THE NEW REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN:
THE FIRST TWENTY-ONE MONTHS

Louis Dupree

This paper is based on a lecture given by Louis Dupree for the Afghanistan Council on May 7, 1975 at The Asia Society.

Spring, 1976
Special Paper
Afghanistan, a landlocked country borders on and is intimately linked to the four major cultural and ecological zones of Asia: the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and the Far East. Historically, its patterns generally parallel those of the rest of Asia for the past 5,000 years: a process leading from Asian Imperialism to European Imperialism to Asian Nationalism to Asian Regionalism. A brief discussion of these four periods is germane.

Europe did not invent imperialism and certainly democratic institutions on a national scale never arose independently in Asia, for 5,000 years of recorded history relate the rise and fall of Asian empires. In essence, European Imperialism simply replaced Asian Imperialism in the nineteenth century.

Two functions dominate the relations of the empire with its subject peoples: the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenue. Therefore, imperialists, Asian or European, need "bookkeepers of empire", a cadre trained to administer the empire at the lower levels.

Upper class sons (seldom daughters) of local elites often journeyed to the center of power to prepare for high level jobs in the imperialistic administration. Eventually, sizeable numbers of the "bookkeepers of empire", plus local intellectuals refused to cooperate with the European imperialists and became leaders of independence movements: Asian Nationalism, the desire of the "bookkeepers" to rule their own lands and transplant European-oriented political ideologies (including variations of Marxist socialism) and economic models in usually unreceptive Asian soil.

All new nation-states of Afro-Asia since World War II have witnessed a tremendous rise in Regionalism, mainly attempts to redefine the rights and obligations of the areas within the boundaries of emerging national entities. The boundaries, usually legacies of European Imperialism, often split ethnolinguistic groups and intensify transnational problems. We must now place Afghanistan into this four-part scheme and lead into its recent attempts to create a Republic.

Afghanistan has a long history of tribal and dynastic struggles for power. In addition, several important empires rose and fell in the Afghan area: e.g., Ghaznavid, 10th-12th centuries A.D.; Ghorid, 12-13th centuries; Durrani, latter half of the 18th century. External Asian empires held sway in the region for varying periods of time, particularly during the great Indian Moghul and Persian Safavid rivalries of the 16th-17th centuries.

The early 19th century found the Afghan region in tribal dissarray, and the imperialistic rivalries between British India and Tsarist Russia in Central Asia culminated in two abortive British invasions of Afghanistan (1839-42;1870-80)
and Russian domination north of Amu Darya.

Glimpses of nationalism by far-seeing amirs prior to 1880 did occur, but Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-93) created an empire, not a nation-state, and later Dost Mohammad (1826-39; 1826-63) also had the vision of an Afghanistan unified, but met with constant consanguineal opposition. By the time Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) became Amir of Kabul, any external imperialist ambitions he might have felt were thwarted by the Russians to the north, the British to the south, with Qajar Persia peripherally protected by both those great powers.

So Abdur Rahman engaged in an exercise which I call "internal imperialism": he attempted to pacify his country and spread his influence - if not actual control over the entire region we now call Afghanistan. While Abdur Rahman was thus engaged, the British and Russians collaborated to draw his boundaries, with or without his permission or acquiescence. Therefore, Afghanistan was never a colony, but it is at least partly the creature of European Imperialism.

The internal imperialism of Abdur Rahman led him to create his own "bookkeepers"; i.e., a military and police force to maintain law and order, and a bureaucracy to man the ministries he was creating. These groups of technocrats evolved into modified nationalists, without clipping the umbilical cords which stretch back to the regional, ethnolinguistic units from which they had sprung.

The intellectual vigor of Mahmud Beg Tarzi(8) and others during the period of Amir Habibullah(9) (1901-19) made nationalism and a brand of modernization within Islam respectable.

The assassination of Habibullah vaulted his third son (and son in law of Tarzi), Amanullah, into the kingship (Amanullah changed his title from Amir to king in 1923). The ten years of Amanullah (1919-29) were complex and dynamic, and much that happened went against the traditional grain of the society. Amanullah's reforms, even in urban Kabul, came much faster than the culture could absorb them, and, for an accumulation of reasons, he was overthrown by a Tajik adventurer and folk hero, Habibullah (also called Bacha Saqqao, son of a water carrier) (11), who ruled for 10 months before General Mohammad Nadir Khan restored Mohammadzai rule in October 1929.

Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-33) retrenched and moved slowly until his assassination. A new constitution, introduced in 1931, was never really implemented, but an interesting economic pattern, begun in the 1920s, was institutionalized as policy, and flourished in the "avuncular period" (1933-1953), when uncles of the king served as prime ministers. Led by three energetic entrepreneurs (Abdul Majid Zabuli, Loe Sher Khan Nasir Ghilzai and Abdul Aziz Londoni), the Afghans began to develop their country with small scale industrial complexes. Export earnings from such items as cotton, garakul skins, furs, fresh and dried fruits and nuts, permitted the Afghans to purchase machinery from Europe and to hire technicians to assist them in establishing various projects.

Then came World War II and the development of the Cold War in the post war period. With the Cold War came the competition between the USA and the USSR for friends in the non-aligned world. Afghanistan literally had foreign assistance, both grants and loans, forced upon it, and the slowly evolving, self-supporting development programs rapidly gave way to massive infrastructure projects, particularly after General Mohammad Daoud seized power from
his uncle, Shah Mahmud, in 1953, and remained in control until his resignation over the "Pushtunistan" issue in 1963. During the decade of Daoud, however, Afghanistan successfully remained bi-tarafi (without sides, non-aligned) in the international political arena. Other solid achievements of Daoud embraced all institutions, social, economic and political: voluntary removal of the veil from women and abolition of purdah; regional economic planning spurred additional development; the status and morale of the armed forces improved; educational opportunities increased; the political base of power broadened, and each Kabul election became comparatively more democratic; the still woefully inadequate pay of the civil service was moderately boosted.

The constitutional period (1963-73) began with a bang and ended with a bang. The initial, unrestrained euphoria gradually sloughed into inertia, as five prime ministers and seven cabinets marched across the political stage - and then were heard no more. Two elections (1965, 1969) were held and a third planned for August-September, 1973.

Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Yusuf (March 14, 1963 – October 25, 1965) headed the interim cabinet while a new constitution was being written and elections held. Reappointed by the king, Dr. Yusuf formed a new cabinet which never served, for student demonstrations over the same old faces led to violence and death, Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal became prime minister on November 2, 1965. He served until October 12, 1967. During his tenure, his big mistake was to act as a prime minister should: he formed a political party (Progressive Democratic Party). Maiwandal also had to face accusations that he and several of his cabinet had connections with the CIA. In a direct confrontation with the parliament, however, he managed to come away with as clean bill of health as is possible under such circumstances. Pressure from the royal family (certain elements) combined with genuine ill health led Maiwandwal to resign.


The patterns which led to the downfall of the nine year experiment in constitutional monarchy intensified during Etemadi’s tenure. Sins of omission were probably more important than those of commission. The theory had been for the parliamentarians to pass about thirty laws written by Afghan legal experts. These parliamentary exercises were to provide a training ground for democratic procedures. The members of the Meshrano Jirgah (Upper House) and Wolesi Jirgah (Lower House) preferred investigation to legislation, however, and many important pieces of legislation lay dormant in committees. Unhappily, one important bill, although passed, was never implemented. The 1964 Constitution called for the creation of political parties under appropriate legislation, but several of the king’s advisers in his family were having second thoughts, so the Political Parties Act continued to gestate until the end.

The constitution also called for the creation of elected Provincial and Municipal Councils to encourage widespread participation in the national political processes. In addition, since the constitution required that one third of the Upper House come from the Provincial Councils (one from each of the 28 provinces), some constitutional authorities argued that the entire nine year period was unconstitutional.
The king himself held ultimate power under the constitution and was, therefore, the key figure, but he did not respond to the needs to shift the drifting inertia into active channels. He generally remained aloof from the cabinet squabbles, and only occasionally put pressure on the legislators to legislate. The judiciary was never really formalized except on paper. The king was apparently more concerned with regional stability, and alternated between blatant interference and benign neglect on the internal scene. (14)

Prime Minister Dr. Abdul Zahir (July 26, 1971 - December 6, 1972), an elder statesman, had to contend with same problems as Etemadi with intensification in several directions: the Wolesi Jirgah met less and less frequently, quorums were increasingly difficult to meet. Also, two years of drought caused famine in several provinces in Central Afghanistan. Famine relief, initially mishandled by bureaucratic inefficiency and some corruption, finally became effective, but not before untold thousands had died.

The pattern of the famine as it developed is instructive. In the various ethno-linguistic regions of Afghanistan, everyone starves or no one starves. The peasant-tribal society is structured in a series of reciprocating, functioning rights and obligations. The rural power elites (khans, maliks, begs, boyars, arbobs, etc.) feel a responsibility to those in their politico-kin units, but government officials stationed in the area have no such feelings of reciprocity - and, unfortunately, some did hoard government grain and sell it at exorbitant prices.

