Political Elites in Afghanistan: 
Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking

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The study of revolutions now deals as much with states and structures as with revolutionaries and their ideologies. An older school of study of revolutions, which sought their origins in the accumulation of individual grievances, motivated many studies of revolutionary "counterelites," comparing them in particular to the dominant political and social elites. The importance of structural factors to the origin and success of revolutions does not render such studies irrelevant; rather, it should change the way we understand their results. Men and women choose to act as revolutionaries not only because circumstances create in them a sense of grievance and injustice, but because of the opportunities for reflection and action offered by their relation to "fields of power" in both the state and the international system. The social origins of revolutionary elites may offer clues not only to their motivations, but also to their connections to those fields of power.

Most such studies found that revolutionary leaders largely combined a level of education unusually high for their society -- the most important determinant of politicization -- with low or modest social status, which blocked their ascent to power under the old regime. Revolutionaries were also more likely to have cosmopolitan or international orientations, at least partly attributable to the high incidence of foreign education and travel among them. Such orientations inclined them to take a critical perspective on their own societies.

Most such studies of "counterelites" have equated revolutionaries
with Communists or leftists (such as radical nationalists), foreign education with "Western" education, and cosmopolitanism or modernization with Westernization. Especially in the Islamic world, however, neither revolutionary movements nor the international system are so one-dimensional. There, well before the collapse of communism in Europe, Islamic revolutionary ideas (Islamism) competed with Marxism for the allegiance of the disaffected. A comparative study of the social and educational backgrounds of Marxist and Islamic militants can clarify to what extent both exemplify the general type of the revolutionary counterelite. It can also link the study of Islamic militants to the broader field of the study of radical or revolutionary activists. Such a comparative study can help distinguish those factors associated with radical opposition in general from those that predispose classes of actors to particular ideological choices.

Afghanistan provides an opportunity for studying both types of revolutionary elites, and comparing them to both each other and the old regime elite. All of these groups are relatively easy to identify, and all three have actively contested power in what might be called a revolutionary situation (multiple power centers) without a successful revolution. Furthermore, the West, the USSR, and the Islamic world have all deployed their resources in attempts to affect the outcome in Afghanistan, and Afghan political actors have endeavored to take full advantage of the opportunities offered thereby.

State Formation and Elite Recruitment in Afghanistan

Afghanistan entered the modern state system as a buffer state between the British and Russian empires. Since no ruler was able to
extract sufficient resources from Afghanistan's largely barren territory and tribal population, consolidation of a central state largely depended on foreign aid.4

During the 1950s Prime Minister Daud, cousin of the king, Zahir Shah, played on the country's status as a buffer between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.-sponsored Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) to build an expanded state apparatus with foreign aid from both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Afghanistan became a sort of rentier state, except that the main source of state revenue that was not derived from the society was foreign aid, rather than petroleum.5 The Soviet Union supplied and trained the military and sponsored some state economic projects, while the U.S. was more active in teacher training, agriculture, and engineering. Islamic legal and educational officials were trained with the assistance of Egypt's Al-Azhar University. France and West Germany provided important assistance in the medical, secular legal, social scientific, and technical fields.

On global issues Afghanistan was non-aligned between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The main focus of the country's foreign policy, however, was regional, centering on Afghanistan's claim to Pakistani territories inhabited by Pashtuns, the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan (the Pashtunistan question). The Pashtun nationalism promoted by the Afghan state led the government into a regional alignment with India and the U.S.S.R. against Muslim Pakistan and its supporters, the U.S. and China. The alignment of the U.S.S.R. with Pashtun nationalism and the related Pashtun predominance in the Soviet-trained officer corps had an important effect on the ideological affiliations of Afghan radicals, as noted below.

In rentier states social and economic integration as well as class formation are generally low. Accordingly, social structures in Afghanistan
tend to be local and based on kinship or religious distinctions. Only with respect to the state have the various populations residing within Afghanistan's internationally recognized borders constituted a single "society." This national society, however, had a recognizable pattern of ethnic stratification, determined by three facts about the state: the sovereign (king until 1973, president from 1973 to 1978) was a member of the Muhammadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe of the Durrani confederation, one of the three major groupings of Pashtun tribes; the official religion of the state was Sunni Islam of the Hanafi fiqh; and the state's center (capital) was the mainly Persian-speaking city of Kabul.

The sectarian identification of the state defined the Shi'a, mainly belonging to the Hazara ethnic group, as the bottom of the hierarchy. The tribal affiliation of the royal family made the Muhammadzais the highest status group. Below them came the Pashtuns as a whole. The original Afghan empire founded in 1747 was based on the Durrani confederation, and the royal family sometimes stressed their Durrani identity, but the Musahiban family, which ruled from 1929 to 1978, seized power with aid from the Pashtuns immediately south and east of Kabul, who belonged to the Ghilzai and "Eastern" tribes. The Musahiban more commonly identified themselves with either the Muhammadzais or the Pashtuns as a whole than with the Durranis.

Intermediate in status between the Pashtuns and Hazaras were the other predominantly Sunni ethnic groups. The Tajiks, who dominated the population of Kabul city, were the most numerous of these. Among these, the Tajiks of Kabul city included persons prominent in state service who enjoyed correspondingly higher status.

Furthermore, nearly all Muhammadzais (who originally came from the
Qandahar area), as well as other Pashtuns who served the state, including sons of some important tribal families, moved to Kabul city. After several generations of Kabul residence and even intermarriage with the Kabulis, the ethnic identification of their descendants sometimes became ambiguous, to the point where the term "Kabuli" may provide more information about their identity than any term based on patrilineal descent. In the analysis below I use the term "Kabuli" to denote birth in Kabul city regardless of ancestral ethnic affiliation. State policies also encouraged the Pashtun colonization of non-Pashtun areas of northern Afghanistan, and Pashtuns in these areas also partly assimilated to Persanophone culture and had attenuated tribal identifications.

In the early decades of this century, the rulers established a few Westernizing secular schools with foreign assistance to train the state elite. By the 1950s the four such elite schools for boys were operating with aid and teachers from France, Germany, the U.S., and Britain; there was also a French-aided school for girls. After the mid-1950s the school system expanded with foreign aid. The government established primary schools in some villages and district centers, secondary schools in many provincial centers, and secondary boarding schools in Kabul for some graduates of provincial primary schools. Several of the secondary boarding schools, including the military high school attached to Kabul Military Academy, were Pashto-medium schools recruiting students largely from the sons of rural notables.

