A GUIDE TO "DOCUMENTS FROM THE NEST OF SPIES"

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INTRODUCTION

On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students entered the US Embassy compound in Tehran and held all the American staff as hostages. This episode marked a new, dramatic step toward the deterioration of relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America.

When the Iranian students occupied the Embassy, they also had the chance to seize all the documents existing in the buildings. So, unlike what happened in Saigon or in other capitals (including, probably, Tehran itself a few months earlier during the climax of the anti-Pahlavi revolution) where the Embassy staff had enough time to select and destroy all sensitive materials, the November 4th takeover was so unexpected that everything was left in the hands of the intruders.

The Iranian government soon decided to publish the documents found and began to edit a series of books called in Persian "Asnad-e lane-ye jasus," i.e., "Documents of the nest of spies." By 1983 some 33 of them were issued, mostly dealing with Iran and Iranian questions. But two of them, nos. 29 and 30 (hereafter referred to as #1 & #2), were dedicated to Afghanistan.

As those two volumes are not easily found, I have been asked to prepare a synopsis and some comments. I shall indicate the distinctive features of the two volumes and how I have summarized them. First, however, it may be useful to introduce a few remarks about the documents themselves.

All of the documents are copies of telex messages sent to or from Kabul and also sent for information purposes to other US embassies, including Tehran where they were filed and then discovered by the Iranian students. Only a few documents originated from Tehran itself, such as a confidential telegram (#8 in our collection), or the draft of a letter sent by Charles W. Naas, charge d'affaires a.i., to the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Amir Eltezam (#20, see also #21 and #22).

Documents #116-130 deserve special mention as they are reproduced in the volumes after all the little strips into which they had been cut had been put back together again [see pp. 21 & 28]. In spite of the careful reconstruction work, they remain hardly readable without comparing them with the Persian translation in the books.) These papers are worthy of notice because they all originated from CIA offices and refer to information collected through secret intelligence and to demonstrations of Afghans against the DRA government held in New Delhi on September 28, 1979, which "were funded by New Delhi Station (of the CIA) and organized at Station behest."
Apart from this special group, to which must be added #1 (a biography of Daud prepared by the Central Reference Service of the CIA in 1973), the general contents of the messages vary from normal intelligence (sometimes bordering on gossip harvesting) caught during official meetings or evening parties, to bureaucratic briefings regarding formal contacts and conversations by US officials with Afghan political leaders (both government and opposition) and with Soviet, East and West European, Indian, Chinese, etc., staff members, to news concerning the internal situation in the country, to biographies and evaluations of top ERA dignitaries.

The period covered runs from January 30, 1978 to November 2, 1979 (two days before the embassy occupation). Only the first one (the above-mentioned biography of Daud) was prepared before; only 11 documents were dated from 1978 (two could not be chronologically identified, i.e., #30b and #126).

I am not certain that all of the documents actually found by the students have been reproduced. 4 Frankly, I think a choice has been made. For instance, no document (except for a few lines in #116) deals with the murder of Ambassador Dubs on February 14 or with the Herat uprising on March 12, 1979, two important events which occurred during the period covered. The latter deficiency, in particular, could be very meaningful as some have suggested that the Iranian Islamic Government was directly involved in the rebellion.

At any rate, through the Reference Telexes often mentioned in the documents, it appears without doubt that many other messages concerning Afghanistan must have reached Tehran. Unfortunately there is no trace of them in the volumes. In spite of this, however, the importance of the volumes remains two-fold: they contain new and (as far as I know) not yet exploited information about a crucial period of recent Afghan history, information deriving, moreover, from well-identified and acknowledged sources; and they allow us a close look into the international diplomatic world, into the activities, objectives, relationships, methods, etc., of Kabul, Washington, Tehran, Moscow, Peking and many other foreign affairs offices, both East and West, North and South.

Such a glance behind the curtain is rarely possible because diplomatic documents become accessible (and not always in their actual fullness) to the public only when a long period of time has elapsed from the time they were written. And when sometimes it happens that some secret or confidential news is disclosed on-the-spot to the mass media by "unidentified diplomatic sources," its real worth very often approaches zero, as the Afghanistan Forum readers know!

In the case of Asnad-e lane-ye jasus, however, we have the very feelings and proofs of how things happened behind the scene a few years ago, a very useful reminder in our troubled days when, once again, propaganda threatens to wipe out reality.
The two volumes on Afghanistan, #29 and 30 of the Asnad-e lane-ye jasus, were published by the Daneshjuyan-e mosalman-e peirv-e Khatt-e Emam. The books have no bibliographical data; there is only an indication (in Persian) of three places in Tehran where they can be purchased.

Vol.1 has 232 numbered pages of English text and 247 numbered pages of Persian translation, plus a blank page in the middle and 4 unnumbered pages at the beginning of the Persian section containing the title, the addresses of the three bookshops, the basmala written as a tughray and a set of general explanations recalling to Iranian readers how all the documents in the series show the actions and deeds of the Sheitan-e bozorg, the Big Devil. Volume 2 has 163 numbered pages of English text and 229 of Persian plus two blank pages in the middle and again four pages at the beginning of the Persian section identical to Volume 1 but for the lack of the set of explanations. In the copies I have used, Volume 2 also has two unnumbered pages preceding the English section; the first one with the basmala in Arabic and in English, the second one with the following annotation: "Telegrams no. Tehran 452, Tehran 4791, Tehran 6160, and Tehran 0025 were the last copies of their original texts, and, thus, very dull in color. Therefore their printing and photographing in books were not favorably possible. For this reason, the above-mentioned documents were re-typed."

Pages 1-25 of the Persian text of the first volume (translated in pages 1-37 of the English part) offer a brief introduction prepared by the Moslem student followers of the Imam "in order to have a succinct information regarding Afghanistan and getting familiar with the events." It is divided into the following chapters: some geographical data; the ruling regimes of Afghanistan from Zaher Shah to Amin; the democratic republic; the Soviets and Afghanistan; overall interest of the Russians in Afghanistan; Soviet penetration in Afghanistan; Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or Afghanistan Soviet Republic?; the way the United States approached the Afghanistan problem; the people of Afghanistan and the combating groups.

In total there are 130 documents (57 in Volume 1) which are not published in exact chronological order. I listed them without any reorganization so the reader must be very careful in their handling. Each telex begins with a group of letters and numbers referring evidently to usual technical codes. Then follows the date, the place of origin, the destination, the other addressees (up to 20 US embassies or international organizations), the classification, the telex number and, when applicable, the numbers of telex messages referred to in the text.

After these technical points, there is a section called "Subject." It is this part that I have reproduced exactly to summarize the contents of the telexes. I chose to do so to keep, as far as possible, the wording used by US officials. When I added something, I put it into [brackets]. Other details needed to better understand the documents are added below the synopsis. The quotation marks used in a text inside brackets indicate that I am quoting again from the original (see, for instance, #4).
After the "Subject" in the telex there is sometimes a "Summary" of up to twenty lines or more and then the full text begins, subdivided into various numbered paragraphs. One or more paragraphs called "Comment," with the signature, are at the end.

