THE FRONTIER "TRIBAL" AREAS 1840–1990
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Occasional Paper #34
August, 1995

The Afghanistan Forum
19 Fanning Avenue
East Hampton, NY 11937

ISSN: 0889-7883 34
from Afghanistan by W. K. Fraser-Tytler, 1967.

Fig. 1. The N.W. Frontier: Administrative Divisions

from Dichter, 1967
The Frontier "Tribal" Areas 1840-1990: Introduction

This is a paper about representation. I discuss the knowledge and imagery generated during one hundred-fifty years of interaction between the populations of today's Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and the agents of colonial and post-colonial systems attempting to regulate life in the region. Over this period, Afghan rulers in Kabul and colonial officials in British-India worked to extend their influence over the "Frontier" tribes through persuasion, coercion, and armed intervention. Post-1947 governments competed to integrate the perhaps two million FATA residents into larger political states.

Fundamental to greater projects of control or nation-building were efforts to understand Afghan and tribal area society and history. Authorities attempting to expand political control and establish legitimacy accumulated and utilized knowledge about "Frontier" populations to validate agendas of colonial management and post-colonial development. At different times, portions of the Pashtun tribal populations of the current Federally Administered Tribal Areas would accept, oppose, or become involved with the larger initiatives of evolving state systems. The mixed legacy of long term authoritative interpretations and characterizations of FATA tribal societies would mean that into the late twentieth century competing efforts by Afghans or Pakistanis to integrate or develop the tribal areas would be hindered by insensitive institutions and simplistic imagery that ignored the complex socio-political realities of the region.

The title of an earlier draft of this paper; "From Afghan to Pathan to Pakistani: The 'Frontier' Tribal Areas 1840-1990", was a remark on the changing nature of even the names attached to FATA residents. I have used the word "Pashtun" (after Grima, 1992: 14-15) to equally represent the many area tribal groups differentiated by Paxto-language dialects. These groups have commonly been referred to as Pashtuns, Pukhtuns, or Pathans speaking Pushtu, Pukhtu, or Pashtu.
The Frontier "Tribal Areas" 1840-1990

"The Pathan future is not in doubt; it lies, as it has always lain, with the people of the Indus Valley" (Caroe, 1958: 437).

"The main purpose of this book is to interpret and discuss the Pathans, their language, culture and way of life. This is done with particular reference to national cohesion and integration of the different linguistic and ethnic stocks which constitute the Pakistani Nation" (Jaffer in Quddus, 1987:xiii).

"It is significant that neither Ibn Batuta nor Baber mention the word "Pathan." Baber gives the names of many east Afghanistan tribes, but nowhere does he mention Pathans, Pakhtuns or Pashtuns. He calls the people Afghans and their language, Afghani" (Abdulla, 1973:44).

As the East India Company expanded its rule in the early nineteenth century it became preoccupied with two international concerns which cast an air of insecurity over local Company interests in revenue collection and administration. After the Company absorbed Delhi in 1803 and contemplated further expansion to the northwest a major fear of Company districts was another raid from Afghanistan. The victory at Panipat by the Afghan Ahmad Shah Durrani had occurred as recently as 1761.

A second British international concern was with the growing Russian empire. From London and Calcutta came a variety of diplomatic initiatives designed to promote Persian and Afghan resistance to Russian expansion in Central Asia. These two fears, of Afghan interference in India and a looming Russian threat, coalesced into a unified apprehension that the Afghans would be used or conquered by the Russians preliminary to a Russian move into India.

The East India Company annexed the Sikh state in the Punjab in 1849 after a decade of political and military attempts to create a friendly border state in Afghanistan which would take its foreign policy lead from Calcutta. Company armies had crossed the Indus and the Punjab in 1839 in transit to Kabul to help reinstall the allied Shah Shuja as Amir of Afghanistan. The absolute failure of the 1839-1842 British intervention in Kabul and a Company desire to maintain the Sikh kingdom as a buffer against Muslim threats from the northwest extended Lahore-based Sikh rule until the final wars of the 1846-49 period. With the resolution of an internal East India Company debate over Sikh questions decided in favor of a forward, aggressive stance a final manipulation of Sikh factional politics led to the Sikh wars and annexation in 1849.

The Company occupied Peshawar and the Sikh controlled agricultural districts which ended at the foothills of the western mountains leading to Afghanistan. While settling administrative and agricultural affairs and while developing strategies to deal with the Afghan Amir and Russia, the Company soon found that it was utilizing considerable amounts of manpower and funds.
responding to armed raids on district villages, traders, and travelers. These attacks came from Afghans of the Amir's territories and from residents of the unadministered highland regions in the one hundred-odd miles of mountains between Peshawar and Kabul. Against a short term context of establishing stable, revenue-producing settled districts and a long term project of developing a useful Afghan buffer state against Russian imperialism, Company administrators attempted to regulate the Paktio-speaking tribesmen along what was called the North-West Frontier.

Long described as one of the largest "tribal" societies in the world\(^1\), in the early nineteenth century several million Paktio-speaking nomads, farmers, pastoralists, villagers, and traders inhabited much of the vast territory of mountains, high valleys, and deserts that laid west of the Indus, south of the highest peaks of the Hindu Kush mountains, east of Persia, and north of Baluchistan. In efforts to control the Afghan populations of the immediate Frontier area, colonial policy makers developed new strategies and revamped old ones. Constrained by tight budgets and the expense of military options, Punjab provincial officials responsible for Frontier tranquility initially relied on control techniques first utilized by previous Sikh and Mughal administrators.\(^2\)

The mountain passes along the Frontier were to be kept open for trade by paying allowances and subsidies to maliks, key tribal representatives, who were responsible for distributing the funds among their related clans. If individual tribesmen were wanted by the colonial authorities for legal offenses the subsidies could be suspended or the entire tribe blockaded from entering the delineated settled districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, and Hazara. A final resort, often threatened and used, would be a military expedition against a particular village, valley, or tribal group.

But the control of the tribal areas was to be a larger effort than just the pursuit of a British version of law and order. The colonial occupation of India had never been seen solely as a business venture. The full colonial project of establishing and justifying the British administration and the colonial mission in India would be brought to bear on the Frontier during the 1849-1947 period. The conflicting missions in India of businessmen, utilitarian administrators, missionaries, scientists, social reformers, the military, and seekers of progress would be distilled in the Frontier context to a highly specific blend heavy on the political and military and light on more refined interests of education or health.

As 19th century colonial India invented new techniques of political management and social control these innovations would be selectively applied to the Frontier. The fact that the "British administered" tribal areas\(^3\) were inaccessible and were supervised by political agents confined to offices in Peshawar or military cantonments meant that modern techniques of administration - land surveys, the census, taxation, resource management, communication, etc. - could only be introduced piecemeal, if at all.
Importantly, colonial institutions and society developed a characterization of the Frontier population, via a rhetoric of definition and imagery, that defined the Afghans and reduced them to manageable, inferior types and ideals. This imagery permeated the intellectual framework for discussing the area in a manner guaranteed to serve the priorities and interests of imperial India. Colonial institutions relied as much on prestige and a moral imperative as on force. The evolving Frontier tribal rhetoric devalued tribal society, culture, and religion and substituted an exclusive agent, colonial authority, as "the ultimate source for norms, and definer of what was appropriate." It will be argued that this colonial structuring of the rhetoric of the Frontier, this controlling of the terms of the discussion was so successfully ingrained in the broader colonial society, that, in part, this embedded set of perceptions and constructions was handed down to the succeeding society and administrative structures of post-1947 Pakistan.

It will be seen that the utility of much of this power of definition was recognized by political forces in Afghanistan throughout this period. It will also be seen that the impact of this Frontier discourse was often more on the colonizer than on the potentially colonized. Self-legitimizing and self-absorbed bureaucrats could badly misjudge actual conditions along the Frontier. Larger concerns with the international situation or provincial revenues might miss the locally explosive potential of larger policy decisions. It will be argued that in the late twentieth century this process of imposed definitions, misperceptions, and insensitive institutional imperatives continued to hamper Frontier stability, economic improvement, and self-determination.

Habits of Rapine

In 1809, with a British diplomatic mission, the colonial official Mountstuart Elphinstone visited the Afghan ruler, Shah Shuja, in his winter capital of Peshawar. The British concern with possible French and Russian activity in Persia led to the drafting and signing of a treaty of mutual defense. Aside from this diplomatic task, members of the mission were assigned reconnaissance duties. Officers and officials of the mission were individually directed to amass information on trans-Indus and Afghan geography, politics, economy, populations, and social customs. Elphinstone assembled his research in volumes published in 1815. Having traveled no further than Peshawar his information was gathered second-hand, especially through various native informants recruited for their specific knowledge.

Elphinstone's writings have long been considered some of the most balanced, dispassionate 19th century observations of this region. He discussed the Afghan "Pooshtoonwullee, or customary law" and differentiated between the varieties and characteristics of city dwellers, pastoralists, farmers, tribesmen, religious figures, and political factions. His judgements, even when received second-hand, were firm:
"To sum up the character of the Afghauns in a few words; their vices are revenge, envy, rapacity, and obstinacy; on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious, and prudent; and they are less disposed than the nations in their neighborhood to falsehood, intrigue, and deceit" (Elphinstone, 1842 (1815), vol. 1, p. 331).

In discussing the "Khyberees," the Afridi, Shinwari, and Orakzai clans of the Khyber pass hill country west of Peshawar, Elphinstone regarded the Shinwaris as "the best people of the three, and most subject to the king's authority" (Elphinstone, vol. 1, p. 43). The Shinwaris were heavily involved in providing pack animal transport services through the regional passes.

To secure communication between Peshawar and Kabul the Afghan "King" had to pay "great pensions" and allow tribesmen to "...have stations in different parts of the pass, to collect an authorized toll on passengers." But "...such are their habits of rapine, that they can never be entirely restrained from plundering passengers; and when there is confusion in the state, it is impossible to pass through their country" (Elphinstone, vol. 1, p. 43).

