Jalalabad. His third son, Amanullah, acting regent in Kabul, seized power and launched a series of political and social reforms. Amanullah: The Soviet Gambit Begins (1919-1929)

In the ten short years of Amanullah's rule, the complexion of politics in Central Asia changed irrevocably. In May, just three months after seizing power, Amanullah fired the opening shots in the month-long Third Anglo-Afghan War, by which he hoped to gain national solidarity and head off efforts by kinsmen to replace him on the throne. The military results were inconclusive, but politically the Afghans gained the right to conduct their own foreign affairs, a major victory won with the signing of the Rawalpindi Peace Treaty (August 8, 1919), and the subsequent Kabul treaty normalizing relations with British India (November 22, 1921).

Exercising its newly won right, Afghanistan (along with Turkey and Persia) became one of the first nations to sign a Treaty of Friendship (February 28, 1921) with the Bolsheviks. Since then, the treaty has been renewed every eight years, with modifications to fit current situations (see Appendix A for latest text). The two nations exchanged ambassadors, and the Russians gave Amanullah several small monetary grants and gifts of weapons which partially offset the British subsidies withdrawn because of the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

Individual Afghan socialists traveled back and forth to the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s and 1930s. No Russian-sponsored, antigovernment agitation occurred, however, because the Russians wanted to cultivate the reform-minded, anti-British young amir. Indeed, one might say that until the coup in 1978, Russian-Afghan relations were fundamentally based on Lenin's belief that: "The revolutionary character of a national movement in conditions of imperialist oppression does not necessarily imply that the movement contains proletarian elements, or that it has a revolutionary republican programme. The struggle of the Amir of Afghanistan is objectively a revolutionary struggle, in spite of the monarchist views of the Amir and his associates, since it weakens, disunites and undermines imperialism." Early Afghan-Soviet relations were not entirely smooth, however. Soviet Central Asia flamed with anti-Communist revolts in the 1920s, and several groups of basmachis (rebels, bandits, what might even be called freedom fighters), led by men like Ibrahim Beg, Faizullah, and Enver Pasha (an ousted Young Turk), sought aid from Afghanistan, Turkey, and Persia. Hedging his bets, in 1921 Amanullah sent his best troops to his northern borders to await developments, and secretly corresponded with Enver Pasha, who was killed in action on August 4, 1922. The Russians demanded withdrawal of Afghan forces from the frontier, and extracted a promise of noninterference from Amanullah. The basmachis received little outside help, however, and eventually the Red Army (having smashed the White Armies and driven out the Allied Intervention—including United States troops!—and the Red Army) bombarded the country into submission. Like later efforts to use technological superiority to win guerrilla wars, the bombings failed.

Amanullah lost the throne to Bacha Saqqao ("son-of-a-water carrier"), or Habibullah Ghazi (as he called himself). Habibullah II has been painted by Afghan apologists for the Yahya Khal monarchy (1929-1978) as a bloodthirsty, iliterate bandit. The portrait has probably been somewhat overdrawn. Other sources indicate that "The Afghan government was described as reasonably efficient, with a distinct 'republican' flavor, and law and order prevailed in Kabul." This assessment may also overstate the case, but Habibullah II's edicts do superficially resemble some reform programs of later governments, including those of the DRA, which has partly rehabilitated Habibullah Kalakani or Kohdamani (after the
village and region of his origin). The new regime considers Habibullah II to have been an innocent pawn of the British.

Nadir Shah: Blood in the Streets (1929-1933)

Paw or not, Habibullah II held the throne for only nine months. Civil war broke out and General Mohammad Nadir Khan and his brothers, supported by a tribal army from both the Afghan and British Indian sides of the Durand Line, deposed Habibullah (the same tribes currently oppose the PDPA regime). Nadir, a distant cousin of Amanullah, was proclaimed King Mohammad Nadir on October 17, 1929.

The new king was not only related to a former monarch but also was the son of Mohammad Yusuf, from a family group known as the Musahiban. Together with his brother Asaf, Yusuf had returned from exile in British India in 1900 and gained influence in the court of Habibullah I after the death of Abdur Rahman. Unlike the Tarzis, the Musahiban were dynastic, not liberal, in orientation and associated by some contemporary observers with pro-British sentiment. The Soviet Union was, nevertheless, the first nation to recognize the new regime (only Turkey and Russia maintained regular embassy staffs during the civil war).

The Afghans and Soviets eventually signed a renewed Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression in June 1931, but not before the activities of the famous Uzbek basmach, Ibrahim Beg, threatened to disrupt peaceful relations. While Nadir and his brothers busily pacified south Afghanistan, Ibrahim Beg waged a guerrilla war against the Soviets. He used hit and run tactics, always falling back to sanctuary across the Afghan border.

In June 1930, the exasperated Red Army Commander pursued Beg across the border about 40 miles into Afghan territory. The Russians failed to capture the elusive guerrilla leader, but the move jolted the Afghans into action. A force led by Shah Mahmud (Nadir's youngest brother) drove Ibrahim Beg into the Soviet Union, where he was captured and executed.

Nadir Shah instituted an internal reign of terror which virtually wiped out the liberal middle class. In spite of a general amnesty, Habibullah II and eleven of his chief associates were among the first to be executed. They were shot and then strung up on public display as an object lesson for aspirants to the throne.

A favorite method of execution was to blow the victim from the mouth of a cannon. Friends of mine tell of collecting scattered bits of a father, brother, uncle, or cousin for burial. However, when the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar (Kabul), a powerful religious leader, called cannon executions un-Islamic, because a Muslim must have a body to go to Paradise, Nadir Shah agreed, and reverted to the rope and the rifle.

The blood feuds engendered by the deaths led to the assassination of Nadir Shah in September 1933. Contrary to expectations, his 19-year-old son, Mohammad Zahir, succeeded him to the throne without the usual fratricidal fights, with Nadir's three surviving brothers (Shah Wali, Mohammad Hashim, and Shah Mahmud) supporting the young crown prince. The usual bloodbath followed, however, further whittling down the liberals among the population.

Zahir Shah: Incipient Capitalism (1933-1946)

Nadir Shah left behind the 1931 Constitution, which technically functioned until 1964. More important to an understanding of subsequent events, however, was the laissez-faire economy that began developing in the late 1920s. Led by several vigorous entrepreneurs, including Abdul Majid Zabuli, Loe Sher Khan Nashir, and Abdul Aziz Londoni, Afghanistan opened trade with the U.S.S.R., British India, and elsewhere in Asia. Some of the profits they accumulated were invested in small-scale industrial complexes, which produced items for local consumption: textiles, soap, leather goods, seed oils. A small class of industrial workers began to emerge.

Zabuli developed Bank-i-Meli (nationalized by the DRA), which served as a center for capital accumulation and investments. The bank, like other industrial enterprises, operated under the government monopolies system (sherkat). The government controlled 40-45 percent of the stock in a company, although it seldom invested that percentage of capital; the private sector held 55-60 percent of the stock, and often invested 100 percent of the capital.

The system controlled production, protected invested capital, and guaranteed profits to investors and graft to the royal family and high government officials. The elite in power benefited enormously, but even then a certain percentage of the profits was reinvested in expansion of facilities or to develop new industries. The Afghans paid for European machinery and hired foreign technicians to set up plants and teach locals how to operate them. This self-sufficiency in development continued through World War II.

