The Ongoing War in Afghanistan: 
New Refugee Influx to Pakistan

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Introduction

As the fighting continues in Afghanistan refugees continue to come to Pakistan. People who had previously escaped the direct effects of the war are now being forced to flee their homes. Pakistan, whose resources have been stretched to the limits over the past decade by refugees numbering close to three million, is still providing a welcome.

Arrival of New Refugees

The latest influx of new arrivals started in October, 1988 when fighting began around the cities of Kunar Province. At the time of heavy fighting in Asmar (a Kunar city) and Asadabab (Kunar's capital), the first large refugee movement into Pakistan was observed. About 500 families (at an official rate of 6.2 people per family this is a refugee population of about 3,100 people) crossed the border near the Nawa Pass.

By November, 1988 people started moving out of Jalalabad when control of the nearby checkpoint began to switch back and forth between government and mujahideen control. Some agencies report that families from Jalalabad itself have moved into Peshawar since they had strong urban connections with people already residing in Peshawar. They did not come in large numbers and exact figures are hard to determine since they disappeared into family networks without seeking outside assistance. These refugees include doctors, engineers, tradespeople, etc. and some are found in the refugee camps.

By December, 1988 a steady stream of people began from villages in the area between Torkham (a border town inside Pakistan) and Jalalabad. These people had previously been unaffected by the war but the mujahideen assaults on Jalalabad had begun and villagers were warned to leave the area. In addition, at least one official at the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR) believed that people also left because of a severe food shortage in the area, caused in part by mujahideen being guests of the villages. Several UNHCR personnel had also heard of food shortages in the affected areas due to food blockades, especially in Jalalabad itself. Some refugees also report that government sympathizers inside Afghanistan were coming to their homes and "bothering" them. According to the Commissionerate, most of the new arrivals initially settled in the Shinwar area of the Khyber Agency and the already established refugee camps of Nasir Bagh, Kacha Garhi, Kababian and Jalozai.

Between November and the beginning of March about 30,000 new arrivals fled Afghanistan through the Torkham border point. By March, as the seige around Jalalabad intensified, the refugee
flow escalated to levels that could not be absorbed by the existing camps. An average of 1,000 people a day were coming through Torkham; in the middle of March there were days with over 2,000 people crossing the border. While the refugee level ebbed somewhat in late March, the end of March and early April again saw the daily rate rise as more military activity forced people to leave. By the end of April and May, however, the rates had fallen off to such a point that on some days no refugees crossed the border.

The result of this influx has been a total of between 60,000 to 75,000 new refugees. Approximately 41,000 of these new arrivals are being served by CAR, the international relief community and United Nations' agencies. The remainder have been absorbed into Peshawar and its surrounding towns, or the homes of relatives already established in existing refugee camps. In late May there were scattered reports of small groups of refugees leaving the Khost area and entering the North Waziristan and Kurram Agencies. These refugees, because so few in number (at least so far), are fending for themselves without formal assistance.

For several reasons, the "exact" number of new arrivals cannot be known and the numbers that do exist are generally only accurate for the Torkham crossing. For example, some refugees diverted themselves to the homes of relatives. Some people crossing at Torkham may have been settled refugees who were unregistered and saw the new influx as an opportunity to become "registered." Moreover, many new arrivals are staying in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and are not seeking assistance. These people, whose number is unknown, generally came in November and December with their livestock and any crops they were able to harvest. Because their land tends to be near the border, they are staying close enough (but in Pakistan) to be able to return on a regular basis to protect their land and crops. These people have essentially disappeared into the mountains and have not been counted in any systematic way.

UNHCR has been attempting to discover new refugees arriving at border crossings other than Torkham, but it is difficult to do so. UNHCR has distributed a reporting form requesting all voluntary agencies to report knowledge of new arrivals.

These new arrivals are generally of the same socio-economic class as previous refugees. That is, they are poor, rural, uneducated farmers whose only resources are the land and livestock left behind in Afghanistan. They have no economic base on which to build in Pakistan and have arrived here penniless. In many cases, they fled without any notice or planning and arrived in Pakistan without even basic requirements, such as cooking pots and extra clothes.
The Commissionerate believes that in one respect the new arrivals are different from previous refugees: the older refugees are more ideological, that is, they left Afghanistan earlier because of their belief that there was a "godless" government. The newer refugees were less concerned about the central government and are leaving now because of increased fighting and severe food shortages in their area. This idea of the new refugees' less ideological focus is neither verified nor confirmed by other agencies and it is not possible to evaluate. However, previously settled refugees have accused the new arrivals of being Communist sympathizers since they had stayed in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. These same accusers have also demanded that the new arrivals return to Afghanistan. This situation has been informally resolved when camp elders and tribal leaders among the settled refugees vouched for the new arrivals. Afghan refugees are linked together by clan and tribal networks so when they arrive in Pakistan there are almost always other family, clan or tribal members in the camps who can vouch for them. This process has assisted in lowering levels of animosity that may otherwise occur.

Finally, although the immediate flow of new refugees appears to have eased off, it is widely anticipated that whenever fighting intensifies an increased influx of refugees will result. Several agencies report their expectation that the next round of heavy fighting will be in the Khost area in the relatively near future. Thus, another heavy influx will probably occur this summer.