Elphinstone collected his information in Peshawar in the Persian influenced court society of Shah Shuja's winter palace. To the court the best hill tribes would undoubtedly be those considered most under the Amir's control. Elphinstone's ability to differentiate between individuals and motives broke down as he assigned collective "habits of rapine." Consciously or not, he did acknowledge that the pass region was "their country."

Before 1838, the Sikh state in Lahore had engaged East India Company policy makers as a "frontier state, as a buffer, as potentially the most dangerous ally of other Indian States, and as an element in the problem of the Indus communications" (Yapp 498). With the keeping of a Company army in Kabul in 1839 to maintain the reinstalled Shah Shuja these issues were reduced to the priority of communications. The main expedition to Kabul had marched through the southern Bolan pass route through Quetta, but the Company desired access over the "Panjab road" and through the Khyber pass to shorten supply lines from northern India.

The British technique used to keep open the pass was coercion. Garrisons were stationed in the pass. Company Governor-General Auckland had hoped to maintain peace through an 8000 pound allowance and employment in a new "Khaibari corps." But coercion was accelerated by the British political agent in Peshawar. A program of intelligence gathering, hostage taking, and playing off Afridis against Orakzais failed. By the winter of 1841-42 and the imminent disaster in Kabul the pass was closed. The political agent had "experimented with most of the methods of tribal control which were subsequently permutated by generations of frontier officials and with similar results. The one policy for which he never had the time was Auckland's policy of gradual conciliation."
Like his successors, Mackeson usually veered back towards coercion" (Yapp, p. 500).

It may be said that British colonial attitudes towards Afghanistan and, incidentally, towards the highland populations west of Peshawar never qualitatively changed after the destruction of the British army retreating from Kabul in January, 1842. This dramatic polarization of political interests and ambitions obscured a brief, more fluid, preceding period between Elphinstone's mission and the events of 1839-42. During the 1820s and 1830s the Afghans retreated from Peshawar in the face of Sikh advances and resourceful European individuals traveled widely through the region.

Between 1826 and 1840, Charles Masson, an East India Company army deserter, who for a time claimed to be an American, traversed Baluchistan, the Punjab, and Afghanistan. He lived in Kabul between 1832 and 1838, supporting himself by excavating Buddhist stupas, the ruins at Bagram, and other ancient sites for coins and valuables. After being politicized during the Shah Shuja debacle Masson left Afghanistan and eventually wrote the volumes of his "Narrative." Before 1832, Masson had journeyed through the Khyber pass, as well as through the rougher, alternate Mohmand country trade routes just north of the Khyber pass.

Masson admitted that of the three "kafila" (caravan) routes through Afridi and Mohmand country -the "Khaibar, Abkhana, and Karapa"- the direct, fairly level Khyber was preferred, though it was "the most dangerous owing to the lawless disposition of the predatory tribes inhabiting it" (Masson, p. 147). This did not deter Masson from walking through the Khyber pass "With my Patan companion" translator. Warily ascending the main pass, in local attire, he met numerous interested Afghans. He was invited to spend the night with villagers. He "became an object of much curiosity, and, as I had conjectured, on leaving Peshawer, my European birth did not prove to my disadvantage" (Masson, 1974 (1842) p. 150).

Masson communicated through his translator. Sick, afflicted persons came to him hoping to find a doctor or medicine. He was forced to prescribe harmless, simple nostrums so as not "to be considered unkind." Continuing through the pass, the next night he stayed in a small village and was given one of only three local "khats, or couches of these countries" to sleep upon.

"As night advanced, a supper was brought of wheaten cakes, roghan, and milk. The chillam also was furnished, and three or four young men came and sat with me, around my khat, until I felt disposed to sleep, and on being dismissed, they asked me, if during the night they should bring the chillum.

Such was the attention I received from these savages; and I am pleased to record it, as affording an opportunity of doing justice to hospitality and kindness, and as it opposes an agreeable contrast to the treatment I have experienced amongst other barbarous tribes. In the morning my eyes opened upon my
friends of the previous evening, who, anxious to anticipate my wants, were ready with the eternal chillam and a bowl of buttermilk. My departure that day was unwillingly consented to" (Masson, 1974 (1842), p. 152).

Masson completed his journey through Afridi country after further requests for medical services. Just before leaving the pass in Shinwari country Masson and his companion had their pockets rifled by robbers. "I was surprised at this adventure, in as much as I had been given to understand that if I could pass unmolested through the Afredis there was less to be dreaded from the Shinwaris, who from their commercial pursuits are not so savage" (Masson, 1974 (1842), p. 160).

To Masson the Afridis were hospitable savages, another barbarous tribe. In the end Masson seemed to confuse effect and cause. He first noted that, "The portions of the Afredi and Shinwari who inhabit the defiles of the Khaiabar...are extremely infamous on account of their ferocity, and their long indulged habits of rapine" (Masson, 1976 (1842), p. 163). Then, later, he stated that a new official policy cancelling tribal subsidies had caused the pass tribes to close the road to Kabul and Peshawar traders.

Did Masson write his narrative distanced enough in time from events that memories of hospitality (and robbery) were colored by prose characterizations available in volumes by Elphinstone? It seemed apparent that he had entered the Khyber with expectations generated by Elphinstone's work.

Dost Mohammad Khan, the Afghan Amir deposed in 1839-42 by the British, was allowed to return to Kabul in 1843. He ruled until his natural death in 1863. In this period Dost Mohammad reconquered the now independent principalities of Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, and the northern provinces south of the Amu Darya river. During this time the British consolidated their control over the Punjab and in 1855, "disturbed over Persian designs on Herat and the Asian implications of the Crimean War (1853-56)," (Dupree, p. 401) the Indian government restored a tenuous relationship with the Afghan ruler with the Treaty of Peshawar. The treaty called for friendship, recognition of mutual enemies, and the maintenance of territorial integrity.

In the great events of the Indian War of Independence-Mutiny, starting in May, 1857, the colonial districts west of the Indus played only a minor role. The local administrative tactic of quickly disarming potentially troublesome non-European army units combined with continuous, frenetic diplomatic activity by regional political agents to keep intact the company rule in the northwest. More importantly, the Afghan Amir choose to respect his treaty commitment to non-intervention. This decision, ignoring pressures to try and regain the Peshawar districts, was related to the October, 1856 Persian occupation of an independent Herat in western Afghanistan. A three month war declared by England had forced Persian withdrawal. A supplementary treaty, signed in January, 1857, gave Dost Mohammad thousands of British firearms
and a one lakh rupees (10,000 sterling) monthly subsidy to build armies to defend his western territories. After intense lobbying, the British were allowed to send a single, limited mission of army officer advisors under H. B. Lumsden to Kandahar.

Perhaps influenced by the works of Elphinstone, Masson, and Alexander Burnes 7 or perhaps due to eighteen months of relative inactivity in Kandahar, a young British Bengal army surgeon, medical officer to Lumsden's mission, wrote a *Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan in 1857* (1862). 8 H.W. Bellew, only recently posted to the Frontier, wrote:

"As a race the Afghans are remarkably handsome and athletic, with fair complexions, flowing beards, and high aquiline features."..."Amongst themselves they are humorous and convivial, and in their large communities are much addicted to debauchery in its worst forms."..."The Afghan is vain, bigoted in religious matters and national or tribal prejudices, revengeful of real or imaginary injuries, avaricious and penurious in the extreme, prone to deception, and which they fail to conceal, and wanting in courage and perseverance." (Bellew, 1862, p. 25).

The great shock of the uprising of 1857 ended with the replacement of the commercial East India Company rule by direct British governance. The new government generated an official demand for more sophisticated information about the populations of India to better administer the different regions and to better understand Indian social systems. One particular purpose of this expansion of knowledge was to be better prepared to anticipate and prevent a recurrence of the turmoil of 1857.

The unique demands of the Frontier, where since 1849 a continuing "law and order" problem remained unresolved, led to official sponsorship of more scholarly work. A British officer published a Paxtto-English dictionary (Raverty, 1860) and grammar. Dictionary users in 1860 were military officers or political agents consciously attempting to "avoid the mistake of employing any native go-betweens" (Raverty, preface) who only intrigued for personal gain. It was anticipated that British officers would lead more and more "Staunch and faithful" Afghan troops who had remained loyal in the "Mutiny."

Bellew published another Paxtto dictionary in 1867. He acknowledged his debt to Raverty as well as certain disagreements. His dictionary was valuable for an English to Paxtto section, but was less detailed than Raverty in vocabulary and grammatical elaboration. Later in the 19th century these works would prove useful to others, including medical personnel and missionaries.

Bellew completed his career on the Frontier as a senior army surgeon. But his scholarly efforts produced several more books (Bellew 1879, 1880, 1891). Again, great events would provide opportunity for the publication of accrued thoughts and research.
"The Second Afghan War, although it did not repeat the military
disasters of the first, ran very much the same course. The leading
parts were the same: a Foreign Secretary in London apprehensive as
to the designs of Russia; a Viceroy blind to all facts and
reasoning that did not fit his own theories; and an oriental
monarch proudly determined to maintain the independence of his
country without offending either of two powerful neighbors" (Elliott, p. 29).

Bellew wrote Afghanistan and the Afghans in late 1878, in
Lahore, in response to the outbreak of war with Afghanistan. His
230 page history and account is a straightforward political
polemic calling for the occupation of Afghanistan by England.
Bellew considered that the Amir's intrigues with Russia had gone
beyond forgiveness.

He argued that the state of Afghanistan only existed as it
did because the British had supplied the stability and wherewithal
needed by the recent Afghan Amirs to consolidate their control
within the country. The only reason for this British support was
to make Afghanistan a strong, allied buffer protecting British
India. England was justified in occupying Kabul, Kandahar, Herat,
and the north to guarantee the stability of this buffer. Bellew's
book mixed history, opinion, and rage:

"For its mere existence as an independent state it was, and
still is, essentially necessary that it derive support from
without, either by conquest or diplomacy; and in the absence of
such maintenance the state must forego its independence and merge
into the territory or political system of one or other of its
paramount neighbors" (Bellew, 1879, p. 54).