Because of the lack of space for this synopsis, I was obliged to reproduce here only the original "Subject," except for #10, 18, 22 & 116 which are offered as illustrative of the material in an appendix. Please note that #116 was, as said before, cut into strips and reconstructed by the Iranian students so it is difficult to read. When I was unable to understand one or more words, I put three points between brackets •••; when the word is only guessed, I put it into brackets.

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NOTES


2 W. Behn, loc cit., is wrong when he writes: "volumes 31 and 32 deal with Afghanistan."

3 On pages 187-188 of the Persian section of vol.2 there is an explanation as to how this "limited group" (ta'jad-e ma'dudi) of CIA documents was found and on the meaning of the abbreviations used in them.

4 I could not verify if any document or part of a document concerning Afghanistan had been published in other volumes of the series according to the main subject of the telex; see also on this question the comments of Yann Richard in Abstracta Iranica n. 5, 1982, p. 214.

5 Sometimes they are abbreviated, e.g., RUEHC/Secstate Washington, etc.; when possible, all the abbreviations have been explained, otherwise they have generally been omitted from the synopsis.
US DOCUMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN

No. 1 Pp 38-46
From: CIA
Ntelex: -
Sign: -
Subj: Biographic report. Mohammad Daud, President of Afghanistan.
Note: "This report was prepared by the Central Reference Service and was coordinated within CIA as appropriate and with Dept. of State. Comments and questions may be directed to Michael Cappe, code 143, ext. 6756."

No. 2 Pp 47-50
Fr: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex Kabul 0820
Sign: Eliot
Date: 78 JAN 30
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 3 P 51
From: -
Ntelex: -
Sign: -
Subj: [Some of the most important figures in the Afghan gov't after Taraki & Amin are: Shah Wali, Watanjar, Lt Col Mazdooryar, Misaq, Iqbal (1st Deputy Minister of Defense, Amin's man).]
Note: Probably part of another document, it is composed of biographies of the five persons mentioned.

No. 4 Pp 52-55
From: -
Ntelex: -
Sign: -
Subj: The political and military situation in Afghanistan.
Note: "An appeal for Soviet combat units is conceivable within the next 12 months."

No. 5 Pp 56-59
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 3511
Sign: Eliot
Date: 78 MAY 03
Classif: Secret
Reftel: Kabul 3423, 3372 (Biog. of Taraki), 3227 (Karmal), 3142 (murder of Khaibar), Kabul 3392 (biog of Laeq). See document 41 and others.
Subj: Biographical data on Afghan cabinet
Note: The biographies are of Taraki, Karmal, Amin, Watanjar, Qader, Nur, Keshtmand, Misaq, Zaray, Shahrayee, Shah Wali, Panjshiri, Shafii or Shafi'e, Laeq, Danesh, Rai, Kashimi, Sumah, Ratebzad, Ghorbandi, Tahzib.

No. 6 Pp 60-63
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 3619
Sign: Eliot
Date: 78 MAY 06
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -
Subj: First conversation with new Afghan president.

No. 7 Pp 64-67
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 3805
Sign: Eliot
Date: 78 MAY 11
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: State 116319
Subj: Future of US aid programs in Afghanistan
No. 8  Pp 68-69  Date: 78 SEP 26
From: American Embassy Tehran  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: Tehran 09279  Reftel: State 240411
Sign: Sullivan

Note: The "Summary" is: "Shah made it clear to US ambassador that he saw little gain from 'codling' new Afghan regime, but he would go along US gov't desires in the matter."

No. 9  Pp 70-72  Date: 78 OCT 23
From: American Embassy Kabul  Classif: Limited official use
Ntelex: Kabul 8517 (2 sections)  Reftel: -
Sign: Dubs

Subj: New Afghan decree liberalizes marriage arrangements.
Note: Section 1: text of the decree; section 2: comment

No. 10  Pp 73-75  Date: 78 DEC 01
From: Sec'y of State Washington  Classif: Secret
Ntelex: State 344356 (2 sections)  Reftel: State 240411, Kabul 7370
Sign: -


No. 11  Pp 76-80  Date: 79 MAR 19
From: American Embassy Kabul  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: Kabul 2052 (2 sections)  Reftel: -
Sign: Amstutz

Subj: USAID Director's meeting with representatives of other bilateral donors in Afghanistan [i.e., H. Disdorn, Counselor, FRG; K.R.Krook, British Ambassador; E. Yendall, 1st Sec'y (Development) Canadian Embassy in Islamabad; S.K. Singh, Indian Ambassador].

No. 12  Pp 81-82  Date: [after 79 MAR 25]
From: [American Embassy Tehran]  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: -  Reftel: -
Sign: Sullivan

Subj: Situation in Afghanistan
Note: As reported by Sultan Mahmud Ghazi, member of Afghan royal family, former Pres. of Afghan Civil Aviation & Tourism Authority, who visited on 3/25/79 US political counselor in Tehran for visa problems.

No. 13  P 83  Date: 79 MAR 29
From: Sec'y of State Washington  Classif: Limited official use
Ntelex: State 077670  Reftel: -
Sign: Vance

Subj: House Committee cuts aid to Afghanistan

No. 14  Pp 84-86  Date: 79 APR 11
From: [Dept. of State]  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: -  Reftel: -
Sign: -

No. 15 Pp 87-90
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 3557 (2 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: The "big lie" becomes standard Khalqi tool.
Note: "Flat denials that any army mutiny occurred in Jalalabad, or that the
regime tortures its prisoners indicate that the 'big lie' may have become the
regime's preferred public tactic for dealing with thorny issues."

No. 16 Pp 91-94
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 3626
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: The current Soviet role in Afghanistan

No. 17 Pp 95-98
From: Sec'y of State Washington
Ntelex: State 120164 (2 sections)
Sign: Vance
Subj: Request for Information on Afghanistan & PDR Yemen.

No. 18 Pp 99-101
From: American Embassy Islamabad
Ntelex: Islamabad 5531
Sign: Constable
Subj: Gailani representative reports progress in unifying Afghan dissident groups.

No. 19 Pp 102-109
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Airgram Kabul A-33
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Educational backgrounds of Ministers & Deputy Ministers in the Afghan gov't.
Note: Enclosures: 1 - Educational backgrounds of Cabinet Ministers & Deputy Ministers;
2 - Individual educational histories.

No. 20 P P 110
From [American Embassy Tehran]
Ntelex: -
Sign: Naas
Subj: -
Note: It is a letter from Ch. W. Naas, US charge d'affaires a.i. in Tehran, to
Amir Entezam, Iranian Deputy Prime Minister, announcing that Naas is sending him
a "separate paper" on Afghanistan containing "a status report from the time of
the April 1978... & a section drawn upon US recent information." The "paper"
in question may be documents #30a & 30b.