Meeting the New Arrivals' Needs

Many of the new refugees crossed the border in mujahideen trucks holding notes from commanders in their area to certify that they were not Communist sympathizers. This paper was used to obtain a yellow card from the resistance parties at the border crossing. This yellow card certifies the holder as a new arrival and is accepted by the Government of Pakistan and aid agencies as a sort of registration identity card. The trucks carrying the refugees delivered them directly to a refugee camp or transferred them to an NLC truck. These are GOP National Logistics Cell trucks that are usually used to transport food and relief items; in this case, they transport refugees to new camps. Some refugees, perhaps between 20% and 30%, went first to find family members in other camps. These "diverted" refugees then disappeared into relatives' homes, thus diluting the amount of aid received by the (presumably) already registered family. On the other hand, it is reasonable for a refugee to want to be among his own relatives. Relief agencies have been trying to notify these refugees of their individual entitlement to assistance but this is not always successful.
For those refugees willing to come forward as new arrivals, the result has been the opening, to date, of five new refugee camps. For ease of reference, this paper will discuss each camp with a summary of what is being provided in that camp and by which agency. Then, the general problems that the new arrivals are facing, and causing to their host government and aid agencies, will be discussed.

In preface, it should be noted that 10,000 people is now considered the optimal size for a refugee camp. This means that a maximum of 1,600 families (using the official figure of 6.2 persons per family) should be accommodated in any given location. Established camps in the NWFP tend to already be at their optimal size. Opening new camps is one way to relieve the crowding, which was exacerbated when new arrivals descended on their relatives.

The Government of Pakistan has done a commendable job in meeting the needs of the new arrivals. Until it actually happened, no agency expected a heavy influx of new refugees after the Soviet withdrawal in February, 1989. In fact, it was widely anticipated that the refugees already present in Pakistan would start their return and most agencies were trying to determine what would be the rate of return rather than the rate of influx. Most, if not all, were caught off guard by the events that occurred. Thus, in the face of this unexpected inflow, the response of the Pakistan government has resulted in generally good conditions among the new arrivals with refugees organized, fairly quickly, into new camps, with services coordinated among and provided by various NGOs and other agencies.

In addition, UNHCR has made consistent and almost daily attempts to ensure the relatively smooth functioning of the new camps. In addition to monitoring the work of the NGOs they have also reported to the Commissionerate observed problems and have tried to stay abreast of the numerous and varied relief activities in the new camps.

Finally, the various NGOs have increased their own regular workload to assist the new arrivals. In each instance, the NGO already had a full schedule in meeting the needs of previous refugees and they have voluntarily extended themselves to assist even more people. In many cases, this was done without the assurance of additional funding since many agencies' budgets are remaining at previous levels or being cut back in the belief that the refugees would be returning to Afghanistan.

Food

New arrivals are not being formally registered for food assistance. Registration has been closed for some time by the Government of Pakistan and no plans exist to reopen it. Thus, a system of pre-registration is being used to identify new arrivals
for purposes of assistance. CAR has pre-registration mobile teams located throughout the various agencies and tribal areas. With the help of its district administrators and political agents, new arrivals are identified as such. In addition, new arrivals may have papers from political parties with which they are affiliated (the yellow cards referred to earlier) identifying them as a recent refugee.

In theory, and usually in practice, when a new arrival goes to one of the established camps someone from the CAR District Administrator's office will arrange transport to one of the new, open camps. Upon arrival at the new camp, the refugee will be interviewed by the pre-registration team to ascertain if he is, in fact, a new refugee or simply an older unregistered refugee. If he is a new refugee, he is issued a Pre-Registration Verification Form enabling his family to receive benefits at the new camp. Agencies distributing food at the new camps are requiring that the refugee family have this form in order to receive food assistance.

Food is being provided mainly through private relief agencies. This came about after a meeting in March called by the NWFP Home Secretary with representatives present from UN agencies and NGOs. At this meeting, the World Food Programme (WFP) was only able to pledge 525 metric tons (mt) of wheat and 17.5mt of edible oil. Unfortunately, at the standard rate of 15 kilograms (kg) wheat and .9kg edible oil per person/per month, this total was clearly insufficient to meet the demand.

As a result, several NGOs made pledges to provide food. In addition, Serve has been making miscellaneous food distributions, usually of a one-time nature, to pockets of new arrivals that it has identified through the refugees, tribal leaders or commanders who come to their offices seeking assistance. Other NGOs are probably doing the same although this has not been confirmed.

At a meeting called by the Commissionerate in April, WFP made an additional pledge of 1,000mt wheat and 80mt edible oil. In the meantime, other NGOs pledged to provide food at the new camps for varying periods of time (this is detailed under the individual camps). However, as CAR pointed out, the pledge of oil is subject to availability and oil was not available until the end of May. CAR reported that when the oil does arrive (they were interviewed prior to its arrival) it would be prioritized to the new arrivals.