When a mild drought occurs in Afghanistan, wheat prices often jump drastically in the urban scene. Farmers will sell their surpluses in the bazaar, saving only enough seed for the next planting. Central Afghanistan is primarily a zone of lalma (unirrigated, highland wheat), with yields varying from six to twelve pounds from one pound of seed, depending on the soil fertility and annual humidity. But in 1971, a unique event occurred: a second year of drought followed the first, and most farmers had saved only enough seed for a normal planting. In many areas the yield was less than one to one. So famine stalked the land.

Mohammad Moosa Shafiq, one of the key framers of the 1964 Constitution, inherited all the accumulation problems of the past nine years when he became prime minister on December 12, 1972. In spite of this, some genuine movement occurred during his short, seven months tenure. Possibly, the king had hoped that almost ten years would bring the young parliament and the young Moosa Shafiq to mutual maturity. Shafiq spent the decade as an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and ambassador to Egypt (among other places), and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Dr. Zahir's cabinet. But a decade of regal and parliamentary "benign neglect" and executive inaction proved fatal.

The new prime minister did, however, begin to break the executive-legislative impasse, and, although still plagued by frequent lack of quorum (eighty two from mid-March to early June 1973; including forty consecutive days to July 2), several meaningful items were passed: including, the 1972-73 regular and developments budgets (on time for a change); several important foreign loan agreements; the Hilmand treaty with Iran (concerning the distribution of waters of the Hilmand River). The Hilmand Treaty was essentially based on the 1951 recommendations of a joint committee (including President Daoud), constituted after the Sistan drought of 1947.

Other Shafiq attempts to induce movement included: moving the prime minister's Office of Parliamentary Relations to the parliament building, and holding weekly meetings with various parliamentary members; encouraging the free press
by increasing government advertising; upgrading the Department of Tribal Affairs to a full Ministry; moving closer to a rapprochement with Pakistan over the "Pushtunistan" issue. In addition, Afghan exports exceeded $100 million for the first time.

The Coup d'Etat (15)

In the early morning hours of July 17, 1973, a classic textbook coup occurred in Kabul. Quietly and efficiently, army and police units took over all pertinent government buildings, the international airport, Radio Afghanistan, the telephone exchange, and surrounded the homes of all who might attempt a counter-coup. Only a few policemen were killed, resisting a movement which they did not understand nor had they been informed about it. Probably, only about twenty-three men (military and civilian confidants of Mohammad Daoud) knew the details of the coup, laying to rest once and for all time the myth that no one in Afghanistan can keep a secret.

The coup had been in the active planning stage since the 1969 elections, when former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud finally realized that the experiment to create a constitutional monarchy had failed - or at least had failed as presently directed. Although legally, no political parties could exist, in fact several did, all based on the active free newspapers. The entire spectra from right-wing conservative Islam to the pro-Maoist left flourished among the emergent urban middle class, particularly those with foreign educations. The middle class had grown tremendously since 1953, combined with the development and foreign assistance explosion during the first decade of Daoud.

But, as is true in most societies, the middle class constitutes an urban "silent majority." Few in the class will become politically active unless parties are legal and legitimate. Since the Political Parties Act had not been promulgated, the intelligentsia and professional groups could not be galvanised.

The king, advised by conservative members of the royal family, did not permit the Act to become law, the theory being that the country would be plucked by the militant communist-dominated parties. However, extremist parties of both right and left will exist whether legal or not, and the problem was to involve the urban middle class, the comfortable stagnants of the center, which remained inactive without a law.

In his ten year absence from the political scene, Daoud held a running seminar to pinpoint his past mistakes and discuss how to correct the mistakes of the present, where he had gone wrong and what was now needed. At some point, Daoud and his followers came into contact with the young members of Parcham, a moderate, urban, civil servant oriented leftist group, definitely not controlled by external communist powers. Parcham, along with some breakaway members of Khalq (another leftist-oriented group), rapidly became the most tightly organized political entity in Afghanistan. And Daoud needed such an organized group to help re-establish administration in the provinces after the coup. With the military and police as his source of power for the coup de main, a readymade, administrative cadre, Daoud struck.

Rumors have it that Major-General Abdul Wali, also a first cousin of Daoud, as well as cousin and son-in-law to the king, had a list of the conspirators on his desk, but before he could move against them (for various reasons), Daoud shifted the date of the coup from October to July.

