The United Nations in Central Afghanistan:
1990 and 1991

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January 1991
Preface

The following report is the result of two missions to central Afghanistan in 1990, one from 27 September - 30 October, and the second from 21 November - 14 December.

With the exception of July, August, and half of November, there was a continuous U.N. presence in central Afghanistan from May to December 1990. Six U.N. agencies - UNOCA, WFP, UNILOG, UNICEF (Peshawar and Kabul offices), FAO, and ILO - had at least one representative in the area during this period. In addition, Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC, or demining) deployed two teams in Bamyan from July - December, the Mine Clearance and Planning Agency (MCPA) visited the area twice, and the Afghan NGO START conducted preliminary road surveys in Bamyan and en route.

While this report reflects my own findings and views, I have attempted to incorporate those of the various personnel who visited the area as well. When possible I have exchanged views with these individuals directly; these discussions, as well as the various reports from these missions, have all contributed to the ideas expressed herein.
Map of central Afghanistan showing U.N. missions in 1990.
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I. Report Summary

This report makes the following recommendations and observations, all of which are elaborated on later:


2. U.N. assistance to central Afghanistan in 1991 should focus on roads and bridges, education, and irrigation (karezes, canals, dams, etc.).

3. The provision of wheat (Food for Work) should be the foundation of the U.N. assistance program for central Afghanistan. The U.N. should set up a storage facility halfway between Peshawar and Bamyan to allow for the prepositioning of wheat.

4. The single most important project for 1991 should be the detailed surveying and construction of a road from Yakaolang (Bamyan) to Balkhab (Jozjan).

5. The center of U.N. operations for central Afghanistan should be shifted from Bamyan center to Panjao or Yakaolang.

6. The U.N., while maintaining its neutrality, should work closely with Hezb-i Wahdat (Party of Unity), the most important ally of the U.N. in the region.

7. Because of the size of and political situation in central Afghanistan, U.N. assistance should be spread as widely and as evenly as possible and not concentrated in one or two districts or provinces.

8. In keeping with UNOCA priorities for 1991, the U.N. should expand its efforts to identify and meet the needs of Afghan women in central Afghanistan. The recommendations proposed herein are the result of discussions exclusively with Afghan men.

9. U.N. agencies and personnel involved in development work in central Afghanistan should be sensitive to the fact that lack of coordination will not only hamper assistance efforts but could threaten the security of U.N. officials in the field.
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II. 1990: Overview

U.N. assistance to central Afghanistan evolved through several distinct phases during 1990. The first phase, coincident with the first U.N. mission to the area (29 May - 19 June), was marked by several accomplishments: the successful negotiation of two routes from Peshawar to Bamyan, the establishment of an office and the identification of local staff, preliminary surveys in the fields of agriculture, health, education, mines, and cultural heritage; and the signing of an agreement for U.N. assistance with the Islamic Shura of Bamyan. The first mission returned to Peshawar convinced that a U.N. presence was both warranted and desired in central Afghanistan.

The second phase, from July to October, was marked by the presence of two missions which extended the reach of the U.N. into Baghlan, Uruzgan, Ghor, and other districts of Bamyan and made the first forays into actual project implementation. The first of the two missions organized a convoy of wheat from Peshawar; some of the wheat arrived during the tenure of the second mission and was used immediately for projects in Yakaolang district and in western Baghlan province.

The third phase of U.N. activity in central Afghanistan was marked by the solidification of the U.N. presence through project implementation and through the storage of wheat for use next year. The mission (UNOCA and WFP) reached Bamyan by a third and new route (1253 kilometers from Peshawar), travelling in close proximity to a convoy of wheat destined for Yakaolang.

Through these three phases, the U.N. has moved through hours of discussion and note-taking and introductions to project implementation. By the end of the last mission, the U.N. had signed agreements to build or reconstruct eight schools, 17.5 kilometers of road, and two small dams. These projects cover four districts in two provinces. It is a modest beginning, but it represents progress. It is a start that has been made possible because each mission built at least one step for the next mission to stand on.
III. U.N. Activities in Central Afghanistan: October - December 1990

A. October

I arrived in Bamyan on 4 October accompanied by the Program Manager for Demining and the director of MCFA. We travelled via Wana - Urgun - Qarabagh - Haji Gak Pass. I overlapped several days with the outgoing Team Leader, Ake Rosvall of UNICEF Kabul, who departed for Peshawar on 7 October. At my request, and with the approval of their respective offices, Peter Larsen (WFP) and Kudus Lobanga (UNILOG), members of the previous mission, remained on site.

The primary objective of my mission was to explore the possibilities of U.N. assistance to central Afghanistan in 1991 and to produce a plan of action focusing on two or three technical sectors. I had also understood from the UNOCA Chief of Mission that the Bamyan SMU should aim to oversee assistance activities in all of central Afghanistan and not simply in Bamyan province. I emphasized this point in my meetings with shuras throughout Hazarajat.

A second responsibility was to stabilize the U.N. office in terms of the local staff and their job duties. There were eight employees on the books but none had been paid since June, none had job descriptions, and all gave the international staff the clear impression that they had plenty of time on their hands. I paid salaries, handed out job descriptions, and placed everyone on two-week probation. I found subsequent performance satisfactory and offered further employment through the end of the year.

The case of the office manager, however, Engineer Alamy, has proven problematic. A former engineer with Ariana Airlines, Alamy was taken on by the U.N. largely because he was well-connected within Harakat Islami, the party that arranged security for the first Bamyan mission in May - June. The first Team Leader clearly had faith in the gentleman and accorded him full responsibility for hiring staff and renovating the office over the summer.

The Islamic Shura, in contrast, wrote two letters to the U.N. in September and October asking that Alamy be fired because he was not trustworthy. The second Team Leader described Alamy as a "wheeler-dealer" and also urged his removal.

Not knowing either the man, the Shura, or the political situation in Bamyan, I decided to place Alamy on two-week probation as I had done with the other staff. During that period I saw no reason to fire Alamy. Instead I found his political connections useful on several occasions and decided also that his independence from the shura was not necessarily a bad thing. I simply resolved to keep an eye on him. The main task, I believed, was to wean him from his duties as a self-proclaimed "liaison officer" and force him to concentrate on his duties as an office manager. (See the section on the Islamic Shura for further
The major preoccupation of U.N. international staff during October turned out to be the whereabouts of 100 MT’s of WFP wheat dispatched from Peshawar to Bamyan. While there were clear uses for the wheat, the dispatch was partly a test of the routes and of the Islamic Shura, which provided escorts.

The convoy departed Peshawar in late September. On 8 October, word reached the Bamyan SMU that one truck had been stopped in Topche (Shashpul), about one hour outside of Bamyan center, by a commander from Harakat Islami named Al-Mas. Later that day, a driver for ATC, whose vehicle was part of the escort, arrived in Bamyan to report that mujahideen at another Harakat base (Abu Nokra, on the Wardak side of Haji Gak Pass) had taken his vehicle.

The truck was released a week later following a series of joint delegations dispatched by the Islamic Shura and Hezb-i Wahdat. The U.N. office sent a letter to Al-Mas requesting the immediate release of the wheat and inviting him to Bamyan to discuss security in the future. The major Harakat commander in the area, Faizi (based at Abu Nokra), insisted in a letter to the U.N. that the seizure of the wheat and the ATC vehicle was a mistake by his subordinate and that he would assist in the release of both.