Mohammad Zahir Shah reigned until 1963 but did not rule. Rather, real power rested with two of his uncles who served as prime ministers: Mohammad Hashim Khan (1933-1946) and Shah Mahmud Khan (1946-1953). Hashim Khan showed great favoritism toward his nephews, sons of his brother Mohammad Aziz, who as Afghan Ambassador to Germany was assassinated in Berlin five months before Nadir Shah in 1933. The assassin, Sayyid Kemal, is now a PDPA hero (see Appendix B). The sons of Aziz would later play key roles in modern Afghan history: they were Mohammad Daoud and Mohammad Naim.

Afghanistan's tradition of neutrality, which all Afghans, regardless of political leanings, supported, received repeated tests during and
immediately after World War II. In October 1941, the British and Russians delivered notes to the Afghan Foreign Ministry demanding the expulsion of nondiplomatic Axis nationals. The Germans in particular were popular with the Afghan elite and many high officials openly supported the Axis cause. Following on the heels of the Anglo-Russian joint invasion of Iran in August of that year, however, the Afghans saw they had little choice but obey: the Axis nationals were sent packing.

Before World War II ended, several thousand Muslim refugees from Soviet Central Asia (mainly Turkic-speaking Kazakh) crossed into Afghanistan to escape Soviet domination. Some stayed in Afghanistan; others emigrated to Turkey; Elmwood, New Jersey; and Flint, Michigan, where many found employment in auto assembly plants.

Almost immediately after the Second World War and until 1949, the Soviets sent provocateurs across the Amu Darya to stir up peasants against landlords and, by extension, the government. Soviet Tajik went among Afghan Tajik; Soviet Uzbek among Afghan Uzbek; Soviet Turkom, Afghan Turkom, etc. The scheme backfired, for the Russians had forgotten or ignored the fact that most of the peoples of north Afghanistan are descendants of Muslims fleeing either Tsarist or Communist persecution, and most hated the shoravist (Russians) with a passion.

The Wikh-i-Zalmayan (Awakened Youth) and the Liberal Parliament (1947-1963)26

A liberal, reform-oriented political brotherhood, Wikh-i-Zalmayan, was founded in Afghanistan in 1947 at a time when Prime Minister Shah Mahmud, encouraged by Western-educated members of the royal family, took modest steps toward preparations for a free election—free at least relative to past elections. Previously, in spite of guarantees in the 1931 Constitution, the government simply appointed most deputies.

The resulting Seventh (or “Liberal”) Parliament of 1949 had a hard core of 40-50 (of the total 120) reform-minded, nationalist-oriented deputies, mainly Wikh-i-Zalmayan, who took their roles as parliamentarians seriously. By 1951, the Liberal Parliament had passed laws permitting freedom of the press. The reaction was immediate: newspapers sprang up overnight, all in opposition to the ruling regime. The most important papers were Watan (Homeland), Angar (Burning Embers), and Nida'-yi-Khalq (Voice of the People).

Watan, a biweekly published in Persian, was edited by Mir Ghulam Ghabar (Appendix B), assisted by Abdul Hai Aziz (Minister of Planning in the 1960s, born 1915, died 1964), and Mir Mohammad Sidiq Farhang (Later Deputy Minister of Planning and a parliamentary leader in the Lower House from 1965-1969). Angar, a Pashto-Persian biweekly, was published by the Kandahari poet, Faiz Mohammad Angar, an avid supporter of “Pushhtunistan.”27 Nida'-yi-Khalq, a biweekly Persian paper published by Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmudi, generally supported the government’s foreign policy but demanded more genuine nonalignment and more freedom of the press, although it loosely accepted the role of the monarchy as a symbolic unifying factor “at this time.” All 3 papers had circulations of approximately 1,500 until they were banned in 1952. The percentage of literacy in Afghanistan at this time was under 5 percent, so the papers obviously had a limited impact on the rural population. In the major cities, however, literates read the papers aloud to groups of interested nongovernmental organizations.

Conservative religious leaders and their supporters in government received the brunt of the journalistic attacks. The editors and their staffs demanded genuinely free elections, and that the government (i.e., the Cabinet) be appointed from and responsible to Parliament. Liberal parliamentary deputies formed a National Democratic Party.

With this impetus from Parliament, other groups began to react, especially the Kabul University students, who formed a Student Union. Numbering no more than 30, this small group debated everything from communism vs. capitalism to the role of Islam in a secular state. Several European and American teachers in Kabul’s high schools encouraged these discussions and some actually participated.28

The Afghan government at first chose to ignore the movement. Then, realizing it had opened a Pandora’s box which might threaten the status quo, the government attempted to form a pro-government party. The move failed, for although civil servants were under heavy pressure to join, many government employees secretly sympathized with the liberals.

Initial rebuffs to their constructive demands for extended freedom of speech and press, parliamentary checks and balances, formation of political parties, and scrutiny of ministerial budgets by parliamentary committees caused the liberals to adopt more virulent tones. The newspapers published articles attacking members of the ruling clique personally. More and more pieces named religious fanaticism as the major block to progress and modernization. Although partly true, these charges drove many fence-sitters away from the liberal trough. Students wrote and acted in plays that insulted the royal family and Islam. Some speakers approached obscenity in the facile double-entendre for which Persian is justly famous.

In 1951 the government dissolved the Student Union, and several student leaders, accompanied by two army officers, fled to Pakistan, unfortunately killing a border guard. Before the 1952 elections to the Eighth Parliament, the government took further steps to smash the liberals, particularly the Wikh-i-Zalmayan. It banned all nongovernment newspapers, and arrested about 25 of the movement’s leaders. The jails which
held the liberals were not designed for rehabilitation but for punishment. Therefore, after a bit of soul-searching and various types of mental and physical coercion, about half of those jailed agreed to cease antigovernment activities. Several of these retreads subsequently gained high positions in the first Daoud government (1953-1963). Others remained in prison and died there. Those still alive were released by King Mohammad Zahir in 1963 at the beginning of his constitutional experiment.

The new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has resurrected several of these early prisoners of conscience, and the media have extolled them as martyrs (if dead) or heroes (if alive). (See Appendix B for several biographical sketches.)

The Liberal Parliament failed because of a number of interrelated factors. First, opposition was directed against an established, independent regime, not a colonial oppressor. Second, the rural elites favored the dynastic urban elite against the liberal intellectuals and the peasantry had been unaffected by the ideological debates in the capital. Massive illiteracy prevented the free press from having an impact outside its own incestuous circle. Third, to many, in and out of government, a freer society, with a Cabinet accountable to Parliament, would have meant less potential graft. Fourth, the central government maintained tight control over the bureaucracy, which did not widely participate in the liberal movement for fear of retaliation. Fifth, personal attacks on the royal family and the religious leaders antagonized moderates and potential allies. Finally, the ruling elite refused to believe that the liberals merely wanted to reform the existing system, and looked on any opposition as preparation to overthrow, a common reaction among Afro-Asian power elites—and often true.

The lingering negative impact of the Liberal Parliament (plus other factors) led Lt. Gen. Mohammad Daoud Khan, supported by King Mohammad Zahir (Daoud's cousin and brother-in-law), to seize power from Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan, in a bloodless 1963 coup. (On another level of reality, the coup was but a repetition of the timeless contest between generations: nephews replaced uncles.)

