minorities' roles in the Soviet Union. Historically, whenever the political atmosphere in the USSR became slightly more liberal, the Central Asians capitalized by attempting to weaken Russian political and cultural hegemony. The confusion in Moscow early in the post-Stalin era and concessions made by Khrushchev after his ascent to power enabled the Central Asians to supplant Russians in many local party organs continually until 1966, despite the 1961 Communist Party program's declaration that "the boundaries between the Union republics are increasingly losing their former significance." At the same time, their historiography resurrected the pre-Revolutionary history of their peoples and emphasized their Islamic cultural roots, while attempts were made to de-Russify the national languages. Although Brezhnev's regime has greatly intensified assimilation programs under the shallow guise of a "unity" campaign, the Central Asians' national tendencies and bitterness toward Russian centralism must contribute to a lingering negative attitude toward Soviet policies.

Because of the Moslem identity and general backwardness of the Central Asian peoples, their assimilation toward a modern, Russified life-style and ideology is particularly difficult to achieve. This assimilation is considered one of the principal tasks of the military, which Brezhnev claims to be:

"A special kind of army in that it is a school of internationalism, a school that fosters feelings of brotherhood, solidarity and mutual respect among all Soviet nations and nationalities." 12

This study is designed to determine whether the experiences of Central Asians in the Soviet armed forces evoke these "feelings of brotherhood" or exacerbate the contradictions between reality and the Soviet Union's professed principles toward minorities.

The technological revolution's recent impact on modern warfare has affected every level of the military. Automation has become an intrinsic characteristic of the Soviet armed forces. Complicated machinery has assumed innumerable tasks formerly performed by physical labor. Diverse types of computer technology are utilized to gather and process information relevant to decisions regarding optimal troop and weapons deployment. The highly scientific nature of long-range and nuclear weaponry has necessitated an advanced human capacity for understanding the intricacies of operation and repair. Even such aims as enhancing the survivability of supersonic attack aircraft through tactical experimentation require a particularly high level of technical intellect. The increased correlation of conscripts' military expertise and officers' leadership abilities to qualities acquired before induction places a premium on education as a means of gaining advantageous placement and promotion in the Soviet military.

Soviet publications and official statements rarely discuss the specific impact of the Central Asians' educational levels on their potential for advancement within the armed forces. But by comparing the effects of the educational background of the Negro on his position in the army of the United States, an army
concerned with comparable facets of modernization, the consequences of this factor for the ethnic minorities in the Soviet forces can be more clearly seen. The process of racial integration in the US forces has been hastened by the leadership's promotion of the rational criterion of merit as the primary determinant of advancement. This policy reflects a preoccupation, shared by the Russians, with military efficiency. Yet the black soldier is hampered in the military by objective characteristics related to his position in American society at large. Because the Negro's average socio-economic level is lower than that of his white compatriots, his social context, including the uneducated people with whom he comes in contact, lessens his perception of the need for educational achievement. Coupled with fewer opportunities for higher education, this perspective places him at a disadvantage when he enters the military. During the Vietnam War, such Negroes were unqualified for support fields which required business or technical experience. Instead, they were disproportionately assigned to positions in the field with high attrition rates, such as riflemen, because of their minimal need for skills acquired before entering the service.

Consequently, casualty figures for Blacks during the Vietnam conflict were higher than those for non-minorities. A study conducted at the University of Chicago demonstrates that, of 10,000 eligible males in Cook County, Illinois from 1964 to 1972, the casualty rate of communities with a greater than 90% black population was 19.40, while the figure for communities with a less than 10% Negro cohort was only 15.92. Their research shows an even greater polarization between educational cohorts; those with less than 10 years of schooling suffered a more than 7.1 unit higher casualty rate than those who had graduated from high school and nearly 14 units higher than those who had completed at least one year of college. 13

![](chart.png)

It can be concluded that the high Negro casualty incidence in the Vietnam War was more a consequence of educational deficiencies than racial discrimination.