Engineer Alamy escorted the truck to Bamyan on 15 October after assisting Al-Mas in rounding up as much wheat as could be recovered (according to Alamy, the wheat had already been distributed). Just over half the original load was recovered, while the remainder - more than five MT’s - was either given (by Al-Mas) to the truck driver as payment for transport or simply "lost." The ATC vehicle, minus a jack, spare tire, and stereo loudspeakers, returned to Bamyan on 11 October.

A more serious situation was developing in Dahane Abdalla, a small bazaar town in Behsud district, Wardak, at the crossroads of routes from Yakaolang, Kabul, Bamyan, and Ghazni. Rumors reached Bamyan 8 - 11 October that several trucks and another ATC escort vehicle had been stopped there, apparently at the behest of Hezb-i Wahdat, so as to avoid the insecurity in Shashpul.

At first the two incidents appeared related; the situation in Dahane Abdalla, however, was murkier. Again, the Islamic Shura and Hezb-i Wahdat sent a joint delegation accompanied by the U.N. office manager, who insisted he could help.

The delegation returned on 13 October. They were unable to release the wheat and complained, moreover, that they had been treated abusively by the mujahideen in Dahane Abdalla. They brought back a letter signed by five commanders requesting that the U.N. itself come to Dahane Abdalla to discuss the assistance needs of Behsud and to release the wheat.
The U.N. team continued to put pressure on the local authorities to do all they could, short of using force, to solve the problem, although it had become clear that Hezb-i Wahdat had not only not ordered the stoppage of the trucks but was not in control of the situation in Dahane Abdalla.

Hezb-i Wahdat dispatched a second delegation on 13 October which carried a letter from the U.N. to the five commanders responding favorably to the "invitation" to visit but only after the wheat was released. When this mission also returned in failure, bearing another letter demanding a "high-level U.N." visit, Hezb-i Wahdat, which had assured us that the problem was minor and could be solved locally, proposed that U.N. international staff make the journey in the company of one or two members of the Hezb-i Wahdat Central Committee.

The U.N. international staff, with encouragement from their Afghan Field Officers, all agreed with the Hezb-i Wahdat proposal provided that we made it clear to the commanders that their actions were totally unacceptable and very damaging to the U.N.'s commitment to central Afghanistan.

Up to this point, 16 October, only one truck out of the entire convoy had reached Banyan. This truck was successful because the driver apparently told all checkpoints that he was carrying private cargo.

After obtaining clearance from UNOCA Islamabad, Kudus Lobanja (UNILOG), Yusuf Sabah (WFP), and I departed for Dahane Abdalla on Wednesday, 17 October, accompanied by three members of Hezb-i Wahdat Central Committee and their armed escorts. En route we stopped in Abu Nokra to meet briefly with Faizi. I thanked him for his assistance in the Shashpul incident and extended my wish for continued good relations. It was very clear that his relations with Hezb-i Wahdat were tense though outwardly congenial (Harakat Islami's absence from the coalition that Hezb-i Wahdat represents is unfortunate, indeed).

We reached Dahane Abdalla in the late afternoon and were escorted to a Nasr base in Seya Buta, about five kilometers west of Dahane Abdalla on the road to Yakaolang. It was too late in the day for business. The following morning more than twenty commanders and shura members arrived from surrounding areas. The Hezb-i Wahdat representatives held brief but closed talks with part of this assembly, whereupon the entire group convened to meet the U.N. representatives.

The leader of the council was Commander Poya (Nasr), a former medical student at Kabul University who speaks fair English. The U.N. team introduced itself, explained its program for central Afghanistan, and stressed the difficulty of transport routes and the urgency of cooperation with commanders along the way. We emphasized that Behsud was part of the U.N. mandate for central Afghanistan but that the stopping of U.N. supplies and the demand to meet directly with U.N. international staff as a condition for its release set a very bad precedent. If repeated elsewhere, such actions would force the U.N. to
re-evaluate its commitment to central Afghanistan.

Poya responded that Behsud was a very large district (and indeed it is) and that he and his colleagues were very glad for the opportunity to discuss possible U.N. assistance. He proposed that the U.N. open a small office in Dahane Abdalla because of its central location, select local implementing partners, and consider assistance to Behsud in all sectors but especially in emergency wheat, education, and health. He pledged cooperation as long as the U.N. worked in Behsud. He made clear his antipathy toward Afghan NGO’s based in Peshawar, arguing that their staff were "earning big salaries but know nothing about the real situation. We don’t trust these NGO’s, especially any who claim to be working for Behsud." After noting that the U.N. could avoid wheat hijackings in the future by establishing relationships with commanders en route, he agreed to release all of the cargo and to pay labor charges to reload new trucks for Bamyan.

The meeting consumed most of the day and at least one kilogram of tea. The following day, 19 October, Mr. Lobanga procured four trucks from the bazaar, though interestingly two other drivers refused the business when they heard that U.N. cargo was involved (drivers are paid upon delivery). Mr. Lobanga also reported that U.N. wheat was on sale in the bazaar but that it had come from Tezak, not from Dahane Abdalla.

While the trucks loaded bags of wheat, seed, fertilizer, and tent parts that had been stacked neatly at the base, Mr. Lobanga, who was supervising, noticed two young mujahideen scurrying into a back room with a bag of wheat. He was certain the back room contained other bags but was not allowed to look inside (it suddenly occurred to us that we had probably been dining on U.N. wheat the last twenty-four hours). Mr. Lobanga was also convinced that his missing spare tires were on the pick-up of one of the commanders attending the meeting (we learned later that the pick-up itself had been appropriated from MSF earlier in the year).

Then at the conclusion of loading Poya announced that he had been "joking" about paying the labor charges and passed the bill to us.

The U.N. staff and four trucks departed the base late on the afternoon of 19 October and reached Bamyan the following day. Unfortunately there was not enough space on the four trucks for 99 UNILOG pallets, which had to be left in the safe-keeping of Commander Poya. Mr. Lobanga received a receipt for the commodities. Poya promised to send them at our request, provided that we arranged for trucks. (See p.8 for more on Poya and pallets.)

The arrival of U.N. commodities in Bamyan allowed the U.N. team to proceed with several projects. Mr. Larsen (WFP) immediately arranged wheat to be transported to Eshposteh (Baghlan) for a road project already in progress. The remaining wheat was dispatched to Yakaolang district (Bamyan) for projects previously identified by WFP. The FAO representative Mohammed Tahir started distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer while Mr. Lobanga, in conjunction with three representatives
from Ockenden Venture, erected one Rubb Hall tent next to the airstrip. Unfortunately the tent team had only enough parts for one tent although three sets had been dispatched from Peshawar.

As of 20 October, 36 MT's out of the original shipment had reached Bamyan. The Islamic Shura claimed that an additional four trucks had temporarily diverted to other locations (Tezak and Nawur) and would proceed only at the direction of Hezb-i Wahdat. We once again requested assistance from Hezb-i Wahdat but, nearing the end of our mission, were not able to remain on site to follow it up.