"It appears in fact, that, with the exception of the ruling
classes and government officials, the whole of the settled
population of the country—excluding of course the hill tribes who
have always been independent in their mountain retreats—is looking
forward to the day of release from the thraldom of their
oppressors by the happy advance across the passes of the British
rule, and which they are persuaded cannot be long deferred"
(Bellew, 1879, p. 73).

Bellew said that the actions of the Amir, in receiving
Russian emissaries and denying access to Kabul by British
emissaries, revealed a treacherous nature that "was foreseen and
predicted by those who have had opportunities of learning the
Afghan character, and studying Afghan politics" (Bellew, 1879, p.
174). Bellew decided that the words Pukhtun and Pukhto were
rooted in the Pactyi and Pactyea references found in Herodotus.

Having promoted the war in his first volume, Bellew now
vigorously promoted Afghan annexation in his 1880 work, The Races
of Afghanistan. Bellew wrote the slim book while in Kabul during a
phase of the Second Afghan War when British armies occupied Kabul
and Kandahar. In his preface, he said that he released his incomplete work hoping to stimulate inquiry and research—

"into the national peculiarities of the several races treated of; since I believe that, for the peace and security of our Indian Empire, they must ere very long, be enrolled among the list of its various subjects;... For to know the history, interests, and aspirations of a people, is half the battle gained in converting them to loyal, contented, and peaceable subjects, to willing participators and active protectors of the welfare of the Empire..." (Bellew, 1880, p. 6).

Bellew noted that the Frontier Afridi, "though professedly a Muhammadan, has really no religion at all" and "he has now sunk to the lowest grade of civilization and borders on the savage;" "his ignorance and barbarism are a bye-word among neighboring tribes..." (Bellew, 1880, p. 83).

Indeed, the Afghan "nationality" was only a "disunited agglomeration of different races" propped up by foreign (British) support. Bellew's implicit and direct arguments were that there was no real Afghanistan, that order and progress would only come when imposed from outside, that the Indian empire needed to occupy Afghanistan for security interests, and that studying "these different peoples" was "of the first importance in view of their ere to long becoming subjects of the British Empire—a lot they themselves are far from unwilling as a whole to accept" (Bellew, 1880, p. 117).

In Bellew's work, polemics of imperial discourse were situated within a context of historical and scholarly inquiry. The empire would be served, after the occupation of Afghanistan, by the accumulated knowledge of the area's inhabitants. Bellew saw the "Pathans" of the British settled districts to be secure and prosperous. Others to the west would benefit from British railroads, security, and justice.

Some last points about Bellew. In the 19th century context of the Indian empire the 1870s marked the consolidation of a fully formed imperial moral authority. In February, 1876, Disraeli declared it time to bestow on Queen Victoria a unifying title over India. The implication that "India was diversity—it had no coherent communality except that given by British rule," (Cohn, p. 184) meant that declaring Victoria Empress was a claim to a symbolic legitimacy not established since the Mughal emperors. Lord Lytton, the new Viceroy, held his grand Imperial Assemblage in Delhi on January 1, 1877 to declare Victoria Empress of India. Some 84,000 gathered for a highly ritualized series of processions, audiences, and speeches. Bernard Cohn saw the Assemblage, and similar events in 1903 and 1911, equally saturated with "ritual idiom," as a way "to express, make manifest and compelling the British construction of their authority over India" (Cohn, p. 208).

The power of the 1877 Assemblage to impute and declare legitimacy was recognized by the Afghan Amir and Bellew. In Afghanistan and the Afghans, the first criticism of the Amir voiced by Bellew was of the Amir's "contemptuous treatment of the
Viceroy's polite invitation to the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, by which act he signalized himself as the only independent ruler in diplomatic relations with the government of India who refused to be represented at that august ceremony—" (Bellew, 1879, p. 5). Of course, by his absence, the Amir had made exactly the representation he intended.

At the great Delhi Assemblage, Victoria was given the title "Kaiser-i-Hind," connoting Caesar, Kaiser, Czar and Hind or India. The scholar who devised the title was G. W. Leitner, professor of Oriental Languages and principal at Government College in Lahore. In 1891, Professor Leitner invited the now retired Bellew to present a paper in London at the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists. His presentation, elaborated upon, was published as An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan. It was an extensive work of Afghan history, traditional genealogies, tribal group listings, and related philological speculation, beginning with Herodotus. After careful caveats, Bellew stated:

"I have...identified certain tribes now inhabiting Afghanistan as the representatives of the posterity of the Greeks who ancienly ruled in that country." "...no evidence could be more conclusive than the fact, that the vocabulary of the language they at this day speak as their vernacular dialect is to the extent of one half, more or less—more rather than less—either unaltered Greek or Greek changed so little from the original as to be easily recognisable" (Bellew, 1891, p. iv).

Bellew concluded his book with:

"It is enough for our purpose that we have found the Afghans among the Armenians, and there as representatives of the Albanians of Asia Minor. And we may now conclude with the assertion that the Afghans of our Afghanistan are but the Albanians of our Indian Albania, and belong to the Oriental empire of the British Albion" (Bellew, 1891, p. 208).

Bellew's scholarship, especially his historical work, did not survive well. In Louis Dupree's Afghanistan (1973), in twenty-one pages of bibliography listing only references cited, Bellew was not mentioned.

In his career Bellew conflated the skills of a colonial army surgeon, historian, and linguist to pursue his interest in Afghanistan and the expansion and protection of a great empire. He used his definitions and categorizations of the "Races" of Afghanistan to prove that, in fact, no such unified country existed until the British created it. His dismissal of the independent frontier tribes as the most barbaric of all coexisted with his efforts to splinter contemporary Pashto language speakers into fragmented races and populations amenable to imperial absorption and cultural improvement. The efforts of Bellew and others created a preeminent authority based on knowledge, in which
specific claims were presented and rationalized. In an intellectual environment that did not differentiate between national interest and scholarly pursuit it would be easier to justify imposed boundaries, such as the Durand Line, or stake claims that "our" Pathans were different from their "Afghans," that linguistic roots proved a western or Indian origin, or that simple answers to such complex historical questions could definitively be addressed by scholarly endeavor. After 1947, the legacy of this undifferentiated intellectual environment would restore legitimacy to Paxto language speaking populations, but contribute to divisive contests over which national government, Afghan or Pakistani, could promote and achieve a moral legitimacy over peoples still considered in need of a paramount authority.

"The three proper names, Afghan (Persian), Pathan (Hindustani), and Pashtun or Pakhtun (Pashto), refer to one and the same ethno-linguistic group. The famous eighteenth-century Rohilla Afghan soldier and genealogist, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, makes this point forcefully in his Khulasatu'il-Ansab. Certain writers have made distinctions between Afghans, Pathans, and Pashtuns based on either historical, genealogical, or social factors, but these distinctions tend to obscure matters rather than aid understanding" (Arlinghaus, 1988, p. 12).
The Failure of Expertise

"But all the information about the country is as sketchy and inaccurate as can be," I protested. "No one knows anything about it really. Here's the file of the 'United Services Institute.' Read what Bellew says."

"Blow Bellew!" said Carnehan. "Dan, they're a stinkin' lot of heathens, but this book here says they think they're related to us English!"


"It appears to the Government of India that the time has arrived when it becomes of extreme importance that an effort be made to bring under our control, and, if possible, to organize, for purposes of defense against external aggression, the great belt of independent tribal territory which lies along our northwestern frontier, and which has hitherto been allowed to remain a formidable barrier against ourselves" (Govt. of India to Panjub Government, 17 August, 1887).  

The mixed results of the Second Afghan War led directly to a new Liberal government under Gladstone in England, a new Viceroy in India, and the withdrawal from any forward "scientific frontier" in Afghanistan. The last British troops left Afghanistan in April, 1881. The British left a new Amir in Kabul, Abdur Rahman, and by treaty retained control over Afghan foreign affairs. Along the Frontier, the districts of Pishin and Sibi, the Kurram valley, and the Khyber Pass were ceded to British India.

In July, 1879 Captain Robert Warburton took over the post of "Political Agent Khyber." Denied a chance to accompany the November, 1878 military force sent towards Kabul, Warburton escaped the September, 1879 killing of the British mission in Kabul under Major Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. For six months after Cavagnari's death, Warburton accompanied avenging forces campaigning in eastern Afghanistan. Returning to the Khyber in February, 1882, Warburton served until May, 1897 as Political Officer dealing with the Afridi and other Paxtun tribes of the Pass region. In 1900, his story, Eighteen Years in the Khyber, was published.

From 1849 to 1879, the Khyber Pass had rarely been open to free passage and trade. Most kafila (caravan) traffic took the more difficult routes just north of the Khyber.

In 1900, Warburton's widow stated:

"From the date of his first appointment on the Frontier, Colonel Warburton set himself to remedy this state of things, and during the whole period of his control of the Khyber, that dreaded Pass was kept open for traffic or travel without a single European soldier or Sepoy being stationed in it beyond Jamrud, and, when he
gave over charge, it was as safe a highway as any in India" (Warburton, p. 8).

Whatever credit Warburton might be due for this was based on his unique history, 14 his knowledge of Pushto and Persian, and a belief that "to deal with Afghans officers must be employed who have knowledge of their language, customs, and ways" (Warburton, p. 100). Through his career Warburton dealt personally with tribal leaders. In most summers, he spent several weeks high in the Khyber Pass in a camp open to tribesmen. He was "a great opponent of the native Arbab or middle man agency in dealing with our trans-border neighbors" (Warburton, p. 328). He thought that too many middlemen had intrigued with tribesmen against the interest of the government, that "my experience of the Asiatic is that he is certain to do so if he can better himself or injure an enemy or a rival by so doing."