It is interesting to note that as far as WFP knows, this is the first time in the context of the Afghan refugees that NGOs have performed wide-scale, regular food distributions. So far, the groups involved are Saudi Red Crescent, Interchurch Aid and Serve. These groups are obtaining their foodstuffs on the open
market. WFP is, however, providing powdered milk to Shelter Now for Nasir Bagh Seven and to the Afghan Health and Social Assistance Organization (AHSAO) for Kheshki 1 and 2. They have also provided milk to Union Aid for distribution in Shin Dand and have requested that Help provide the necessary transport for Union Aid's efforts.

Shelter

Tents and quilts have been provided primarily by UNHCR and Interchurch Aid. Serve has also provided some tents to various groups of new arrivals. In addition to distributions in the camps, Serve, for one, has been distributing tents to groups of new arrivals who may or may not be located in a camp environment. For example, they distributed 64 tents on March 12 to new arrivals near Badaber and 100 tents to new arrivals at Munda Camp No. 6. In order to carry on a distribution in a camp, the NGO must have CAR's prior permission. If the group settles in an area outside a camp, e.g., by the side of a convenient road, then permission is not required although Serve will notify CAR of the distribution at the regular monthly Relief Subcommittee meeting.

Education

The Commissionerate Social Work Committee has identified educated refugees in the camps who are voluntarily teaching in schools. In theory, CAR will support one school per camp with a teacher and a large school tent.

Security

As alluded to earlier, there has been some degree of unrest and hostility toward the new refugees. Some of this is probably attributable to the attitude that the new arrivals are causing the settled refugees to lose some of their "entitlement." While this is not true, the perception remains. This, among other things, has resulted in accusations that the new arrivals have Communist sympathies. As a result, some attempt has been made to segregate the new camps from pre-existing ones although this has not always occurred.

The New Camps

1. Nasir Bagh Seven.

Near Peshawar, Nasir Bagh 7 has been added onto the older camps of Nasir Bagh 1 through 6. This is not an optimal situation, for the reasons referred to above, but has evolved with the unanticipated influx of refugees. It has also occurred because the new arrivals in Nasir Bagh are virtually all from the Shinwari tribe and the previous Nasir Bagh residents are also Shinwari. They have moved in with their relatives and refuse to
move to other camps out of security concerns. Their Nasir Bagh relatives vouch for them and protect them from accusations of being sympathetic to the Najibullah regime.

Most of the new arrivals report that they left because of bombardments: they repeatedly mentioned food shortages since there were bombings of fields such that they were not able to care for their crops. These new arrivals also reported that they came from the Jalalabad area, Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces. The camp is now closed to new arrivals and any who come are supposed to be directed to other camps that are open.

Food was provided in November and December, 1988 and January and February, 1989 by Interchurch Aid (ICA). This was due to ICA's discovery of new arrivals who needed assistance and was prior to the formal establishment of a new camp designated solely for new refugees. ICA distributed a tent, ground sheet, two quilts and two blankets to each new family. In addition, they distributed what they consider their standard emergency ration: 85kg flour, 5kg edible oil, 5kg sugar, 5kg beans or lentils, two bars of soap and 250 grams tea. Residents confirm that they had received these items upon their arrival.

ICA's subsequent distributions are based upon the standard WFP allotment with the difference that the total amount given is not determined by the actual family size but rather by the formula of 6.2 persons per family. Thus, the distribution is 85kg flour and 5kg edible oil. (WFP allots 15kg per family member, and if there are 6.2 persons in a family, the family would receive about 95kg wheat. Allowing for loss in the grinding process, this has been translated by the NGOs into 85kg flour. A similar rationale is used for oil with the additional reason that it is very time consuming to pour the requisite amounts of oil into containers, if the family even has such containers in an emergency situation, and it is administratively easier to simply provide one 5kg tin of oil.)

Although UNHCR reported that Saudi Red Crescent began to distribute food to 2,000 families in this camp around January, 1989, it was actually in March that Saudi Red Crescent began their first distribution and this was directed to 1,000 families. This March distribution also included quilts, blankets, shoes and clothes for men, women and children.

At the initial meeting with the NWFP Home Secretary and other NGOs, Saudi Red Crescent pledged to provide food, shelter and medical care to a total of 1,000 families in Nasir Bagh Seven. While this was done in March and April, by the time of the latter distribution there were additional new families, with the District Administrator reporting a total of 1,546 families. Saudi Red Crescent agreed to include all the families in their food distributions beginning in May. This has been accomplished by
means of a list provided by the District Administrator with each refugee family identified and numbered sequentially. Saudi Red Crescent has given a card to each head of family listed and that person appears at the Saudi Red Crescent storehouse located in Kacha Garhi on a designated day of the month (based on their number) to receive their rations. Saudi Red Crescent's commitment to continue food distribution remains open although they did state that if CAR informs them that food from WFP is available for the new arrivals, they will cease their food distribution.

On April 5 Serve distributed food to two "blocks" of the seven blocks then in existence at Nasir Bagh Seven. This distribution covered the shortfall mentioned in the previous paragraph, i.e., the families in excess of 1,000 that Saudi Red Crescent had pledged to feed. Serve distributed the wheat ration that is standard for the older refugees (i.e., 15kg per family member) as well as oil (provided by Shelter Now), beans, tea and sugar.