By comparison, Soviet bias in the distribution of its Central Asians in the military can be justified on similar grounds of combat efficiency. Data concerning the educational backgrounds of various types of units can be culled from sporadic reports in Soviet publications. Among non-officers in the prestigious and highly technical naval and aviation services in 1971, 70% were reported to have completed at least a ten-year secondary education. 14 The next year, a sur-
vey conducted by the official army newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, indicated that, of 1000 inductees in motorized infantry squads, units with high casualty rates and minimal need for pre-induction skills, the number of those who entered the armed forces from industrial plants and farms numbered 5 times as many as those who were inducted from schools. Since conscripts are drafted from the 18 year old cohort, it can be accurately speculated that the workers have completed fewer years of education.

The likelihood that a Central Asian conscript will be relegated to such a unit is quite high, although statistics from a US Central Intelligence report portrays only a slight disparity in educational levels between the Central Asian and European republics. The graph below compares the supposed increase in Central Asian secondary education that occurred between 1959 and 1976 with rates among other nationalities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgizia</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR total</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% OF POPULATION 10 YEARS OLD & OVER WITH 8 YEARS OR MORE SCHOOLING

These figures, however, are deceptive because they compare education between national republics rather than between nationalities. Due to previous migrations, a significant proportion of the Central Asian regions is inhabited by Europeans, as demonstrated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>European % of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgizia</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because the educational levels of their home republics are higher than those in which Central Asians constitute the majority and because many of the European migrants are specialists who were brought in to modernize the backward republics, it is reasonable to speculate that the apparent educational equality proposed by the CIA report can be attributed to the attainment of outside groups rather than achievement by the Central Asian peoples.

The Central Asians are relatively excluded from access to specifically technical educations by their geographic distribution within their republics. The rural character of Central Asian conscripts is demonstrated by the graph below, which compares the rural proportions in their home republics with those of four European republics in 1970 and 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESTONIA</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATVIA</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMENIA</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAZAKHSTAN</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIA</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKMENISTAN</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UZBEKISTAN</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRGIZIA</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rural proportions of the Central Asian titular nationalities are probably even higher than suggested by these figures for their republics as a whole, since the Europeans in these areas have settled mainly in urban areas. Their rural origins place the Central Asians away from the locus of technical and mechanical learning, rendering them prime candidates for relatively unskilled and non-prestigious services, mainly in the land forces. The data in the graph above further indicates that, over the past decade, little change in their rural/urban ratio has occurred, so military disadvantages which are education-related are likely to continue to plague Central Asians.

According to an analysis of surnames, only two of the 59 generals appointed between 1940 and 1975 have been of Turkic origin. The relatively low educational attainment of Central Asians contributes to the great disparity between the ethnic composition of the USSR population and the officer corps which seems to exist, particularly in the high command. The significance attached to educational achievement in selecting Soviet officers is reflected in military writings:
"The greater demands made upon the commanders in connection with the equipment of troops with complicated weapons and the more complex tasks facing them in the training and education of their men make it necessary for every commander to (be)... familiar with the great achievements in the social and natural sciences, technology, and military science."\(^{21}\)

The application of these criteria has made the officer ranks increasingly well-educated. One Soviet publication claims that 41% of Soviet officers in 1973 had attended institutions of higher education, as compared to only 10% in 1953.\(^{22}\) The Central Asians are simply less eligible for command status on grounds of technical efficiency. This situation is likely to persist for years to come as the exigencies of technological warfare will not diminish and Central Asians continue to lag behind most other nationalities in educational attainment.

The motive of efficiency may not be sufficient to explain another clearly discriminatory feature of the Soviet military - the exclusive use of the Russian language for all forms of communication. All military journals and training manuals are printed in Russian only,\(^{23}\) while entrance examinations for officer training academies include not only testing in the Russian language, but in Russian literature as well.\(^{24}\) This latter, culture-oriented criterion suggests that the language qualification for promotion and the general use of Russian in the armed forces are not solely intended to ensure efficiency in military communication and command, but also to guarantee that all officers are reconciled to Russian dominance and to further Russification of minorities during their stint in the service.