Warburton's ideas for dealing with middlemen and the problems of distributing subsidies through tribal "Maliks" fell on deaf ears. "When I explained these matters to the people in authority over me, they turned and said: 'But it is not everyone who can understand these details'" (Warburton, p. 329).

Warburton addressed the question of "the incompatibility of the English officer mixing with the trans-border man and understanding his ways."

"I think this subject is not understood by the officials, who believe in that theory. Mixing with the untrained savage of the hills does not mean that you are to live with the man, or share the same house with him, or partake of food from the one platter."

"In the early mornings, before office work has commenced, or in the evenings when the day's work is over, let him walk out, or sit outside his quarters, and allow any and every savage to come and sit down in the assembly and join freely in the conversation that may be going on."

"When some confidence has been assured, these men will speak of their customs, their feuds or friendships, and of what is going on amongst them-information which is not only extremely interesting, but of great service for the future to the Englishman who listens" (Warburton, p. 332).

Warburton complained throughout his book that no British officers were assigned to the Frontier for a suitable, long term apprenticeship to eventually replace him and to take over the current "native" command of the tribal Khyber Rifles stationed in the different Khyber posts. He understood the challenge for an "average" officer:

"I admit that there is another side to this picture, which is not quite so roseate. To go and live in those hills for any length of time means to the average Englishman: considerable personal danger and risk, until a certain period has passed and his reputation has been assured; privations in the way of food, and increased expenditure in securing the ordinary comforts of life;
deprivation of English papers, society of English friends, of club, mess, polo, and all amusements" (Warburton, p. 333).

In his book Warburton described the numerous railroad and alternate road survey teams he guided into the Khyber hills. He regretted the reasons of bureaucracy or empire which delayed the construction of rail projects. He discussed how in 1890, the "Caubul River Railway Survey," guided by him, was fired upon by tribesmen nominally under the rule of the Amir of Afghanistan, and that "for ten or eleven days the firing from both sides was brisk" (Warburton, p. 218). The survey, in territory east of the Durand Line, was eventually completed.

Warburton's eighteen year tenure on the Khyber coincided with the high water mark of the Indian Empire. By 1885, the notoriety of the now relatively peaceful Khyber led to the Pass becoming a semi-official tourist attraction. Warburton delighted in escorting famous politicians, generals, Viceroyys, and British royalty on overnight trips to his high camp, day trips into the Pass, or quick visits to the Pass entrance at Jamrud.

In 1885, Warburton escorted the Afghan Amir, Abdur Rahman, on his passage through the Khyber to and from an "Imperial darbar" with the Viceroy and Governor-General in "Rawal Pindi." Warburton was responsible for supplying the needs of the Amir's "1,622 men, 1,734 ponies and horses, besides numerous camels" (Warburton, p. 136). He described each personal encounter with the Amir as well as numerous details of the colorful "cavalcade."

1894 was a prime year for notable visitors to the Khyber. In August, members of the "Mohmand-Bajawar Boundary Commission" traveled to Afghanistan to discuss demarcation of the Durand Line negotiated in late 1893. In early November, Warburton accompanied "Mr. Curzon" through the Pass. Curzon, soon to be Viceroy, was traveling to Kabul at the beginning of a longer trip through eastern Afghanistan. Ten days later, the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, "and a large and brilliant following" visited the Pass, suitably entertained by Warburton and the Khyber Rifles.

Warburton retired a Colonel in 1897. He supported the scheme proposed by Lytton to split off the Frontier from the Punjab. Given this division, with more efficient, considered administration, "there is every certainty of a vast improvement in the relations between the Indian Government and the independent hillmen quickly following" (Warburton, p. 340).

The retired Warburton left Peshawar in May, 1897 for the hill station of Murree. In June, Frontier tribesmen south of the Khyber attacked a British political agent at Maizar in the Tochi Valley. A following, punitive expedition campaigned until August. In August, Mohmand tribesmen northwest of Peshawar attacked Chakdarra. Malakand tribes in the north revolted. On August 22, Orakzai and Afridi tribesmen attacked military posts on the Samana ridge south of the Tirah and in the Khyber Pass. The new British officer in charge of the Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal at the Afghan end of the Khyber Pass was withdrawn to Peshawar. Reinforcements were not sent to the post and it was overrun. Conventional wisdom, then and later, declared that the revolt
across the Frontier was due to the work of religious "fanatics" instigated by the Afghan Amir and his Governor in Jalalabad:

"17. As we have already acquainted Your Lordship in telegraphic correspondence, we are of opinion that the situation created by the Afridi and Orakzai unprovoked aggression is so grave and so subversive of our dominant position on the frontier, that nothing short of dictating our own terms in the heart of the country will meet the occasion. We had given neither tribe any cause of offence. Our relations with the Afridis, founded upon tribal subsidies and payment for tribal service on the Khyber route, had stood the test, almost unbroken, of sixteen years' experience. Their country has not been touched, and they have been left to govern themselves undisturbed. The Orakzais, since they were punished six years ago for raiding in the Miranzai valley, have been left equally undisturbed. The present risings have been stirred up from within and have not been excited by any action of ours. We believe that the demands which they have formulated are after inventions put forward to cloak an outbreak which is fanatical in its origin."¹⁵ (In Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 14th October 1897).

After days of delay, Warburton was recalled. He joined the military force which marched into the valleys of the Tirah to restore British prestige. The October-December, 1897 campaign in winter conditions was considered a great success in that the Orakzai and Afridi tribes "submitted" before a second campaign in the spring of 1898 was required. It was never admitted that the over one thousand casualties suffered by the colonial army in the Tirah amounted to anything more than a minor learning experience.

Warburton served for three months with the military columns, then, until April, 1898, as a political officer trying to reconcile different tribal groups to heavy fines of money and arms. Warburton's personal sense of understanding and his desire to solve the "great problem" was unappreciated in official circles. He was destroyed by what he called the "Khyber Debacle." Warburton died before his book was published in 1900. His wife wrote in the book's introduction that:

"The hard work of the Tirah campaign which followed, the exposure and fatigue, coupled with unceasing attacks of dysentery, may be said to have caused his death—but the loss of the Khyber, after his faithful guardianship of so many years, preyed most heavily upon his mind.

It is no exaggeration to say that it broke his heart" (Warburton, p. 9).

Colonial authorities blamed the events of 1897 on religious fanaticism manipulated from Kabul. They held responsible the "Mad" Mulla, the Adda Mulla, the Aka Khel Mulla, the Fakir of Swat, and 1500 Mulas from Afghanistan. Tribal responses to the government conditions for a settlement complained about the recent
occupations of the Khyber Pass and the Samana ridge south of the Tirah, the 1896 increase in the salt duty, and the refusal of authorities to return women eloping to the settled districts.

The complaints were dismissed as unwarranted excuses. The uprisings were suppressed systematically. No frontier wide conspiracy theory was ever proven. In 1886, a joint Russian-British commission had delineated the northern Afghan border and diminished the Russian threat. Now, more concerned with reducing the influence of the Amir, British administrators dissimulated:

"5. Several of the tribes concerned in the disturbances have put forward as one of their grievances the enhancement last year of the duty on Kohat salt. The enhancement may have been utilized by mullas and others, as a means for exciting discontent and disaffection; but, so far as we are at present in a position to judge, it seems more likely that the increased duty was only advanced as a pretext, after the tribes had committed themselves to hostilities. However this may be, we consider it desirable that, when the time comes for reconstructing tribal arrangements with the Tirah Afridis and Orakzais, our policy in regard to Kohat salt should be fully explained to them..." (In Letter from Govt. of India to Secretary of State for India, 11th November, 1897).16
The Creation of Empire

"In the beginning was James Fenimore Cooper" (R.A. Billington, 1981).17

"Mr. Kipling, the Anglo-Indian, had frontier welfare, and rebellions, and Khartoum, and he produced the Empire" (T.S. Eliot, 1919).18

It may be argued that, in the 19th century, the British empire fulfilled a role in England equivalent to the role played in America by the "Frontier." The Empire, and particularly the North-West Frontier, served for the British as a marker between civilization and savagery, a barrier defining both self and the other. It was claimed that frontier challenges were character building rites of passage that made young middle-class English colonials, and through them the nation, responsible and tough. "These individual regenerations validated the system which had made them necessary in the first place; they demonstrated its moral utility. An empire founded on individual regenerations was clearly preferable to one founded on greed."19

By the late 19th century, the frontier, in America, Africa, and Asia, was perceived as bringing the process of order and progress to the world. Curzon had read Frederick Jackson Turner's work on the defining impact of the frontier on the American psyche. As individuals gained worth through frontier testing, even through regenerating acts of necessary violence, so nations and empires could be created or diminished.20 (See Appendix A).

Frontier conceptions were propelled by a frontier mythology-ideology that was used by politicians and by the developing popular literature of the period. In discussing the "west," on the far side of the receding 19th century American frontier line, Billington observed how opportunistic "image-makers," including travelers, promoters, and novelists, exploited frontier images of savagery and lawlessness:

"Of those who capitalized on this chance, the novelists were the most important and the least restrained by actuality. Their soaring imaginations created a school of writing that played a larger role in misinforming Europeans about the frontier than any other" (Billington, p. 30).

James Fenimore Cooper's Leatherstocking Tales, The Pioneers; or The Source of the Susquehanna was published in Europe in 1823. The American frontier thrived as a subject of American and European popular literature through the 19th century and into the 20th century. European authors contributed as rising literacy rates and the cheap paperback book spread popular reading material to millions. The myth of the frontier was an unqualified success. Buffalo Bill Cody took his "Wild West Show" to Europe, appearing in 1887 before Gladstone, Queen Victoria, and the Prince of Wales.