Currently residents report that they receive a monthly allotment from Saudi Red Crescent of 12kg wheat, 4kg sugar, one packet of tea and one can of edible oil. Recently, they have also begun to receive 12kg of rice in addition to the regular provisions.

As mentioned previously, Shelter Now is providing liquid milk to children in the new camp. They distributed 1,500 entitlement cards to newly arrived children in the camp and around December, began distributing milk to these children. About 10,000 liters per day is distributed throughout the Nasir Bagh camps of which about 1,500 liters is distributed to new arrivals. The distribution had been five days per week but with the advent of hot weather, which quickly spoils milk, the distribution will be three times a week to boys and two times a week to girls in the morning hours. Each child receives one liter and the families make cheese, yogurt or curd out of this supply.

Saudi Red Crescent is providing medical care in tents located near the new arrivals. ICA is also providing two mobile medical teams three days a week to three Nasir Bagh blocks. Neither Saudi Red Crescent nor the Commissionerate seem to be aware of this overlapping medical care.

The Austrian Relief Committee (ARC) began latrine improvements on April 16, 1989. The refugees themselves dig pits, build the walls and install a roof and ARC then provides the necessary slab and exhaust pipe. Construction of the mud walls has been slow due to a water shortage in the camp and the hard and rocky ground. Regardless of these impediments, ARC finds that the motivation of the refugees is quite good. In addition, ARC has two field officers in the camp and two Lady Health Motivators who, respectively, give health talks to the men while they are constructing latrines and health education lectures to women and
children. UNHCR is funding this project and by the end of May 394 slabs had been distributed.

DACAAR is improving shallow depth tube wells, providing hand pumps, and also supervising pipe maintenance. The Kuwait agency, Lajnat al Dawa, is building a new deep tube well and all required extension lines. UNHCR is funding one water tanker which is operated by the Government of Pakistan's Public Health Engineering Department (PHED). Residents confirm that a water tanker delivers water daily but since this barely meets the needs of the refugees, especially in the heat of the summer, they are also using the extremely muddy water of a nearby stream to meet their drinking water needs. This, of course, contributes to the prevalence of diarrhoeal disease. Shelter Now plans to bring in about 3,000 liters a day of water, five days a week, beginning in mid-June to assist in alleviating this situation.

Interestingly, and in tribute to the entrepreneurial spirit of the Afghan people, by the end of May some of the new arrivals had already set up businesses while others were engaged in casual labor. For example, there is a tailor with two sewing machines and an assistant, a bakery (established by GTZ), and jewelers who made their own tools and are now making traditional Afghan jewelry in one of the tents.

Unfortunately, it appears that some of the new arrivals at this camp have "fallen through the cracks" of the assistance provided to new arrivals. At a June 7 visit there was a group who had been there approximately one to one and a half months with no assistance provided them. These people, some of whom were widows with small children, were living in rough shelters of cloth with almost no possessions or food. Apparently, as far as it was possible to determine, these people had not been informed that the camp was closed and that it was possible to approach camp administrators to arrange transport to another camp where they would be entitled to receive shelter and provisions. These particular new arrivals said that some people had returned to Afghanistan because of the lack of provisions in the camp and that they were considering doing the same. One widow who had not been receiving provisions, and who had arrived with seven small children, had already seen two of her children die in the camp and a third was at the hospital at the time of the visit.

2. Kheshki One and Two.

These camps are located about 45 minutes from Peshawar and 17 kilometers north of Nowshera. It was established as a single camp on March 28, 1989 and subdivided into two camps on May 1. Located near the bank of the Kabul River, various UNHCR personnel estimate that anywhere between 20% and 50% of the camps' residents are actually refugees who arrived some time ago but were unregistered. Other agencies estimate about 30%. However, no
one seems to have any serious objection, since it is clear that these are needy people, without the resources necessary to sustain themselves, and it would be unacceptable to refuse such minimal assistance to them.

When the camp closed to additional arrivals on May 30, there were 3,288 families consisting of 20,097 people. However, the continuing informal influx of small groups, presumably people who have relatives already residing in the camp, has resulted in a total population on June 13 of 3,595 families.

The camp has grown haphazardly which will make it difficult to provide water and sanitation services. In addition, the tents initially provided by the Pakistan Red Crescent were not suitable for shelter (they were porous and did not provide adequate protection). UNHCR recommended that its own standard tents be provided, which was done, and the earlier ones be cut up for use as bed sheets. As of the beginning of June, many refugees had built homes to live in and the vast majority had erected compound walls around their tents or homes. The easily available Kabul River water assists in making the mud necessary for home construction. UNHCR is funding DACAAR's construction of a ten kilometer access road in and around Kheshki.

Food is currently provided by Interchurch Aid (ICA). For new arrivals they provide the same emergency rations described for the Nasir Bagh camp. At an April 20, 1989 meeting with the CAR Relief Subcommittee, ICA pledged that it would provide food for this camp in May, June and July, in the amount of one 85kg bag of flour and one 5 kg tin of edible oil per family/per month.