The establishment of a Westernized system of higher education began with the founding of the Faculty of Medicine in 1932, under French sponsorship. Other faculties followed, and they joined together to form Kabul University in 1947. Nearly every faculty had a foreign sponsor,
which provided support, faculty members, and scholarships for the training of professors. In conjunction with the founding of these faculties, Afghans received scholarships to study in France, Egypt, the U.S., West Germany, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere.

Until the 1950s, access to secondary education, Kabul University, foreign study, and the officer corps was restricted to a small elite group, mainly residents of Kabul. As late as 1959 Kabul city, with 1.8 percent of the country's population, contained 73.7 percent of the country's secondary school students. During the late 1940s and early 1950s there were only about 500 students in Afghan institutions of higher education at any one time, and 20 to 30 students went abroad to study each year.

During the latter eight years of Daud's premiership (1955-1963), however, the number of primary and secondary school students nearly tripled, while the number of post-secondary students (mainly at Kabul University) increased more than fourfold. During a period of political liberalization known as New Democracy (1963-1973) the number of primary school students doubled, and secondary enrollment increased more than six-fold, growing an average of one-fifth per year. University enrollment was 3.4 times larger at the end than at the beginning of the decade, including over 11,000 students by 1974. By then there were also about 1500 students per year being sent abroad. At the same time, the expansion of the army had led to the growth of training for a new officer corps. Between 1956 and 1978, 3725 Afghan military officers -- concentrated in the air force and armored corps -- had been trained in the Soviet Union, sometimes for as long as six years, while Afghan officers had taken a total of 487 courses in the U.S.
Political Elites in Afghanistan

The members of the political elites to be analyzed were recruited by this state from this stratified society and trained in this educational system.

I will discuss the elite of the old regime here mainly to contrast it with the revolutionary groups. I define it as all those who served as sovereign, cabinet ministers, governors, or members of the supreme court during the rule of the Musahiban family. Since both the Communists and the Islamists first organized themselves during New Democracy, I also analyze the elite of that period separately. Within this elite I identify a "core," consisting of those who exercised the key power functions of the state, namely the offices of sovereign, prime minister, or minister of foreign affairs, defense, or interior. Information on these people was available from published materials and interviews with knowledgeable Afghan emigrés.

The data on the Communists and Islamists analyzed here include only those active before 1978, when the Communists took power in a coup. This is particularly important for comparing Afghan Islamists to those in other countries, as those who favored a revolution against the government before 1978 were a narrower group, more comparable to members of similar groups in, say, Egypt, than those who later joined the jihad against a Communist government and, later, Soviet troops. The Islamic revolutionaries analyzed here include only some of the leaders of the much broader movement of the Afghan resistance, which also included supporters of the old regime, traditional Islamic figures, and others. Finally, these data omit both the "Maoist" Marxist groups and the Shi'a Islamist groups, both of which represented minorities within their
The principal Communist organization in Afghanistan has been the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which was founded at its First Congress on January 1, 1965. In 1967 the party split into two factions, PDPA-Khalq, led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and PDPA-Parcham, led by Babrak Karmal. Each had a complete parallel structure and claimed to be the genuine PDPA. They did not reunite until 1977, when Soviet pressure transmitted by Communists in India and Pakistan was key to the shotgun (re-) marriage. This was, as far as I know, the first, but not, alas, the last, case of a foreign power pressuring feuding Afghan factions to unite.

I analyze Parcham and Khalq separately, as they constituted (and still constitute) distinct political and social groups. The elite of each group consists of those who served as members of the Central Committee before its reorganization by General Secretary Najibullah in 1986, when many activists who had risen during the war joined or displaced the "historic leaders" on that body. The "core" of the elite includes those members of the Central Committee who also served on the Politburo.

After 1965, the new Islamic movement gained influence among students at Kabul University under the name of the Muslim Youth Organization (Sāzmān-i Javānān-i Musulmān). Around the beginning of 1973, the movement, which also included a more secret association of professors, began to register its members and formed a leadership shūra (council). Burhanuddin Rabbani, a professor at the Shari'a Faculty of Kabul University, was chosen as chairman of the council. (Ghulam Muhammad Niyazi, the Dean of the Faculty, was recognized as the ultimate leader, but, because of the sensitivity of his position, he did not formally join or attend
meetings.) The council later selected the name *Jam'iyyat-i Islami* (Islamic Society, known in English as Jamiat) for the movement.\(^{18}\)

In 1973, after Zahir Shah was overthrown by Daud, who proclaimed himself president, the Islamic movement encountered greater repression. Its main activists fled to Pakistan and took up residence in the city of Peshawar. There had been some "signs of differences" among the members of the movement since at least the early 1970s,\(^{19}\) and under the strains of exile and of the failure of an attempted uprising in 1975, the movement split into the Jamiat-i Islami, still led by Rabbani, and the *Hizb-i Islami* (Islamic Party), led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.

There is no precise parallel in organizational structure with either the PDPA or the old regime. I define the core leadership as the membership of the original Jamiat *shūrā*, plus Professor Niyazi. Somewhat arbitrarily, I have defined a broader leadership as consisting of the members of the council plus all the members of the following (overlapping) categories: those who were arrested during Daud's repression of the movement; those who joined the movement before 1978 and subsequently rose to head administrative departments (committees) of Jamiat or Hizb; those who participated in the 1975 uprising; and those among the Islamist exiles in Pakistan before 1978 who subsequently became major resistance field commanders.\(^{20}\) My data base omits some individuals belonging to these categories; it might be biased in that Jamiat sources were more easily available to me than those of Hizb. I take this into account by analyzing the members of the two parties separately. Many of those in my sample, however, either were killed during the 1975 uprising or remained in prison from that time until their mass execution in 1979, and hence did not participate in the Jamiat-Hizb split in Peshawar.
Information on these groups, like those on the old regime and the PDPA, came from published sources supplemented by interviews.\textsuperscript{21}

Information is incomplete on some members of all of the groups. Hence the total number (N) given for the groups may differ among the tables presented below, as it includes only those on whom the information relevant for that table was available. I have no reason to believe that this incompleteness introduces systematic biases into the results.

**Ideologies**

The old regime in Afghanistan did not develop a coherent ideology. Like other authoritarian regimes, it had typical "mentalities," or general political orientations.\textsuperscript{22} It believed in the need to "modernize" the country by importing technology and some Western models of social organization, but gradually, without provoking a reaction from the masses. Many of the members of the old regime elite were personally pious. When the need arose, they could deploy the discourse of Islamic modernism to oppose resistance from traditionalist elements to reforms such as permitting the unveiling of women, but Islam was never a guide to policy or the central legitimating formula of the regime. In other contexts, the regime used a Pashtun nationalist discourse which was poorly integrated with or even contradictory to the Islamic discourse. The old regime elites were proud of Afghanistan's heritage of resistance to the British and Russians (which they depicted more in nationalist than Islamic terms) and confident of their ability to maintain the country's independence through balancing competing foreign patrons.