The role of the armed forces in the coup is also instructive. During his 1953-
63 tenure, Prime Minister Daoud modernized and revitalized the officer corps, and generally improved the lot of the conscripts who make up the bulk of the army, police air force, gendarmes and labor corps. After failing to obtain US military assistance, the Afghans turned to the Soviets, who accepted with alacrity. By 1970, seven thousand officers had been trained in the USSR, with another six hundred trained in the USA. Some officers attended schools in both places. Some also received training in England and Turkey. Many Western observers worried about the political orientation of Afghan officers trained in the USSR. Some Afghans also worried. The fact that Soviet officers served as instructors and advisers in Afghanistan also caused concern. Afghan officers trained in the USSR and USA often compare their experiences, and find them reasonably similar. America and Russian military bases apparently resemble one another; so do the attitudes of the instructors and the instruction received. After all, only a limited number of ways exist to teach a rifle platoon to kill another rifle platoon, or to engage in air combat. Neither the USA nor the USSR turned out to be the paradises painted by their respective propaganda, and attempts to proselytize and penetrate (I think that is the correct intelligence terminology) sound almost identical.

The end result of Soviet (and American) training tends to make the military even more pro-Afghan (or pro-Egyptian, pro-Pakistani, etc.) than pro-Soviet or pro-American. This is not to deny that some Afghan military types were probably successfully recruited, but the overwhelming majority remained loyal to their country.

After Daoud resigned voluntarily over the closure of the Afghan-Pakistan border (1961-63), and the "Pushtunistan" issue, the king appointed Abdul Wali commander of the Central Forces in Kabul, with responsibilities stretching all the way past Jalalabad to the Durand Line. In theory, therefore, whoever controlled the Central Forces should control Kabul and, therefore, Afghanistan. A sincere patriot and ambitious man, Major-General Abdul Wali formed a special unit or strike force (ghund-i-zarba,) which he personally staffed and trained with what he thought was a loyal force of superior troops. He also began to ease out high-ranking troop commanders and replaced them with "his" men - or those he assumed to be "his" men. Among those replaced were General Khan Mohammad (not the long-time Minister of Defense, but a field general who at one time or another commanded most major divisions and garrisons) and General Abdur Razak, commanding officer of the air force. These men shall concern us later.

Good soldier Abdul Wali, a strict though fair disciplinarian, had few personal friends outside the royal family, and a keen sense of destiny. Even in the army, he was respected as a soldier, but, as he found to his surprise on July 17, 1973 few genuine supporters. In addition, he had often opposed his cousin, Prime Minister Daoud, on policy. Cousin competition is common in Afghanistan, and the Pashto term, turburghanay, which means intensive hatred, is a linguistic indicator of this feeling. Possibly, Abdul Wali looked on himself as a successor to the king, or at least the eminence gris behind the crown prince, Ahmad Shah. No one denies that Abdul Wali had great influence on the king and the royal family in general. Rumors that the king planned to abdicate in favor of the crown prince, with Abdul Wali wielding power cannot, at this point, be substantiated.

The modern army was Daoud's creation, and it was Daoud the army backed in the coup. When news that Daoud was leading the coup reached the commanders of army garrisons, police and gendarme barracks, and air force installations, they simply waited for Daoud's order. Many observers felt amazed that no one stood for the king, who was still in Italy.
Almost all known communist-leaning officers (including those who participated in the coup) have been retired or transferred to non-sensitive posts. The army (mainly the professional, nationalistic officer corps of all services) remains staunchly pro-Afghan and will remain the fundamental base of Daoud's power for some time to come. As such, it will not make or implement decisions (expect on a limited scale where engineering involvement is needed), but will sit, ready to act if the Republic feels its reform programs threatened or its internal or external security threatened.

Among the leaders of the coup were some of Abdul Wali's most trusted subordinates. Daoud remains the "father figure" of the modern Afghan officer corps.

Just as they had cheered Daoud's departure in 1963, the crowds cheered his return. Named Founder of the Republic, President (or Head of State, preferred by Daoud), and Prime Minister, Daoud's first public announcements indicated that the Republic of Afghanistan would "conform to the true spirit of Islam," and continue its foreign policy of bi-tarafi, non-alignment. He alluded mildly to the "Pushtunistan" problem with Pakistan, which he hoped would be solved peacefully.

A horizontal shift of power had occurred, a common feature on the Afghan dynastic landscape. But the first rash of appointments by Daoud and the thirteen man Central Committee indicated possible deep-penetrating changes. The fifteen man cabinet was mainly leftist in orientation, and five members of the Central Committee, excluding Daoud, made the cabinet; four of the five were leftists. Of the total fifteen finally appointed to the cabinet, eight were leftist-oriented, some more so than others, but none controlled by external communist influences, or so is my opinion.

Two leftist cabinet members left the scene early. Engineer Pacha Gul Wafada, Minister of Frontier Affairs, had trained as an air force officer in the USSR, where he had married a Russian woman who bore him a child. Pacha Gul failed to inform the Afghan government of his marriage, and it is illegal for military officers to take foreign wives. Neither had Pacha Gul informed Daoud, and when the minister's wife and child appeared in Kabul, Daoud and the Central Committee took action: Pacha Gul resigned from all his posts and went to Bulgaria as ambassador.