The distribution is based on the Pre-Registration Verification Form and is performed by number, sequentially, according to the CAR list of eligible refugees. Food is distributed from a truck and thus, storage facilities at the camp are not necessary. The process takes about three hours with a distribution to 500 families per day. While it is unknown what will happen after ICA's pledge to distribute food through July expires, ICA did state that they did not want their generosity exploited if food is available through WFP. As they explained, their mandate is to provide relief in emergency situations.

AHSAO distributes a small amount of milk, approximately 1,000 liters per day, with each child that appears receiving one to two liters, depending on the size of their container. Of course, this is not sufficient to cover the needs of the entire camp which is estimated at approximately 50% children.

During Ramazan and the Eid holiday, representatives from Arab groups distributed meat, sweets and cash.
Saudi Red Crescent reported on June 12 that it had received a request from the Commissionerate two days previously for 2,000 sets of kitchen utensils for this camp and Hawai (discussed in the next section). Saudi Red Crescent pledged 1,000 sets and anticipated its delivery by mid-June.

In April, ICA began providing medical care with two mobile units seeing women and children, but with no malaria or TB control program. In May, ICA expanded this service and established a permanent Basic Health Unit (BHU) staffed with two doctors (one male and one female). This structure, located in tents, will be moved to a permanent compound by late June. This BHU provides medical care four days a week to women and children and two days a week to men, although emergencies will be seen on any day the clinic is open. This emphasis on women and children is based on the socio-cultural context which makes it acceptable for men, but not women, to seek medical help in the nearby town. In addition, two mobile units, consisting of one male and one female doctor, visit various camp sites three days a week. These mobile units replace the earlier idea of a permanent second BHU in the camps. A malaria program located near the BHU has begun in coordination with the CAR malaria program, and there are TB referrals to the Italian Cooperation for Development program.

The Afghan Health and Social Assistance Organization (AHSAO) is providing immunization for children. ICA has provided a tent to AHSAO and it has been placed near the BHU. Children coming to the BHU are referred to the AHSAO facility and this system appears to be functioning smoothly. Initially, there was a desire by AHSAO to provide all the medical care in this camp but it was decided that NGOs should provide services for which they would not need the assistance of others. Thus AHSAO, which is self-sufficient in vaccines but not in providing all medical services, agreed to limit their activities to immunization. One example of problems in coordination occurred when CAR stated in late May that AHSAO had been chosen as the sole medical provider in the Kheshki camps, although this idea had been dropped for the reasons already stated.

Interestingly, a visit through the camp found one compound wall with a doctor's sign. Upon investigation, it appears that this doctor, from Jalalabad, is seeing refugees but often they cannot afford to pay him. His papers show that he graduated from an Afghan medical school in 1985 and he has been directed to become licensed through the Commissionerate since he cannot be hired by the NGOs until this process is completed. While he is attempting to complete this procedure, he does see patients at night when there are emergencies. His presence also tends to confirm agency reports that more urban professionals are being seen in the new refugee population.
ARC is providing latrine improvement at this camp. This began on April 23 as soon as the refugees had settled into their permanent areas. The method and personnel utilized are the same as described for Nasir Bagh Seven and by the end of May a total of 1,070 slabs had been distributed. Motivation is high and water, especially from the Kabul River, is easily available for the necessary mud wall construction. Since the latrine campaign is concurrent with the refugees building houses, it is relatively easy to motivate them to build a latrine at the same time. However, some of the ARC staff suspect that motivation is also high because in reality many are previously unregistered refugees who have been previously exposed to latrines and have also heard the health messages. In fact, some of the Lady Health Motivators recognize the refugees they are now seeing at Kheshki.

A section of Kheshki is divided by a road and although UNHCR officials tried to prohibit refugees from settling on the side of the road near the Kabul River, they have insisted on doing so. This area flooded last year during the July monsoon season and there is the danger of it happening again. In fact, the river level in June is only about four feet below the plain on which tents and houses are located. The refugees have been warned of this danger and DACAAR is preparing a feasibility study on building a flood protection embankment.

ARC points out that the water table is high in this area, making it unsuitable for pit latrines. However, UNHCR will no longer fund surface latrines, which would have been more appropriate here. In addition, the area has poor sandy soil with a fluctuating water table that can lead to pit collapse. On the other hand, surface latrines take longer to build and there could have been a disease outbreak before they were completed. In any event, ARC points out that this particular area (which is only one part of the Kheshki camp) is an extremely poor location for all the cited reasons. ARC has checked with local people in the area who report that the last serious flood was in 1976 so they are hoping for the best in the near future. There are additional sites in the Kheshki camp for the refugees to relocate if the settled area does flood.

Water is provided by two water tankers although during May there were three. In addition, UNHCR has funded a contract to ensure an adequate water supply by the end of June through a local tube well and pipe lines built and installed by PHED. This work is underway and refugees were digging pipeline ditches at a visit on June 13, and tube well construction was in progress. DACAAR is building six shallow wells (2 have been completed to date) and 13 above ground static tanks which are filled by water tankers. In addition, the water tankers distribute at six additional sites to ensure adequate geographic coverage of the camps. UNHCR also
has a contract with the owner of a local tube well to supply its water tankers, at least to some extent.