Like the elites of other rentier states, the old regime was hardly accountable to the state's citizens. There was little taxation and little representation. Its policies aimed at expanding the state and the "modern"
sector it controlled and in redistributing some of its revenues to obtain loyalty through patron-client relations.

These policies created a bureaucratic class that lived (or aspired to live) in Kabul. This city developed upper and middle classes with Westernized or semi-Westernized lifestyles. The state's development policies did not improve the standard of living of the rural masses or provide them with a reliable and just administration. Neither did it systematically exploit or oppress them, although individual officials might do so.23

Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary Islam had in common a critique of the "corruption" (faaṣd) and stagnation of that regime. The PDPA articulated its critique through the application of poorly understood Marxist terms. The party's knowledge of Marxism was skimpy, mainly limited to what could be gleaned from Persian translations of a few Marxist classics published by the Tudeh Party in Iran. More important than Marxism as a theory of social change was the role played by the neighboring Soviet Union in supporting the Afghan state and offering to export its version of "modernization." One might say that the PDPA opposed to the Westoxication (Gharbzadigi) of the some of the old regime not an original analysis or practice rooted in its own society, but its own Eastoxication (Sharqzadigi).

The PDPA's analysis of Afghanistan, as set forth in its "Platform"24 was a more or less canned Soviet-line analysis which could just as well (or ill) have been applied to any one of dozens of post-colonial countries. The PDPA claimed that Afghanistan had a "feudal economic and social system." The "basic contradiction[s]" were between "farmers and feudal lords, between the people of our country and the imperialists." It summarized
the international text by noting that "The most outstanding subject of contemporary history is . . . class struggle and war between international socialism and world imperialism which began with the Great Socialist Revolution of October."

This platform, amazingly enough, contains not a single reference, positive or negative, to Islam. Its sole reference to tribalism was to promise to remove it by settling nomads and by "bring[ing] advantages to the oppressed factions" as part of the "fight of all sections of the population against national oppression." It included the standard Soviet nationalities policy of encouraging the various languages, but never mentioned tribal autonomy.

The PDPA's model of a better future for Afghanistan was the "non-capitalist path of development" then favored by Soviet theorists of the Third World. This model relied on Soviet-aided, state-led development, which would have made the newly educated, especially those with Soviet training, into the leading political and economic force in Afghanistan. The PDPA advocated economic development led by state investment in heavy industry together with protected handicrafts for consumer goods. Rather than supporting allocation of major state resources to agriculture, as through investment in major irrigation works or new productive technology, the PDPA advocated redistributive land reform to release productive forces and the development of state farms on unused lands. The PDPA also advocated the rights of labor, women, and linguistic groups and called for the expansion of education, health services, civil liberties, and democracy. In practice, the only political model it turned out to have was the Soviet one, which it later tried to import.

The public platform did not advocate socialism or communism for
Afghanistan, but the Party's secret Constitution,\textsuperscript{25} which described it as the Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class of Afghanistan, made clear that the ultimate goal was Soviet-style socialism. This constitution also shows its derivative origin in that it contains prohibitions against all the usual deviations but does not mention the particularly acute Afghan problem of tribalism, except insofar as it might be subsumed under "factionalism."

There was little evidence of doctrinal disagreements between the two factions. Initially they differed mainly on strategy and tactics, Parcham favoring cooperation with the "progressive" wing of the ruling elite and Khalq a rather ill-defined "uprising." After they seized power, however, a section of the Khalqis under Amin advocated a stage-skipping forced march to "socialism," rather than the "National Democratic" transition advocated by the Soviets and Parcham.

It was important for later developments that when it seized power in 1978 the PDPA had still not organized any class-based mass organizations, such as trade unions or peasant associations. This reflected both the weakness of class formation in the society and the social character of the PDPA itself, as a movement developed by portions of the state bureaucratic stratum who desired faster, state-directed Western-style modernization.

Just as the PDPA must be placed both within the society of Afghanistan and the international Communist movement, so the Islamists must be situated in both their own society and the international Islamic movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The organizations with whom they felt the closest kinship were the Muslim Brothers of Egypt and the Jam\textsuperscript{a}-at-i Isl\textsuperscript{a}am\textsuperscript{a} of Pakistan, but they initially had no formal links with either.\textsuperscript{26} Although they were influenced by Sayyid Abul-A\textsuperscript{i}la Maududi of
Pakistan, the writer who seems to have influenced them the most was Mawlawi Sayyid Qutb. Both Rabbani and Maulvi Yunus Khalás, leader of a breakaway faction of Hizb-i Islami, translated his work in the 1960s.27

The programs of the two organizations28 bear out this ideological orientation and also show certain differences between Jamiat and Hizb. Both exhibit their adherence to the general orientation of Qutb and Maududi in insisting that Islam is a complete system with its own prescriptions for economics and politics and in their depiction of modern capitalist and Communist societies as examples of jāhiliyya, or pre-Islamic ignorance.29

In their general attitude toward the old regime the Islamists had more in common with the Communists than with the elite. They characterized it with words such as "corrupt" (fāsid) or "tyrannical" (zālimānah). They point to both economic injustice (accumulation of land and other kinds of property through impermissible means) and the penetration of non-Islamic culture and customs, leading to moral corruption. The main root of these abuses is the failure of previous rulers to apply Islam in all its aspects. Both parties attribute this to the moral character of the old regime and its penetration by un-Islamic foreign powers. Both parties agree that Afghanistan nonetheless remains an Islamic "country" (kishvar) and "society" (jamiyya). Hizb, however, takes a much more critical attitude toward that society, verging on condemning it as un-Islamic. Hizb states that the "way of life of the people is not established on the basis of its beliefs [Islam]."30 The economic system of Afghanistan, it says "is a summary of all the corruptions, tyrannical practices, and injustices of all the un-Islamic orders and systems."31

Islamists further agree with Communists and differ from the
traditional ulama in their belief that the way to fight injustice is not mainly by preaching moral reform of individual conduct, but through mass political activity aimed at taking state power. As Hizb-i Islami states, "Without a complete reform of the ruling order, no individual reform is possible."\textsuperscript{32}