While Mr. Lobanga was working on the tents in Bamyan and Mr. Larsen was finalizing projects in Yakaolang, I spent two days (23-25 October) in Lal-o Sarjangal district of Ghor province. This marked the first U.N. visit to eastern Ghor. The shura, led by a young cleric named Sajjadi, was the most impressive I encountered in central Afghanistan: active, well-organized, full of initiative, civic-minded. We discussed and visited several project sites and, like most shuras I met, I found their chief concern to be roads and schools.

On the second day the shura received a visit from Raiz Babur Murad, an elderly leader (Jamiat Islami) of the Chahar Aimaq people near Chagcharan. He announced that his people were facing a severe food shortage for the winter, partly because of chronic shortages but mainly because three years of fighting against Hezb-i Islami (Hekmatyar) had disrupted planting. While the situation as described was certainly a cue for the United Nations, given time constraints (the area is not accessible by vehicle) I was in no position to verify the situation myself. I suggested that Mr. Murad submit a letter with the details and I would take it to Islamabad and try to arrange something for next month. However, I began to foresee difficulties and delays. With the shura's encouragement, I went to the bazaar and bought the gentleman nine bags of wheat, which he promptly loaded onto donkeys for the journey back.

I rejoined my colleagues in Yakaolang on 25 October, and the following day we started our journey back to Peshawar. The main task for the return trip was to explore the prospects of a new route from Qarabagh (Ghazni) to Bamyan via Yakaolang rather than the Haji Gak Pass. The new route would skirt Dahane Abdalla. Our task was not only to travel the route but also to introduce ourselves and the U.N. to the major commanders en route, thereby enlisting their support and avoiding a repeat of the incident in Behsud.

The journey was encouraging. While a number of commanders were unavailable, those whom we did meet offered their full cooperation for U.N. activities in central Afghanistan (see Annex G). My colleagues and I agreed that the new route looked promising
and that we would, therefore, recommend another convoy of wheat to the area before winter.

We reached Peshawar on Wednesday, 30 October. The following day Mr. Larsen and I briefed U.N. members of our mission at the inter-agency meeting in Islamabad. We then met with key members of WFP and UNILOG to draw up tentative plans for the next mission.

B. November - December

The primary objective of the last mission to Bamyan of 1990 was to assist in the safe passage of a convoy of 220 MT's of wheat for Yakaolang travelling via the "new" route. The mission planned to use some of the wheat immediately and store the remainder in Yakaolang for next spring.

Another important task was to survey at least part of a road from Yakaolang to Balkhab district, Jozjan. The construction of this road would facilitate movement between north and central Afghanistan. The U.N. team hired a consultant, Mohammed Alam, a native of Ghazni with eight years of road engineering experience, to conduct the survey.

The mission - consisting of Mr. Larsen, WFP Field Officer Zia ul-Haq, a UNOCA interpreter, Mohammed Alam, and myself - departed Peshawar on 21 November. Once in Qarabagh, I assumed overall responsibility for the convoy while Mr. Larsen proceeded via the Haji Gak Pass to Bamyan center to pursue projects there.

On 30 November, Mr Larsen reported from Dahane Abdalla that about thirty UNILOG pallets were being used as shelves in the bazaar. That night at an inn outside the bazaar Mr. Larsen and his colleagues received an abrupt visit from Poya and several other commanders who railed angrily against a WFP-AVICEN project to distribute wheat in Tezak. The project had been stopped prematurely partly because most of the wheat had ended up in the hands of a commander (Haji Noori) from Harakat Islami, a rival of Poya and Nasr in the area. However, an additional four hundred MT's had already been dispatched from Peshawar to complete the project, apparently with the understanding that Haji Noori was not to be involved this time. Poya knew more wheat was coming, but he apparently suspected the same scenario.

Fortunately, Mr. Larsen was able to talk his way out of a threatening situation, but he was treated rudely nevertheless. Somewhere there was a lapse in communication, since neither Mr. Larsen nor I knew of the resumption of the project. This example points to the urgency of at least the Team/SMU Leader being informed of all U.N. and U.N.-related activities in his area of jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, back in Qarabagh, six escorts from Hezb-i Wahdat
arrived to meet the convoy (Hezb-i Wahdat had given its support to the plan for a "new route" to Bamyan during the previous mission). The drivers, escorts, and I held a meeting in a teashop on the night of 30 November to finalize plans for the journey. The drivers were given letters from political offices in Peshawar requesting assistance from commanders en route. Most of the trucks departed the following morning with the escorts on board. I departed half a day later.

Keeping track of every truck (there were twenty-five to start with) was simply not possible. Most of the trucks that started the journey in Peshawar were exchanged in Wana because they were not appropriate for the terrain in Afghanistan (but the transporter, who was Pakistani, did not realize this until we arrived in Wana, resulting in a delay of several days while he found new trucks). Furthermore, some drivers did not want to take the "U.N. route" to Bamyan even though the transporter had assured UNILOG and myself in Peshawar that his trucks would take any route as long as we arranged escorts. Once inside Afghanistan, there were frequent breakdowns, some trucks travelled faster than others, and a few drivers decided that their loads were too heavy and shifted part of their cargo onto new trucks.

Thus, the trucks that left Peshawar were not the same as those that left Wana, the trucks that left Wana were not the same as those that left Qarabagh, and the trucks that arrived in Yakaolang were not the same as those that left Qarabagh.

Two mishaps occurred. In Tagao (Behsud district, Wardak), where the road passes directly through the compound of a hospital now used as a base, young mujahideen waved kalashnikovs and took several bags of wheat from each truck (it is not uncommon for a checkpoint to "tax" transiting vehicles, but this tax was high). When I arrived and made inquiries, the boys insisted that they had taken only ten bags; one of the escorts, however, waiting with his disabled truck in the bazaar, claimed that fifty-five bags (5.5 MT's) had been taken. We had met the commander (Fahimi of Nasr) on the way out in October, and I had seen him in Peshawar prior to our departure. He was not at the base; I do not believe he would have authorized or even condoned this action, especially since he has requested U.N. assistance in reviving the hospital. I left a letter for him looking forward to "your assistance in clearing up this mistake and sending the wheat to Yakaolang," but the mujahideen admitted that they had already disposed of the cargo.

The seizure of wheat will never be taken lightly in central Afghanistan; especially by Hezb-i Wahdat. Hezb-i Wahdat claims to "control" central Afghanistan; when U.N. wheat is stopped, it points out Hezb-i Wahdat's vulnerabilities. Accordingly, I was pleased but not altogether surprised to encounter a delegate from the Panjao shura (staunchly pro-Hezb-i Wahdat), an hour outside of Tagao, bearing a letter for the mujahideen requesting the release
of the wheat. The Yakaolang shura and Hezb-i Wahdat Central Committee later promised to lend their full assistance as well.

The second incident occurred in Dahane Rishga, two hours outside of Panjao. A truck broke down five kilometers from the bazaar. According to one version of the ensuing events, the truck was partially looted by the local people; according to another and more likely version, a commander (Tawasuli of Nasr) ordered the wheat taken into the hills. When I stopped at the checkpoint on the way out, accompanied by a representative from the Panjao shura, I met with the head commander Yusufi, who had been absent for several days and was clearly embarrassed by the incident. He said he thought the wheat could be reclaimed. When Mr. Larsen stopped there the following day, Yusufi told him that thirty-four bags were unretrievable but that the remainder (twenty-eight bags) was safe. Rather than send it on to Yakaolang, Mr. Larsen decided to keep the wheat in situ for use in the area next spring. Yusufi gave Mr. Larsen a receipt.