No. 21 Pp 111-113
From: American Embassy Tehran
Ntelex: Tehran 05208
Sign: Naas
Subj: Free-lance Afghan rebels call on Embassy.
Note: On the visit in Tehran by American citizen Zia Nassry

No. 22 Pp 114-115
From: American Embassy Tehran
Ntelex: Tehran 05246
Sign: Naas
Subj: Limited Iranian response to Afghan rebel appeal [Zia Nassry].
No. 23 Pp 116-121
From: American Embassy Moscow
Ntelex: Moscow 13083 (3 sections)
Subj: Afghanistan: prospects for Soviet intervention

No. 24 Pp 122-123
From: American Embassy Moscow
Ntelex: Moscow 13189
Sign: Toon
Subj: Reported appointment of Soviet diplomatic adviser to DRA [V.S. Safronchuk].

No. 25 Pp 124-126
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 4236 (2 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Senate amendment on aid to Afghanistan

No. 26 Pp 127-129
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 4888
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Meeting with Soviet diplomat. Part I of III: Observation on the internal Afghan political scene.
Note: One hour-long courtesy call with V.S. Safronchuk, identified by Amstutz as "unquestionably the most interesting Soviet diplomat I have ever met."

No. 27 Pp 130-131
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 4889
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Meeting with Soviet diplomat. Part II of III: Soviet-Afghan relations.

No. 28 Pp 132-133
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 4890
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Meeting with Soviet diplomat. Part III of III: Human rights

No. 29 Pp 134-135
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 4981
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Afghan-US relations: a gesture that was botched.

No. 30a Pp 136-138
From: -
Ntelex: -
Sign: -
Subj: Section one- Soviet activities in Afghanistan
Note: Probably first part of the paper mentioned in doc. #20.

No. 30b Pp 139-140
From: -
Ntelex: Kabul 5146
Sign: -
Subj: Section two - The current Soviet role in Afghanistan.
Note: Probably second part of the paper mentioned in doc. #20. Note that 30a is classified "Secret" while 30b is only "Confidential."
No. 31 P 141
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5308
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: New Afghan ambassador to Iran is another high ranking Parchami.
Note: Also contains biographical information on Dr. Najib.

Date: 78 JUL 02
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: Tehran 6250

No. 32 P 142
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5146
Sign: Flatin
Subj: Communist diplomats in Kabul [East German ambassador H. Schweisau & Soviet Minister Counselor V.S. Safronchuk] continue to hint a possibility of "National Front" alternative to Khalqi regime.

Date: 79 JUL 05
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 33 Pp 143-144
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5147
Sign: Flatin
Subj: Afghan regime makes display of good will on American Independence Day.
Note: Prof. M. Sooma, Minister of Higher Education & Member of PDPA Politburo, Dr. A.R. Jalili, Minister of Education & Eng. M.I. Danesh, Minister of Mines & Industries attended July 4 reception in US Embassy. On the same day the Kabul Times "carried a friendly editorial about the United States."

Date: 79 JUL 05
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 34 P 145
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5148
Sign: Flatin

Date: 79 JUL 05
Classif: Secret
Reftel: State 172400

No. 35 Pp 146-147
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5243 (2 sections)
Sign: Flatin
Subj: Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi appointed Minister-counselor of Afghanistan's UN mission.

Date: 79 JUL 09
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 36 Pp 148-152
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5243 (2 sections)
Sign: Flatin
Subj: Kabul University: trouble on campus.

Date: 79 JUL 10
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 37 Pp 153-158
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5244 (3 sections)
Sign: Flatin
Subj: Current status of the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Date: 79 JUL 10
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: Kabul 4325

No. 38 Pp 159-161
From: USDAO Kabul
Ntelex: -
Subj: This is IR 6 800 0046 79.
Title: Soviet intentions in Afghanistan/Pakistan.
Note: Probably a document originating from the CIA.
No. 39 Pp 162-166
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5246 (2 sections)
Sign: Flatin
Subj: Puzzlement of the East German Ambassador (Dr. Hermann Schwiesau) over "contradictions" of the Khalqi regime.

No. 40 Pp 167-169
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5360
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Afghan underground propaganda calls for the ouster of PM Amin.

No. 41 Pp 170-177
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5433 (3 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Soviet efforts to urge DRA to find a political resolution of domestic conflict may be underway. See Document #5.

No. 42 P 178
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5448
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Soviets repeatedly have included former minister Abdul Samad Hamed [once Minister of Planning under King Zahir] in "national front" talks.

No. 43 Pp 179-184
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5459 (2 sections)
Sign: -
Subj: GDR Ambassador reports that Soviets hope to replace PM Amin with a broader based government.

No. 44 Pp 185-187
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5459
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Further comments by East German Ambassador about Soviet efforts to alter Afghan regime.

No. 45 Pp 188-190
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5463
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Reports of "united front" not supported by information here.

No. 46 P 191
From: American Embassy Moscow
Ntelex: Moscow 18789
Sign: Garrison
Subj: Pravda commentary on Afghan nat'l organization for the defense of the revolution.

No. 47 Pp 192-194
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5493
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Taraki & Amin hint publicly that they may be aware of behind-the-scene maneuvering against the regime.
No. 48 Pp 195-199
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5609
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Afghan Gov't complains about evacuation of American dependents from Afghanistan.

Date: 79 JUL 25
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: State 191371, State 190958, Kabul 5544

No. 49 Pp 200-204
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5627 (2 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Possible motivations behind Soviet decision to publicize its efforts to "negotiate" settlement of DRA domestic conflict.

Date: 79 JUL 25
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -

No. 50 Pp 205-212
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5648 (3 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Demarche to Soviet Ambassador in Kabul about evacuation of American dependents.

Date: 79 JUL 26
Classif: Secret
Reftel: Moscow 18979, State 189714

No. 51 Pp 213-214
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5683
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Amin given more direct role in prosecuting counter insurgency.

Date: 79 JUL 28
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -

No. 52 P 215
From: American Embassy Tripoli
Ntelex: Tripoli
Sign: Quinlan
Subj: Libyan support for Afghan revolutionaries (Mujahideen).

Date: 79 JUL 29
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -

No. 53 Pp 216-218
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5736
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Further data on nat'l organization for the defense of the Revolution.
Note: The same document is repeated on pp 219-221.

Date: 79 JUL 29
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: Kabul 5683

No. 54 Pp 222-224
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5736
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Cabinet reshuffle unlikely to defuse growing opposition.

Date: 79 JUL 30
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: Kabul 5683

No. 55 Pp 225-226
From: American Embassy Islamabad
Ntelex: Islamabad 8629
Sign: Hummel
Subj: Zia Nassery returns with new project.

Date: 79 AUG 01
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 56 Pp 227
From: American Embassy Kabul
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Libyan support for Afghan insurgents

Date: 79 AUG 06
Classif: Secret
Reftel: Tripoli 1185

No. 57 Pp 228-232
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 5967 (2 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: An initial evaluation of the Bala Hissar mutiny.