Daoud Khan: The First Decade (1953-1963)
In the mid-1950s, the Soviets changed their unsuccessful infiltration tactics to large-scale economic penetration. Why did the Soviets take the big plunge into foreign assistance so soon after World War II? The answer is rather complicated, but boils down to a theme articulated by Nikita Khrushchev: the ultimate victory of world communism over capitalism through peaceful competition in the developing world.

Soviet planners partly took their cue from the success of the Marshall Plan, under which the Americans helped rejuvenate the wrecked economy of Europe. Soviet theorists reasoned that massive economic assistance could be used to capture selected nations in the developing world. Afghanistan became an "economic Korea," a testing ground to determine whether economic penetration would enable the Soviets to capture the country's social and political institutions. Further, the experiment would test the economic responses of the West, particularly the United States, just as the Korean War tested the military responses (and staying power) of the United States and its allies.

Seldom have the United States and U.S.S.R. adequately examined the human factors involved before launching development projects. To institutionalize change in the economic sector of a developing society requires shifts in emphasis in values, attitudes, and belief systems (for better or worse). In Western Europe, World War II may have smashed the economic superstructure but not sociopolitical institutions. Therefore, only money and machines, not whole new sets of values, were needed. In Afghanistan, the first decade of Daoud Khan brought rapid change in the economic sector but political growth was suppressed and distorted by repression.

A flareup over the "Pushtunistan" problem with Pakistan closed the border in September 1961. During the next 18 months, Afghan dependency on in-transit facilities through the U.S.S.R. increased manyfold. In order to reorient the trade and aid balance, Prime Minister Daoud stepped down in March 1963 at the height of his power, a step few strong men would take. After considerable negotiations, brokered by the Shah of Iran, the border reopened in May 1963.

An Experiment in Constitutional Monarchy Fails (1963-1973)
Daoud's resignation heralded another abortive experiment in parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. A Loya Jirgah (Great National Assembly, partly appointed, partly elected) passed a new Constitution, promulgated by King Mohammad Zahir in October 1964. The country held two elections (1965, 1969), but several factors inhibited the institutionalization of the processes, and the third elections, planned for August-September 1973, were never held.

The constitutional period failed partly because the American- and European-educated Cabinets (1965-1973) were not able to institutionalize their concepts of Western liberal modernization. The perpetuative-oriented bureaucracy and conservative elements in the royal family constantly blocked their efforts. A wishy-washy king also impeded their efforts. He vacillated, and failed to promulgate the laws necessary to implement the constitutional provisions for political parties, provincial councils, and municipal councils. Some of the king's closest advisers insisted that legalizing political parties would permit communist groups (read, "antimonarchist") to gain strength.
But leftist groups already functioned, encouraged by the relatively liberal Press Law of 1965. The first significant party to emerge—although there were no public announcements to that effect—held an organizational meeting on January 1, 1965 at the Kabul home of its founder, Nur Mohammad Taraki.35

A Taraki Ghilzai Pushtun, Taraki was born in 1917 in the village of Sor Qala in Ghazni Province. He liked to remind people that his birth coincided with the birth of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. His family was seminomadic, and traveled annually from the Ghazni area to trade in British India. They sold livestock and smuggled, the classic powindah pattern, which largely ended (all but the smuggling) after the 1961-1963 border closure.36

Taraki, a first generation literate, attended schools in both Afghanistan and northwest British India (now Pakistan). At age 15 he obtained work as an office boy at the Pushtun Fruit Company in Kandahar. The management, genuinely impressed, sent Taraki as a clerk to Bombay where he continued his education in and out of schools, met Indian nationalists from all points on the political spectrum, and was most impressed by the socialist leaders, including those in the then undivided Communist Party of India (CPI). Apparently, he maintained contact with the CPI leadership after leaving India, but he never joined the party.

In 1937 the 20-year-old Taraki returned to Kabul. His literary skills gained him a position in the Department of Press. No free press existed and the Royal Government of Afghanistan controlled all publications. Taraki served in several provincial posts before returning to Kabul. His official biography gives Taraki a major role in the Wikh-i-Zalmayan. Any support he gave to the movement was very secret and probably minor because he held on to his government job. According to his official biography, however, Taraki was “exiled” to Washington as press attaché in the Afghan Embassy. (Many American foreign service personnel have the same feeling when transferred to Washington from overseas.)

After Daoud became Prime Minister in 1953, Taraki applied for political asylum, which was refused. He held a press conference and denounced the Afghan ruling elite. The New York Times, among others, carried the story, complete with a photograph of Taraki. The Afghan government naturally ordered Taraki home. With no political asylum, Taraki had no choice.

The official biography gives a slightly different version:

*When on his way back, many imperialistic sources began to circulate various lies about Comrade Nur Mohammad Taraki. Even regimes with imperialist puppets asked him to assume another nationality and thus spare himself from Daoud’s wrath by taking refuge. However, as a staunch revolutionary patriot, Comrade Taraki did not accept the privileges offered by imperialism and its lackeys anywhere, continuing his journey homeward. Upon his return to Kabul, he telephoned the despotic Daoud from the Kabul Cinema, telling him: “I am Nur Mohammad Taraki. I have just arrived. Shall I go home or to prison?” Since Comrade Taraki’s case was now an international one, he was told to go home as Daoud would receive him later on. However, from then to the triumph of the Saur Revolution, Comrade Taraki was under constant police surveillance, shadowed by detectives wherever he went.*37

Taraki had to support himself and his family, and worked for several private companies. Seldom did he hold a job long because the secret police would drop unsubtle hints to his employers about the inadvisability of hiring people who, like Taraki, expressed antigovernment sentiments.

Ironically, it was the United States government permission is always necessary before foreigners can hire Afghan nationals, and the United States government would be the least likely institution to hire Taraki without such permission. So, when USOM (later USAID) hired Taraki in 1955, tongues wagged. Three years later, however, Taraki left USOM employment, presumably under pressure from the Afghan government.

Taraki founded the Nur Translation Company, which is where I first met him. Most embassies, foreign companies, and many individuals like myself subscribed to his translations of Persian and Pashto government press releases, documents, and periodic publications. Impressed by the quality of his work, the U.S. Embassy hired Taraki as a full-time translator, again with the permission of the Afghan government. He remained an embassy employee from May 1962 to September 1963.

The official biography of Taraki makes no mention of his periods of U.S. government employment, and, after the 1978 coup, some in the opposition launched a whispering campaign that Taraki was a CIA agent. In my opinion, however, the Afghan government permitted Taraki to work for the Americans in order to use him as an informer.