Two other incidents occurred concerning the uses of the wheat. In Panjao center, three trucks broke down. As it was our original intention to leave part of the cargo for projects in Panjao, Mr. Larsen and I agreed that the wheat on these trucks should remain in place. When I met the shura in Yakaolang the following day, however, the acting head, Mohammedi, was livid: he had heard that three trucks bound for Yakaolang had been stopped in Panjao, and he immediately assumed that the Panjao shura was responsible. When I calmly steered him off this dangerous line of reasoning, he then accused my interpreter of diverting the trucks.

Eventually I convinced Mohammedi that the decision was strictly mine and Mr. Larsen's. The incident points to an important rule of thumb for the U.N., however: the U.N. should identify its program, inform the local authorities, and then stick to the program. The local authorities are very defensive about "their" wheat and are quick to point fingers when something unexpected happens.

Meanwhile, in Bamyan center, forty MT's of wheat from the previous convoy had arrived in our absence, i.e. in early November. The wheat was stored in the Rubb Hall near the airstrip and attended to by a storekeeper and two chowkidars hired by Mr. Lobanga during the last mission. All was in good order. Mr. Larsen had spent several days in Bamyan to discuss projects with the Islamic Shura and was close to finalizing agreements for the rehabilitation of two schools, projects that would use the full amount of wheat stored.

When I visited the Rubb Hall on 7 December, a small delegation (Harakat Islami) from the surrounding cluster of buildings came to meet me. While not threatening, they informed me that neither the Islamic Shura nor Hezb-i Wahdat had any authority at the airport
and demanded that some of the wheat be used for a school at the airport. I replied that they should submit a detailed proposal which I would discuss with my colleagues in Peshawar but that the wheat on hand was already accounted for; I had neither the inclination nor the authority to change the program at the last minute. I informed the Islamic Shura of the encounter and left the matter for the two parties to sort out, as I believed that the U.N. had fulfilled its responsibilities.

Mr. Larsen and his team finalized agreements for projects in three districts: Bamyan, Yakaolang, and Panjao. Unfortunately, we had to begin our journey back before all of the trucks had arrived in Yakaolang. We departed with 170 MT's accounted for. The Yakaolang shura agreed to take full responsibility for receiving the remaining trucks and for storing the wheat. Travelling a day apart, Mr. Larsen and I headed back toward Ghazni, rejoining in Qarabagh on 11 December and proceeding together to Peshawar, which we reached on 14 December.
A. Hezb-i Wahdat

Hezb-i Wahdat (Party of Unity) is a coalition of nine Shia parties formed in Iran in mid-1989. Its Central Committee, based in Bamyan center, includes representatives from all districts of Hazarajat. While the chief preoccupation of Hezb-i Wahdat is security, on the district level it is organized into various committees such as health, education, and public welfare.

The formation of Hezb-i Wahdat is one of the most significant and promising political developments in central Afghanistan since 1979. Throughout the war, but particularly in the early 1980's, the Shia parties were involved in bloody fratricidal warfare that claimed hundreds of lives. The formation of this coalition has brought a fragile peace to central Afghanistan.

U.N. officials in Bamyan have been impressed with Hezb-i Wahdat. Its members are professional. Meetings are well-organized and direct. When U.N. officials were detained in neighboring Parwan province in September, Hezb-i Wahdat played a leading role in their release. Hezb-i Wahdat is very supportive of the U.N. presence in central Afghanistan and is keenly interested in seeing the U.N. "think big" in the region.

In my view, Hezb-i Wahdat will continue to cooperate fully with the U.N. as long as 1) U.N. programs do not disturb the unity of the area, and 2) the U.N. respects (i.e. listens to) Hezb-i Wahdat's recommendations. Up to now the party has not imposed an agenda on the U.N. the way shuras often do. However, they want to be informed of all U.N. activities. They have also made it very clear that the U.N. should not focus on one or two districts but should cast its net wide. One way the U.N. can disturb the unity of the region is by pouring too many projects into a small area.

Hezb-i Wahdat is the most important ally for the U.N. in central Afghanistan. While the U.N. should remain outside of local politics, the choices we make - which schools get rebuilt, which hospitals get medicine - are political choices. Whenever possible, we should ensure that our choices do not interfere with or complicate Hezb-i Wahdat's task of maintaining unity.

Hezb-i Wahdat is still young and still "testing the waters." There are limits to its unity and authority, as we have seen when commanders who nominally belong to Hezb-i Wahdat (e.g., Poya) disrupt supplies bound for other Hezb-i Wahdat areas. Good relations with Hezb-i Wahdat are a necessity for the U.N. in central Afghanistan, but they do not guarantee success.
B. The Islamic Shura

The Islamic Shura is a multi-ethnic coalition of both Shia and Sunni parties whose mujahideen were involved in the liberation of Bamyan in 1988. Unlike Hezb-i Wahdat, its writ does not extend beyond Bamyan center. It makes no claim to represent central Afghanistan, as Hezb-i Wahdat does. A tacit understanding between the two parties allows the Shura to go about its business in the center, although there are rumors that Hezb-i Wahdat ultimately wishes to "absorb" the shura.

While relations are generally good, the Islamic Shura has had two complaints against the U.N. First, until the last mission, they were upset that no projects had been implemented in Bamyan itself. That problem has been at least temporarily solved with the two school projects finalized in December.

The second complaint is that the U.N. hired and then refused to fire an office manager not proposed or even backed by the shura. Like most shuras, this one wants control over U.N. local staff; they argue that local employees should be selected from a list of nominees put forth by the shura. The first U.N. team to return in the spring will have to resolve this matter and decide the fate of the office manager and the personnel that he hired, provided the office is to remain in Bamyan center. The agreement with the Shura now is that Alamy may remain, but his employment beyond next spring depends on an improvement in his relations with the shura.

The Islamic Shura is the local authority in Bamyan and must, therefore, be respected. If the U.N. office moves, however, the Islamic Shura will be of no more importance than any other shura.

C. Harakat Islami

Harakat Islami (HI) has been the most active Shia party in battling the Afghan government and is a major player in the politics of central Afghanistan. Unlike other Shia parties, HI is not exclusively Hazara but draws strong support from the Shia population in Qandahar. Ayatollah Mohseni, the party’s leader, is a Qandahari Shia himself.

HI is not a member of Hezb-i Wahdat, and in some areas there is tension between the two. Several Harakat commanders remarked that HI does not join Hezb-i Wahdat because the ideology of the latter is "mullahism."

HI’s zones of influence in central Afghanistan lie on the outskirts of the Hazarajat in areas such as central Parwan, northern and central Wardak, and central Ghazni (Qarabagh, Jaghatu, and Nawur). Hezb-i Wahdat is stronger in the heartland of the Hazarajat. Where U.N. missions to Bamyan are most likely to encounter HI is on the road from Dahane Abdalla to Shashpul, the
domain of Commander Faizi.