Date: 79 AUG 06
Classif: Secret
Reftel: Kabul 5942
No. 58 Pp II/1-4 From: American Embassy Kabul Ntelex: Kabul 6016 (2 sections) Sign: Amstutz Subj: My meeting with the new Afghan Foreign Minister Dr. Shah Wali.

No. 59 Pp II/5-15 From: Sec'y of State Washington Ntelex: USNATO 05615 (6 sections) Sign: Glitman Subj: Polads discussion on Afghanistan Note: The Political Committee of NATO met on Aug. 7; UK, FRG, Canada & Turkey submitted written contributions on Afghanistan, see #71.

No. 60 P II/16 From: American Embassy Kabul Ntelex: Kabul 6023 Sign: Amstutz Subj: High-level Soviet visitor reportedly visited Kabul last October. Note: According to DRG Ambassador Schwiesau, this was "the fourth ranking man in the Soviet Politburo," & according to an unnamed South Asian ambassador who referred the news to Amstutz, he "might have been...Kirilenko."


No. 63 Pp II/20-22 From: Sec'y of State Washington Ntelex: State 194166 (2 sections) Sign: Vance Subj: Under Sec'y Newsom's trip to Southern Asia

No. 64 P II/23 From: American Embassy Moscow Ntelex: Moscow 23252 Sign: Garrison Subj: High level Soviet Politburo member visited AmEmb Kabul last October. Note: Prof. Yuri Gankovskij.of the Oriental Inst. in Moscow said to a US Embassy staff: "I can assure you that no Politburo member of the USSR has been in Kabul since the April 1978 revolution." Text very dim; read in transl. on p. 26 of Persian Section.


* The document is correctly dated even though it is inserted here.
No. 66 P II/32
From: American Embassy Moscow
Ntelex: Moscow 20485
Sign: Garrison
Subj: Soviet views on Afghanistan.

No. 67 Pp II/33-34
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6269
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Soviet official [diplomat A.V. Morozov] expresses confidence that Moscow will protect its citizens here.

No. 68 Pp II/35-36
From: American Consulate Peshawar
Ntelex: Peshawar 0199
Sign: Archard
Subj: Rebels deny "shadow cabinet" rumors.

No. 69 P II/37
From: Sec'y of State Washington
Ntelex: State 217276
Sign: Christopher
Subj: Report of high level Soviet visitor to Afghanistan last October.
Note: "US Dept. of State "has no repeat no information to confirm report."

No. 70 P II/38
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6309
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: East German Ambassador [H. Schwiesau] departs Kabul scene [because he broke his leg].
Note: "Comment: Schwiesau will be missed in Kabul diplomatic community. Either operating on his own - or more probably at Soviet direction - he kept his Western world colleagues 'informed' about Soviet attempts to arrange a political solution to the Afghan insurrection."

No. 71 P II/39-40
From: Sec'y of State Washington
Ntelex: State 218144 (2 sections)
Sign: -
Subj: Polads discussion of Afghanistan.
Note: US comments on some of the points raised orally & in allied papers at Aug. 7 Polads discussion of Afghanistan, see #59.

No. 72 P II/41
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6385
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Contrary to DRA propaganda, "massive marches" not taking place in Kabul.

No. 73 Pp II/42-47
From: USMISSION USNATO
Ntelex: USNATO 05863 (3 sections)
Sign: Glitman
Subj: Polads discussions of Afghanistan & Iran.
Note: The Political Committee of NATO met again on Aug. 21. UK & Dutch circulated additional written contributions on Afghanistan.
No. 74 Pp II/48-49
From: Sec'y of State Washington
Ntelex: State 221826
Sign: Christopher
Subj: Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan.
Date: 79 AUG 23
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: Islamabad 8335, Geneva 13234

No. 75 P II/50
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6400
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan.
Note: Answer to #74.
Date: 79 AUG 25
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: State 221826

No. 76 P II/51
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6604
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Pavlovskiy [Commander of Soviet Ground Forces] mission to Kabul.
Date: 79 SEP 02
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -

No. 77 Pp II/52-57
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6672 (3 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Date: 79 SEP 06
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -

No. 78 P II/58
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6789
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: PM Amin reiterates that he wants "friendly relations with the US."
Date: 79 SEP 11
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 79 P II/59
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6788
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Biographical tidbits on PM Amin.
Date: 79 SEP 11
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 80 Pp II/60-63
From: Dept. of State
Ntelex: -
Sign: [Griffin]
Subj: Memorandum of conversation between Nanguy Tarzi, Afghan exile, former officer of AfEmb in Washington & of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, & George Griffin on 9/12/79 at Griffin home in Washington.
Date: 79 SEP 20
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: -

No. 81 P II/64
From: American Embassy Moscow
Ntelex: Moscow 21696
Sign: [?]
Subj: Taraki visit to Moscow.
Date: 79 SEP 13
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: FBIS WASHDC 1823037, Moscow 14964

No. 82 Pp II/65-66
From: Sec'y of State Washington
Ntelex: State 240680
Sign: Vance
Subj: Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
Date: 79 SEP 13
Classif: Confidential
Reftel: Islamabad 9794, Kabul 6564, Geneva 14638, Islamabad 10263
No. 83 P II/67
From: Sec'y of State Washington
Ntelex: State 241748
Sign: Vance
Subj: Dialogue on Afghanistan with PGOI [Provisional Gov't of Iran?]

No. 84 Pp II/68-71
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6874 (2 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Khalqi regime maintains tight security alert in Kabul.

No. 85 Pp II/72-75
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6936 (2 sections)
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Tensions lessen in Kabul as President Amin digests his recent political gains.

No. 86 P II/76
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 6978
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Some reflections on the Afghan political crisis.

No. 87 Pp II/77-78
From: American Embassy Islamabad
Ntelex: Memorandum of conversation
Sign: [Sherman]
Subj: Hazara dissident activities
Note: Colloquium between Wali Beg, Pres., Alliance of Muslim Freedom Fighters for Afghanistan & Rick Sherman, acting political counselor.

No. 88 P II/79-80
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 7025
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Comments by two Eastern Europeans [Klaus Maser, GDR charge & Edward Baradziej, Polish Ambassador] on Afghan political situation.

No. 89 P II/81
From: American Embassy Islamabad
Ntelex: Islamabad 10745
Sign: Hummel
Subj: Japanese assessment of Taraki fall.

No. 90 P II/82
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 7093
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Iranian interest in possible Cuban involvement in Afghanistan.

No. 91 P II/83
From: American Embassy Kabul
Ntelex: Kabul 7062
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Khalq possibly waving olive branch toward Washington?
No. 92  Pp II/84-85  Date: 79 SEP 22
From: American Embassy Kabul  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: Kabul 7063  Reftel: -
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Local Soviet views [V. Safronchuk] about the new Amin regime.