The promotion of the Russian language as a tool for national integration in the civilian sector seems to have resulted, over the past decade, in substantial gains in the number of Central Asians claiming good knowledge of Russian. These increases, compared with the rates of other minorities, are depicted in the graph below: \(^{25}\)

\[\text{% CLAIMING A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN AS A SECOND LANGUAGE}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TURKMEN</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRGHIZ</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAJKHIS</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLDAVIANS</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UZBEKS</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKRAINANS</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITHUANANS</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAZAKS</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATVIANS</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELORUSSIANS</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The exceptionally high figure which the census gives for Uzbekks casts doubt on the validity of all these statistics. This data claims that Uzbek knowledge of Russian has increased an outrageous 361.4% in the past ten years. This exaggeration is probably the result of manipulation by local officials in Uzbek areas to create the impression of overwhelming Soviet success in their regions. If this statistic is ignored, the Central Asians in general seem to trail the other nationalities in mastering Russian and are consequently less able to enter the officer class. The Kazaks are an exception, but their fluency in Russian may be attributed to the fact that they share their homeland almost evenly with Russians, which hastens language assimilation by necessity. Still, stepped-up Russian programs seem likely to close the language gap; in 1980, Russian was introduced in kindergartens in Central Asian republics while the required time for Russian study in higher grades was increased about three hours per week.26

Central Asians are further disadvantaged in the military advancement process by political status for Soviet propagandists explicitly assert that "the only criterion of promotion in service is the serviceman's political and professional characteristics." 27 Since the Soviet armed forces are intended to be vehicles for the mass indoctrination of the populace to Soviet principles, soldiers are constantly exposed to lectures and writings that express the ideal expressed by Marshal Grechko:

"Soviet soldiers and officers are people of the same ideology and thought. They are solidified in a single, indestructible family by a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and a striving for a common goal - the victory of communism."28

The wording of the 1967 military reforms stressed the need to step up such Party-political efforts in the armed forces:

"Soldiers should be taught in the spirit of high ideological conviction and selfless devotion... in the cause of communism, proletarian internationalism, and combat cooperation with the armies of fraternal countries. The dissemination of the revolutionary and combat traditions of the Soviet people, Communist Party, and Armed Forces, and of our country's progress in communist construction should be intensified. Work toward unmasking bourgeois ideology and toward indoctrinating personnel in the spirit of high vigilance and class hatred of imperialists should be conducted more persistently."29

The burden of educating inductees in Soviet dogma falls on the officers. Consequently, there is a natural bias toward admitting politically reliable applicants to officer training programs, as evidenced by the attributes deemed desirable by the military elite:

"All officers in the Army and Navy, irrespective of the posts they hold, are the leaders and educators of their subordinates. They must therefore possess high Party qualities, master the Marxist-Leninist theory... to perfection and apply them in practice."30

A decisive indicator of an aspiring officer's willingness to conform to, if not agree with, Soviet doctrine is his membership in some branch of the Communist Party. The Russian elite's reliance on this criterion is indicated by a survey conducted by Krasnaya Zvezda which revails that, in 1969, only five per cent of Soviet lieutenants were not Party members. 31
Party membership among Central Asians is lower than among European nationalities of the USSR. This contrast is treated in the graph below which compares the five Central Asian titular nationalities' current proportions in the CPSU and in the Soviet population as a whole.32

This data demonstrates that, except among the Kazaks, the number of Central Asian Party members is less than half of what it should be in relation to their proportions in the population. Only the Kazaks have lessened this disparity since 1967, while the party/population gap of the other Central Asian minorities has increased.33 This trend implies that the applicants from these nationalities are becoming less likely to meet the political qualifications desired by officer schools in proportion to their population-wide distribution. Their slow migration rate from rural to urban areas indicates that the Central Asians' susceptibility to Soviet ideology and values, which are directed predominantly toward the urban proletariat, and resulting Party membership will not be substantially greater in years to come.