Note that Taraki’s periods of employment occurred during the prime ministership of Daoud (1953-1963). Although harassed, Taraki was never incarcerated for long periods, nor was he tortured, even though Taraki continued to be a self-proclaimed leftist. He wrote a number of books which, though not printed, were circulated privately in manuscript form among friends and possible converts: themes of oppression of the peasants, working classes, and intellectuals infused all his writing.38

From September 1963 through December 1964, Taraki and other leftists met to discuss strategy. The “new democracy” of King Mohammad Zahir at first encouraged political groups to
prepare for elections. So, on January 1, 1965, about 30 of Taraki's comrades gathered at his home in Shah Mina, Kabul, and launched the Jamiat-i-Demokratiki-Afghanistan (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the PDPA). Those present unanimitously elected Taraki Secretary-General. They also elected a Central Committee whose regular members were: Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal, Dastigir Panjsheri, Nur Ahmad Nur, Dr. Saleh Mohammad Zeri, Shahrullah Shahpur, Sultan Keshmand, Dr. Shah Wali, Taher Badakhshi. Alternates were: Abdul Mohammad, Bareq Shahfiyee, Hakim Shahrayee, Ismail Danisht, Abdul Karim Misaq, Wahab Shafie, Zafer Ofaq, Dr. Zafer, Hafizullah Amin, Sultaiman Layek.

The 1965 elections, the first held under the 1964 Constitution, were as fair as could be expected under the circumstances, although the ruling elite established a series of ground rules which guaranteed the defeat of certain candidates, including Gulam Hasan Safi, Nur Mohammad Taraki (defeated in his home district of Nawah, Ghazni Province), and Hafizullah Amin (defeated by 17 votes in his Paghman constituency). The king's minions placed one of the following notations on each candidate's application: do not allow to run; allow to run, but defeat; allow to win; persuade to become a candidate if he tries to withdraw, and allow to win; must be a candidate and must win; do not interfere, let the candidates fight it out.

The government also arrested several PDPA leaders during the campaign and held them in jail for periods up to seven years. Among those jailed were Dr. Saleh Mohammad Zeri (now Minister of Public Health), Dastigir Panjsheri (now Minister of Public Works), and Abdul Hadi Karim, who was released after he went insane.

Technically, no parties contested the 1965 elections, but deputies in the Lower House (Wolesi Jirgha) split into approximately five loose groups:

1. a conservative, go-slow, pro-royal family element, headed by traditionalist religious leaders (led by the influential Mojaddidi family);
2. a laissez-faire, economically oriented group, favoring free enterprise and more self-reliance in development, supported by Abdul Majid Zabuli (not a deputy, however), the dynamic, able founder of the Bank-i-Meli and one of Afghanistan's foremost entrepreneurs and industrialists;
3. the Wahdat-i-Meli (an informal "National Party"), led by Khaliullah Khalili, a poet and close confidant of the king, presumed to be centrist;
4. a small group of liberals favoring the public sector in development, the private sector in commerce and trade, led by Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang (with links to Zabuli);
5. a minute but vocal group on the left, led by Babrak Karmal, Nur Ahmad Nur, and Dr. Anahita (one of the three female deputies), all members of the PDPA.

Few deputies from the countryside understood either parliamentary procedures or their responsibilities under the system. Therefore, the tragedy which developed needed no outside machinations.

After the elections, King Mohammad Zahir asked the Interim Prime Minister (March 14, 1963-October 25, 1965), Dr. Mohammad Yusuf to form a new government. As usual in Afghan politics, Dr. Yusuf reappointed most of his old Cabinet (9 of 13), all of whom had served in previous Daoud cabinets. Several had served efficiently, but the newly released political energies demanded new names and faces. The educated urban elites wanted the "new democracy" to be more than cosmetic.

Led by Babrak and Dr. Anahita, Wolesi Jirgha deputies of most political hues heaped abuse on the PM-designate and his interim and proposed Cabinets. The House Speaker, Dr. Zahir, hoped that the vituperative verbal diarrhea would run its course, so he maintained only very loose control over the proceedings. Students in the 80-seat spectators gallery joined in the action, shouting slogans against the Cabinet, and with the usual Persian double-entendre, the royal family and their sycophants. In a frenzy of parliamentary zeal the Wolesi Jirgha passed a resolution requiring Cabinet members to make public their financial and landholdings, but quickly voted down a motion that deputies do likewise.

Babrak and his followers encouraged leftist students to appear in Parliament on October 24, the day Dr. Yusuf was to present his Cabinet for approval. Primed with a series of slogans, students stormed into the Parliament building on Darul Aman road. They overflowed from the spectators' area and occupied the deputies' seats and sat in the aisles. The demonstrators ignored Dr. Zahir's repeated requests to leave, so he adjourned until the next day. The Wolesi Jirgha held an informal straw vote (196 to 6) that night, and decided to hold a closed session, a right guaranteed in the Constitution.

October 25, 1965 (sehum-i-aqrab 1345 on the Afghan secular calendar) will always live in the memory of Afghans as a day of tragedy. Demonstrations began about 7 A.M. in front of Parliament, and ended just after 5 P.M. near the house of Prime Minister Yusuf, where Afghan troops fired into a group of slogan-shouting demonstrators. At least three people were killed and scores wounded.

In the wake of violence and death, Dr. Yusuf resigned on October 29, ostensibly because of ill health. The King appointed Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal (former Ambassador to the United States and Pakistan, and Minister of Press and Information in Dr. Yusuf's Interim Cabinet) as Prime Minister. Maiwandwal's 20-person Cabinet included 15 new faces, including a few women.
The schools in Kabul, closed on October 26, reopened on November 1, and the students at Kabul University held a series of sit-ins. Prompted by Babrak and his followers, the students demanded that the government investigate the sehum-i-aqrab deaths, release arrested students and faculty members, and permit the creation of a Student Union.

Maiwandwal (Prime Minister from November 2, 1965 to October 12, 1967) made a dramatic personal appearance on November 4 at the Kabul University campus, agreed to the students' demands, and was triumphantly paraded around on the shoulders of the joyous students. But nothing came of the demands, although most of the jailed students and teachers were released.

Several other periods of student demonstrations and worker unrest occurred before the 1969 elections. In my opinion, the strikes and demonstrations were in response to real inequities, and the participants struck out at those ideologies (primarily religious conservatism and Western materialism) which they believed had created the injustices. From the beginning, the approach was more evolutionary than revolutionary, no matter what the source of inspiration.

From Maiwandwal to the second Daoud coup (July 17, 1973), Afghanistan ran through four Prime Ministers, and about 30 free press newspapers. The 19 papers surviving ceased publication in 1973 under government orders after the Daoud coup. This was, in my opinion, a mistake of major proportions, since it closed off any channels of meaningful, literate dialogue and debate.

The first important leftist paper was Khalq (The Masses, or The People; Nur Mohammad Taraki, publisher; Bareq Shafiyee, editor), which published six issues from April 11 to May 16, 1966. Khalq announced its policy would be to alleviate the “boundless agonies of the oppressed peoples of Afghanistan,” and linked itself with international socialism: “the main issue of contemporary times and the center of class struggle on a worldwide basis, which began with the Great October Socialist Revolution, is the struggle between international socialism and international capitalism.” Khalq's models for development included Egypt, India, Burma, and Yugoslavia.

Outcries against Khalq arose from many quarters, particularly among religious leaders in the Meshrano Jirgah (Upper House), 20 of whom demanded an investigation. Accused of being anti-Islamic, antimonarchy, and anti-Constitution, Khalq replied that it was not against the principles of Islam, favored the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution, and recognized the necessity of the monarchy “at this stage of Afghanistan’s development.”

Khalq’s stand on land reform and preference for public over private ownership of certain types of property was widely held to be anti-Islamic. The Attorney General's Office, under Article I of the Press Law, banned the paper on May 23. Taraki immediately applied for permission to publish a new paper, but the government turned down his request. Even many nonleftist Afghans considered these heavy-handed decisions to be mistakes.