No. 93  P II/86  Date: 79 SEP 22
From: Sec'y of State Washington  Classif: Secret
Ntelex: State 250373  Reftel: Islamabad 10702
Sign: [Vance]
Subj: Gov't of Pakistan analysis of Afghan situation.

No. 94  Pp II/87-88  Date: 79 SEP 27
From: American Embassy New Delhi  Classif: Secret
Ntelex: New Delhi 17718  Reftel: State 250400, New Delhi 16994
Sign: Goheen
Subj: Soviet intentions in Afghanistan

No. 95  Pp II/89-91  Date: 79 SEP 27
From: American Embassy Kabul  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: Kabul 7218 (2 sections)  Reftel: State 250412, State 250278
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Charge's call on Pres. Amin.

No. 96  P II/92  Date: 79 SEP 27
From: American Embassy Kabul  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: Kabul 7208  Reftel: -
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Call on Min. of Information & Culture Katawazi.

No. 97  P II/93  Date: 79 SEP 28
From: American Embassy Belgrade  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: Belgrade 7328  Reftel: State 250400
Sign: Eagleburger
Subj: Soviet intentions in Afghanistan

No. 98  Pp II/94-97  Date: 79 SEP 29
From: Sec'y of State Washington  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: State 256809 (2 sections)  Reftel: -
Sign: Vance

No. 99  Pp II/98-99  Date: 79 SEP 30
From: American Embassy Kabul  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: Kabul 7232  Reftel: Kabul 7208
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Min. of Foreign Affairs Chief [Asadullah Matin, Dir. of the Information Div.] inquires about chance of better relations with US Gov't.

No. 100 Pp II/100-101  Date: 79 OCT 01
From: American Embassy Kabul  Classif: Confidential
Ntelex: Kabul 7258 (2 sections)  Reftel: Kabul 7208, Kabul 7232
Sign: Amstutz
Subj: Indications that DRA seeks better relations with US Gov't: a commentary.
No. 110  P  II/118
From: American Embassy Kabul       Date: 79 OCT 18
Ntelex: Kabul 7537                  Classif: Confidential
Sign: Blood                       Reftel: -
Subj: -                            Note: Bakhtar News Agency on Oct. 11 announcement of USAID reimbursement &
                                          grant for Afghan rural sector may be intended "to illustrate to the Afghan population
                                          that ... Amin's new gov't is receiving support from the US Gov't.

No. 111  Pp II/119-120
From: Sec'y of State Washington     Date: 79 OCT 19
Ntelex: State 273949 (2 sections)   Classif: Secret
Sign: -                              Reftel: -
Subj: Dialogue on Afghanistan.       Note: Talking points prepared by Sec'y of State Washington on Soviet-Afghan
                                          relations & Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Section 2 seems to be missing.

No. 112  Pp II/121-123
From: American Embassy Ankara       Date: 79 OCT 25
Ntelex: Ankara 07966 (2 sections)   Classif: Confidential
Sign: Spiers                        Reftel: State 273949, Ankara 7248,
                                          Kabul 7352, State 260343, Kabul 6936
Subj: Turkish information on Afghan situation.

No. 113  Pp II/124-125
From: American Embassy Kabul        Date: 79 OCT 25
Ntelex: Kabul 7706                   Classif: Confidential
Sign: Blood                         Reftel: Kabul 6309
Subj: New East German Ambassador [Kraft Bumbel] to replace central figure in last summer's reported attempt to broaden regime's political base.
Note: [Kraft Bumbel: "Afghan Foreign Ministry sources insist that is the correct spelling.]

No. 114  Pp II/126-128
From: American Embassy Kabul        Date: 79 OCT 30
Ntelex: Kabul 7784 (2 sections)      Classif: Confidential
Sign: Blood                         Reftel: Ankara 7966
Subj: Turkish information on situation in Afghanistan.

No. 115  Pp II/129-130
From: American Embassy Islamabad    Date: 79 OCT 31
Ntelex: Islamabad 12425             Classif: Confidential
Sign: Hummel                        Reftel: State 278279, State 282436,
                                          Kabul 7726, State 283008
Subj: Ambassador's discussion with Additional Foreign Sec'y Piracha on Afghan matters.

No. 116  Pp II/131-134
From: [CIA] Los Angeles             Date: 79 AUG 31
Ntelex: Los Angeles 20781           Classif: Secret
Sign: -                              Reftel: Director 504525, Islamabad
                                          40289, Kabul 24591, Kabul 24580, Rome
                                          77486
Subj: -                              Note: Various information gathered by an Afghan identified only as L/1;
                                          intelligence regarding Ambassador Dubs' assassination: "L/1 was not sure how the
timing of these events took place, but apparently everything went off on schedule...
L/1 believes Lal Mohammad (Kabul Police Chief) [to be identified with Mohammad
Taroo, G.V.] killed the Ambassador but can not give any reason or proof for
this belief... L/1 hates Lal Mohammad & believes him to be a butcher & capable
of anything."
No. 117  Pp II/135-137
From: [CIA] New Delhi
Ntelex: New Delhi 51273
Sign: -
Subj: -
Note: The message is a report on a "noisy demonstration" mounted on Sept. 28 by "Islamic Assoc. of Patriotic Afghan Student in India" (=IAPASI): "This demonstration was funded by New Delhi Station [of CIA] & organized at Station behest by unilateral asset GeCarreon/l(G/1), IAPASI officer."

No. 118  P II/139
From: [CIA] Copenhagen
Ntelex: Copenhagen 28075
Sign: -
Subj: -
Note: - No information on demonstration held in Copenhagen by IAPASI as requested in telex from New Delhi, see #117. The same answer from Tehran is recorded in a piece of a telex reproduced on p. 138.

No. 119  Pp II/140-141
From: [CIA] New Delhi 51298
Ntelex: State 266505 (2 sections)
Sign: -
Subj: -
Note: Information on Indian press coverage regarding the demonstration of Sept. 28 cited in #117.

No. 120  Pp II/142-145
From: Sec'y of State Washington
Ntelex: State 266505 (2 sections)
Sign: -
Note: Information regarding various countries of the Near East, including the relations of Saudi Arabia with Afghanistan & her help to the rebels.

No. 121  Pp II/146-147
From: [CIA] Kabul
Ntelex: Field report: NHK 4092
Sign: -
Subj: Afghanistan: situation report #7 as of 1530 hours (local time) 10/15/79.

No. 122  Pp II/148-149
From: [CIA] Islamabad
Ntelex: Field: NPR 2117
Sign: -
Subj: Discussion on Afghan situation during the visit of a Chinese military delegation to Pakistan (20-29 October 1979).
Source: A generally reliable Pakistani field grade officer [Brigadier Mian Moh'd Afzal, Director of military operations] whose past reporting has been generally substantiated.