There are two schools currently operating in Kheshki, one for boys and one for girls. The schools were started through the assistance of the CAR Social Service Cell on a self-help basis with two women refugees teaching the girls. ICA has provided school tents and will have compound walls built around them. This will provide additional security, especially for the women teachers and girl students, and will, hopefully, encourage other women refugees to teach and families to send their daughters to the school. ICA will provide the necessary additional tents as the program expands. ICA will also pay teacher salaries and cover administrative costs. The CAR Education Cell will provide textbooks.

A major camp problem is the busy traffic on the road passing through a part of the camp. Several weeks ago there was an accident in which a small girl was injured. As a result, the refugees tried to halt the traffic and when the CAR security staff person tried to stop them from doing so he was attacked and beaten. Two refugees were briefly arrested and then released and camp elders promised that this would not recur. However, a few weeks later on June 9 a small girl was killed by a bus which struck her when the bus attempted to pass another vehicle. The refugees threw stones, damaged the bus, and future trouble is likely. The UNHCR Territorial Officer has suggested that a more permanent solution would be the building of a playground for children in an area away from the road in order to divert the children from "playing" with the cars travelling in the area.

3. Hawai Eight.

This camp is in a particularly desolate location that is very barren, rocky and with little or no naturally available water. It is about 45 minutes east of Peshawar and, as the name implies, there are seven camps already established in the area, although the closest one is about one to two kilometers away. It is not like Nasir Bagh Seven in which the new camp abuts the older ones. This camp opened on June 1 and new arrivals found in other camps are being transferred here. In addition, it will be the destination for future arrivals. In all likelihood, there will be previously unregistered refugees among the "new arrivals" but anyone who would come to this isolated, arid and burning hot location would have to be truly desperate. The women and children are generally barefoot and, as one refugee woman pointed out, she burns her feet when walking because the rocky ground is so hot.

Four days after its opening on June 1 the camp held 310 families, or 1,953 people. By June 13 this number had grown to 497 families, or 3,097 people, with daily arrivals varying from one or two families up to fifty or sixty families. Upon arrival, the
family is issued a UNHCR tent. More permanent shelter for the camp residents will be difficult for at least three reasons: the ground is rocky and hard making it difficult to dig the necessary earth to build walls; there is insufficient water to make the mud necessary for home construction; and the refugees have no cash with which to pay for the transport of earth that can be more easily dug in locations near the camp. The UNHCR Territorial Officer has suggested that the families in this camp be given a one-time cash distribution (particularly appropriate at the second Eid coming soon) in order to enable them to build more adequate shelters. This suggestion has a great deal of merit and should be seriously considered by the appropriate NGOs.

Currently, each newly arrived family is allotted 15kg of wheat per family member from the WFP wheat stocks. Within a few days of arrival, the family is interviewed to determine if they qualify for the Pre-Registration Verification Form. If they do not, return of their tent is requested. It is a testament to the camp's uninviting nature that of the first 300 families interviewed, only three did not qualify. Edible oil has not been available for distribution but at a June 13 visit, the UNHCR Territorial Officer hoped that some would become available within the week. The wheat that is issued to the families must be transported elsewhere by the refugees for grinding into flour.

Shelter Now is planning to provide milk in this camp beginning in mid to late June. Their concern is that this particular group of refugees will not have proper milk containers, necessary for sanitation reasons. Thus, milk distribution could be delayed until proper containers are first distributed.

The Kuwait Red Crescent Society began providing medical care (as it does in several of the previously established Hawai camps) in mid-June with daily visits by a mobile team consisting of one male and one female doctor and also a supervisory doctor. This team brings medications with them but of necessity, the care provided is basic. The agency has begun the EPI immunization program for women and children, and has been issuing family health cards. BHU tents have been received and were scheduled for erection on June 14.

The Pakistan Red Crescent will be in charge of sanitation in the camp and first came on June 13 to determine needs and priorities. It is unexplained why this could not have been done prior to the camp's opening since it was known ahead of time that a camp would be located here.

It has not yet been decided who will build latrines. These will probably be communal in nature due to the shortage of water with which to build the necessary walls.
PHED is in charge of delivering water with two UNHCR-provided water tankers. However, no permanent tanker is assigned to this camp and they are being temporarily requisitioned from other locations pending a more permanent solution. The residents' absolute dependence on the water tankers, since there is virtually no locally available water, makes this a situation that could easily become desperate as the tankers inevitably break down or are equally desperately needed somewhere else. For example, on June 11 and 12 one of the two tankers was non-operational and all the families had to depend on the six deliveries made that day by one tanker.

There is a nearby tube well belonging to the GOP Education Department and another tube well built by the Lajnat al Dawa agency (a Kuwait relief agency). However, there are no pipe connections and it has not yet been determined who will be responsible for building them.

A final problem with this isolated camp is the difficulty of Commissionerate staff in arranging transport to even get there. The administrator who must be present each day to receive new arrivals is often several hours late since transport to the closest location is about three to four kilometers away and even that is sporadic. In the afternoon when he leaves he must again walk several kilometers, through the summer's heat, to find a ride back to the main road. Despite requests to CAR, transport on an emergency basis has not yet been arranged.