From Cooper onward, a classic frontier mythology had grown. Conflict with uncivilized "savages" required a white hero, wise in
the ways of Indians, who could temporarily thrive in the harsh wilderness and justify occasional violence as necessary for personal salvation as well as national destiny. It was, perhaps, no coincidence that vernacular speaking Robert Warburton, one of the Empire’s frontier warriors, achieved a certain celebrity. Warburton dedicated his book to the Prince of Wales, who had suggested that Warburton write his story.

In 1885, at the Khyber Pass, another Anglo-Indian, born in India and educated in England, followed the progress of the Amir of Afghanistan's entourage. Nineteen year-old Rudyard Kipling was already an experienced journalist. He came to Peshawar to cover the Amir's visit for his Lahore paper, "The Civil and Military Gazette." The particulars of Kipling's life and controversial politics must be found elsewhere. Here, it is fair to say that, in the west, "Kipling created the literary image of India that has lasted until our time." 21

For Kipling, the Empire was redeemed by a vigorous work ethic. Englishmen expanded British India, built bridges and railroads, and created new systems of progress. Kipling wrote of colonial officials tested by the Indian climate and culture, of a larger imperial destiny which required the pursuit of the Great Game against Russia. Throughout Kipling's works were scattered the rationales of empire, including the necessity for a display of moral superiority. "Never forget that unless the outward and visible signs of Our Authority are always before a native he is as incapable as a child of understanding what authority means, or where is the danger of disobeying it." 22

In 1901, Kipling published *Kim*, a work overstuffed with every colorful image, character, and drama remembered from his India days. The pattern of the frontier myth was evident. As a poor white boy raised on the streets of Bombay, Kim spoke the vernacular and English. Recruited to the conflict of the "Great Game" by a Pathan horse trader, Kim was a white hero who could pass for "native" and prosper in that "primitive" environment. He was educated to be a clandestine surveyor of frontier lands forbidden to British access.

Kipling patterned Kim's budding career on actual agents recruited by colonial mapmakers to fill in the unmeasured valleys of the northern and western frontiers. Kipling recognized the connection between knowledge and the advancement of empire. Kim was recruited for his spying duties by a Colonel of the "Secret Service" posing as head of the "Ethnological Survey."

In *Something of Myself*, written in 1935, Kipling wrote of his 1885 trip to the Frontier and the Khyber Pass. In a review of his varied newspaper assignments he listed covering "receptions of an Afghan Potentate, with whom the Indian Government wished to stand well (this included a walk into the Khyber, where I was shot at, but without malice, by a rapparee who disapproved of his ruler's foreign policy);..." This was fiction. Thomas Pinney explained, "Incidentally, at the time of his visit to the Khyber Pass (April 1885) he makes no mention of being shot at, either in his articles for the CMG or in his letters, though a letter of January 30,
1886, says that he had been threatened by a native with a knife in the preceding April as he walked towards the Khyber Pass."23

Perhaps, in 1885, the nineteen year-old reporter had been able to travel as far west of Peshawar as Fort Jamrud at the foot of the Khyber. If it was apparent that the active imagination of a frustrated journalist might embellish a trip to the Khyber, it might be consistent that Kipling, and others could easily elaborate the "savagery" of the Frontier in far more distanced works of the scholarship and fiction.
The Development of Knowledge

"I agree with the reviews of a previous book (Ahmed, 1976) who criticized me in otherwise favourable reviews for using the term Pathan instead of Pukhtun or Pashtun (Dupree, 1977:514; Misdaq, 1976:58). The word Pathan does not exist among Pukhto speakers and the Pukhtuns, it is an Anglo-Indian corruption. I shall therefore use the 'correct' term in this study." (Ahmed, 1980:368).

"I have used the word Pathan throughout since I am talking about both the Pukhtun and the Pashtun people of Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan. A term which would include both would be Afghan, but this might be confused as a national designation, so I have chosen to keep the British word 'Pathan' which includes both Pakhtun and Pashtun peoples" (Lindholm, 1980: 350).

In 1901, Curzon (Viceroy 1899-1905) created the North-West Frontier Province from the trans-Indus region of the western Punjab. Curzon attempted to stabilize the frontier with a Close Border Policy that replaced forward British-Indian military units with tribal militias. After the 1901 death of Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman, Curzon attempted to pressure Habibullah, the new Amir, to allow the extension of Indian railroads and telegraph lines into Afghanistan.

If Curzon "lacked the sensitivity and compassion which softened the paternalism and rigorous efficiency of some of his contemporaries" (Brown, p. 101), the paternal efficiency of other bureaucrats would maintain the Indian colonial system until 1947. Civil Service administrators had roles limited to functions of revenue, judiciary, and executive tasks. They worked to the ideal that their only economic role was to provide the infrastructure of rails, irrigation, and communication that would facilitate private commerce. "They had neither the ideological motivation nor the financial and political freedom to become prototype developmental economists" (Brown, p. 100).

There was motivation to further accumulate knowledge of sub-continental geographic and social conditions in the interests of better administration. The first census, in 1871, reflected a continuing post-1857 imperial effort to learn the exact details of Indian life. By 1875, Herbert Risley was fully engaged in his anthropological studies of Indian populations. District gazetters and more or less official histories and regional studies flourished.

In 1899, a Dictionary of the Pathan Tribes in the North-West Frontier of India was published. This dictionary was, literally, a 264 page taxonomy of Frontier tribes and their "divisions," "sub-divisions," "sections," "minor factions," and "vassal clans." This attempt to specify groups to the "khel" (clan) and even village level coincided with political efforts to pinpoint exact tribal targets for punitive fines, blockades, or military operations. The dictionary appeared to be useful in attempts to limit coercive expenses and avoid excessive tribal alienation.
Risley's work used the measurements of physical bodies to promote a "biological" theory of caste, which stressed genetic difference. He propounded a form of anthropology which was inseparable from administrative concerns, arguing that an ethnographic survey was as necessary as a cadastral (land registry) survey for the efficient administration of Bengal. In his 1908 work, The People of India, Risley used his anthropometric statistics to prove ideas about the sources and classes of Indian "races." He divided the inhabitants of British India into seven "physical types." Eighty "Pathan" subjects were measured for Dimensions and Measures of Head and Nose, for Stature, and for "Relative Prominence of Root of Nose." Risley's multi-colored map included the residents of Baluchistan and the Frontier Province in the "Turko-Iranian" type. Contemporary and later critiques of Risley's theories are less important here than the influence of such authoritative studies and representations.

From the 1871 census, as communities were categorized and counted by religion and caste, anxieties coalesced around perceptions of the impact of the rankings on specific groups. Educational, administrative, and nascent political opportunities might increase or decrease with census percentages. "And each act of identification confirmed the apparently fragmented nature of Indian society."28

In his 1980 essay, "Images of the Pathan: The Usefulness of Colonial Ethnography," Charles Lindholm discussed how differences in tribal representations, from Elphinstone to Caroe, "varied according to the vacillations of colonial policy" (Lindholm, p. 357). He thought that there had been a decline in an aggressive colonial frontier strategy, even that, "In the end, a modified version of the Close Border Policy won out, and the later administrators of the Frontier had strong amicable ties with the Pathans who were their nominal charges, but who were more like their partners."

Lindholm concluded with an analysis and interpretation of the interaction of British colonial agents with Frontier tribals. Specific conclusions aside, he thought that:

"These different images of the Pathan character, which seem so inconsistent to the western observer, are not really inconsistent at all. Once the structural framework of the society is grasped, the contradictions are resolved and the diverse visions of the Pathan fit together into a coherent whole. Colonial ethnography thus need not be discarded, or seen only as a commentary on itself. When informed by an adequate notion of social structure, and by an historical consideration of the position of the colonial ethnographer, the work of these early writers can offer indispensable information for anthropologists, as this essay has attempted to demonstrate" (Lindholm, p. 360).

Lindholm's insights masked the irreconcilable nature of overall colonial relations with what are now known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of the Northwest Frontier
Province. Ten years after the repression of the 1897–8 Mohmand uprising in the tribal valleys just north of the Khyber Pass, a major British punitive expedition against the Mohmands suffered hundreds of casualties. In 1916, an attempt was made to blockade these hill Mohmands from the settled plains. A seventeen mile electrified fence and periodic blockhouses were raised between the Kabul and Swat rivers. "Four hundred Mohmands were electrocuted that year" (Ahmed, 1980, p. 67). In 1935, 30,000 British troops campaigned in the Mohmand valleys when tribesmen opposed road builders in the Gandab river drainage. When the Empire dissolved in 1947 the British legacy within what would become the Mohmand Tribal Agency (1951) included "not a single school, dispensary, electric bulb, or government post" (Ahmed, 1986, p. 121).
Pakhtunistan

"The origin of nationalism in the North-West Frontier Province will not be discussed here. It is sufficient to state that nationalism was in the air and, for a variety of reasons, had immense attraction for large numbers of people. Some were attracted to it for economic reasons, others had considerations of personal power uppermost in their minds and for many the main attraction was the ideological content of nationalism...." (Jansson, 1981, p. 18).

Between the 1930 Civil Disobedience campaigns and 1947, Frontier Province political rivalries pitted the British and their large landholder allies (often, settled district Paxtuns loyal to the Muslim League) against smaller landowners (khans), socio-economic reformers, and Paxtun nationalists gathered under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgar or "Red Shirt" movement. His evolving political agenda was based on opposition to the British and the large landlord khans who had been co-opted to British alliance. His interest was in a firmly Muslim, Paxtun nationalism "concerned with the political emancipation of the Pakhtuns and with little interest in other ethnic groups" (Jansson, p. 240).

Constitutional reforms recommended in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 and the Government of India Act of 1919 did not include measures for the Frontier Province. Border security concerns, revived after the short, three month 1919 Third Afghan War,\(^{30}\) meant that not until after the Civil Disobedience disturbances of the 1930–32 period would political devolution be applied to the Frontier Province. Abdul Ghaffar Khan had led the April, 1930 Frontier Civil Disobedience campaign as an individual member of the All India National Congress. After his release from prison in 1931 he merged his Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) organization with the Congress Party.