From the earliest cabinet meetings, factional fights developed between leftist and non-leftists, and between the leftists themselves. Engineer Abdul Hamid Mohtat, Minister of Communications, a militant, became openly critical of his leftist peers and attacked the direction the Republic had taken. He was summarily dismissed from the cabinet and the Central Committee. He now sits at home, bi-chawki, bi-motor (without chair - or post, without automobile), the term used to express the fall of a high government official and his resulting unemployment.

Later, Dr. Nehmatullah Pazhwak, Minister of Education, was replaced for policy disagreements. So the president is giving his cabinet relatively free reins, to permit those who cannot or will not work under the guidelines he had established for the Republic to eliminate themselves.

Another initial move broke the political strength of the Parchamis, the only known, well-organized party, which had been instrumental in the coup. The new Republic sent about one hundred and sixty of these enthusiastic, reform-minded young men to man district and sub-district administrative positions, and spread the word of the Republic. As most of these young men were Kabulis or
ultra-urban oriented, they ran headlong into the rural power elites, who, although paying lip service, would have none of the rapid changes desired by the reformers. The new cadre of administrators became frustrated, and most did one of two things: accepted the fact that change would be slow and within the existing patterns, so they stayed at their posts and became effective; others, cynically turned as corrupt as any of their predecessors. Others, totally disillusioned, returned to Kabul and resigned – or were dismissed for leaving their posts without permission.

As of March 1975, Parcham no longer existed as an effective political force, and its leadership either sits quietly at home, or cooperates with the Republic. But quietness does not always mean a lack of activity – or interest in the future.

In the early days of the Republic, other crucial questions remained. Can those who make a revolution make a Republic? Was President Daoud's strong reiteration of his bi-tarafi a cloak for pro-Soviet bias? The Chinese, particularly, believed the Soviets had a direct hand in the coup, and considered it as part of the continuing scheme to foster pro-Soviet regimes along the Chinese borderlands.

**The Search for Security**

Having performed one of the more perfect coups since World War II, the new government turned its attention to security. With Abdul Wali safely incarcerated, another plot surfaced, which had its roots in Abdul Wali's attempts to consolidate his power in the army. A group of disgruntled retired officers, and others concerned with Abdul Wali's growing power, clustered about Lt. General Khan Mohammad and General Abdur Razak. The plot was more anti-Abdul Wali than anti-monarchy.

The officers looked around for a civilian to govern – at least as a figurehead – until their new government could securely hold elections, and the reins of administration turned over to civilian ministers, all this assuming the coup would succeed. Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal was an ideal choice. A distinguished diplomat (ambassador to Washington and Karachi), administrator (Minister of Information and Culture in Dr. Yusuf's first cabinet; Prime Minister for two years), and intellectual (he had written a masterful analysis of Afghanistan's ills in Musawat, and proposed a socialist program to remedy them), Maiwandwal also had the enmity of Abdul Wali and certain other members of the royal family. In 1969 Maiwandwal had stood for the Wolesi Jirgah, and had been defeated because of the open involvement of the government at the polls.(16)

Maiwandwal, an ambitious man who loved his country, was to be destroyed by ambition. What actually occurred is still subject to much speculation – and emotion – and the following account is simply a personal attempt, using both official and non-official sources, to ferret out an approximation of the truth.

When approached by the generals, Maiwandwal must have gone through a period of agonizing reappraisal. He had given much to his country, but on several occasions had been had by the royal family. He had been virtually forced to resign as prime minister; he had been unfairly defeated at the polls. A gambler, like most Afghans, Maiwandwal probably finally answered with the familiar: "Why not?" He may have reasoned that as long as the present royal family ruled he had no chance to gain power through legitimate means.
Knowing little about military matters, Maiwandwal left the mechanics of the coup to the military. The conspirators assured Maiwandwal they had the support of key army and air force units, and presumably indicated they were backed by a "foreign power". If such actually existed remains a matter for speculation, but two candidates stand out: Pakistan, or, through the American Embassy in Islamabad, the USA. There may have been no direct involvement or negotiations, but either or both candidates could have informally implied that quick recognition would follow a successful coup.

The time factor in Maiwandwal's involvement is important. Did he join the plot before or after the July 17 coup? In my opinion, before, for, after the coup he had interviews with both the Head of State and his brother, Mohammad Naim, former Foreign Minister and now foreign policy adviser. Maiwandwal, a man of humble origin, was essentially a creature of Naim's period as foreign minister.

After the unfolding tragedy ended, a plaguing question remains: is it possible that the president considered Maiwandwal, the only Afghan with an international reputation and a substantial local following, as his possible successor under free elections after the promulgation of a new constitution? The question must remain unanswered.