In July 1967 the Khalq group finally split into two groups over policy and personality issues. Taraki believed in the class struggle; Babrak, more pragmatic, wanted to form a United Democratic Front, a class alliance or coalition. The Taraki-led Khalq also advocated a much stronger stand on the “Pushtunistan” issue than did Babrak's supporters.

The Babrak breakaway group first published Parcham (The Banner; Sulaiman Layek, publisher and editor; last editor was Mir Akbar Khyber) on March 14, 1968. About a month later, another Khalq splinter faction began to publish Shu’la-yi-Jawed (Eternal Flame; Dr. Rahim Mahmudi, publisher and editor and son of Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmudi). The Shu’la particularly appealed to literate urban minority groups, such as the Persian-speaking Shia Qizilbash.

The Shu’la, led by Mohammad Osman Landai, the brothers Sadeq and Yayari, and the Mahmudi family, were often referred to as “pro-Peking,” just as Parcham was often called “pro-Moscow,”’ loose terms at best. Many urban Afghans also believed a connection existed between the “Establishment” and Parcham (Babrak’s father was a general in the army), which some jokingly called “The Royal Afghan Communist Party.” Khalq maintained an independent stance.

A further split occurred when Talib Badakhshi left Parcham to form the Tetem-i-Mel (loosely translated, Against National Oppression), whose manifesto called for a Maoist-type mobilization and the localization of power in the countryside, in effect, a combination of ethnocentrism and Maoism.

Afghan Melat (Afghan Nation), one of the older and more tenacious nongovernment weeklies (first published April 5, 1966, banned several times, finally died with the July 1973 coup), was published by Engineer Ghulam Mohammad Farhad (called “Papa Ghulam,” now in jail) as the organ of the Jamiat-i-Sosial Demokrati-Afghanistan (Afghan Social Democratic Party). The paper defined social democracy as constitutionalism, a democratic society, no bribery, land for the landless, prohibition of luxury imports, no unnecessary foreign loans, a progressive income tax, restoration of Pashto as a popular language, and a free “Pushtunistan.”

Constantly under pressure from the government, Afghan Melat continued to be a devil’s advocate. The lead article in the April 25 1967 issue, for example, asked, “Are our government officials spies?”: the result was a nine-month ban on publication. The article quoted and commented on a Ramparts (April 1967) exposé entitled “How the CIA
Turns Foreign Students into Traitors,” by Abdul Latif Hotaki, a sometime Afghan student in the United States. The article named names and implicated others, including Prime Minister Maiwandwal and several of his Cabinet members, who faced a barrage of hostile questions in the Wolesi Jirgah. Maiwandwal came out of the ordeal with as clean a bill of political health as possible under the circumstances. Maiwandwal’s eventual resignation may have had the circumstances. Maiwandwal of taking unfair advantage of his position to appoint only those who supported the PDP to high positions.

During his tenure as Prime Minister, Maiwandwal founded an unofficial party, Jamaat-i-Demokratik-Mottaraqi (Progressive Democratic Party), which published the weekly Musawat (Equality). Many, both in and out of government, accused Maiwandwal of taking unfair advantage of his position to appoint only those who supported the PDP to high positions.

After his resignation and successful medical treatment in the United States, Maiwandwal published a series of articles in Musawat that presented his political and economic theories in great detail. Neither Communist nor Liberal in the Western sense, he tried to adjust socialism to the Afghan reality. His interpretation—in effect the PDP position—emphasized five elements: 48

1. Religion. Islam was to be respected as a religion; the state would be secular, but no laws would be repugnant to Islam.

2. Monarchy. The PDP proposed a constitutional monarchy, with the king as a stabilizing figurehead. Implicit in many of Maiwandwal’s statements, however, was the acceptance of an eventual, evolving republicanism.

3. Democracy. Sovereignty would be with the people (one person, one vote), and the parliamentary apparatus would bring about changes through constitutional means.

4. Nationalism. All Afghans would be equal before the law, and no group would be permitted to dominate the others, but regional autonomy was accepted as necessary.

5. Socialism. The humanistic aspects of classical evolving socialism (social democracy) were to be introduced. The economic aspects would include land reform, nationalization of basic resources and industries, and a progressive income tax.

The PDP, therefore, conceived of Afghanistan’s future as an evolutionary socialist pattern within the humanitarian, positive aspects of Islam. Maiwandwal would later pay dearly for these sentiments.

The 1969 Elections: Prelude to Disaster

Apparently the power elite used the 1965 selective criteria during the 1969 elections for the 13th Parliament.49 All the leftist papers (plus some others)50 were banned during the election campaign. The government blocked the election of most known leftists and socialists (such as Maiwandwal and Farhang). When the fixed results had been counted, only two prominent leftists remained in the Wolesi Jirgah: Babrak had been returned from his Kabul ward, and this time Hafizullah Amin won in Paghman.

The period 1969-1973 witnessed a rapid deterioration of the parliamentary system (fruitless investigation reigned over positive legislation), and the do-nothing Lower House failed to muster a quorum for 82 sessions from mid-March to July 2, 1973. In any event, the Parliament had ceased to be regarded by anyone as an independent body; it served as a pawn in the hands of the royal family and its supporters. The judiciary was in the same category, and the comfortable stagnates of the growing urban middle class were not about to rock the boat. The executive, controlled by the monarchy, proved inactive, although the king’s final Prime Minister, Mohammad Musa Shafiq (December 6, 1972-July 17, 1973) attempted reforms, but too little and too late.51

All during the 1969-1973 period, the major leftist parties, Khalqi, Parcham, and PDP, collected strength, with Khalqi particularly concentrating on the military and the civil service, and Parcham among the urban middle class, the intellectuals, professionals, and students. Taraki also reportedly had several talks with the king during this period. The PDP, more centrist, tried to gather Western-trained, anticommunist liberals under its banner.

Other forces were at play, however. Former Prime Minister Daoud, convinced that the constitutional experiment had failed, ran a running seminar to debate two questions: What went wrong during his first decade (1953-1963); how can those mistakes and the ones being made by the present regime be corrected? Leftists and moderates were included in the discussions. Many young military officers trained in the U.S.S.R.52 some had received training in the United States. Most were Parchamis,53 but some Khaliqis also participated. Taraki and Amin preferred to remain in the background. Several times, however, Taraki sought interviews with Daoud, but was blocked by Daoud’s protective screen of “yes men.” Even after the 1973 coup, Taraki continued to try to see Daoud.

Probably the most important intellectual influence on Daoud’s later life came from Abdul Rafiq Ziaee (born 1914), a diplomat who served in Iran and the United States and as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Ziaee, a liberal constitutionalist who favored a republican form of government, first attracted the attention of Mohammad Naim, Daoud’s younger brother. Ziaee also brought Parcham into the coup circle, but died in Prague (1971) before he could see his brain child in action.
By 1973, Daoud had at least partly absorbed the republican ideals of his mentors, and when the king left Afghanistan for eye treatment in London and mud baths in Italy, the time to strike appeared ripe. On July 17, Daoud and his followers seized power in an almost bloodless coup. Daoud was proclaimed Founder, President, and Prime Minister of the Republic of Afghanistan.