While the U.N. should work closely with Hezb-i Wahdat, it must not do so at the expense of HI. Thus far the U.N. has not implemented projects in Harakat areas; the road from Behsud to Bamyan, called for in the 1991 Draft Plan, would be an excellent start.
V. Draft Plan of Action for 1991

A. Overview

U.N. missions to central Afghanistan have corroborated the conventional view that the Hazarajat is a particularly undeveloped region of the country. While the physical damage wrought by war is not as great here as in other areas, the region still lacks basic and decent services in all sectors. There are many reasons for this deficiency: chronic neglect by Afghan governments, fierce fighting among competing Shia parties during the 1980's, deficiencies in local leadership that hamper local initiative, and the ruggedness, isolation, and severe winters of the region. Snow blocks roads for four months or more a year. Moreover, the distance between Bamyan and Peshawar has simply discouraged participation from many NGO's.

During 1990, U.N. officials from several agencies spent many hours discussing the possibilities and logistics of assistance to central Afghanistan with local authorities. These discussions revealed the importance of the U.N. introducing itself and explaining its objectives, its programs, its modus operandi, and its resources. Central Afghans are not familiar with the U.N.; this unfamiliarity spawns both wariness and unreal expectations. One of the main tasks of each mission should be to chip away at both.

There is also a recognition in central Afghanistan that U.N. assistance offers an unprecedented opportunity, and there is eagerness throughout the region to take advantage of it. In some areas, either because local leaders have had no contact with the U.N. and do not know its agenda, or have had too much contact without any results, or perceive a project to be aiding an opponent, or are simply unscrupulous, "taking advantage" of assistance will be done by force. However, the overall experience of 1990 demonstrates that there is a strong commitment to the U.N. in central Afghanistan and a genuine concern for the welfare and security of its personnel.

There are other ingredients for success: stability in the area, albeit fragile, and very strong initiatives to maintain it; genuine needs without an accompanying "dependency syndrome;" the availability of technically trained personnel and teachers; an abundance of labor; and the availability of supplies (e.g., construction materials such as cement and glass, mainly from Kabul).

The area also features airstrips, unused in recent years (except for Bamyan) but still in good condition, in Lal (Ghor), Yakaolang, Panjao, and Bamyan. U.N. personnel have visited all of them. Shuras are keen to see the U.N. plane used more.
Encompassing as wide an area as its does (approximately 50,000 square kilometers and one million people, all falling under the administration of one U.N. office), central Afghanistan has very different needs in its different regions. While karezes, for example, are a priority in parts of Ghazni, in Bamyan they are not. What cuts across all districts is the concept of Food for Work, which is both feasible and appropriate and allows the U.N. flexibility in tackling the specific needs of each district.

B. Sectors

1. Roads

The need most frequently emphasized by shuras in central Afghanistan was roads. Indeed, it was startling how often, in a region short of hospitals, clinics, schools, and machinery, shuras mentioned roads and bridges as priorities.

Based on discussions with shuras in Bamyan, Yakaolang, Panjao, Lal, and Balkhak, the most highly sought-after road is one that would link central Afghanistan with the north, i.e. with Mazar-i Sharif. It is an approximately 180-kilometer stretch of impassable terrain (except on foot) between Yakaolang district (Bamyan) and Balkhak district (Jozjan). It would be a major project that would require more planning and surveying than has been possible thus far. An Afghan engineer surveyed more than forty kilometers of the proposed road on horseback during the last mission. He estimated the total cost of the road at $500,000 plus at least one tractor. The cost could be significantly reduced if laborers were paid in wheat.

In spite of the obstacles, the project is appealing for several reasons:

1. the road would be a major contribution to the infrastructure of central Afghanistan;

2. it has been approved verbally by the Central Committee of Hezb-i Wahdat in addition to regional shuras;

3. it could be a multi-district project if the local authorities agreed to involve laborers and technicians from other districts;

4. it could be a joint U.N. project involving both the Bamyan and Mazar offices.

If the project is deemed worthy of further investigation, the next step would be to complete a detailed survey of the road next spring. The Yakaolang shura can assist with preparations in the field.
The second major area for road improvement is along the Behsud - Bamyan route, which for most of the year was the standard U.N. route to Bamyan. The road is passable during summer and fall but treacherous, mainly because of makeshift bridges, the rest of the year. The Afghan NGO START has done a preliminary survey of the road.

The Behsud - Bamyan area is not a Hezb-i Wahdat stronghold, although Hezb-i Wahdat supports the idea of U.N. activity there. Harakat Islami is the major party. From the political standpoint, road projects in the area would enhance the U.N.'s appearance of neutrality.

Beyond these two routes, there are dozens of smaller roads and bridges scattered throughout central Afghanistan in need of repair. In most cases, hand tools are the only equipment needed. UNOCA purchased two hydraulic drill machines in November for use on a road project from western Baghlan to Samangan; these machines would be available in the spring for use elsewhere and could be part of a growing arsenal of equipment collected at the SMU.

2. Education

The second priority for U.N. assistance in central Afghanistan is education, particularly primary education.

The U.N. should ardently take advantage of the relative receptivity of central Afghans toward female education. There are already primary schools for girls in Lal (Ghor) and Shahristan (Uruzgan).

Ideally a U.N. plan for education would include the provision, at least initially, of salaries and supplies. If UNESCO is able to pursue projects in central Afghanistan during 1991, or at least to send a representative to assess the possibility, this organization could play an important role in the education sector.

If UNESCO is not in the picture, there are possibilities for close cooperation between the U.N. and NGO's. Swedish Committee is the leading NGO in this sector in central Afghanistan. The SMU leader in Bamyan should meet with NGO's in Peshawar to raise their level of interest.

What can be done immediately, however, is the rehabilitation or construction of school buildings under Food For Work projects. Often classes in existing "schools" in central Afghanistan are held in mosques; homes, outside, or in damaged buildings. Shuras are understandably keen to have classes held in proper buildings.

In 1990 the U.N. built or rehabilitated eight schools in three districts using 130 MT's of wheat. Generally these projects consisted of a ten-classroom school with toilets and surrounding...
Major road projects proposed for 1991
wall without any provision of salaries or supplies; however, the
schools were functioning already, thus precluding the need to
introduce salaries.

3. Irrigation

Karezes, small dams, wells, and various mechanisms for water
control are the third priority for 1991, particularly in the
northern districts of Ghazni. As the major input for these
projects is labor, activity in the irrigation sector would fall
primarily under Food For Work.

Karez repair can be undertaken in the winter in parts of
northern Ghazni, according to local residents. WFP is finalizing
projects in Jaghatu district at present. If it is indeed possible
to work in the snow and for convoys to reach Ghazni from Peshawar,
these are projects that should be started as soon as possible.

4. Demining

Central Afghanistan is heavily mined, but the U.N. can make
an important contribution to the security of the region by demining
the two areas where mines are found: Bamiyan center and the border
between Qarabagh and Jaghori districts (Loman) in Ghazni.

Demining teams were active in Bamiyan from July - December
and should resume in the spring. The central committee of Hezb­
i Wahdat has encouraged the U.N. to demine in Ghazni (deminers have
been working in Qarabagh already) as soon as possible.