According to persistent rumors, Mainwandwal attempted to persuade the generals to abandon their plans after the successful July 17 coup. Once begun, however, such plans are difficult to curtail, and the first coup made it all look so easy. Why should the second be any different?

In any event, the police uncovered the plot, and the Head of State finally sanctioned the arrests on September 20. Apparently, tapes of conversations were the main evidence.

Sometime between midnight and dawn on October 20, 1973 Maiwandwal met his fate. Officially, he committed suicide, being unable to live branded a "traitor" by Radio Afghanistan and other government-controlled media. Many believe he was killed by over enthusiastic guards.

Maiwandwal's death came as a shock to the Head of State and his brother. One reason Naim did not go to Washington as the President's Special Envoy (he had already visited the USSR and India) was that he wanted to avoid questions concerning Maiwandwal from mutual friends. Both Naim and Maiwandwal had served as ambassadors to Washington. Waheed Abdullah, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary to the Cabinet, made the trip instead.

Maiwandwal's death placed a protective blanket over other high-ranking technocrats who had served during the nine-year constitutional experiment, for the Head of State let it be known that if anything similar occurred those responsible would pay dearly. Maiwandwal's death also caused the President to tighten his own control over the upper echelons of government.

The trials of the other accused continued, and the verdicts began to trickle in by the end of December, 1973. Of the 45 defendants, five (including General Khan Mohammad) were executed, seven (including General Razak) were given life sentences, 15 received prison sentences ranging from two to fifteen years, seven received prison sentences and had part or all of their property confiscated, seven were released because their period of detention was considered sufficient punishment, two were released but retired from the military, and two were acquitted (an air force major and a former Lower House deputy).
Maiwandwal was sentenced to death in absentia.

**Patterns and Problems**

As of March 1975, several patterns, both internal and external, could be discerned, but first one important point must be made. Afghanistan, like most developing countries in the Third World, has a natural resource which neither its foreign advisers nor its foreign-educated elite will permit it to utilize. That natural resource is time. Given the economic base of the country (agriculture-herding), the predominately rural (90%) nature of its population, plus massive non-literacy (90%), undirected rapid change will probably bring disaster.

Almost immediately after the coup d'etat, several visual manifestations, some misdirected, of the revolution hit the streets of Kabul. (Also important to remember is the fact that two Afghanistans exist: Kabul, and the rest of the countryside, and we have already seen what happened when the new district administrators were exposed to the countryside and vice-versa.)

Taxis were painted black and white almost overnight, and sported lighted TAXI signs in Dari and English on their roofs. TAXI also had to be stenciled with black paint on appropriate spots. Policemen with stencils and spray cans of black paint stopped taxis without the required markings and performed the task for the delinquents. The government insisted all footpaths adjacent to compound walls in residential sections be paved by their owners. Since effective, enforceable quality control and building codes are still lacking, however, each owner did his own thing, with predictable crumbly results in some areas, but a surprising number of sidewalks (in the view of the more virulent critics of the project) still exist.

Traffic islands and roundabouts complete with flowers attempted to channel Kabul's independent, often unruly drivers, into directions of movement. Tickets for traffic violations and even jaywalking were issued for the first time in large numbers.

The government encouraged jobless high school graduates (and the number grows annually) to attend the Police Academy and a new, professional breed of policeman with obvious esprit began to emerge.

The Kabul Municipality (forty one years old) collected and continues to collect millions of afghanis in back taxes, and the Construction Bank finally insisted that home-building loans be repaid.

A Central Statistical Office was founded - a major step in planning potential. Conciliation Councils to handle local ward problems were formed in Kabul on an experimental basis.

To try and hold down prices, the government agreed to subsidize petroleum-oil-lubricants, sugar and edible oils.

Some attempted reforms reach into somewhat dubious jurisdictions. For example the regulations forbidding kite-fighting (17) will probably be ignored, although the intent is noble: to prevent youngsters from falling off rooftops while concentrating on their duels.
The zeal of most new republican administrators is admirable, but often they lack foresight and experience. Several in the new elite were educated in the USSR or Eastern Bloc countries, where they were exposed to socialist theories, but never actually worked within the systems. Had they had such experience, they might better appreciate how implementation of plans deviates widely from theory.

Most ministries have been streamlined with varying degrees of effectiveness. According to one Kabul wit, "Some ministries have been streamlined to the point of stagnation."

The best source for the articulated goals of the Republic are still to be found in the speeches of President Daoud and the more than two dozen laws published in the Official Gazettes of the Ministry of Justice. Most of the president's speeches touched on common themes: promulgation of a mixed guided economy, the refusal to accept an ideological label other than Islam, and the ultimate creation of a constitutional, parliamentary, party-oriented system. Generally, the government promises a lot.