The 1930 Civil Disobedience arrests, agitations, and rioting had led to Frontier unrest so severe that for "more than a week the government lost control over Peshawar City" (Jansson, p. 52). In June, 1930 an anti-British Afridi lashkar (armed group) attacked Peshawar Cantonment. In August, another Afridi attack on Peshawar District was broken up by strafing aircraft. Only the declaration of martial law and months of effort repressed the Frontier movement.

The popularity of Ghaffar Khan and the Congress peaked with the election of a Congress ministry in the Frontier Province in the 1937 elections. By 1947, this popularity had melted in the face of a wave of Muslim nationalism and the demand for Pakistan expressed by Frontier students, native born administrators, religious leaders, and the Muslim League. At the moment of Partition Ghaffar Khan continued to demand Paxtun autonomy, even an independent Pakhtunistan composed of Paxto speaking regions.
If this demand was more an attempt to win regional concessions in the political negotiations of 1946-47, it would later leave Ghaffar Khan open to accusations of being anti-Pakistan.

With "Pakhtunistan" also in the air and Afghanistan ready to exploit the unstable post-partition political atmosphere, Paktuns of what would be reconstituted as Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas had new opportunities to maneuver for advantage. Pakistan did not replace British troops withdrawn from forward bases in the tribal regions. Annual subsidies were guaranteed. The tribesmen were now addressed as brother Muslims called to the work of nation building. In 1948, Pakistani President Jinnah drove through the Khyber Pass and accepted the accession of the tribal areas to Pakistan. He received a locally produced rifle from an Afridi malik, Wali Khan Kukikhel. Wali Khan was the grandson of malik Amin Khan, who had given Warburton numerous headaches in the 1890s.

The Pakhtunistan issue played itself out in a long simmering rivalry between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The rivalry would frequently disrupt cross-border trade and turn the Afghan government to greater economic links with the Soviet Union. The early career of the Pakhtunistan issue could be traced through the Afridi, Wali Khan Kukikhel, who, in 1950, turned against Pakistan:

"...apparently for economic reasons. In the next few years he was the leading Pakhtunistan malik and raised large lashkars against Pakistan. His village in Tirah was bombed by the Pakistan Air Force and he had to remove himself to Afghanistan. However, he subsequently changed sides again and in 1963 he was elected a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan" (Jansson, p. 266).

After 1947, politicians in the provincial assembly would have a different view of Paktun nationalism than militant tribal area maliks. Residents of the tribal areas, where political parties were banned, would travel to the settled districts for trade and work and be influenced and recruited by reformers, the Centre, the religious, and elites. And, even as tribal area political and social autonomy remained closely defended, economic interests would begin to involve larger numbers of FATA Paktuns in the larger world.
The Knowledge of Development

"Pakistan wants to help you and make you as far as it lies within its power, self reliant and self sufficient; and to help your educational, social and economic uplift" (M.A. Jinnah, "Addressing the tribesmen," 1948?).31

A discourse of tribal area development, progress, and prosperity was a staple of Pakistani nation building rhetoric from the beginning. The creation and utilization of economic surveys, censuses, and data bases within this discourse was considered necessary so that state institutions could plan and direct policies to alleviate poverty, spur commerce and industry, develop agriculture, and satisfy the educational, health, and other needs of a post-colonial nation.

Residents of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were simultaneously direct targets of developmental rhetoric and potential beneficiaries of new policies. But the realities of various state economic policies in the several differing Pakistani political regimes of 1947-90 meant that any benefits claimed for the tribal areas were often diffused or rendered peripheral to larger strategies in which tribal interests played a subordinate role.

Post-1947 tribal economic documentation illustrated at once, the attempt to enlist all FATA Paxtuns to the work of state building, the use and limitations of "objective" technocrats in information gathering pursuant to this goal, and the reaction of tribal elements to shifting state tribal area related tactics. Paxtuns who might have accepted direct economic inputs, often, were less than willing to enter into any dialogues of development or modernity which implied integration by subordination or a compromise of political autonomy.

Only in 1956 was a "Preliminary Economic Survey of the Tribal Areas Adjoining West Pakistan" printed. A 1954 decision to incorporate tribal development plans into the larger NWFP development plan had been followed by a Rs. 100 million "lump-sum" allocation for the Frontier Regions in the first Five Year Plan of 1955-60 (Ghulam Jilani Khan, 1972, p. 35). But, the nature of the rhetoric of tribal development was evident as a characteristic budget pattern emerged. The pattern was composed of high Plan Allocations, lower Budget Allocations, and even lower actual Expenditures. In fact, NWFP provincial politicians spent none of the Rs. 100 million allocated under the 1955-60 Plan. Instead, Rs. 5500 was spent on the "Preliminary Economic Survey."

Representatives of the Board of Economic Enquiry, Peshawar University, were limited in their access to the tribal areas. They admitted a heavy reliance on estimates from Political Agents and other officials based on "personal enquiries from the local tribesmen". For some tribal regions "no records whatsoever are maintained" (Mian, 1956, p. 3). The surveyors noted:
"Difficulties Faced During the Survey. The main difficulty in conducting this survey was the lack of basic and up-to-date data. We had to depend on the honesty and integrity of the tribesmen. Innocent and illiterate as these tribesmen are they are against such Surveys. It is very difficult to make a thorough survey of this kind. In some places even the life of Investigators is not secure. Usually the tribesmen took the nature of the Survey in a wrong sense. They thought of it as a step towards complete control and consequent levying of taxes by the Pakistan Government."32

Many Frontier Paxtuns of 1956 saw the mission of these new government bureaucrats as little different from that of recently departed colonial administrators. University of Peshawar economic investigators were often treated as agents of a law and order, revenue oriented government structure. Intentions aside, the appearance of the old system was reinforced by a bureaucracy still in transition. Nurul Islam Mian, author of the 1956 "Preliminary Economic Survey", in his acknowledgements thanked Mr. McIntosh (Chief Agriculturalist, I.C.A.), Professor Guy Miller (Rural Economic Advisor, Government of Pakistan), J.R. Wilson (Expert on Hybrid Maize, Agriculture Department, Peshawar), and Professor T. F. Wise (Director, Board of Economic Enquiry, Peshawar).

The 1956 survey was able to trace the outlines of the 1950s Mohmand and Afridi tribal economies. Eighty jobs existed in arms manufacturing, whose "volume and value could be improved if better machinery and material were available"..."The question of the desirability of such an improvement should be considered however" (Mian, 1956, p. 41). In 1956, Rs. 326,000 was still being paid to the Afridi as an annual subsidy, while 1681 khassadar "Tribal Levies" earned salaries totally Rs. 1,109,000.

The value of the transport trade to the Khyber Agency was apparent in 1956. There were 630 Afridi vehicles with an "estimated net annual income" of Rs. 2,600,000, particularly on the Afghanistan-Pakistan commerce through the Khyber Pass. It was noted that "this trade is still almost all in the hands of the Khyber Agency tribesmen" (Mian, 1956, p. 41).

If "Efforts be made to build a motorable road to the Tirah Valley, which has considerable potentialities of agricultural development," still "However the effective law and order is a prerequisite" (Mian, 1956, p. 43). Again, "Improvements in transport are essential for economic development, but often difficult because of fears of loss of freedom from control" (Mian, 1956, p. 89).

The trials of government survey takers and inefficiencies of method continued for decades. The 1961 Census detailed only the village populations of the few non-Afridi tribal groups on the fringes of the Khyber Agency. All Afridi related numbers were politically sensitive "estimates." Only in the 1980 Housing Census of the NWFP and the tribal areas could it be stated that:

"In the census history of Pakistan for the first time training to census trainers were imparted directly by the master trainers having knowledge of the Pushto language."33
After the proclamation of martial law in October 1958 and the rise of Ayub Khan, a deliberate, new state policy emphasized overall national growth over efforts to address specific social or regional inequities.\textsuperscript{34} The second Five Year Plan (1960–65) may have achieved higher growth rates and aimed for rural stability, but the limitations of the enacting agents in the civil bureaucracy, through the vehicles of public development corporations, meant that the "developmental and distributive impact of rural development programs, however, if not negative was at best marginal." It was observed that:

"The West Pakistan Rural Works Programme, for instance, was captured by the landed aristocracy soon after its inception and made no contribution whatsoever to redistributing incomes or alleviating rural poverty" (Burki in Burki and Baxter, 1991, p. 99).

The 1964 government publication \textit{Pathans; The People of Pakistan} listed new state funded industries in the Khyber Agency:
1) Electrical goods manufacturing at Jamrud. 2) Machine screws manufacturing unit also at Jamrud. 3) Hosiery goods factory at Khajuri Plain. 4) Automobile Service and Repair Workshop at Landi Kotal."\textsuperscript{35}

The 1964 publication glorified "Industrial Revolution", most dramatically symbolized by the Warsak Dam, newly built on the Kabul River at the base of the Mohmand and Afridi agencies. Built in the late 1950s by "Canadian engineers working under Colombo Plan auspices"\textsuperscript{36} it was "the multi-purpose project that brought prosperity to tribesmen" (Pathans, 1964, p. 41). Building the dam supplied wages to "10,000 tribesmen." The Rs. 360 million project included a three and a half mile tunnel to carry water to irrigable land.

In 1956, it was anticipated that the dam would provide irrigation for 15,000 acres of the Mohmand Agency and 93,000 acres overall in Tribal Territory (Mian, 1956, p. 44). The 1964 document estimated 120,000 acres would be irrigated; with the new Bara River wier at Miri Khel watering another 43,000 acres in the Khajuri Plain.