Soviet political ideologists have had to combat an unforeseen consequence of the transformation of much of the officer class to a relatively specialized group with superior technical skills. Regardless of their national origin, younger technical officers with high levels of training in operating and maintaining the complex modern implements of warfare, have demonstrated a degree of aversion to performing the Party-political work required of Soviet officers:

"I am a specialist. My job is to ensure good conditions and combat readiness of the equipment; the education of soldiers and sergeants - that is the job of commanders and political workers."34

This self-perception reflects not only a desire to avoid time-consuming lectures and Party chores, but also the greater pride of technical officers in their specific work than in the Party's Army as an ideal. Their professional self-esteem clearly conflicts with Grechko's claim that, among an officer's primary duties, "the first and chief...is that he must be an active champion of Party policy," while maintenance of his military skills was ranked last in importance.35 Any incidence of this specialist mentality among officer-qualified Central Asians presumably weakens the impact of assimilationist propaganda and may lead the technically educated to avoid the military altogether after fulfilling their mandatory obligations.
Consequently, it is highly possible that the relative absence of Central Asians among Soviet officers can be partly explained as an offshoot of their general animus or indifference toward the party's ideological lines. Since application to officer training schools is a voluntary process, and since the Party-political work of officers is designed partly to justify biased nationality policies, the Central Asians may not wish to partake in the deception of indoctrination. This aversion is probably compounded by direct contact with prejudice within individual units composed primarily of Russians. Gabriel's emigre survey reports that one former soldier witnessed an incident in which an officer put out a cigarette on the forehead of a Central Asian inductee.36

Such occurrences demonstrate a pressing practical problem that accompanies the appointment of Central Asians to positions of command. Because the Soviet system promotes de facto the idea of inherent Russian superiority, it is safe to speculate that the resulting prejudices against minorities preclude efficient leadership by Central Asians in platoons, companies and smaller subunits. The degree of discipline and efficiency that can be obtained when the commander is relegated to an inferior status in society as a whole will suffer even if questions regarding his source of authority are internalized by his troops.

Certain features of Soviet army life lack appeal for soldiers of all national groups, including Russians. The standard of living in the military, as measured by available food and housing, evokes dissatisfaction from both officers and their consigns. Food served at messes and PXs is monotonous and some outposts are constantly without such staples as tea.37 Low hygienic standards and poorly functioning wood-burning stoves are also frequently reported and the Soviet press blames contracted builders and designers for these deficiencies, claiming that they "are not fulfilling their assignments" in refurbishing and constructing new facilities.38 The army newspaper described the roaming quarters of many bachelor officers as "dreary, crowded," and lacking privacy, adding: "It is no secret that the quarters given to young officers constitute an important component of their attitude."39 More than 90% of Gabriel's emigre sample report that hot water for showers is a luxury.40 The pay scales for conscripts are generally lower in the military than in the civilian sector.41 The Soviet-affirmed fact that only about 20% of their officers are recruited directly from the military ranks reflects a general disillusionment with army life and a resulting aversion to furthering one's military career. The negative attitudes which stem from the armed forces' shortcomings tend to neutralize much of the ideological pedagogy of the Soviet military elite, including the rhetoric of their nationality policies.

The present and future success of the Soviet military as a means for national integration is hampered by interrelated and sometimes ambiguous problems. The requirements of modern warfare necessitate that divisions in certain desirable services and the officer corps in general be composed of relatively well educated men. Less objective factors, including political associations and degree of Russification, are used to determine the assignment and promotion of service personnel. For reasons stated previously in this study, Central Asians generally lack these qualifications although some trends promise to rectify partly their weaknesses in Soviet eyes. Yet the present handicaps experienced by Central Asians in the armed forces, combined with the impact of Russian jingoism and perhaps even contact with cruel forms of prejudice, probably create a perception of Soviet exploitation, rather than a feeling of fraternity with their Russian big brother. Despite the increased exposure of minorities to Russian politics and language in the Soviet military, its success as an instrument for assimilation of the Central Asians is doubtful and may very well exacerbate existing civilian nationalist discontent.
NOTES


7. quoted in Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 15.


10. quoted in Critchlow, p. 20


35. quoted in Goldhamer, p. 286-287.


38. Ibid. June 26, 1971, quoted in Goldhamer, p. 27.


41. Goldhamer, p. 25.

42. Khalturin, Shchelokov, p. 4.