Both programs offer the complete application of Islamic principles by the state as the solution to the problems of Afghanistan. The longer Hizb program includes sections on law, religion and morals, education and training, administration, the economy (agriculture, trade and industry, workers' and bureaucrats' rights, general economic reforms), and foreign policy. Both call on the state to spread Islamic training and values. Besides the Islamic content, education should also teach "technology." In the economic area, the Islamists attack inequality and oppression as strongly as the Communists, but they propose the Islamic solution of just and cooperative relations among social classes -- a sort of Islamic corporatism -- rather than class struggle. Their economic program consists of a set of ethically motivated reforms and prescriptions for national and international Islamic self-reliance, but is not conceptualized as an integrated development strategy. Hizb's economic program, like the Communists, supports investment in heavy industry but says nothing about how to accumulate the capital. The Islamists also advocate that Afghanistan and the Islamic countries in general should create their own arms industries to free themselves from external dependence.\textsuperscript{33}

In the international arena, the Islamists' views are of course quite different from the Communists. The main points of their foreign policy are equal opposition to "imperialism of the East and West," and solidarity with the Islamic world. The Islamists have opposed the Pashtunistan demand,
but neither party mentions this in its program.

The Islamists, like the Communists, condemned divisions of language and ethnicity. Neither party analyzes the causes of these divisions. Except for a brief mention by Hizb of provision of education for everyone in his mother tongue, neither Islamic party goes beyond condemnation to propose any institutional measures other than the spread of Islamic ideas to overcome tribal and ethnic divisions.

Most strikingly, while both have much to say over how state power is to be exercised, neither has anything to say about how it is to be constituted or financed. Hizb mentions the rightly guided caliphs as a model (the reference of all Sunni Islamists), but, since each of them came to power in a different way, their reigns can offer models only of how to govern, not how to constitute a government. Hizb and Jamiat both, of course, advocate a legal system based solely on shari'a. Hizb also comments on the organization of the administration (emphasizing measures to prevent corruption and other abuses). While Hizb calls on the state to enforce Islamic taxes, neither the Islamists nor the Communists even mention the problem of establishing a sustainable fiscal base to pay for the numerous activities they want the state to undertake.

In the section on law Hizb calls for the free and direct election of a "parliament" (parliament) but does not specify its powers; in the section on the economy it says, "The economic policy of the country, which should be carried out with the participation of the elected representatives of the nation, will be implemented after approval by the consultative council."34 Neither party, however, says anything about how the executive power of an Islamic state should be formed. This may derive from the problem Sunni Islamists have in prescribing a temporal form of sovereignty
(ḥākimīyya), since they believe in principle that the latter belongs only to God. Sunni Islamists have no equivalent of Khomeini’s theory of vilayat-i fāqih (guardianship of the jurist). This doctrine uses the Shi’a notion of the Imamate to merge temporal rulership with affirmation of the sovereignty of God by recognizing the jurist as the deputy of the Imam (nā’ib-i imām).

According to Roy, the split between Jamiat and Hizb, besides its ethnic, personal, and organizational causes, also recapitulated the split in the international Islamist movement over the issue of takfir: could Muslims be declared unbelievers by virtue of their participation in an un-Islamic state or society? Sayyid Qutb was “the first to brand the society and its leaders as unbelievers living in the pre-Islamic state of ignorance.” The militant group that split from the mainstream Ikhwan in the mid-1960s, some of whose supporters later assassinated Sadat, did so over the belief that the leadership of the Brothers was not implementing Qutb’s views on takfir. Qutb’s successor as Amir of the Brothers, ʿUmar Tilimasani, argued that it was not up to human beings to condemn as kāfir a Muslim who still publicly professed a belief in God.

Roy claims that Hizb-i Islami took the more extreme position on takfir. The evidence of these documents and some others does not support this claim. Hizb does take a more revolutionary approach toward Afghan society, as noted above, but without condemning it as wholly un-Islamic. There is considerable evidence that Hikmatyar has ordered the assassination of his enemies, which might be justified by declaring them unbelievers, but this practice is hardly limited to organizations of one ideological coloration in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Hizb does not consider all Afghan government personnel to be kāfir, but, like the other parties,
generally restricts this category to those who voluntarily joined the PDPA and have not repeated. Furthermore, Hizb’s English language magazine, the content of which indicates that it is aimed at international Islamic supporters rather than Westerners, published a laudatory obituary of Tilimasani, whose criticisms of the extreme position on takfir are well known to Islamic activists.

The emergence since 1988 of a group in Eastern Afghanistan whose practice and theory does conform to the strict construction of the takfir doctrine has helped to clarify the differences. This group, led by a former Hizb field commander, is called Jamat al-Da’awa fi al-Qur’an wa Ahl al-Hadîth (most Afghans call it “Wahhabi”). Aided and even joined by Arab sympathizers, it reportedly treats Afghans living in government-controlled areas as unbelievers to whom Muslims should apply the laws of fitnah (conquest), including execution of adult males who resist and enslavement of women and children. This organization also opposes accepting aid from non-Muslims; its mujahidin have attacked Western journalists and relief workers, including some travelling with the protection of commanders of Hizb-i Islami.

The major differences between Hizb and Jamiat thus appear to be more political and strategic than theological. As Roy also notes, Hizb emphasizes the exclusive nature of its party as the vehicle for struggle and advocates a more thoroughgoing Islamic revolution, while Jamiat favors a broad coalition of all Islamic forces in Afghanistan. As part of this approach, Jamiat has taken a more conciliatory role toward both traditional ulama and orthodox Sufi orders. Jamiat continued to emphasize that an Islamic movement needed to be guided by ulama who could interpret the shari’a systematically, and its leadership reflects this (see below). The top
leaders of Hizb, however, all had secular educations. In Hizb the ulama are in charge of only the administration of justice.

Social Status and Education: The Old Regime and the Revolutionaries

Under the old regime in Afghanistan, the national structure of tribal-ethnic affiliation strongly affected an individual's chances for social promotion within the state. Table 1 presents the tribal-ethnic affiliations of the various political elites.

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The most salient characteristics of the old regime elite were that Muhammadzais and Kabulis were represented probably more than ten times more in the elite than in the population. Pashtuns in general were also over-represented. Furthermore, the over-representation of both Pashtuns and Muhammadzais was greater among the core power holders than in the elite as a whole. Tajiks (mostly Kabulis) were also quite prominent, but mainly in the legal, financial, and social ministries, while the Pashtuns held the core of power. It is interesting to note, in view of the common statement that the royal regime was Durrani, that Durranis other than Muhammadzais were virtually absent from the old regime elite, and that those who did serve were mainly members of leading families who had settled in Kabul as clients of the court.