One of the president's more important speeches occurred the night of the first anniversary of the coup. His address on the second anniversary closely paralleled the first, and the time lag seemed to indicate continued in-fighting in the cabinet, and the ad-hoc constitutional committee. Possibly differences of opinion on the position of ideology - or lack of it - are still unreconciled. Or just probably the president is waiting until those he considers not wholeheartedly devoted to the ideals of the Republic have removed themselves - or have been removed - from the scene.

Many foreigners in Kabul criticized the president's first anniversary speech as "defensive," but in reality it was a national jirgah, held through the medium of radio, reminiscent of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "fireside chats." The speech, in my opinion, was not an apologia, but a typical Dari way of projecting the past into the future: Daoud was telling his audience what to expect. In another way of looking at it, it was a trial balloon.

The president read long excerpts from a series of letters he had written in 1964 to former King Mohammad Zahir, detailing his ideas for a new constitution. Probably the most important section concerns political parties, and would allow two parties after an initial one party election.

But the gap between articulation and implementation is still wide, especially in the educational and economic sectors. The problem of too many literates and too few jobs (overeducation, underemployment) is a familiar one in the developing world. Ultimately, no more jobs can be extracted from the burgeoning bureaucracy, for which the literates are basically trained. With the private business sector virtually stagnant and a diminution of foreign-assisted development programs, the number of urban unemployed increases annually. The attendant discontent is potentially dangerous to any government, be it republican or monarchal, and an explosion can result if the problem is not tackled with vigor and imagination.

The rapid development of the private enterprise sector has slowed down perceptibly for two reasons: [1] the regime early announced its espousal of a mixed, guided economy and tightened control on the free-wheeling private sector; [2] corrupt members of the private enterprise fraternity feared government action against them, and some fled the country. Others were brought to
trial, notably top officials of the Spinzar Cotton Company of Kunduz, and many received prison sentences and heavy fines.

Bazaar merchants cut back on orders from abroad, and much of the financial sector came to a virtual standstill. Western-trained economists predicted dire results but the balance-of-payments improved, as those exporters with clear records continued to export. Profits dropped, however, as hard-currency rates plummeted. With a new and tougher Domestic and Foreign Private Investment Law, however, the government hopes the private sector will revive.

In fact, the wealthy private sector can afford to ride out the crisis on the exorbitant profits made in the past. And we must remember that the countryside would be little affected.

What is really needed is a fair and equitable system of taxation. Attempts to collect back taxes, a good idea in theory, has sometimes resulted in new inequities. For example, several private sector companies have been told their back taxes would be computed on the current year's income, often on gross - and not net - income. Not surprisingly, some private companies have simply ceased to function, although they still exist on paper and can begin operations again as soon as an equitable tax system is instituted.

Another serious problem in the public domain is censorship. Few would question the right of a nation to legally censor items considered detrimental to survival, but would criticize the methods of implementation and the items selected for censorship. Few would argue with the need to screen carefully publications from foreign sources, especially propaganda from foreign countries. Slanted propaganda of all sorts of literature contrary to Islam, polemics against or tracts attempting to subvert the ideals of the Republic should be - and rightly so - vigorously scrutinized.

However, in my opinion, foreign works which try to assess honestly (within the capabilities and limitations of the individual scholars involved) patterns in Afghan history and culture deserve the attention and criticism of the Afghan literati, for who else will be able to read works in foreign languages? Let us consider the problem hypothetically, since statistical verification is currently impossible. Let us accept the most favorable (and probably too high) figure of 10% literacy. Of the 10%, what percentage can read foreign languages with sensitive comprehension? Shall we say a generous 4%? And how many of that 4% bother to include books (and not newspapers, novels, etc.) in a foreign language as a regular item in their intellectual diet? In any event, those who really want to read foreign language books do read them, and can easily have access to them through foreign friends.

Another problem deserves mention: cultural and historical genocide, the active censoring or suppression of books already published in Afghanistan. Shortly after the July 17 coup, a number of copies of An Historical Guide to Afghanistan (now out of print), by Nancy Hatch Dupree, published by the Afghan Air Authority, Afghan Tourist Organization, 1971, appeared in bookshops with sizeable paragraphs (all dealing with the life and achievements of ex-King Mohammad Zahir) marked out with a black felt pen. By holding the book to the light most of the offending material could be read. After it was pointed out to those responsible that such blatant censorship would give Afghanistan an international black eye, new tactics were adopted.

The remaining copies of An Historical Guide to Kabul, 2nd Ed., also by Nancy
Hatch Dupree, same publisher, 1972, were placed under lock and key and cannot be sold to tourists.