C. Implementing partners

There are three types of implementing partners in central
Afghanistan: foreign NGO's, Afghan NGO's and shuras.

For foreign NGO's, the author either visited or heard of the
following agencies working in the area. This list is not meant to
be complete but is simply a reflection of the author's contact in
the field.

1. Roads

VITA Recently opened an office in Bamiyan center
and has, according to the Islamic Shura, discussed possible road
projects, particularly between the Haji Gak Pass and Shashpul.
Could be a useful implementing partner for U.N. road projects.

AFRANE Is working with WFP on a road project in
Jaghatu district, Ghazni.

NCA Provided an international engineer for
monitoring a road project in Eshposteh (Baghlan/Bamiyan) in
December. Active in Ghazni but not in Hazara areas.

DAACAR Has worked in Ghazni but not in Hazara areas.

2. Education

SCA Supports schools in Jaghatu and Jaghori districts (Ghazni) and is the best bet, based on geographical range and level of experience, for work with the U.N. in this sector.

UNO Along with Muslim Aid, said to be supporting schools in northern Ghazni, but the author has had no contact in the field.

3. Health

AVICEN The most active NGO in central Afghanistan in any sector. Focuses on vaccination but has also branched out into wheat distribution and road building.

LEPCO Active in Lal (Ghor), Sheikh Ali (Parwan), Jaghori (Ghazni). Also supports schools in Jaghori.

GAF Has an office in Bamyan center but the author has seen no activity there.

GAC Supports clinics around central Afghanistan. Recently agreed to fill the vacuum left by MSF at a hospital in Yakaolang.

IMC Has a clinic in Abu Nokra (Wardak) and in Kalu Valley (Bamyan).

For Afghan NGO's, there are the following Hazara organizations:

Aryana Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan. Based in Peshawar and affiliated with Harakat Islami. Its main area of interest is northern Wardak, including Behsud.

Cooperation Council for Afghanistan. Based in Islamabad and affiliated with Mustazifin. Its area of primary interest is Shashpul.

Gharjestan Reconstruction Council. Based in Quetta and interested primarily in northern Helmand.

Khorasan Assistance Group. Based in Quetta, this is the most active Afghan NGO in the central region. It has implemented a variety of projects in Jaghori and Qarabagh districts of Ghazni: emergency feeding, schools, fruit trees, etc.
Islamic Unity Reconstruction Council. Based in Quetta. Has conducted extensive surveys in various sectors but has not actually implemented projects. Claims to have letter of support from Hezb-i Wahdat Central Committee.

Resalat. Based in Peshawar and affiliated with Nasr but has recently folded.

Most of the Afghan NGO's are still in their infancy in terms of actual experience with implementation. If the U.N. wishes to continue to encourage the growth and maturation of indigenous institutions, then the U.N. must be more responsive to their project proposals. However, Afghan leaders inside the country are ambivalent about Afghan NGO's because they are based in Pakistan and perceived to be out of touch with local conditions.

A widely held view in central Afghanistan is that implementing partners should come directly from areas surrounding the project site and meet the approval of the local shura. In 1990, in fact, most projects in central Afghanistan were implemented by local shuras, which appointed a representative, usually an engineer, for oversight. Some shuras have formed technical committees on their own initiative. The "shura approach" is the most popular on the local level and could be developed to satisfy U.N. concerns about contributing to viable institutions for the future.

D. Further recommendations

1. Shifting of the U.N. office

If the U.N. is to have a major presence in central Afghanistan during 1991 and beyond, it might be advisable in the long run for the U.N. to shift its base of operations from Bamyan center to Panjao or Yakaolang. While Bamyan (site I) is the political and symbolic capital of central Afghanistan, Panjao/Yakaolang (site II) offer the following advantages:

a. less political tension

Site II is a Hezb-i Wahdat stronghold and, therefore, does not have the competitive political atmosphere of Bamyan center, which has three shuras.

b. more responsive shuras

Shuras in site II are less preoccupied with security and are more responsive to the needs of the civilian population.

c. logistical superiority

If the U.N. continues to use the new route via Tagao instead of the Haji Gak Pass, site II is closer to Peshawar. More
importantly, it offers better access to the heartland of central Afghanistan, where most future U.N. activity will be. Site II also has a telephone line that links Yakaolang, Panjao, Waras, and Lal. Like Bamyan, there are useable airstrips. Site II has excellent storage facilities as well.

d. miscellaneous

The U.N. will have to move out of its present office in Bamyan in 1991 regardless. The office is now the project site (Food for Work) for a school. Other sites are available in Bamyan but would require reconstruction. Both shuras in site II are keen for the shift, as is the Central Committee of Hezb-i Wahdat, which favors Panjao. However, office sites in site II would require reconstruction as well.

2. Distribution of 100 MT's of wheat per district

In keeping with the need to distribute assistance evenly and widely so as not to disturb the political balance in central Afghanistan, the U.N. should plan on allocating 100 MT's of wheat to each of the twenty-one districts targeted for 1991. Some districts, such as Lal, Waras, Nawur, and Behsud, are ready for project implementation once the U.N. draws up agreements with the relevant shuras. Other districts, such as those in northern Uruzgan, have not received U.N. missions and would not, therefore, be ready to implement projects until later in the year.

The SMU leader and WFP will have to tailor the actual amounts for each district based on need and population but should aim for 100 MT's. Every district can easily absorb this amount in the form of Food for Work. As one can see from Annex B, 100 MT's would cover five to ten small projects, which is not a lot in terms of overall need but is a start nevertheless. It is unrealistic to expect to distribute more than 2100 MT's for Food for Work projects in one year based on past experience.

3. Placement of storage facility en route to Bamyan

Reflecting on the difficulties the U.N. encountered in bringing wheat to central Afghanistan during 1990, members of the last mission to Bamyan entertained the idea of setting up a storage facility (Rubb Hall or otherwise) halfway between Bamyan and Peshawar.

Under ideal circumstances, the 1253-kilometer journey takes a Land Cruiser five days and a lorry at least one week. From the time of loading in Peshawar to unloading in Bamyan, a lorry carrying U.N. wheat can expect to spend ten days to two weeks.

Over the summer, conventional wisdom in the U.N. was that the challenge of getting supplies to central Afghanistan was getting
through the Pashtun areas, i.e. from the Pakistan border to Qarabagh. The experience of 1990, however, shows that the major obstacles lie inside the Hazara areas where individual commanders are quick to perceive the U.N. as tipping, albeit inadvertently, the local balance of power.

The positioning of a storage facility with a capacity of at least 1000 MT’s in Ghazni, near Qarabagh, offers two significant advantages: it places the onus of getting the wheat to its final destination on the local authorities, particularly Hezb-i Wahdat; and it gives local transporters an economic boost.

Under this plan, the U.N. would dispatch 6000 MT’s of wheat by the standard U.N. transport companies (based in Peshawar) as early in the year as possible. The wheat would move out of storage as soon as specific projects were identified and proceed to the project site. Shuras in the recipient districts would arrange escorts and assume overall responsibility for the safe passage of the convoy. Convoys moving through central Afghanistan would, thus, be smaller and more manageable.