No. 123  P II/150
From: [CIA] Kabul
Ntelex: Field report . NHK 4134
Sign: -
Subj: Departure of Soviet military delegation from Afghanistan (22 OCT. 1979).
Source: A middle-level Afghan officer whose reports have been generally substantiated.
No. 124 Pp II/151-153
From: [CIA] Islamabad
Ntelex: Field report # NHK 4133
Sign: -
Date: 79 OCT 31
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -
Subj: 1) Concern of Afghan dissidents over the major DRA offensive [?] in Paktia Province; 2) Approval by the Government of Pakistan to provide a limited supply of [ammunition] to Afghan insurgents.

No. 125 Pp II/154-156
From [CIA] Kabul
Ntelex: Field report # NHK 4132
Sign: -
Date: 79 OCT 30
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -
Subj: Afghanistan USSR: Increase in Soviet military presence in Kabul.
Source: A middle level Afghan gov't employee who is a new & untested source. He acquired paragraphs 1-4 from an Afghan military officer & paragraphs 5 & 6 from personal observations.

No. 126 P II/157
From [CIA] -
Ntelex: -
Sign: -
Date: -
Classif: -
Reftel: -
Subj: -
Note: The text, very short - about 20 lines - is quite unreadable & the Persian translation, too, is full of blank spaces. It is possible only to decipher some Afghan names & in the last lines to catch the words "additional arrests have also been made" & "arrest of pro-Taraki supporters in the army."

No. 127 Pp II/158-159
From [CIA] Kabul
Ntelex: Field report # NHK 4138
Sign: -
Date: 79 NOV 02
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -
Source: A middle level Afghan military officer whose reporting has been generally substantiated. He acquired this information from an Afghan army intelligence officer.

No. 128 P II/160
From: [CIA] Kabul
Ntelex: Field report # NHK 4133
Sign: -
Date: 79 OCT 31
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -
Subj: Ammunition flights from the Soviet Union to the Kabul area in Oct. 1979.
Source: A middle level Afghan air force officer whose past reporting has been generally substantiated. He obtained the information in the course of his normal duties.

No. 129 P II/161
From: [CIA] Kabul
Ntelex: Field report # NHK 4136
Sign: -
Date: 79 NOV 02
Classif: Secret
Reftel: -
Subj: Soviet control of Shindand air force base.
Source: A middle level Afghan officer whose reporting has been generally substantiated. He got the information from an Afghan army intelligence officer.

No. 130 Pp II/162-163
From: [CIA] Director
Ntelex: Director 516886
Sign: -
Date: 79 SEP 19
Classif: Secret
Reftel: Tehran 54242
Subj: "To begin intelligence relationship with the Bazargan gov't, we would charge Laingen to provide selected intelligence orally rpt orally on Afghanistan to Yazdi or Bazargan."

Note: The summary of the selected intelligence is as follows: "On 17 August a senior Soviet military delegation, led by a four star general, arrived in Kabul."
APPENDIX I

US DOCUMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN

DOCUMENT N. 10

Subject: Assessment of Afghan developments and U.S.-Afghan relations.

1. We agree with the broad outlines of your assessment of the general direction of developments in Afghanistan and the uncertainties prospects for a return to close U.S.-Afghan relations. Nevertheless, we still find ourselves unsure about the shape of things to come, even assuming that the present regime maintains its hold on power, and we believe we should work from the premise that a constructive U.S.-Afghan working relationship could still emerge. We wonder, if and when the situation gets a bit more, whether the DRA will become a docile camp-follower dominated by the USSR, or a radical leftist regime on the fringe of the non-aligned movement but with peculiar Afghan characteristics and a degree of independence. The most adverse development in terms of our interests would be the introduction of Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan which would seriously disturb the entire region.

2. We see, as you do, our regional interests as paramount in our consideration of a proper approach to the DRA and would view an irredentist Afghanistan, especially one backed by the Soviets, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the area. We believe this is a real fear especially in Pakistan and also in Iran.

3. The assessments of Afghanistan’s neighbors are similar to ours although Pakistan and Iran contend that Afghanistan is already irrevocably "lost" to the Soviet Union. Pakistan seems to want us to share their assessment of the threat, presumably to obtain a greater U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s security. At no time have the Pakistanis questioned our policy of maintaining the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The Indians, somewhat more sanguine about being able to deal with the DRA but, nonetheless, are very deeply concerned about increased Soviet influence in Kabul. We need to keep these views in mind when judging possible regional reactions to any change in our own policies toward Afghanistan.

4. The countries of the region are in fact following policies quite similar to our own. Iran is continuing aid already committed although holding back from new agreements. India has apparently offered to step up assistance to Afghanistan and has in our view been playing a very helpful role in attempting to encourage some degree of independence and non-alignment by the new regime. Pakistan is actively pursuing a policy of friendly relations with DRA (expediting transit of Afghan trade, 0438$3,575/September 10 visit, down-playing of Afghan refugees, restrained rhetoric) and appears to see such a policy as in its interest.

5. One option would be for us to phase out our activities in Afghanistan, but we believe this would be very unsettling to Afghanistan’s neighbors and incompatible with their policies. The DRA has not asked us to pack our bags and leave but on the contrary has accepted our policy of maintaining our interests and presence. Closing out our efforts in Afghanistan would likely be seen as an abdication of our responsibility and would accomplish for the Soviets one of their primary objectives, namely to reduce further U.S. and Western influence in Afghanistan (Moscow 23479) and
the region. It would not be in our interest to give such a blank check signal to Moscow.

6. Consequently, we believe the general approach advocated in State 211102 remains valid as a framework for U.S. policy. We should not press our aid on the Afghans but we should seek opportunities to maintain contact with the DRA and try to establish mutually compatible objectives for our assistance program, and identify projects which satisfy our aid mandate, our human rights policy and their concerns. We fully recognize that the Afghans themselves seem to be moving to reduce our presence: a much smaller Peace Corps program; no military training for Afghans in the U.S.; for the moment, and restrictions on the DAO Office; a more limited cultural exchange program; and a resistance to proposed USAID projects incorporating large amounts of technical assistance. For our part, we will also have to balance our humanitarian concern in helping the people of one of the world's poorest countries with our concern about the new regime's questionable human rights performance. The Afghans should be kept fully aware of these concerns in discussions with the leadership.

7. We regard the situation in Afghanistan as an evolving one which requires our continuing attention as well as a continuing dialogue with other states in the region. We encourage Embassies Tehran, Islamabad and New Delhi in particular to continue exchanging views with host governments on the changing Afghan scene, keeping in mind that our influence in Kabul is severely limited and that we look to Afghanistan's neighbors to take the lead in developing a network of cooperative relations which will contribute to peace and stability in the region.

Vance

DOCUMENT N. 18

SUBJECT: (C) Gailani representative reports progress in unifying Afghan dissident groups.

1. (C) Entire text

2. Summary: Humayun Asefi, Afghan attorney from Paris who accompanied Syed Gailani to Embassy on April 23 (Reftel), called on Emboff May 13 with up-date on progress in forging unity among Peshawar-based groups. Asefi also advised on successes in fighting between dissident forces and DRA troops. He left with us parts he alleged were taken from MIG-21 aircraft downed by dissident forces in late April. End summary.