4. Shin Dand.

This camp, located near Kohat, opened at the end of February and currently has approximately 9,100 people. It is located near an older camp but was chosen because the older camp is underpopulated (with about 4,200 residents) so the region could support additional persons. There are, however, real security concerns about this camp and the situation is being closely monitored. Most of the camp residents result from the Jalalabad fighting with minimal numbers of older refugees. UNHCR estimates that between 20% to 30% of the camp residents are previously unregistered refugees.

When the refugees first arrived at Shin Dand the previous refugees provided them with food. Then the Commissionerate made a food distribution. However, unlike the other camps which were essentially free of corruption, the tribal leaders and CAR staff created difficulties when the new refugees attempted to meet the pre-registration verification requirements. As a result, the Commissionerate terminated one staff member and transferred the others.
Food is currently being provided by Serve. At the same April 20, 1989 meeting with the CAR Relief Subcommittee referred to earlier, it was decided that in May, June and July Serve would provide 85kg flour and 5kg edible oil per family/per month. The oil is purchased by Shelter Now and CAR provides the transport. As explained by Serve, this commitment was made for several reasons: it was their understanding that WFP could not provide the requisite food at such short notice; Serve had the available resources and personnel necessary to both purchase and distribute the food; and new arrivals are a priority for the organization and its donors.

The food distribution is carried out with use of the Pre-Verification Registration Form. The RVA or Refugee Village Administrator has provided Serve with a list of the 1,500 families holding a Pre-Registration Verification Form. Each family is numbered sequentially. Families between particular numbers receive food on previously announced days. The person whose picture appears on the Form appears at the distribution point and when his name is called he receives his food allotment. The Form has a space for Serve to stamp which indicates that the allotment was made.

Union Aid has wanted to distribute milk but could not arrange the necessary transport. WFP has asked Help to assist in transport.

Saudi Red Crescent operates a dispensary in the old Shin Dand camp but it was not able to handle the influx of new refugees. As of May 28, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) opened a BHU for the new arrivals. The refugees have been informed that only new arrivals should go to the IRC unit and the hiring of a new refugee as gatekeeper should assist in enforcing this rule. The purpose of such a rule is to defuse animosity between the two groups of refugees and to minimize their contact with each other.

Because the Commissionerate did not know if these refugees would be temporary, they did not allow building for several months. Since then, some refugees have built walls around their tents and others have started building houses in the surrounding area. However, the shortage of water for construction purposes has resulted in a slow building process.

Initial latrine construction by IRC emphasized communal latrines since a water shortage made construction of individual latrines difficult. However, the refugees dislike communal latrines and beginning in June, IRC has been emphasizing the construction of individual latrines in the houses the refugees are now building. The motivation of the refugees to build latrines has been high.

A UNHCR-funded water tanker, operated by PHED, was initially assigned to this camp pending a more permanent solution. Unfortunately, the water tanker was reassigned by a CAR staff
person to another established camp around late April. As a result, there was a severe water shortage which led to increased infant mortality. A concurrent shortage of ORS in the BHU exacerbated the seriousness of the situation. This was resolved when IRC reassigned one of its water tankers to Shin Dand camp. Around the beginning of June a PHED-operated tanker was again assigned to this camp and the water shortage, although still present, is not of immediate concern.

As for a more permanent solution, there is an existing PHED tube well with pipes in the older Shin Dand camp. DACAAR has been building additional pipelines to extend this scheme into the new camp area. The original plan was to connect these lines to new surface tanks in the camp but delays in construction have forced a continued reliance on water tankers. IRC has built eight surface tanks and plans to complete an additional four. Eventually, these surface tanks will be connected to the pipeline scheme but in the meantime they are filled by the water tanker. A few water stand posts were built by DACAAR when the camp first opened but none have been completed since then.

There are two schools in the old Shin Dand camp and UNHCR has requested that the Commissionerate begin another school in the new camp. Since school is now in recess, it is not known if this will occur although CAR did state that they would try to open one school.

The logistical and coordination problems inherent in an unexpected refugee influx have been exemplified in several incidents occurring at this camp. For instance, Save the Children/UK pledged 20,000 pounds sterling for the new refugees. CAR then purchased kitchen utensils and distributed sets to 500 families in March but was not able to complete the distribution to the remaining 1,000 families until the end of May. On two occasions, camp officials ran out of tents and quilts for several days because the stocks were in Peshawar and no transport had been arranged. In addition, food was not available when the refugees first arrived. When representatives from Arab groups did make an Eid food distribution fights broke out due to the lack of administrative structure. Finally, the UNHCR Territorial Officer did not even know the camp was being opened for new refugees until its actual opening on his regularly scheduled day for visiting the area.