Hezb-i Wahdat shuras are in favor of the idea. The recommended site for such a facility is Jaghatu district, in either the villages of Qeogh, Jermatu, or Sariab (Sariab is the largest of the three), all about two hours from the Qarabagh bazaar. It is a strong Hezb-i Wahdat area under a commander from Nasr who is a member of the Central Committee and enjoys good relations with the U.N. The surrounding area is sparsely populated and secure. None of the three proposed sites, however, has a storage facility at this time. The U.N. would have to provide one and hire the relevant staff.

4. Further expansion of the Bamyan SMU

The draft plan for 1991 covers twenty-one districts in five provinces. This is a very large area for one office to administer. To operate effectively the U.N. will have to either open offices in each province or divide the central region into northern and southern (or eastern and western) halves. Access from Quetta or the solidification of a base in Tarin Kowt (Uruzgan) would facilitate such a division.

For 1991, however, the set-up as outlined here can function as is although U.N. teams will have to cover a lot of ground in order to monitor projects.

When expansion is possible, i.e. when work is underway in the twenty-one core districts, the U.N. should push out to the periphery of central Afghanistan, into western Parwan, southwestern Baghlan, southern Jozjan, south/central Ghor, northern Helmand, northern Zabul, and central Wardak. These areas are no less important ultimately than the core areas. However, work is mixed
Hazara/Pashtun districts will require caution but could eventually contribute to a defusing of tension between the two ethnic groups. A great achievement for the U.N. would be to assist in the creation of a stable, functioning, representative shura composed of both Hazaras and Pashtuns in at least one district.

E. Objectives for 1991

The above discussion points to the following objectives as guidelines for U.N. activities in central Afghanistan for 1991:

During 1991, the U.N. should:

1. facilitate access between central and northern Afghanistan by surveying and repairing/constructing at least two major roads;

2. improve educational facilities, particularly at the primary school level, by constructing or repairing at least two schools in each of twenty-two districts;

3. improve agricultural output and water quality through the repairing/construction of karezes, small dams, canals, and wells;

4. dispatch and preposition 6000 MT's of wheat for use in the above projects under the Food for Work program;

5. complete demining in the two areas in which mines are found;

6. implement at least one project, provided it meets U.N. standards and objectives, with each of the Afghan NGO's active in central Afghanistan, and more if the projects are successful;

7. assess needs in areas hitherto unvisited, particularly in Uruzgan province;

8. compile a comprehensive assessment of health conditions and set priorities for the health sector;

9. compile a comprehensive assessment of agricultural conditions and set priorities for assistance;

10. identify the concerns of Afghan women, hitherto overlooked by U.N. missions, and set priorities for assistance.
1. District - sector priorities for 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>Bamyan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kahmard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panjao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saighan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shibar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>Jaghato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jaghori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khwaja Omri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malestan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nawur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qarabagh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>Lal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
<td>Ajrestan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dai Kundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gezab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kajran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shahristan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>Behsud I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behsud II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total districts: 21
2. **Budget for 1991**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. <strong>Roads</strong></td>
<td>Yakaolang - Balkhab 180 kms.</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behsud - Bamyan 100 kms.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other roads, esp. Lal and Behsud</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,250,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. <strong>Schools</strong></td>
<td>construction and supplies</td>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong> 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. <strong>Irrigation</strong></td>
<td>tools and equipment</td>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong> 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. <strong>Demining</strong></td>
<td>two teams x 4 months in Bamyan</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>two teams x 4 months in Ghazni</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>160,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. <strong>Storage</strong></td>
<td>one Rubb Hall tent</td>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong> 75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. <strong>Wheat</strong></td>
<td>100 MT's per district for Food for Work (2100 MT's)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3200 MT's for road projects listed above (3200 MT's)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>700 MT's reserve (700 MT's)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs.8000/ton x 6000 MT's</td>
<td>2,220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,220,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,705,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex A

U.N. International Staff in Bamyan - 1990

I. first mission: 29 May - 19 June.

participants: Michael Keating (UNOCA) Team Leader
Caroline Sergeant (UNICEF)
Gerard Viguie (WFP)
Kei Kimpara (UNILOG)

major reports: Keating, "Bamyan Bound."
Sergeant, "Health in Bamyan Province."
Abdul Wasay Najimi, "A Study of the Cultural
Heritages."
Abdul Wasay Najimi, "Schools in the Central
Part of Afghanistan."

II. second mission: 31 August - 10 October.

participants: Ake Rosvall (UNICEF) Team Leader
Peter Larsen (WFP)
Kudus Lobanga (UNILOG)


III. third mission: 27 September - 30 October.

participants: Timothy Lenderking (UNOCA) Team Leader
Peter Larsen (WFP)
Kudus Lobanga (UNILOG)

major reports: Lenderking, "U.N. Program for 1991: A
Preliminary Assessment."

IV. fourth mission: 21 November - 14 December.

participants: Timothy Lenderking (UNOCA) Team Leader
Peter Larsen (WFP)

major reports: Lenderking, "The U.N. in Central Afghanistan:
1990 and 1991."
Larsen, "Bamyan Mission: Information Sheet."
Mohammed Alam, "Reconnaisance Survey: Yakaolang and Balkhab Road Project."
Annex B

Summary of Projects - 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>Input</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>road</td>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>local NGO</td>
<td>15.7 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>road</td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>20.6 MT Rs.8800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>food</td>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>local commander</td>
<td>Rs.6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>school</td>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>22.6 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>school</td>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>13.8 MT Rs.1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>school</td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>20.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>school</td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>12.7 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>school</td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
<td>local shura</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>school</td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>12.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>FFW</td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>10.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>dam</td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>5.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>dam</td>
<td>Yakaolang</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>5.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>school</td>
<td>Panjao</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>26.8 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>school</td>
<td>Panjao</td>
<td>local shura</td>
<td>12.0 MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of projects started: 14

Total amount of wheat used: 188.5 MT (includes 2 MT for project supervision in Yakaolang)

Total cash input: Rs.16,600 ($760.00)
Annex C

U.N. Wheat Dispatches to Bamyan:

September - December 1990

I. September/October

100 MT's dispatched from Peshawar with escort from the Islamic Shura of Bamyan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MT</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>projects (October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>projects (December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>taken in Shashpul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>unaccounted for (Dahane Abdalla?) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>presumed lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of December 1990, spare tires and vital parts of Rubb Hall tents were still missing from this convoy as well (Dahane Abdalla?).

II. November/December


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MT</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>projects in Yakaolang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>projects in Panjao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>storage in Yakaolang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>storage in Dahane Rishga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>paid to drivers as transport charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>spoiled en route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>taken in Dahane Rishga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>taken in Tagao (figure could be as high as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5 MT's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>unaccounted for but presumed to have arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Yakaolang after mid-December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220.00</td>
<td>MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above convoy also consisted of 20 MT's of seed and fertilizer provided by FAO for OXFAM projects in Panjao, Waras, and Lal districts. These 20 MT's arrived in toto.

III. December

WFP dispatched 400 MT's for a project with AVICEN in Behsud district. Details are not available at this time. At least part of the dispatch was hijacked but negotiations are underway for its release.
Likely Food Deficit Areas in Central Afghanistan

The following is a record of areas that U.N. officials have reason to believe are areas of food shortage.