3. Asefi, who has been traveling throughout Pakistan since previous visit to Embassy in attempt to establish unity of dissident movements, says "meaningful association" of three groups (ANLF, Gailani group, and Mian Gul Jan Group) is now 90 percent assured and should be announced by May 18. The agreement will be signed by leaders of three organizations in Peshawar and will be announced to press throughout the world, Asefi says. The association will include command coordination in field operations and cooperation at top levels in Peshawar.
4. Asefi has also arranged for expatriate Afghan businessmen to sponsor a radio station which will be purchased in Europe and set up in Waziristan under direction of unified groups committee. Asefi reportedly told his cousin, Gong Fonseck (Government of Pakistan Foreign Office Secretary) Shahnawaz, of his intentions and asked permission to import radio equipment. Asefi did not report Fonseck approval; rather, Shahnawaz "did not tell me to stop the process", Asefi said.

5. Asefi says major tribal groups of Afghanistan have recently become more active in supporting rebel activities. Wazirs have actively joined fight as of May 11 and Mengals, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Afridis have all agreed in principle to do so but lack organisation to coordinate their people's efforts. Another factor causing some hesitation on part of those ethnic/tribal groups is lack of any leader of "national" stature with whom they can identify. Asefi has letter allegedly signed by all these groups addressed to King Zaher Shah appealing for his return, or that of Abdul Walli, to represent rallying point for dissident activities. Letter makes clear to King, according to Asefi, that re-establishment of monarchy not, rpt not, intent of the groups. Royal personage would be figurehead rather than ruling monarch.

5. Asefi said he has asked Fonseck Shahnawaz about possibility of Zaher Shah's or Abdul Walli's being permitted to establish a base in Pakistan. Shahnawaz' response was "perhaps a little later, but not now". Shahnawaz allegedly told Asefi that Soviets have made demarch at MFA opposing GOP's permitting Afghan royal family to take up residence here.

6. When asked about foreign support for dissident groups Asefi said the PRC (=Popular Republic of China) UAE (=United Arab Emirates) and Saudis have all promised assistance but have yet to deliver. As soon as commune of association of groups is issued, Asefi plans to visit UAE and Saudi Arabia to follow-up promises. He then plans to return to Paris via Rome to appeal to Zaher Shah and Abdul Walli. There is possibility he may be able also to arrange stop in Iran, as Hazara community in Pakistan has offered to put him in touch with Ayatollah Khomeini to elicit assistance from that quarter.

7. Asefi says groups in Peshawar tend to doubt Soviets would, in any circumstances, occupy Afghanistan to save Khalqi government. He says first move after unifying major groups will be to contact Soviets in some neutral "turf" and establish relationship based on realities of the situation, i.e. that no regime in Kabul can exist without good relations with the Soviet Union. These intentions cannot be mentioned at this time, Asefi contends, or the super-religious would misunderstand and unity will be impossible.

8. Purportedly reflecting views of Syed Ahmed Gailani and other leaders in Peshawar area, Asefi warned Embass that Amcit (=American citizen) Zia Nassery is "probably a double agent". Asefi claims Zia Nassery met with Hafizullah Amin at the UN last year shortly thereafter visited Kabul. He then appeared in Peshawar and allied himself with Gailani after being repulsed ANFL leader, Mojededi. Gailani now regrets befriending Zia Nassery and wants it understood there is no
relationship between him and the American, according to Asefi.

9. Asefi reported that dissident forces have not shot down three DRA MIG aircraft. The first at Wozza in the Zadran area of Paktia on April 25; the second near Pachar Ogan (sic—this 'sic' in the telex itself) village Paktia; and the latest, on May 9 near Khowst in Paktia. He did not specify how aircraft had been shot down but left with Emboff—on loan—ever·al remnants of the aircraft, including five markings plates torn off the first MIG, as well as photos of the aircraft. Copies being pounced to longeteig c/o INR/RNA/SOA (?) for interested Washington consumers.

DOCUMENT N. 22

SUBJECT: Limited Iranian response to Afghan rebel appeal.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: Afghan found raiser Nassry reported some assistance from Iranians, talk of "humanitarian assistance". Report 30-35,000 Afghan refugees in Iran. End summary.

3. Amcit Afghan Zia Nassry called Poloff (=Political Officer?) May 21 to report results of his talk with Iranian authorities. He states that he did travel to Qom and met with Ayatollah Khomeini. He said their talk was friendly, but not productive. He was asking for arms assistance, and the Ayatollah spoke instead of "humanitarian assistance". He spoke again with Ayatollah Khamkali, who said that this "could be a beginning". He did not meet with Fonmin (=Foreign Affairs Minister?) Yazdi, but instead met with Mr. Taghavi, chief of the MFA section dealing with Afghanistan, and has a second meeting scheduled with him in approximately ten days.

4. Yesteday, in a press conference, Ayatollah Rohani, a major religious figure and close relative of Khomeini, called on the Afghan people to revolt against their government as the Iranian did here". He urged the Iranian government to "intervene in Afghanistan" to assist Muslims. Such statements by unofficial, second-level figures, carry little weight until they are confirmed either by Khomeini or by the Government.

5. Nassry states that the PGOI (=Provisional Government of Iran) did assist him in contacting Afghan refugees in Iran. He travelled to Mashad, where the Afghan have a small office, and was escorted to the refugee camps. He states there are approximately 30-35,000 Afghans located in an area stretching twenty miles along the border from the town of "Tybad" (sic: Tayyebad), south of Mashad. Most are shepherd families, with their flocks, and because of lack of fodder, many have already returned to Afghanistan. Included in the number, however, are over one hundred Afghan military officers—ground forces, artillery, and air forces. These are attempting to train a guerrilla force (most male refugees have personally-owned rifles) and, Nassry says, are conducting some operations inside Afghanistan. Nassry hopes that the Iranians will at least take the burden of the
actual refugees off the hands of the officers, freeing them from more training and operations.

6. Nassry intends to travel tomorrow to Pakistan, and will plan to return to Iran after approximately one week there. Naas

DOCUMENT N. 116

1. A/cob introduced Base officer Abbamonte to Gelabel (according to the Persian explanation at p. 188, all the abbreviations refer to C.I.A. officers and Afghan spies) (L/1) evening 30 August. In over 1-hour meeting Base obtained following information in response to or in conjunction with (over) refs. Also obtained recorded cassette (tape) with Ambassador Dubs’s murder story which is at very little (...) with para 1E and 1F of Washington 499386 (not sent all (...)); See summary below. Obtained photographs of present Kabul (Police) Chief Lal Mohammed and Army Officer Major Qader described as supporter of Abdul Wali. Tape and photographs will be (pouched) Hqs.