In all the revolutionary groups, in contrast, there was only one Muhammadzai, Shair Jan Mazduryar, a Khalqi PDPA Central Committee member of non-elite background. The Parchamis alone of all the revolutionary groups included a significant number of Kabulis, indeed about the same percentage as the old regime. Only a few isolated
individuals of Kabuli origin joined Khalq. The Islamic militants were entirely non-Pashtun in background, without a single Kabuli. Both Khalq and Parcham, especially the former, resembled the old regime in being dominated by Pashtuns. The Islamists, however, were the only group in which the proportion of Pashtuns was no greater than their proportion in the population (about 45 percent), and Pashtun representation in their top leadership (the shūrah) was even less.

These data indicate a hierarchy of social distance from the old regime elite among the revolutionary groups. The Parchamis were the closest. (Indeed, they had direct links to Daud and supported his coup in 1973.) They came from the lower ranks (non-Muhammadzai) of the social groups who constituted the elite. Both the Khalqis and the Islamists were outsiders, but the Khalqis at least had the Pashtun link to the elite. The Islamists were the most distant.

This does not mean that either the Khalqis or the Islamists came from the most deprived and impoverished sectors of the population. The limited information I have on the social background of these groups indicates that by and large they came from middle or upper-middle social levels in the countryside -- otherwise they would have been hard put to complete their education, as nearly all of them did (see below). There was thus a discrepancy between their social position in their region of origin and their social position with respect to the state in Kabul, reflecting the different relation of the state to different ethnic groups in the country.

Non-Muhammadzai Durranis were largely absent from the revolutionary groups, as well as from the elite. Some Kabuli Durranis, like those in the old regime elite, joined Parcham. The Khalqi Durranis, however, were of rural, tribal origin. There were no Durranis of any sort
among the Islamists, although in the changed circumstances after 1978 all of the Islamic parties acquired followings among the Durrani tribesmen of South and Southwest Afghanistan.

The Pashtuns among the Islamists are a rather different group from those who joined the old regime, Parcham, or Khalq. Unlike most of those in Parcham or the old regime, none of the Eastern Pashtuns in the Islamic movement came from the Kabuli milieu. Unlike most of those in Khalq, they did not come from the southeastern tribal belt (only Prof. Niyazi was from this area). Most were from areas with mixed Persian and Pashto speaking populations and weak tribal institutions. These data confirm Roy's observation that there were no Islamist intellectuals among the tribes. The Islamists largely came from those ethnic groups which were both mobilized into the national political arena by state education and least connected to state power. These groups included Tajiks of the Northeast and detribalized or partly detribalized Pashtuns.

The social basis of factionalism in the two movements is somewhat different. Among the Communists the only statistically significant distinction between Parchamis and Khalqis is that between Kabulis (predominant among Parchamis) and provincials (among Khalqis). The Kabuli/non-Kabuli distinction seems to be a rough proxy for class origin, as the Kabulis tend to have fathers of high social status.

The split between Hizb and Jamiat was more clearly ethnic. Table 1 confirms, however, that neither is ethnically monolithic. The Hizb leadership was about two thirds Pashtun, and Jamiat's was nearly three fourths Tajik. As noted below, the Pashtuns who remained in Jamiat were primarily those who had attended either the top state madrasa or Al-Azhar. Hizb is the only group with even one leader drawn from the caste-
like occupational groups of Eastern Afghanistan, whose social status is lower than that of any of the major Sunni ethnic groups.

The difference in social status of the political elites shows up equally clearly in the type of secondary schools that the leaders attended (Table 2). The old regime elite came overwhelmingly from the students of the elite Kabul schools. Of the older generation, a significant number had been educated privately, but the elite of New Democracy nearly all attended the elite schools. Those few who did not nonetheless attended secondary schools in Kabul such as the military high school, the top state madrasa (Abu Hanifa), or the teachers' training high school. Thus regardless of whether they were born in Kabul, all members of the elite of New Democracy had lived in the Westernized Kabuli milieu since early adolescence.

Table 2 about here.

The Parchamis had a similar but slightly less elite background. Of the Central Committee members 48.6 percent had attended the elite schools, as had 6 of the 7 Politburo members (85.7 percent). The other (Maj. Gen. Muhammad Rafi), who joined the Politburo only in 1981, attended the military high school, so that all Parchami Politburo members received their secondary education in Kabul. Of the 12 Parchami Central Committee members who attended non-elite secular schools (who were generally the least influential members), 3 attended tribal boarding schools in Kabul, so that 62.9 percent of all Parchami Central Committee members attended secondary school in Kabul.

Among Khalqis, by contrast, only one rather marginal person in a
leading position attended an elite school. Khalqis at all levels predominantly attended the non-elite secular state schools. Among these, however, many attended either the military high school or the tribal boarding schools. Four of nine Khalqi Politburo members (44.4 percent) attended high school in Kabul, as did 55.5 percent of the Khalqi Central Committee members.

At least 48 percent of the Islamists and 61 percent of the members of the shūrā (10 of 16) attended high school in Kabul, but they attended very different institutions from the old regime elite or the PDPA members. Only a few individuals attended elite schools or the military high school, and none attended the tribal boarding schools. Of those Islamist leaders and shūrā members who attended high school in Kabul 60 percent of the former and 70 percent of the latter attended the Abu Hanifa Madrasa or its predecessor, Dar al-Ulum-i Arabiya. They thus formed an Islamic enclave in a Westernizing educational system and capital city. Those with secular state educations mainly attended provincial high schools, outside of the Westernizing Kabul milieu.

In the original shūrā, those with state religious educations predominated. As one moves down to lower level elites in the (pre-split) Islamic movement, the proportion of those with state secular educations increases. After the split, religious education was more prevalent among Jamiat leaders than Hizb. While some of the early Islamists who attended Abu Hanifa madrasa (including Pashtuns) later joined Jamiat, none joined Hizb. While Jamiat's main leadership includes graduates of both state madrasas (leader, deputy leader, and head of recruitment), and state secular schools (heads of the political and military committees), the equivalent offices in Hizb are all filled by graduates of state secular
schools. In the Hizb leadership only two men who headed the judicial committee graduated from madrasas.46

The data on secondary education thus confirm the same social hierarchy attested to by the ethnic data. But although the Islamists came from the lowest status, least Westernized, and most Islamic part of the state educational system, they did come from that system, not from an unchanged traditional society outside it. As noted above, this pattern is typical of revolutionary counter-elites, not of traditionalist conservatives. The Islamists included virtually no representatives of the generality of Afghan ulama, who were educated in private madrasas.