1. **Yakaolang district, Bamyan.** U.N. staff members visited the village of Sare Tarnok on horseback in June. The UNOCA representative wrote that "local people said they lost 300 jeribs of cultivable land, and that one-quarter of the remaining 400 jeribs had been damaged, along with many houses," when the earth's plates shifted earlier in the year. He continued: "It is almost certain that if not helped the villagers will have to sell their remaining cattle; then they will have to leave and will become internally displaced."

The U.N. arranged for 50 MT's of wheat to be dispatched to the village in the November convoy. The Yakaolang shura, however, was opposed to sending free food to the area, saying it would destroy morale. In the end 10 MT's were set aside for Food for Work projects in Sare Tarnok.

2. **Sheikh Ali district, Parwan.** U.N. staff members in Bamyan received repeated visits from shura members in this Hazara area requesting immediate help for 400 families whose fields were destroyed following spring floods. The representatives insisted that without outside help the inhabitants would have to leave the area.

Because of a serious security incident in this district in September involving a commander from Ittehadi Islami (Sayyaf), the U.N. is not working at present in Parwan. Hezb-i Wahdat in Bamyan is keen for assistance to the Hazara areas and has offered to help resolve the situation, short of using force, but is skeptical of its influence.

3. **Chagcharan district, Ghor.** A prominent elder of the Chahar Aimaq people of central and western Ghor arrived in Lal district during my visit. Also a commander of Jamiat Islami, Rais Babur Murad claimed that thousands of Aimaq families (the Aimaq are considered the poorest of Afghanistan's ethnic groups) were facing acute food shortage because of three years of fighting against Hezb-i Islami (Hekmatyar).

The U.N. dispatched close to one MT of wheat to the area immediately.

4. **Airestan district, Uruzgan.** Reports from residents visiting Peshawar speak of a food crisis caused by fighting between
Hazaras and Pashtuns earlier in the year. Ajrestan is a Pashtun area surrounded by Hazara lands. One tribal leader claimed that half the district's inhabitants had no foodstocks for the winter.

The U.N. is in the process of organizing a mission to Uruzgan to assess the situation.

5. Day Chopan district, Zabul. This is another district badly affected by the recent Hazara-Pashtun conflict. I encountered commanders from this area in Qarabagh in December. They were en route to Pakistan with letters from shura members requesting immediate assistance from agencies in Peshawar following widespread destruction of homes and the displacement of residents.
Letter from Hezb-i Wahdat with proposals for 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Duplicate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Party of United Islamic Afghanistan.**
Annex E

Letter from Hezb-i Wahdat with proposals for 1991

The proposals which have been given to the reconstruction committee and the U.N. should be taken with keen interest.

1. Less than 25% of the aid which has been given to areas controlled by the mujahideen was allocated to Hazarajat.

2. The office in central Hazarajat and its related areas should be established under the control of Hezb-i Wahdat because security conditions can be properly checked by the party.

3. The head of the U.N. [in Bamyan] should have every sort of design or programme with him.

4. Work should be done under the supervision of Hezb-i Wahdat. All kind of necessary staff should be taken from the party if available within the shura and which will be officially introduced by the party. Aid should be used under the control of persons who will be introduced by the Peshawar-based parties [?].

5. Apart from the central office, branch offices should be opened in every province to ensure proper supplies, e.g. in Ghazni, Wardak, Parwan, Uruzgan, and for the northern region of Hazarajat.

6. To maintain security and to attract local people for cooperation it is necessary to deliver food supplies to all areas of Hazarajat, especially to those areas which have not yet received any help or aid.

7. The aid material should be used for construction work and for projects pertaining to the construction of schools, for homeless and orphans under the guidance of administrators present in the area.

8. All schools, hospitals, and government buildings which were destroyed should be repaired or reconstructed.

9. Roads, bridges, small bridges, and telephone lines should be repaired or reconstructed.

10. Projects should be started for social welfare, i.e. agriculture, electricity, and handicrafts.

11. Veterinary clinics and poultry farms should be established.

12. Personnel should be trained in every field.

13. The U.N. can establish projects in the areas of Ghazni,
Wardak, etc.

Hezb-i Wahdat requests the U.N. to give attention to the reconstruction of all areas of Hazarajat....

Thank you.

signed and sealed by Hezb-i Wahdat Central Committee
Annex F
Routes and Distances: Peshawar - Bamyan

DISTANCES AND DRIVING TIMES
(kilometers and hours)

- Peshawar - Wana 453 9.0
- Wana - Urgun 126 5.0
- Urgun - Qarabagh 162 8.0
- Qarabagh - Nani 35 .75
- Nani - Nawr 120 4.5
- Nawr - Tagao 106 3.5
- Tagao - Panjao 95 3.5
- Panjao - Yakaolang 58 2.5
- Yakaolang - Bamyan 98 2.5
### Annex G

**Important Commanders between Qarabagh and Bamyan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>commander</th>
<th>village</th>
<th>district</th>
<th>province</th>
<th>party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ustad Hakimi</td>
<td>Qeogh</td>
<td>Jaghatu</td>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Shahjan</td>
<td>Turgan</td>
<td>Jaghatu</td>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali Shahjoy</td>
<td>Nawur</td>
<td>Nawur</td>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo'atammedi</td>
<td>Rakulakh</td>
<td>Behsud</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poya</td>
<td>Dahane Abdalla</td>
<td>Behsud</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andesh</td>
<td>Dahane Seyasan</td>
<td>Behsud</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fahimi</td>
<td>Tagao</td>
<td>Behsud</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusufi</td>
<td>Dahane Rishga</td>
<td>Behsud</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>Nasr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ustad Hakimi (Qeogh)**
- Well-respected within HW and one of Nasr's major commanders in Afghanistan. WFP is discussing FFW projects in Qeogh now.

**Dr. Shahjan (Turgan)**
- Reported to be an important commander but the U.N. has not met with him directly.

**Wali Shahjoy (Nawur)**
- Very supportive of the U.N. but also complains about too many surveys with no follow-up.

**Mo'atammedi (Rakulakh)**
- Second Bamyan mission met his assistant Mawin and delivered a letter of introduction to Mo'atammedi.

**Poya (Dahane Abdalla)**
- Hijacked four trucks of U.N. wheat in October but released them later. Might cause further trouble until projects are implemented in his area. Has submitted a variety of project proposals to U.N.

**Andesh (Dahane Seyasan)**
- Also involved in October hijacking but subordinate to Poya. Still has good relations with U.N.

**Fahimi (Tagao)**
- Mujahideen at his base hijacked U.N. wheat in November during his absence. Has submitted proposals to revitalize the hospital on his base.

**Yusufi (Dahane Rishga)**
- Very cooperative with U.N. after U.N. wheat was taken near his base. First and only encounter with U.N. in December 1990.
Faizi Abu Nokra Behsud Wardak HI

Important commander in Behsud, met with first Bamyan mission. Has been cooperative with U.N. so far but U.N. has not yet worked in his area.

In the major district centers of Bamyan, Panjao, and Yakaolang, the local authorities are multi-party shuras strongly allied with Hezb-i Wahdat.

abbreviations:  HW = Hezb-i Wahdat  
SI = Shura Ittefaq  
HI = Harakat Islami  
FFW = Food for Work