But, perhaps the main point of the Warsak Dam was less tribal area than Peshawar area industrial development. The new power generated by the dam allowed the doubling of the 30,000 ton seasonal capacity of the Premier Sugar Mills at Mardan, the full operation of the Charsadda Sugar Mills (18,000 ton capacity), and the construction of two new sugar refineries, at Bannu and Peshawar (totally 30,000 tons of capacity). The 1964 publication claimed there were now 100,000 industrial workers around Peshawar "where before Independence there was no industry worth the name in this area" (Pathans, p. 56). The continuing "large scale demographic movements of the Mohmands to the fertile lands of Charsadda and Mardan" (Ahmed, 1977, p. 31) now helped to fill industrial wage laborer positions.
The 1977 Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas had its own national political context coloring a rhetoric of development. One aspect of the 1977 book was a chart described as portraying a "thirty-fold" increase over a "four year" period (i.e. the Bhutto era) in central and provincial "expenditure in the Tribal Areas" (Ahmed, 1977, p. 31). The chart, itself, showed only a ten-fold increase over the first four years of the Bhutto period and symbolized the vulnerability of developmental literature to numbers that could be easily confused or distorted.

The Bhutto era (1972-77) concerns with a separatist movement in Baluchistan and renewed competition with the Kabul government completed a larger context in which any approaches to the tribal areas might be seen as mixing political expediency with altruism. Through the Zia regime, ending in 1988, tribal, provincial, and national interests would ebb and flow around the same issues of access, autonomy, employment, and the control of limited resources.

The 1980s concluded with incomplete results for programs of government led national and tribal area "development." In his 1991 analysis, B.S. Khanna noted that the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development defined development as the "transformation of rural life and activities in all their economic, social, cultural, institutional, environmental and human aspects." A primary focus was to be on eliminating poverty and improving nutrition. "For this purpose economic growth is to be accelerated with an appropriate emphasis upon equity, people's participation and redistribution of economic and political power" (Khanna, 1991, p. viii).

Khanna detailed the frustrations of Pakistani policy makers and administrators who complained of having to work through tribal area political agents, deputy commissioners, fragmented tribal groups, and middle men. A "senior NWFP government administrator" at the end of the Fifth Plan (1978-83) said that:

"There is no direct return on government investment in development projects, as no taxes or land revenues are levied in these areas; in causes of time sharing of costs may have to be introduced to meet expenditure."

Khanna discussed large, extra "special development" expenditures for the 1983-86 period within the Sixth Plan period. The rhetoric of dates, budget numbers, and needy "sectors" could not mask the economic reality that it could only be funded by "provision of additional resources which are proposed to be raised from foreign donor agencies, by and large" (Khanna, 1991, p. 112).

But, if Sixth Plan "substantial increases in resource allocation for tribal development amounting to a little more than Rs. 5 billions (Plan and special provisions)" might be difficult to realize, the point was not to be missed that aid:

"has however, to be supplemented by an appropriate enhancement of administrative capability, and institutionalized
tribes men's participation in local decision-making. In this connection several suggestions have been made by an administrator from Pakistan:

"(b) Management techniques and administrative skills of the political officials will be the critical factor in years to come. How the resources can be harnessed into meaningful development, to what extent participation can be ensured and in what manner the willing consent of the tribal people can be continued to remain available are the main challenge for the administrators. Sooner or later participation aspect will have to be institutionalized."

"(c) "It is essential that a more direct contact with the mass of tribesmen be evolved with the passage of time", as too much dependence upon tribal maliks, lungi-holders, etc. has assumed "negative implications".

"(d) "Collection of reliable information and data would need to be emphasized by the administrators in future" (Khanna, p. 114).

By 1990, partisan opinion could claim it equally true that there would continue to be tribal area resistance to the "transformation of rural life and activities in all their economic, social, cultural, institutional, environmental and human aspects," while there would continue to be state and institutional resistance to any "appropriate emphasis upon equity, people's participation and redistribution of economic and political power."
In both colonial and post-colonial South Asian systems of authority there were found assertions of paternal leadership that might be repressive or benevolent, concerned with law and order or social welfare, with security or national integration. Especially during times of weak or non-existent representative forms of political expression, one means towards legitimizing and reinforcing this leadership was the process of the production and use of information within an administrative-social system that could promote or obscure different facts and interpretations of the "reality" of South Asia.

Post-1947 constitutional forms of government gained legitimacy through broader representation and programs of national development. But, many of the structures of administration and attitudes of elites continued to reflect older interests in control and preeminence; interests that often poorly meshed with regional perspectives seeking particular, subtle relations with the centre based on aspects of social autonomy or economic opportunity. In Pakistan, the continued dominance of administrative and military structures earned the immediate post-independence bureaucracies a characterization as a continued "viceregal" system (Burki, 1991, p. 12).

Claims of legitimacy and precedence relied heavily on assertions of superior competence and knowledge. The assembly and deployment of information and analysis continued in similar patterns throughout the period of this study. This was particularly apparent in Frontier related attitudes, documents, and images. Paxtun lands would be surveyed. Paxtuns would be contested as Pathans, Afghans, Pakistanis, or Pakhtunistanis.

Edward Said once described the growth of knowledge as a form of assembly, not just additive or cumulative, but "a process of selective accumulation, displacement, deletion, rearrangement, and insistence within what has been called a research consensus." From the earliest days on the Frontier, a recognizable, selective, "citationary" drawing from previous sources validated a knowledgeable "re-presentation" of Paxtun tribal life (See Said, 1978, pp. 176-77). Whether in the interests of "authenticity," scholarship, or the retelling of stories known to be well received by home audiences, Masson used and recycled Elphinstone's Khyber images; images already derived from interested informants. Kipling retold seemingly real frontier tales, acquired in club barrooms and barracks, that were part of a sourceless, timeless colonial frontier mythology.

By the early 1920s, the Indian empire had been weakened by the great losses of World War I and was under siege from a growing Nationalist movement inspired by Gandhi and others. But the production of authoritative colonial knowledge continued and even accelerated with the growth of modern media.

In 1920, a particular wave of popular western interest in the "oriental" world peaked with the overwhelming celebrity of T.E. Lawrence. After the war, Lawrence had returned to England a
disillusioned partisan of Arab nationalism. In 1919, his life, and western perceptions of the east, had been transformed when an American journalist, who had traveled in the desert with Lawrence, presented a stage show of newsreel film, slides, oriental music, props, and a live performer doing the "dance of the seven veils." Lowell Thomas conquered London with his illustrated lecture presentation "The Last Crusade: With Allenby in Palestine and Lawrence in Arabia."

The show was a sensation. It played for months, before royalty and hundreds of thousands of others. Thomas' two hour narrative linked music, film, and slides to create the romantic hero "Lawrence of Arabia." Among the celebrities who attended the theatrical lecture was Rudyard Kipling. After months in London, Thomas took his show on tour. He played Australia and then a year in Asia, from Singapore to India. Thomas was impressed by India and spent a year and a small fortune filming a new project, "Through Romantic India and into Forbidden Afghanistan."

Thomas' 1925 book, Beyond Khyber Pass, captured his unique style of authoritative exoticism (See Appendix B). He traveled along the Frontier and into Afghanistan. With cooperation from the Frontier Police he staged for his newsreel camera a raid of thieving Mahsud tribesmen, "for the later edification of audiences in London, Paris, New York, and Chicago" (Thomas, 1976, p. 245). Frontier Paxtuns would be "re-presented" on London stages as thieves and murderers through fictional film scenes and overheated rhetoric. Thomas returned to England with a tall Afridi aide who had accompanied an English officer advising Thomas' production effort. In London, Thomas stationed the Afridi in his theater. Before each show:

"...he stood in the lobby of the Royal Opera House in his native costume and, seven feet tall from the ground to the top of his striking Afridi headdress, was surely the most dazzling theater attendant in all London" (Thomas, 1976, p. 258).

After 1947, the Frontier-Empire confrontation ended and a process of state conciliation with tribal interests began. Colonial era narratives of savage tribesmen would be replaced, in the 1980s, by a flourishing Paxtung language audio cassette trade in Peshawar bazaars in which stories were repeated of tribal heroes outwitting the British (See Heston, 1986).

Through the 1980s, the FATA Paxtun areas changed as local economies were touched by the influences of slow regional industrialization and extensive labor migration to cities and Gulf oil states. In 1979, the Soviet Union finally did invade Afghanistan. Images of anarchic, uncivilized, religious fanaticism undoubtedly eased Soviet rationalizations for the invasion. The tribal areas were affected by ten years of nearby war and immense refugee problems. Border region Paxtuns exploited opportunities for licit and illicit trade. At one point in the Soviet-Afghan war a frustrated mujahideen leader attacked an Afridi malik who would not cooperate with the free movement of supply caravans in tribal territory. After shelling Tirah homes with light artillery the Afghan commander said, "Wali Khan is a stupid man. He has the face
of a rat coming out of mud. He is an agent of Khad and KGB" (Kaplan, 1990, p. 100).

The period under study ended with a renewed state emphasis on tribal area developmental processes that offered education, health care, and other state provided benefits, often in return for degrees of access by integrative roadbuilders, statisticians, or administrators. The use of knowledge in the pursuit of "progress" accelerated despite the 1980s war and other setbacks. The state had now replaced the imperial regime as the mobilizer of information and analysis for policy goals. But any attempt by Afghan or Pakistani centres to become "the ultimate source for norms, and definer of what was appropriate" for the tribal areas confronted a region economically invigorated in the 1980s by remitted wages, unrecorded cross border trade (including drugs), and Afghan war related arms supplies. Legacies of insensitive state institutions and authoritative tribal imagery would continue to hinder rather than ease contacts with Frontier populations. The imperatives of state integration and development would guarantee that any apparent Frontier stability would represent as much a current, temporary synthesis of competing interests as any final resolution of tribal relations with the larger world.