Problems Associated with the New Arrivals

Coordination

Many NGOs made various commitments to provide assistance to the new arrivals. Unfortunately, these commitments were made to the new arrivals in general and not by camp. This has led to a great deal of confusion. For example, Help donated Rs.30,000 for tents;
Save the Children/UK gave Rs.760,000 for utensils and water containers; and the CAR Commissioner gave Rs.85,000 from his own funds. None of this was earmarked to specific camps. Staff already assigned to other camps and other problems were requested to handle the sudden influx. The resultant strain led to some inequitable distributions with excess at one camp and not enough at another. For example, one agency went to Shin Dand camp with plastic water buckets for distribution. They had 1,000 more buckets than refugee families and UNHCR had to ask them to reallocate these items to another camp. In Kheshki camps there were overlapping food donations when other new camps received only the rationed minimum.

Some NGOs have not kept UNHCR or the Commissionerate informed of their activities. Thus, in this emergency groups have not been aware of each other's activities and efforts to help have occasionally resulted in unfair results. For example, the Commissionerate has received contributions for kitchen utensils and water vessels. They decided to distribute these goods on a first-camp-established, first-camp-supplied basis which, on its face, seems fair. However, given the time to fully plan this distribution, the Commissionerate would have realized that this has resulted in Kheshki camp (with its nearby river from which refugees can repeatedly obtain non-potable water) being supplied water containers before Hawai. Yet Hawai's residents are desperately short of water and the people in dire need of additional containers to use when the water tanker makes its deliveries.

A source of some frustration, both for the Commissionerate and the refugees, is the different food distribution standards. That is, while WFP has one distribution formula (15kg wheat and .9kg edible oil per family member), the new refugees, for ease of administration, are usually receiving 85kg flour and 5kg oil per family. This disparity, however, is not causing as much confusion as the differing monthly food distributions of some NGOs in which items in addition to the flour and oil basics are supplied.

Some coordination problems have been caused by donor-imposed requirements. For example, Serve's donors require that distributions be made directly to recipients and not to a governmental agency. A problem arose after Serve made a pledge in late March of approximately 500 tents, 6,000 quilts, 1,500 tarpaulins and several thousand rugs and plastic ground sheets. Later, the Commissionerate asked that these items be delivered to the Commissionerate but Serve responded that they must distribute goods directly to new arrivals and would be able to do so within 72 hours of CAR's designation of a recipient group. As of June 11, Serve had not heard back from the Commissionerate.
Finally, as mentioned before, the various NGOs, UN agencies and
the Commissionerate were working to the limits of their resources
and personnel prior to this latest influx of refugees. The
unexpectedly heavy increase in their workload, combined with
static or declining budgets (previously calculated on the basis
of a refugee return rather than increase), has led to systemic
strains in the system, manifesting itself in problems such as
lack of transport for CAR staff, overlapping medical care or lack
of pre-planning prior to a camp's actual opening. These lapses,
unavoidable in such an emergency situation, are the inevitable
result of a fatigued and overburdened relief community.

Peshawar Cost of Living

Many new arrivals have gone into Peshawar itself rather than the
camps. These tend to be the refugees who originate in the larger
towns of Afghanistan. As a result, the rents in Peshawar have
increased dramatically. The rent for an average two room dwelling
has gone from Rs.400 per month to Rs.600, an increase of 50%.
This has had a definite impact on Peshawar residents and
resentment towards the refugees can result.

Security

As mentioned earlier, there is some hostility by the older
refugees based on the alleged Communist sympathies of people who
remained during the war. This type of hostile reception by
settled refugees has occurred frequently, probably more as a sign
of discontent with new arrivals receiving aid that refugees
believe would have gone to them instead, than with any real
ideological animosity. Meetings between the Commissionerate and
the Islamic Interim Government of Afghanistan have resulted in an
agreement that propaganda against the new arrivals will cease.
Thus, broadcasts from the mosques and in schools regarding the
alleged Communist sympathies of the new arrivals no longer
occur.

In addition, programs that offer jobs to refugees have
encountered problems when hiring new arrivals. Existing employees
accuse the agency of hiring Communists. It is impossible to
evaluate to what extent this is encouraged by the parties and to
what extent it reflects individual opinion.

Conclusion

When one considers refugee situations in other parts of the
world, such as the Sudan, Thailand or Hong Kong, the needs of the
Afghan refugees are being adequately met in a safe and relatively
healthy environment. However, the world at large is prone to
forget Afghanistan since the Russians have completed their troop
withdrawal. However, the legacy of the Russian occupation is far
from over. Instead of troops the Soviets have left: a government
that is discredited by three million people who voted their disapproval by fleeing to Pakistan; two million who fled to Iran; millions of mines that lie scattered over the countryside making many roads and much of the land unsafe for travel or cultivation; and a war between those loyal to the Soviet-installed government and those who want a government free of an alien ideology.

Until it is safe to return, the Afghan refugees will remain in Pakistan. The government of Pakistan, while welcoming and caring for these refugees, has barely the resources to care for its own population. Its continued hospitality to the Afghans depends in large part on the resources of an international community willing to assist in meeting the needs of the refugees. In addition, as the war intensifies between the Soviet-backed Kabul government and the mujahideen, more refugees will leave for the safety of Pakistan. Thus, instead of large numbers of refugees returning, as had been anticipated, an influx will probably occur. The needs of the people already here, and the people who will come, must be anticipated and not forgotten by a community which, no matter how much it longs for peace, should not forget the realities of war.