The pattern of higher education among these elites further illustrates both their places in the social hierarchy and their international links. Table 3 shows the location of higher education. The distinction is among international political and cultural networks, not purely among territories; I distinguish the West (capitalist Europe, America, and Australia), the Soviet bloc, foreign Islamic institutions (mainly Al-Azhar), and other institutions in Asian or Islamic countries. The latter category includes Turkey and American University in Beirut, both of which might be said to belong to Western cultural networks. Table 4 shows the institution or faculty of higher education for those who received at least part of their higher education in Afghanistan. All tables include military training as a form of higher education.

Tables 3 and 4 about here.

Nearly all members of all of the elites had formal higher education, which definitely set them apart from most of the population of
Afghanistan, a country with a single digit literacy rate. Two things distinguish the old regime, especially the elite of New Democracy: a plurality of those who studied in Afghanistan attended the Faculty of Law and Political Science (the French-sponsored faculty of secular law which trained administrators and managers for the government); and a near totality of its members studied in the West. Thus exposure to Western-style modernity was part of the process by which this socially elite group was prepared for the highest posts of government service.

Unlike the ruling elite both Communists and Islamists were primarily recruited from the campus of Kabul University and hence were much more likely to have studied in Afghanistan. Those PDPA elite members who pursued higher education in Afghanistan studied in different faculties and institutions than the elite of the old regime. Whereas 43 percent of New Democracy elites with Afghan higher education had attended the Law and Political Science Faculty, only 11.5 percent of Parchami and 4.2 percent of Khalqi Central Committee members had. About a quarter of both had attended the Soviet-aided Kabul Military Academy, which drew on the graduates of the military high school, mainly tribal Pashtuns. Among Khalqis an even larger proportion (41.7 percent) came from the scientific and technical faculties which largely prepared specialists for middle-level bureaucratic jobs.

As one would expect, both Khalqis and Parchamis were less likely than old regime elites to have studied in the West. A suggestive and initially counter-intuitive finding, however, is that Khalqis were more likely to have studied abroad. What this suggests is that the Khalqi leaders were relatively successful members of disadvantaged social strata. They were advancing socially due to educational achievement, while finding
their way to a share of power completely blocked. Parchamis were relatively unsuccessful members of more advantaged social groups who saw their more successful (or favored) classmates from elite lycées leave for France or America while they went on to Kabul University.

Both factions were far more likely to have studied in the Soviet Union than the leaders of the old regime, and there is no appreciable difference between Khalqis and Parchamis on this score. Of those studying in the U.S.S.R., about half were in the military, an equal proportion of both factions. It is not necessarily the case that education in the U.S.S.R. turned Afghans into Communists. In some cases, students who had joined the PDPA in high school or at Kabul University were granted Soviet scholarships. Nonetheless, it appears that the Kabul joke, reported by Louis Dupree, that America produces Communists and the U.S.S.R. produces capitalists, was not quite accurate.

Higher education among Islamists shows a completely different pattern. Two thirds of the shūrā members and about two fifths of all the early leaders had advanced Islamic educations. The movement's founder (Niyazi), its leader (Rabbani), and deputy leader (ʿAbd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf) had all studied at Al-Azhar, as had Dr. Tawana, then in charge of cultural affairs.

The cadres largely came from graduates of the provincial state high schools or madrasas who then attended non-elite faculties of Kabul University. As elsewhere in the Islamic world, the technical faculties provided the bulk of the student cadres, although this was equally true of the Khalqis.

The differences between the religiously educated "professors" in the leadership and the radical Islamist students in the technical faculties is the
main non-ethnic part of the split between Hizb and Jamiat. Only a quarter
of the Hizb leaders from Kabul University had studied at the Shari'a
Faculty, and none had taught there. Eight of 18 Jamiat leaders attended
the Faculty of Shari'a, several of them taught there, and three of them had
studied at Al-Azhar. (One head of the judicial committee of Hizb had
studied in the Gulf, but no Hizb leaders had attended Al-Azhar.) The
remaining 10 Jamiat leaders from secular faculties were all from scientific,
medical, or technical ones. The Islamists' non-elite background shows up
again in the fact that not a single one of them attended the prestigious
Faculties of Law and Political Science or Economics. Nor did Hizb or Jamiat
include any graduates of the Kabul Military Academy.

Finally, the Islamists were as a whole the least Westernized (or
"Easternized") of the Afghan elites. Their education embodied the Islamist
slogan "Neither East nor West." Not a single one of them had been
educated in the Soviet bloc, or in non-Islamic Third World institutions like
the American University of Beirut or Indian universities; a sole individual
of secondary importance had a master's degree in engineering from the
U.S., reflecting the American sponsorship of Kabul's Faculty of Engineering.
Their only significant international ties were with the Islamic umma.

Conclusion

The revolutionary groups in Afghanistan came from aspiring elites
whose access to power was blocked. Through their participation in the
state educational system and the time they all spent in the capital, they all
developed aspirations for not only themselves but for their nation. Those
most exposed to Western cultural influences through either their place of
residence or their type of education tended to opt for the Western ideology
of revolution — Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union's role in supporting
Afghan and Pashtun nationalism, in particular by building up the military, may account in part for the recruitment of Pashtun tribal youth to the pro-Soviet Khalq and rural non-Pashtuns to Islamic or "Maoist" movements. Those less subject to Western influences sought a more indigenous discourse of protest and found it in revolutionary Islam.

Under New Democracy these groups founded their newspapers and formal organizations. They began their struggle for power with Daud's coup in 1973. The old regime elite split, and Parcham allied with the section that supported Daud. Portions of the old elite began to join the ex-king in Western exile, while the Islamists, facing harsh repression, retreated to Peshawar. There they found support from the Pakistani government and interest from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. As Daud removed the Parchamis from significant positions and distanced himself from the U.S.S.R., the Soviets encouraged Khalq and Parcham to reunite. Together, in 1978, they overthrew the remaining portion of the old regime.

Soon Khalq expelled Parcham from the government, and the Parchamis found refuge in the Soviet bloc, even as the Soviets poured in support to the Khalqi regime. The Khalqis' revolutionary policies overwhelmed the fragile administration and army, both of which disintegrated in the face of revolts, desertions, and mutinies. The old elite, long since reduced to a Westernized patronage network in Kabul with few ties to the country's society, found no way to lead the revolt against the regime that had overthrown them. Some disappeared in the prisons; more found their way to the West; a few, mostly those of rural, tribal Pashtun origin, found a place in Peshawar.43

The Soviets invaded and forced Khalq and Parcham to reunite under the dominance of the latter. The disintegration of the army and
administration, as well as the bountiful assistance now available from the Islamic world and the West (via Pakistan) afforded the Islamists the opportunity to organize networks inside the country. The fragments of the old regime who remained with the exiled resistance (none of them joined the rural maquis) constructed no differentiated political organizations in Afghanistan. Instead they affiliated themselves to traditional religious figures who could patch together tribal coalitions.