Throughout this period, Afghan leftists argued about the desirability of cooperation with Daoud's republic. Parcham still supported the united front concept, but the die-hard Khalqis placed emphasis on class struggle as the key to change. In addition, the Khalq leadership accused the Parchamis in Daoud's government of helping the commanding officer of the Republican (or Presidential) Guard to draw up a hit list consisting of the Khalq Central Committee. Parcham, in turn, spread rumors that both Taraki and Amin were CIA agents.

As the leftist in-fighting continued, Daoud picked off the leftists in his Cabinet one by one. Babrak watched helplessly as his dreams of becoming an Afghan eminence grise faded. By mid-1975, Daoud had seriously wounded Parcham and downgraded Khalq, and moved ahead with his reform programs, at least on paper.

Before this, however, the cause of liberalism in Afghanistan suffered two major casualties: the death of the free press (mentioned previously), and the murder (in prison) of former Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal. None of the 19 nongovernment papers published before the coup could be considered excessively antigovernment. Most were either pro-Pushunt, pro-minority groups, or pro-Islamic. Seldom did an editor protest a government action. In spite of this, the Daoud regime stamped out the free press on July 17, 1975 and rumors, almost always to the detriment of the government, replaced the press. Despite repressive action, it was nonetheless difficult to stifle dissidence completely. A new type of free press, this time clearly antigovernment, emerged in Kabul: the Shab-Namah (evening news), leaflets mimeographed and distributed at night by all opposition groups, from religious right to secular left.

The police arrested Maiwandwal and 44 others in July 1973 for conspiring to overthrow the Daoud government. Ironically, the group had been conspiring to overthrow the monarchy at the same time as Daoud and his followers, but Daoud struck first. Maiwandwal was in Iraq when the coup occurred, having just completed an extended trip to the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, England, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In Moscow, Maiwandal reportedly had tried to get Russian support for his PDP if it came to power under free elections. Again, reports indicate the Russians were polite, but made no promises. In the other countries, Maiwandwal had talked to a wide range of socialist and communist leaders. After the coup he dashed back to Kabul from Baghdad. In the Kabul International Airport, Maiwandwal danced the atan (traditional Afghan war dance) and shouted "Jamhuriat zindabad!" (long live the republic!). Maiwandwal, essentially a creature of Daoud and Naim, had been Naim's protege in the foreign ministry during the first decade of Daoud (1953-1963). On his return, Maiwandwal had long interviews with both Daoud and Naim. Quite possibly, Daoud considered Maiwandwal as his successor under future free elections, for Maiwandwal was one of the few internationally known Afghans of proven leadership caliber. He had served as ambassador to Karachi and Washington, on several international commissions, as Minister of Information and Culture, as well as Prime Minister. His thoughtful articles in Musawat had gained him a sizable middle class liberal following. Therefore, he would be a threat to other leftists in any free elections, and this proved to be his downfall. According to persistent rumors, Maiwandwal tried to persuade his fellow conspirators to abandon their scheme until the Daoud regime had a chance to prove itself, but to no avail. The police penetrated the group and taped conversations later used as evidence.

Neither Daoud nor Naim wanted harm to come to Maiwandwal, as they both told me in conversations in late 1973. (And to those who scoff, I believe.) In any event, sometime between midnight and dawn on October 20, two of his main interrogators strangled Maiwandwal to death in his cell. The murderers, both extreme leftists, are no longer with us. But, unfortunately, neither is the moderate Maiwandwal.

Officially, Maiwandwal committed suicide because he could not live with the brand "traitor." The Maiwandwal cover-up was a major mistake. In my opinion (freely and gratuitously expressed at the time), the government should have told the complete truth. Instead, the trial of the other accused plotters dragged on and ended in December 1973. Five defendants were sentenced to death. Seven received life sentences. Fifteen were given sentences ranging from 2-15 years in prison. Seven received other prison sentences and had all or part of their property confiscated. The government released seven because their period of detention was considered punishment enough. Two were released but retired from the military, and two were actually acquitted.

Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal was sentenced to death in absentia. Daoud himself reverted to the tactics of an old-style tribal khan. In early 1977, a partly-elected, partly-appointed Loya Jirgah (Great National Assembly) approved a reasonably liberal Constitution. The nation waited for President Daoud (elected by the Loya Jirgah) to appoint a new Cabinet which most observers hoped would include new blood, including leftists.
But at this crucial point—in my opinion, the turning point—Daoud reappointed old friends, sons of old friends, sycophants, and even collateral members of the royal family to the Cabinet and other high positions. His increasing dependence on an “inner Cabinet” of conservatives eventually produced a Cabinet crisis.

Meanwhile, in July 1977, Taraki’s Khāq and Babrak’s Parcham reunited, after a 10-year divorce, to oppose the regime, but even they did not realize that events would move so quickly and dramatically. The stage was set for the “accidental coup” of April 1978. (September 1979)

NOTES


4. Torajan, a folkhero of northern Afghanistan, may become one such “peasant revolutionary.” Folksongs tell how Torajan organized resistance to tax collectors in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century, and was hanged for his efforts.


6. One of the earliest important proponents of the nineteenth century Pan-Islamic reform movements, Jamul ud-din Afghan, claimed to be Afghan, and unsuccessfully tried to spread his ideas in Afghanistan. Some scholars, such as Nikkit Keddi, claim an Iranian origin for Afghan. See N. Keddi, Sayid Jamal ad-din (“al-Afghan”), Berkeley, 1968.


13. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is currently trying to downgrade the role played by General Mohammad Nadir Khan (later King Mohammad Nadir Shah, 1929-1933) in the war. Newspaper (Kabul Times, May 29, 1978) and magazine articles have credited Shah Abdul Kayeum-with the temporary victories near Thal. A massive rewriting of twentieth century Afghan history has been undertaken by the Afghan media, a predictable reaction, and perhaps necessary catharsis, to the panegyrics by apologists for previous regimes. More objective histories may come later.


15. For texts, see Adamec, Afghanistan 1900-1923, pp. 182-188.

16. For text, see Adamec, Afghanistan 1900-1923, pp. 188-191.

17. One such individual was the father of a famous Afghan female singer, Parwin. A dissident in Afghanistan, after going to Russia he also became disillusioned with Stalin, though not with communism. Parwin’s father was accused by the Russians of antigovernment activities and was sent for several years to Siberia. After serving his sentence, he returned to Moscow, where Parwin met him and her Russian stepmother when she visited the U.S.S.R. as part of a cultural delegation in the mid-1950s.


19. The Amu Darya boundary was not precisely defined until after World War II. In 1946 both sides agreed on the thalweg (middle of deepest channel). Periodic shifts of the river have caused minor adjustments since then.


21. Amanullah went to Italy in exile. He died in Zurich in April 1960, at the age of 60. The Afghan government flew his body back to Afghanistan, and he lies buried in Jalalabad, next to his father, Habibullah I. The Tarzis, refugees once more, went to Turkey.

22. For several folktales about Bacha Saqqao, see L. Dupree, Afghanistan, 1973, pp. 120-122.

23. Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs, 1974, p. 163.


Outline History of Afghanistan After the Second World War (in English), Moscow, 1966.


29. Other factors were the pronounced tilt to the West by the Shah Mahmud government; slow progress in development projects; downgrading of the "Pushtunistan" issue with Pakistan; and Daoud's personal ambitions for power.