2. Summary. Dubs’ assassination: Kabul Chief of Police, Air Force Colonel and two of his assistants (names mentioned) on tape) were invited to L/1’s home. Lal Mohammed (departed) shortly leaving his two subordinates who proceeded to (become) intoxicated. These two men are the source of L/1’s (story). They were assigned to fire machine guns for approximately twenty seconds into the Hotel room where Ambassador (Dubs) was being held before Lal Mohammed and some other (Police) officers were to storm the room. L/1 was not sure how (the) timing of these events took place, but apparently everything went off on schedule. The two men opened fire on the room from the roof of the bank across the street and as (soon as) they ceased firing the door was forced by the Lal (Mohammed party). Ambassador Dubs was, according to these two (...) (...ting in a chair covered with blood, and (...the,...) already (dead) or very near death when the Lal Mohammed party entered the room. L/1 believes Lal Mohammad personally killed the Ambassador but cannot give any reason or proof for this (belief). The information provided by the two drunken (Police) officers does not support L/1’s views. L/1 says that Lal Mohammed personally told him that he had (killed) over <2,000> Afghans. L/1 hates Lal Mohammed and (believes) him to be a (butcher) and capable of anything.

3. L/1 stated that recent (fighting) in Kandahar is being organized and led by Qudus (Khan), an Afghan army major named Ismat and a Mullah named Abdu (...). Qudus, as chief, has had one son killed by the present Government and another imprisoned and possibly also dead. Qudus is a former member of the Afghan Senate. This groups (...) L/1 supports Wali.

4. Sardar Wali has not been able to obtain a Pakistani visa. This information obtained directly from Sardar Wali during telephone conversation with L/1 on (29) August.

5. Fellow students in L/1 group are discussing rumors that Soviets have talked with King in Rome but (these) only rumors. Same goes for release of Nur Ahmed (Etemadi), who also rumored to have been taken to Moscow for talks. L/1
believes if Etemadi had \( \ldots \) released someone would seen him and reported such.

6. L/1 plans take vacation sometime during middle of November after completion \( \langle \text{Douglas} \rangle \) training and busy Haj season. He agrees with training in Washington during the period and will work out details with Kabul station.

7. L/1 would like have \( \langle \text{copies} \rangle \) of cassette tape given Frankfurt in order distribute tapes to Afghans \( \langle \text{contacts} \rangle \). Tapes he previously distributed had a message from \( \langle \text{Shal?} \rangle \). Mohsini Kandahari reputed to be an Afghan number three man under Ayatollah Khomeini in Qom. L/1 not met Kandahari but has \( \langle \text{sent} \rangle \) him money under assumed \( \langle \text{Sarbaaz} \rangle \). L/1 said Khomeini is \( \langle \text{actively} \rangle \) supporting Kandahari's efforts in Afghanistan, by providing money and \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) haven for Afghans in Iran. He has also agreed to \( \langle \text{provide} \rangle \) military training for those Afghans who \( \langle \text{want} \rangle \) it and to \( \langle \text{return} \rangle \) them to Afghanistan.

8. L/1 requests and hopes Washington will send any \( \langle \text{sum} \rangle \) of money between $50 and $1,000 support to Kandahari who \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) besides in Qom. Money should be send to \( \langle \text{Central} \rangle \) Bank of Iran, \( \langle \text{Bank-e Melli} \rangle \), City Branch, Account number 70.9. Account name is Afghan Religious Organization \( \langle \text{Harakat-e Islami-yar Afghanistan} \rangle \). L/1 adds that Kandahari is 10 percent \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) and all the money will be used for medicine and humanitarian supplies for people in Herat area. Money should be \( \langle \text{donated} \rangle \) in the name of Sarbaaz and receipt returned to L/1. L/1 \( \langle \text{says} \rangle \) that he has given approximately \$50,000 of his \( \langle \text{own} \rangle \) money to this cause.

9. L/1 would like to briefly visit Dr. \( \langle \text{Bashir} \rangle \), a Sandar Wali man and founder of Afghan National Liberation Front \( \langle \text{ANLF} \rangle \). Bashir's mailing adress is P.O. Box \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) Norwood, New Jersey 07684. Wali suggested the two men meet and L/1 is determined to do so and would like Washington \( \langle \text{pay} \rangle \) for trip. L/1 plans travel between 12-20 September when he hopes to have some free time. Please comment on this travel \( \langle \ldots \rangle \).

10. L/1 would also like copies of family photographs \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) his retention. These photographs included in film \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) Frankfurt.

11. Dr. Yarmohd Mohhammed, \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) Hospital, Schenectady, New York 11238, is L/1 wife's cousin and reputed to be strong supporter of current Afghan regime Soviet \( \langle ? \rangle \). Yarmohd is also reputed to be very active in printing pro-Soviet materials in the U.S.

12. L/1 will provide Base with list of current Afghan students at Douglas course and names of several Afghans in Los Angeles area who \( \langle \text{entertain} \rangle \) these students on regular \( \langle \text{basis} \rangle \). Classes are held twice yearly. L/1 will pass \( \langle \text{student list} \rangle \) to Kabul station approximately two month before \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) for passage FR/LA \( \langle = \text{Frankfurt/Los Angeles} \rangle \). L/1 expects to return to \( \langle \text{Douglas} \rangle \) \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) yearly for update training and this already \( \langle \text{contracted} \rangle \) \( \langle \text{between} \rangle \) Ariana and Douglas.

13. Base made contact telephone with Geplastic 1 on \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) Agust and plans hold meeting with him on 4 September.

14. Base has talked with Los Angeles-based SGSWIRL \( \langle ? \rangle \) officer to discuss L/1's reporting on Dubs' assassination. \( \langle \text{Though} \rangle \) prepared to comply with earlier requests \( \langle \ldots \rangle \) L/1,
SGSWIRL on his Dubs reporting, base is not certain this is essential given limited detail L/I provided. Hqs might wish reconsider whether this necessary <permission> he given SGSWIRL some 8 to 9 month previously in New York.

APPENDIX II

LISTING OF THE DOCUMENTS
BY DATE

Date: - No.: 30c
Date: - No.: 12a
Date: 73 Aug 13 No.: 1

Date: 78 Jan 30 No.: 2
Date: 78 May 05 No.: 5
Date: 78 May 06 No.: 6
Date: 78 May 11 No.: 7
Date: 78 Jul 02 No.: 31
Date: <after 78 Jul> No.: 3
Date: 78 Aug 12 No.: 63
Date: 78 Sep 26 No.: 8
Date: 78 Oct 03 No.: 105
Date: 78 Oct 23 No.: 9
Date: 78 Dec 01 No.: 10

Date: 79 Mar 19 No.: 11
Date: <after 79 Mar 19> No.: 30a
Date: <after 79 Mar 25> No.: 12
Date: 79 Mar 29 No.: 13
Date: <after 79 Mar 31> No.: 4
Date: 79 Apr 11 No.: 14
Date: 79 May 08 No.: 15
Date: 79 May 09 No.: 16
Date: 79 May 12 No.: 17
Date: <79 May 14> No.: 19
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