With aid from the Pakistani military and Jamaat-i Islami, Hizb built up the most disciplined party organization, but its sectarianism prevented it from establishing a territorial base anywhere inside Afghanistan. Jamiat alone, through its policy of alliances and the skill of some of its commanders (generally those with secular educations) has established base areas in the Northeast and West. In these areas its commanders have come to enjoy if not a monopoly then at least a dominant oligopoly of the means of violence. The price it has paid is to be identified as a Tajik party as much as an Islamic one.

As the Soviets under Gorbachev decided to withdraw their troops, the Soviet-chosen new leader of the PDPA, Najibullah, enunciated a policy of "national reconciliation." The core of the policy was to advocate a reconciliation between the Parcham-dominated rulers of Kabul, still shored up by massive Soviet aid, and their kin in the old elite. Such a policy agitated the Khalqis, whose opposition culminated in a March 1990 coup attempt led by the Defense Minister, who ended up in the camp of his Islamist co-ethnic, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.

Hikmatyar supported the coup and has unsuccessfully tried to repeat the adventure. He hopes to seize power in a putsch carried out by his party's forces with Pakistani logistical support and Arab-Islamic money
and armistice to his plans of most of the field commanders (and of the State Department, if not the CIA) has prevented him from mounting a serious effort. Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, the Jamiat field commander who leads the Supervisory Council of the North (Shu'rā-yi Naẓār-i Shāmāl), the most developed proto-state in Afghanistan, hopes that further building of his forces, broader alliances with other mujahidin commanders inside the country, and the eventual weakening of Soviet support for Najibullah (or the disintegration of Soviet power in Central Asia) will enable his organization to displace the current state structure.

Najibullah has multiplied his overtures to the old elite, co-opting increasing numbers of individuals into his government. In June 1990 he convened the PDPA's Second Congress, at which it renounced Marxism, the leading role of the Party, and socialism; embraced Islam, political pluralism, and free enterprise; and renamed itself Hizb-i Watan, the Homeland Party. The party's new program could have been adopted by any of Zahir Shah's governments, except that it is more fervent in its profession of Islam. Najibullah projects his government as the only remaining nationalist, Pashtun-led politically effective force in the country, but no major figure or force has yet shown a willingness to share power with him.

The exiled old regime elites and traditionalist Pashtun forces still refuse to join Najibullah, although the lines of communication are open. They reject both the increase of non-Pashtun power represented by Mas'ud and the Arab-funded Pakistani intervention in support of Islamic "extremism" represented by Hikmatyar. Their refusal to support either of the latter may leave Najibullah in power, but they hope that a U.N.-brokered deal between the superpowers will ease him out and open the
door to their return to Kabul. In early 1991 such diplomatic efforts remained stalled.

No political elite in Afghanistan enjoys ideological hegemony, a near-monopoly on the means of violence or administration, or control over renewable, autonomous resources. The revolutionary situation of multiple power continues, but no one has the strength to consolidate state power throughout the country. Afghanistan has moved from rentier state building to rentier state wrecking.

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Notes

Author's note: Research on this paper was partly carried out as a Peace Fellow of the United States Institute of Peace. All views are those of the author, not of the Institute. Besides those people mentioned in the footnotes, the author would particularly like to thank Paula Smith, Mohammad Es'haq, Professor Hasan Kakar, Anthony Arnold, David Katz, and five anonymous reviewers for their assistance and comments.

1The seminal -- though not the first -- work in this reevaluation was, of course, Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, 1979).


3For a review of a variety of such studies, see Robert D. Putnam, The


6Non-Muslims, including tiny groups of Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews, played roles more akin to consulting firms (in trade and finance) than citizens. A small group of urban Shi'a (Qizilbash) played a similar role in the bazaar and bureaucracy.

7In Afghanistan the term "Kabuli" is more commonly an ethnic designation for members of the qawm (solidarity group) of the indigenous Persian speakers of Kabul. I, however, shall refer not only to "Kabuli Tajiks" (as distinct from provincial Tajiks), but also to "Kabuli Pashtuns," a term which would not be used by Afghans. I should also note that, while in Afghanistan the term "Afghan" still commonly means "Pashtun," I am using it in its juridical sense, meaning (as a noun) any citizen of the state.
or (as an adjective) anything pertaining to the country.


11Etienne, L'Afghanistan, p. 39. It is not clear whether this number includes those sent for military training.


13For a fuller treatment see Rubin, "The Old Regime in Afghanistan."

14The main source was Ludwig Adamec, A Biographical Dictionary of Afghanistan (Graz, 1987), supplemented by an interview with Hafizullah Karzai.

15Khalq (the masses) and Parcham (the flag) were the names of the factions' newspapers. On factionalism in the PDPA see Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq (Stanford, 1983); Olivier Roy, "Le double code afghan: marxisme et tribalisme," Revue Francaise de Science Politique (December 1986), pp. 846-861; and Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First-hand Account (London,
1988).

16 Published information on the PDPA leadership came from Adamec, *Biographical Dictionary: Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism*; and press reports of appointments. I supplemented these with information taken from unpublished data bases compiled by Anthony Arnold and David Katz, which I was kindly permitted to consult, and several interviews with Miagol, the Kabul government's chargé d'affaires in Washington during 1989-1990, who was a member of PDPA-Parcham since 1967.

17 For a participant's memoirs of this period see Mohammad Es'haq, "Evolution of Islamic movement in Afghanistan, Part (1): Islamists felt need for a party to defend Islam," *AFGHANews* 5 (January 1, 1989), pp. 5, 8.


19 Ibid., p. 5.

20 I have also included some prominent individuals such as Maulana Faizani and Minhajuddin Gahiz who were part of a broader Islamic movement but did not join the formal organization. I have not included Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, of the famous family of Naqshbandi piras. Mujaddidi, whose family represented the most Islamic wing of the old regime elite, was a prominent activist who was arrested by Daud in 1959. His brother Harun was active enough in the *Ikhwan* in Egypt to have been imprisoned by Nasser, and he was also connected to the Brotherhood.
himself. Mujaddidi has consistently had good relations with Rabbani (with whom he shares a Naqshbandi connection) and bitterly antagonistic ones with Hikmatyar. In Pakistani exile, however, whenever the resistance parties split between Islamists and traditionalist-nationalists, he always joined the latter. Hence I have not included him among the Islamic revolutionaries. His case illustrates, however, that the distinction between the Islamic revolutionaries and the Islamic establishment is not so absolute in Afghanistan as in some other Sunni countries.