30. Contrary to popular belief, Soviet aid to Afghanistan did not begin after World War II, but during the Amanullah period (1919-1929).


32. The competition between the two great powers evolved into de facto cooperation. For example, the Americans assisted in building roads from south to north, the Russians from north to south. The roads obviously had to link up. For other examples, see L. Dupree, _Afghanistan_, pp. 526-530.

33. L. Dupree, _Afghanistan_, pp. 530-538.


35. Taraki's humble home has been immortalized on a recent DRA stamp issue.

36. My summary of Taraki's life varies occasionally with his official biography in the _DRA Annual_ 1973, also published as a separate pamphlet by the Ministry of Information and Culture. My version is based on conversations with many Afghans (including Taraki) over the years.

37. _DRA Annual_ 1979, pp. 16-17.

38. For a discussion of Taraki's writings, see _DRA Annual_ 1979, p. 17, and _Kabul Times_, July 14, 1979.

39. Safi, a supporter of the Wikhi-Zalmayan movement, had resigned to Afghan Ambassador to Indonesia to contest the elections in Laghman against Dr. Abdul Zahir (Columbia University MD), the government choice, who won the election and became Speaker of the Lower House and later Prime Minister (July 26, 1971-December 6, 1972).


44. The three Prime Ministers after Maiwandwal were Nur Ahmad Etemadi (November 15, 1967-May 16, 1971), Dr. Abdul Zahir (July 26, 1971-December 6, 1972, returned to Afghanistan after visit to U.S., fate unknown), Mohammad Moosa Shafiq (December 7, 1972-July 17, 1973, arrested by DRA, presumed dead).


46. The Meshrano Jirgah consisted of 84 members: 28 elected, one from each province; 28 appointed by the king; one elected from each Provincial Council. Since Provincial Councils were themselves never elected, the Upper House functioned without one-third of its constitutionally required members. Therefore, according to some Afghan lawyers, the whole period from 1965 to 1973 was unconstitutional.

47. Article 1, Paragraph 3: "The goals which the law aims to secure consist of: Safeguard the fundamentals of Islam, constitutional monarchy and other values enshrined in the constitution."

48. For full text, see _Kabul Times Annual_, 1967.


51. L. Dupree, _Afghanistan_, pp. 653-760.

52. For example, Faiz Mohammad, a military officer, became Minister of Interior after the 1973 coup. He was appointed Minister of Frontier Affairs in September 1975. Though leftist in politics, Faiz Mohammad was not a member of Parcham or Khalq. He later served as ambassador to Indonesia and Iraq, and disappeared from Baghdad after the 1978 coup. He is a Masud Pushtun from Paktya.

53. Parcham members who participated in the 1973 coup and became Cabinet members were: Jilani Bakhtyari (Agriculture and Irrigation, dismissed by Daoud on September 27, 1975); Dr. Nehmatullah Pazhwak (Education, friend of Babrak, dismissed on December 19, 1974).

54. One Khalqi became a Cabinet Minister after the 1973 coup: Air Force Engineer Pacha Gul Wafadar (Frontier
Affairs, later appointed ambassador to Bulgaria and Libya, now ambassador to India). Engineer Abdul Hamid Mohtat (a Panjsheri military officer), Minister of Communications, was dismissed by Daoud on September 27, 1975. Now Ambassador to Japan, Mohtat was originally Khalqi, but switched to Setem-i-Meli. A later Daoud appointee, Dr. Ghulam Sediq Mohebi (Minister of Higher Education), had been with Khalq when he was Dean of the Polytechnic Institute. He turned independent after being appointed minister. He returned to his teaching position after the 1978 coup.

55. In 1973, non-leftist coup participants included: Gen. Abdul Mustaghi (Chief-of-Staff); Gen. Ismail Jun (Secret Police Chief, friend of Pazhwak-fn. 53); Col. Ghulam Sanwar (Commander of armored unit; received political asylum in Pakistan in 1979, had been military attaché in New Delhi); Major Abdul Qadir Nuristani (police officer killed in 1978 coup); Col. Abdul Qader (led air force in 1973 and 1978 coups, now in prison, sentenced to death but sentence recently reduced to 15 years).

Three important Khalq military leaders (all supporters of Taraki in the 1973 and 1978 coups) disappeared from Kabul after the Amin takeover of September 15, 1979: Major Aslam Watanjan (Minister of Interior); Major Sayyid Mohammad Gulabzoi (Communications); Lt. Col. Shah Jan Mazdooryar (Frontier Affairs). All three were more nationalist and Muslim than Marxist. They had been recruited for Khalq by Taraki in 1977, the year of maximum Khalq recruitment in the armed forces.


58. The name is a play on the Shah-Namah, History of the Kings, by the eleventh-century AD poet, Firdausi.

59. Including Gen. Khan Mohammad Khan (not the former Minister of Defense, but a popular corps commander forced into retirement by Sardar Abdul Wali, cousin and son-in-law of the former king), and Gen. Abdul Razak, former air force commander.

60. Naim indicated to me that "when the time is right" he would personally hold a fateha (public Muslim prayers for the dead) for Miawandwal in a major Kabul mosque.

61. For a complete list, see Kabul Times, December 14, 1973.


63. Including Sayyid Abdul'ilah (Vice-President and Minister of Finance), General Ghulam Haider Rasuli (Minister of National Defense), and Abdul Qadir Nuristani (Minister of Interior).


APPENDIX A
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
December 5, 1978*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,
Reaffirming their commitment to the aims and principles of the Soviet-Afghan treaties of 1921 and 1931, which laid the basis for friendly and goodneighbourly relations between the Soviet and Afghan peoples and which meet their basic national interests;
Willing to strengthen in every way friendship and all-round cooperation between the two countries;
Being determined to develop social and economic achievements of the Soviet and Afghan peoples, to safeguard their security and independence, to come out resolutely for the cohesion of all the forces fighting for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress;
Expressing their firm determination to promote the strengthening of peace and security in Asia and the whole world, to make their contribution toward developing relations among states and strengthening fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation in Asia, attaching great importance to the further consolidation of the contractual legal basis of their relations;
Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter;
Decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighbourliness and Cooperation and agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare their determination to strengthen and deepen the inviolable friendship between the two countries and to develop all-round cooperation on the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.
ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties shall make efforts to strengthen and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them. With these aims in view, they shall develop and deepen cooperation in the fields of industry, transport and communications, agriculture, the use of natural resources, development of the power-generating industry and in other branches of the economy, to give each other assistance in the training of national personnel and in planning the development of the national economy. The two Sides shall expand trade on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favoured nation treatment.

ARTICLE 3

The High Contracting Parties shall promote the development of cooperation and exchange of experience in the fields of science, culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sports and other fields. The two Sides shall facilitate the expansion of cooperation between bodies of state power and mass organisations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions with a view to making a deeper acquaintance of the life, work, experience and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and goodneighbourliness, as well as in the spirit of the UN Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries. In the interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the High Contracting Parties they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

ARTICLE 5

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of nonalignment which is pursued by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and which is an important factor for maintaining international peace and security. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan respects the policy of peace pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

ARTICLE 6

Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not join any military or other alliances or take part in any groupings of states, as well as in actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 7

The High Contracting Parties shall continue their consistent struggle against machinations by the forces of aggression, for the final elimination of colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations. The two Sides shall cooperate with each other and with other peace loving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.