In this process of competition and cooperation individual words would matter. When Ranajit Guha examined colonial documents about the Santal revolt of 1855 he argued that particular representations within opposed discourses would generate a "clash of codes" that would color apparently neutral reports. One observer's "fanatic" would be another's "Islamic puritan." Guha decided that "our texts are not the record of observations uncontaminated by bias, judgement, and opinion" and that, the "antagonism" between positions might be "irreducible" (Guha, 1988, p. 59).

In his 1860 Paxto dictionary, Raverty recorded several words that might have been listed with the border hill tribes in mind. "Yaghi" was defined as "rebelt, rebellious, mutinous." "Khpul-sar" was listed as "uncontrolled, obstinate, self opinionated." "Sar-kakkkh" was translated as "stubborn, mutinous." In 1867, Bellew reprinted these Paxto words in his Paxto to English section with similar definitions. "Sar-kakkkh" was expanded by Bellew to include "rebeltious, disobedient, perverse."

In the English to Paxto half of his dictionary, Bellew listed Paxto words for English terms. His method may have been to sit with Paxto speaking informants, read an English term, and write down the answers. Bellew's definitions between the first and second sections of his dictionary did not always completely match as, perhaps, different informants were consulted at different times. In the second section of his dictionary Bellew, apparently, also used informants with differing judgements about word meaning and, perhaps, about Paxtun hill populations. In Bellew's second section, yaghi, khpul-sar, and sar-kakkkh were all listed as definitions of the English word "Independent."
Appendix A

".....Another deferred topic is the engrossing subject of Border Literature, in which it would, I believe, be possible to demonstrate a common growth and characterization in diverse periods and many lands. I should also have liked to have analyzed the types of manhood thrown up by Frontier life, savage, chivalrous, desperate, adventurous, alluring. To only one of these allied subjects will I refer before I conclude, and that is the influence of Frontier expansion upon national character, as illustrated in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race.

We may observe two very distinct types of this influence on the eastern and western sides of the Atlantic. A modern school of historians in America has devoted itself with patriotic ardour to tracing the evolution of the national character as determined by its western march across the continent...."

".....Now let us turn to the other side of the world, where on a widely different arena, but amid kindred travail, the British Empire may be seen shaping the British character, while the British character is still building the British Empire...." ".....Outside of the English Universities no school of character exists to compare with the Frontier; and character is there moulded, not by attrition with fellow men in the arts or studies of peace, but in the furnace of responsibility and on the anvil of self-reliance...." ".....The Frontier officer takes his life in his hands; for there may await him either the knife of the Pathan fanatic, or the more deadly fevers of the African swamp. But the risk is the last thing of which he takes account. He feels that the honour of his country is in his hands. I am one of those who hold that in this larger atmosphere, on the outskirts of Empire, where the machine is relatively impotent and the individual is strong, is to be found an ennobling and invigorating stimulus for our youth, saving them alike from the corroding ease and the morbid excitements of Western civilization. To our ancient Universities, revivified and reinspired, I look to play their part in this national service. Still from the cloistered alleys and the hallowed groves of Oxford, true to her old traditions, but widened in her activities and scope, let there come forth the invincible spirit and the unexhausted moral fibre of our race. Let the advance guard of Empire march forth, strong in the faith of their ancestors, imbued with a sober virtue, and above all, on fire with a definite purpose. The Empire calls, as loudly as it ever did, for serious instruments of serious work. The Frontiers of Empire continue to beckon. May this venerable and glorious institution, the nursery of character and the home of loyal deeds, never fail in honouring that august summons."

(from George Curzon, Frontiers, Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 1907: excerpts pp. 54-58)
Appendix B

Beyond Khyber Pass

"To-morrow if Allah wills, and if Amir Amanullah does not change his mind, and if his playful subjects do not shoot holes in the tires of our American automobile, and if a thousand and one other things do not happen that invariably do happen to delay travelers east of Suez, why then we will pass out of the old Bajauri Gate and journey through the Khyber Pass to mysterious Afghanistan, where but few other Americans have passed before us.

But to-morrow may never come; so to-day let us follow the example set by the countless millions who have stopped in this Central Asian caravanserai during the past five thousand years—yes, even to the extent of visiting the serai of the dancing-boys and the street of the daughters of Jezebel and to tasting the delights of charas. We are not here to sit in judgement on the Paris of the pleasure-loving Pathans. We are merely onlookers, bound for a remote land beyond the Khyber and the Safed Koh. After all, standards of morality not only differ in different ages, but in different climes. What happens in Paducah or Poughkeepsie would startle Peshawar, and vice versa. Let us be frank, however, and say that of the thousand and one sins of Peshawar most are unmentionable and some are unbelievable. They are the sins of opium and hemp and dancing-boys and jealousy and intrigue and that deviltry which gets into men's blood in certain latitudes. They are the sins of battle, murder, and sudden death, of gambling and strange intoxications, of savagery, sentiment, and the lust of revenge that becomes the strongest of all passions" (Thomas, 1925, pp. 42-44).

"Next morning it was with a very real sigh of relief that we whizzed past the frontier post of Landi Khana, back into British India. Here in the Khyber we were on one of the most dangerous roads in the British Empire, perhaps, but after Afghanistan it seemed restful indeed. We had been under something of a strain, not so much because of the heat and possible difficulties which our presence with a camera might have caused us, but from the nervous tension necessary to "fill the unforgiving minute with sixty seconds worth of distance run." Our days in Afghanistan had been among the most strenuous of our lives, but we all felt amply rewarded.

The gardens of Peshawar looked very calm and English. We passed some subalterns riding back from polo. Mustachioed majors in mufti were driving pink and white girls to tennis. A church bell pealed. In the chief commissioner's garden, a fox-terrier romped with a well-washed goat; over them flapped lazily the Union Jack. We had left the fierce passion of Central Asia behind us; from Kabul to Peshawar is a long way farther than from Peshawar to New York" (Thomas, 1925, pp. 254-255).
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Endnotes

1 See Ahmed, Akbar, *Pakhtun economy and society* (1980), for a detailed description of the evolution of the concepts and literature of "tribal" social organizations.

2 Sixteenth century Mughals paid the Afridis Rs. 125,000 a year in tribal subsidies to keep open the passes between Kabul and Peshawar. Seventeenth century Mughals paid all hill tribes a Rs. 600,000 annual tribute.

3 After the 1890s these areas were defined as east of the Durand Line. The line was intended to separate spheres of influence over the borderland tribal groups between the Afghan Amir and 19th century British India. After 1947, the line was generally perceived as a de facto, though widely ignored and disputed, international boundary.

4 The fuller quote from Sandria Freitag: "the concept of authority for the British was an exclusive one, encompassing both power, in the sense of the ability-through institutions and brute force-to coerce and effect change, and moral influence, in the sense of providing the ultimate source for norms, and definer of what was appropriate." in "Collective Crime and Authority in North India" in Anand Yang, ed., *Crime and Criminality in British India* (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1985) 141.

5 Shah Shuja had served as Amir from 1803-1809. He had been deposed in the endlessly unstable Afghan political environment, and then been restored by British strategists and armies to act as a friendly buffer against Russian moves in Central Asia. See Dupree (1973) for a comprehensive history of nineteenth century Afghan dynasties.


7 Many others contributed to extensive Indian Empire literary genres detailing Afghan wars, the "Mutiny," and travel-adventure-mission sagas. A sub-genre of literature about Russian expansion also existed including *The Russian Advance Towards India*, Marvin (1882); *The Coming Struggle for India*, Vambery (1885); Russia's March Towards India, 2 vols. "An Indian Officer" (1894), Russia Against India The Struggle for Asia, Colquhoun (1901).

8 *Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan in 1857, Under Major (Now Colonel) Lumsden; With an Account of the Country and People.*

9 *Afghanistan and the Afghans: Being a Brief Review of the History of the Country, and Account of Its People, with a Special Reference to the Present Crisis and War with the Amir Sher Ali Khan.*

10 The Pakto language spoken by Paxtuns and others has a "hard" eastern dialect which becomes the Pakhtu language, spoken by Pakhtuns.

11 "Leitner was a Hungarian by birth and began his career as an Orientalist, linguist and interpreter with the English army during the Crimean War. He was educated at Constantinople, Malta, King's College, London, obtained a Ph.D. from the University of Fribourg and was a lecturer in Arabic and Turkish, professor of Arabic and Muhammadan Law at King's College, London before going to Lahore in 1864" (Cohn, p. 201).


13 From Davies 71.

14 In 1840, Warburton's father, a British officer in Kabul, had married a niece of Afghan Amir Dost Mohammad. Both parents survived the disastrous retreat of the British army from Kabul. In 1842, while his mother was a fugitive in hiding, Robert Warburton was born. He was educated in England before joining the Indian colonial army.
15 From Papers Regarding British Relations with the Neighboring Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India, and the Military Operations Undertaken Against Them During the Year 1897-1898, vol. 1, Presented to both Houses of Parliament (London, 1898) 98.
16 Papers Regarding British Relations... 143.
19 Plain Tales From the Hills, Introduction, 17.
20 Relevant sources include Richard Slotkin’s Gunfighter Nation The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America and Regeneration through Violence.
22 From “His Chance in Life” in Plain Tales from the Hills, 1987, p. 93.
24 The Dictionary was published in Calcutta with no author listed, but with an appendix by Captain A.B. Mc Mahon, "Political Agent, Dir, Swat and Chitral."
26 Pinney in Bayly, p. 256.
28 Pinney in Bayly, p. 258. Pinney footnotes that David Washbrook traces the post-1947 internalization of such categorization in arguing that “the University of Oxford could be said to bear prime responsibility for modern castism in South India for a large number of early caste activists were its graduates” (Washbrook, 1982, p. 158).
30 An assertive Afghanistan regained control over it’s international affairs in settlement of a “war” of bluff and maneuver which took advantage of war weariness in England and British India.
31 Quoted in Ghulam Jilani Khan, Development of Tribal Areas (Peshawar: Board of Economic Enquiry, 1972) 35.
35 Pathans; The People of Pakistan (Pakistan: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1964) 60.