Published sources included the memoirs of, Sayyed Musa Tawana and Mohammad Es'haq (respectively the deputy leader and a political officer of Jamiat), both published in the Jamiat English language publication, AFGHANews; a series entitled "Who's Who in the Mujahideen" published in various issues of AFGHANews; Adamec, Biographical Dictionary; Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, 1986); and Edwards, "The Evolution of Shi'i Political Dissent in Afghanistan," which also includes information on Sunni Islamists. I supplemented the published materials with information collected in interviews with Mohammad Es'haq, Naim Majrooh, Sultan Mahmud, and Abdul Jabbar Sabet.


According to Dr. Tawana, they chose the name *Jimāyyat* for the movement "because it resembled the word 'Jamaat' in the name of 'Jamaat Ikhwan Musleemeen' of Egypt and 'Jamaat Islami' of Pakistan but was also distinct from both." (Tawana, "Glimpses, Part (4)", p. 5.)


Fashardah-ye hadaf va mūrām-ī *Jimāyyat-i Islāmī-yi Afghanistan* (*Summary of the aims and program of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan*) (n.p. [Peshawar], n.d. [1978 or 1979 by internal evidence]; *Mūrām-ī Ḥizb-ī Islāmī-yi Afghanistan* (*Program of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan*) (n.p. [Peshawar?], 1365 H. Sh./1986-87). The latter is a fifth printing of a program which may have been written before 1978, as it mentions neither the 1978 coup nor the Soviet invasion.

For this use of the term "jahiliyya" see *Mūrām-ī Jimāyyat*, p. 8; *Mūrām-ī Ḥizb*, p. vi (vay), and elsewhere.

"Niẓām-i zindigī-yi mardum bar pāyah-yi muṣtaqqīdāt-i ʿānhā istivār na-mībāshad." (*Mūrām-ī Ḥizb*, p. v (hā.))

Ibid., p. 38: "Īn niẓām fashardah-ye tamām-i ṭafāsad, nāzālam va bīʿadālatīha-yi niẓāmhā va ʿistamkhā-yi ghair-ī islāmī ast."  (*Mūrām-ī Ḥizb*, p. vii (zain.))
33Ibid., pp. 51, 69.

34Ibid., pp. 13, 59; the latter quote is: "Pālīsī-yi iqtiṣādī-yi kishvar bih īshţīrāk-i namāvindīgān-i muntakhib-i millat tārīb gardośdāb, bēsad az tasyīb-i mālis-i shūrā samāli mīgardad."

35Roy, Islam and Resistance, pp. 77-78.


37Ibid.


39Hikmatyar has taken this position verbally at times, but in view of the massive aid he has received from the U.S., Afghans do not take his statements on this subject too seriously.

40Mūrām-i Jāmīyyat, p. 10-11, says, "Jamiat has no inherent opposition to any individual or group" and states its willingness to cooperate with any that share its general goals. On p. 12 it calls for a union of "all believing and valiant compatriots, courageous youth..., of ulama..., of brave and valiant [military] officers..., of those educated in modern sciences..., of honorable and faithful peasants..., of... workers..., and of the whole believing nation..." without insisting on a leading role for itself.

41Of course, the Pashtun predominance in the Parchami Politburo requires that one accept the Pashtun identification of Dr. Anahita Ratibzad and Babrak Karmal. Karmal and Ratibzad are both of ethnically mixed, Persianized, Kabuli backgrounds, and neither has any tribal ties.

43 The lone exception is the Khugiani tribe, from which Mawlawi Yunus Khalis comes. This tribe is Durrani by descent, but has been settled so long among the Ghilzai of Ningrahar that it no longer has any links to the main Durrani tribes. I have classified it here with non-Durrani tribes, as it lives outside the Durrani homeland.

44 This analysis was carried out on all Central Committee members with adequate data (N=99) with ethnicity coded as a dichotomy (Pashtun/non-Pashtun). The apparent relationship of ethnicity to factional membership is due to the fact that most (71 percent) of the Kabulis in the PDPA Central Committee were non-Pashtun, which is consistent with the population of Kabul, and most of the non-Kabulis (80 percent) were Pashtun. Non-Pashtun educated provincial youth were seemingly less likely to join the PDPA. Those belonging to this social category seem largely to have joined either the "Maoist" organizations or the Islamists.

45 The lone Khalqi from the elite schools was Muhammad Isma'il Danish, a Qizilbash Shi'a from the Chindawul district of Kabul, who is thus triply (birthplace, ethnicity, education) unusual among Khalqis.

46 The former Deputy Leader of Hizb, Qazi Muhammad Amin, who
formed his own splinter party after a dispute with Hikmatyar, also attended a government madrasa.


48See Table 10 in Rubin, "The Old Regime in Afghanistan."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Muham-madzai</th>
<th>Other Durrani</th>
<th>Other Pashtun</th>
<th>(All Pashtun)</th>
<th>Tajik/Farsiwan</th>
<th>Sayyid</th>
<th>Other Sunni</th>
<th>Shīa</th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>Percent Kabuli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>(57.9)</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: Core</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>(73.8)</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democracy</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>(56.1)</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: Core</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>(75.0)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcham Central Committee</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>(59.0)</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: Politburo</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>(85.7)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalq Central Committee</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>(80.1)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: Politburo</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>(75.0)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamists Early leaders</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>(44.8)</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: Shura</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>(37.5)</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>(22.7)</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>(66.7)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: As stated in text.
Table 2

Secondary Education of Political Elites in Afghanistan (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Elite Schools</th>
<th>Military School</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>State Secular</th>
<th>State Madrassa</th>
<th>Private/None</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Old Regime</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
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Sources: As stated in text.
### Table 3

Higher Education and Training of Political Elites in Afghanistan (Percentages)

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<th>Elite</th>
<th>Percent with higher education</th>
<th>N</th>
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</table>

Sources: As stated in text.

Note: (a) The percentages do not add up to 100, because some individuals studied in more than one place and hence are counted more than once.
Table 4

Political Elites in Afghanistan: Institutions or Faculties Attended by those with Higher Education in Afghanistan (Percentages)

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<th>Elite</th>
<th>Law and Political Education</th>
<th>Science/Technology</th>
<th>Humanities/Science</th>
<th>Military Academy</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Medicine</td>
<td>Economics</td>
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Sources: As stated in text.

Note: (a) Includes the Polytechnic Institute and the Faculties of Sciences, Engineering, and Agriculture.