ARTICLE 8

The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the development of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of relations of peace, goodneighbourliness and mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent.

ARTICLE 9

The High Contracting Parties shall consult each other on all major international issues affecting the interests of the two countries.

ARTICLE 11

The High Contracting Parties state that their commitments under the existing international treaties do not contradict the provisions of the present treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.
ARTICLE 12

Questions which may arise between the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of any provision of the present treaty, shall be settled bilaterally, in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.

ARTICLE 13

The present treaty shall remain in force within twenty years of the day it becomes effective.

Unless one of the High Contracting Parties declares six months before the expiration of this term its desire to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force for the next five years, and so on until one of the High Contracting Parties warns the other party in writing, six months before the expiration of the current five-year term, about its intention to terminate the treaty.

ARTICLE 14

If one of the High Contracting Parties expresses the wish in the course of the twenty-year term of the treaty to terminate it before its expiration date, it shall notify in writing the other High Contracting Party, six months before its suggested date of expiration of the treaty, about its desire to terminate the treaty before the expiration of the term and may consider the treaty terminated as of the date thus set.

ARTICLE 15

The present treaty shall be ratified and take effect on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to take place in Kabul.

Done in duplicate, each in the Russian and Dari languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on December 5, 1978.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

L. BRESEHNEV

For the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

N. MOHAMMED TARAKI

APPENDIX B:

SKETCH BIOGRAPHIES OF LEFTISTS

Below are a few notes on heroes of past nationalist-leftist, anti-Mohammadzai movements resurrected by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Most of those mentioned in the text are not discussed here. Information has been abstracted from the Kabul Times, including the following (all articles are 1978):

1. Interview with Mir Abdul Rashid Baigham, May 16.
8. “Nader’s exploits as described by Amanullah,” July 2-4.
11. “Taj Mohammad Paghman” (Baluch), August 1-3.
12. “Reminiscences of a stark revolutionary” (Baba Abdul Aziz), August 6-8.

Mohammad AZIM. Son of Munshi Nazir. Student at Nejat High School (German-sponsored), Azim tried to assassinate British ambassador Sir Richard Maconachie on September 6, 1933 at British Embassy in Kabul. Instead, Azim was killed after murdering three embassy staff members: British mechanic, Indian and Afghan secretaries. Azim, who was married to a Swede, was influenced by Mehta Singh (see biography), pro-German, anti-British, Indian leftist. Executed on September 13, 1933 for complicity were: Mohammad Wali Badakhshi, Sher Mohammad, Hedayatullah, Mohammad Mehdi, Faqir Ahmad, Ghulam Jilani Charkhi.


Mir Abdul Rashid BAIGHAN' (Last name means “Free from Pain”). Brother of Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar (see biography). Advanced education in Germany. Friend of Mohammad Aziz. After British Embassy murders, Baighan arrested, then exiled to Farah. Also jailed were Ghobar and another brother, Mir Ghulam Ahmad Babar, his cousins, Sayyid Akram and Sayyid Daoud, along with Sarwar Joya. Released by Shah Mahmud, Baighan worked in Ministry of Education as President of Sports until publication of Ghobar’s book (1968), after which he was retired.


Abdul Hadi DAWI. Born 1894. Journalist (assistant editor of Siraj-ul Akbar and later editor of successor paper, Aman-i-Afghan); Diplomat with wide experience (India, England, Russia, Indonesia); politician (President of Senate-Meshrano Jirgah, 1965-1973).

General Sayyid Hasan FARANI. Born 1900 in Kunar. Worked on Anis in Paktya. Wanted to overthrow Habibullah II in favor of Amanullah. Farani was cousin and brother-in-law of Ali Ahmad Loynab, who declared himself himself king after Amanullah’s abdication. (Captured by Habibullah II, Ali Ahmad was blown from a cannon.) Jailed by both King Nadir and King Zahir, Farani died in prison, presumably deliberately infected with a deadly disease.

Dr. Abdul GHANI. Born in Gujarat (British India), British-trained MD. Brought to Afghanistan by Amir Habibullah I (1901-1919). Member of Mashruta Group, and suspected of being a British agent. (Two other contemporaries, Khan Bahadur Ainuddin Bamizai and Maulavi Najaf Ali, were also accused of being British agents). Arrested during attempted plot on life of Habibullah I by Abdul Rahman Ludin. Released; Dr. Ghani returned to India, where he wrote The Political Situation in Central Asia, n.d., published in Lahore.


Sayyid Hasan HASAN. Poet killed in jail on orders of King Mohammad Nadir.


Sayyid KAMAL. Killed Mohammad Aziz, father of Mohammad Daoud, in Berlin on June 6, 1933. Kamal was pro-Amanullah and anti-British, but had no known links with the pro-Amanullah Charkhi family. Amanullah had sent Kamal to Germany as a student in 1922. Kamal convicted of murder on July 6, 1934; executed in Germany on January 14, 1935.

Abdul KHALIQ. Son of a servant of Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, member of a prominent pro-Amanullah family, who was executed by King Nader. Khaliq assassinated Nadir on November 8, 1933; was killed on spot. Nine others executed for complicity: Khuda Dad (father of Abdul Khaliq); Qurban Ali (uncle of Abdul Khaliq); Maula Dad

MEHTA SINGH. Served in British Indian Army in World War I. Captured by Germans. Remained in Germany and married a German woman. Anti-British, pro-German, Indian nationalist-leftist. Founded cafe in 1927 in Kabul frequently visited by anti-British, pro-German Afghans. Coffee house named Shahi Bazaar Coffee House. Published anti-Nader tracts, written by Mir Majedi, Mirza Ahmad, and Mohammad Zaman. Mehta and wife arrested after Nader's assassination, along with Sarwar Joya, Ghobar, his brothers and cousins, and Abdullah Bashir Store. Mehta knew Nadir's assassin, Mohammad Azim, very well. Released and returned to Germany.

Mohammad Bashir MONSHIZADA. Born 1894. While Nadir governor in Badakhshan and Katagan under King Amanullah, Monshizada was editor of Islah (Reformation). Later appointed editor of Mishriqi-Ettehad (Union of the East) by Mahmud Tarzi. Jailed under King Habibullah II, Monshizada agreed to edit Nahzat-ul-Habib (Movement of Habibullah.) Arrested by Nadir, Monshizada spent 10 years in the palace dungeons. He died of typhoid in 1941, presumably deliberately infected.

Taj Mohammad PAGHMANI (Baluch). His father was a government official under Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) in Badakhshan, Paghmani joined the Mashruta Group and wrote for Siraj-ul-Akhbar. After Abdur Rahim Ludin took a pot shot at Amir Habibullah I (1901-1919), Paghmani was among those arrested. He spent 16 months in jail. (Also arrested was father of Ludin, Kaka Sayyid Ahmad, who had already spent 32 years in jail). Habibullah was assassinated the night before Taj and the others under arrest (Ludin, Kaka, Shamuddin, Faiz Mohammad, Hasser, etc.) could be sentenced. Amanullah released the prisoners. Taj returned to Kabul in 1929 to take up a new post promised by Nadir. Accused of helping foment the second Koh Daman rebellion, Nadir had Taj blown from a cannon.