One simple example will illustrate the fallacy of trying to pretend that certain historical events did not occur. Although references to former King Mohammad Zahir (1933-1973) are being deleted from publications, he did reign for 40 years, longest reign of any modern Asian monarch. That is a simple statement of fact; interpretations of his contributions will obviously vary. But if his 40 years are to be denied, what will Afghanistan do with the 1953-1963 dynamic period of Daoud's first prime ministership? History cannot be erased, only rewritten. It cannot be suppressed, only driven underground to become folklore, and a potential danger.

I would suggest that those who disagree with the facts publish their corrected versions. I would further suggest that those Afghans who disagree with interpretations publish rebuttals. For, in my opinion, the economic state of affairs (especially in the non-agricultural sphere) of the Republic is less important than its intellectual state of mind, which cannot help but be stunted in its attitudinal growth unless a relatively free forum exists in several forms. The active free press faded away with the advent of the Republic, but a relatively free press governed by a law which prohibits individual libel and public subversion is essential. A free press is often the opiate of the literati, but also serves as a safety valve. Without such a safety valve, rumors proliferate, facts become distorted, and tensions, usually anti-government in essence rise. In a developing free society, probably true subversion can be more easily spotted than in tightly censored societies which drive even the mildest opposition underground.

A free Kabul University and the publication of books by Afghan scholars (and the group ever expands) which objectively view history and culture will enhance the Republic in the eyes of those whose minds are free. I believe that 99.44% of the literati still support the ideals of the Republic as articulated by the Head of State, and an honest discussion of the past can only intensify this support. But Republics are governed by men and not by ideals, and many still in positions of power crucify the ideals of the Republic in the name of the Republic.

The External Factors: The Region and the World

The stone of Afghan foreign policy, bi-tarafi, non-alignment, developed under the first decade of Daoud, and remains the pattern. The initial tilt toward the USSR after the July 17 coup was more apparent than real. It was intended to assure the Soviets that the new regime wished to resume its balancing act which had swung somewhat Westward toward the end of the constitutional period.

Many nations and institutions (UNDP, World Bank, Asia Foundation, CARE-MEDICO, etc.) continue to assist Afghanistan's development programs. The patterns of four (USSR, USA, India, Iran) deserve some specific attention.

The Soviet Union remains Afghanistan's most important trading and aiding partner. Probably the most significant current pattern is the flow of Afghan natural gas to the USSR, which constitutes about 16% of Afghanistan's total exports, and about 40% of its exports to the USSR. The Soviets, although they did agree to a cost increase from 19.5¢/1000 cubic feet to 34¢, still obtain the gas at well below the world market price. The Afghans have little choice in the matter,
however, for the export of the gas helps repay Soviet loans. To help ease the repayment problems of the new Republic, the USSR recently called a five year moratorium on debt repayment, but, even without additional loans debt servicing will soon constitute about 40% of Afghanistan's total exports by value.

Western nations have given Afghanistan no debt relief because the country enjoys a favorable balance-of-payments. In 1973-74, a balance of $13.5 million remained after debt servicing, $6 million in balance with the USSR. In addition, the Afghans have a monetary reserve of $69 million, including $38 million in gold valued at the official rate, $150 million at current open world market prices. Afghanistan owes Western nations only about $5 million annually, and these repayments are not expected to become crucial until about 1980.

American aid, slowly withering for years, received an initial boost under the new congressional guidelines for foreign assistance programs. Currently, American aid tends to concentrate on education, public health, family guidance, population, demography, and, after a pull out over a year ago, new assistance to the Hilmand-Arghandab Valley Authority, long associated with less than success. The recent involvement came about after Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Kabul in November, 1974, when the Afghans convinced him that the HAVA was an "unfinished American symphony."

The education programs primarily concern the Teachers College Columbia University Textbook and Curriculum Project and a $3 million grant to Kabul University Faculties of Agriculture, Engineering and Education (now absorbed into the Faculty of Letters). The Afghans requested (and AID approved) the University of Nebraska at Omaha as the US contracting agent, primarily because of the presence of the new Afghanistan Studies Center at UNO. The two universities (KU and UNO) are exchanging professors and over 40 Afghans will become M.A. and PhD. candidates under the program.

India, a major commercial partner for centuries, has greatly expanded its efforts in Afghanistan in recent years. India assists in the development of the Kabul Industrial Park (a private investment area for new factories), and the Ghorband irrigation project. An Afghan-Indian Joint Economic Commission is considering a wide range of potential projects, particularly in the following fields: agriculture and irrigation, mines and industries, education and rural development.

The Indians have greatly intensified their efforts in education and related fields. More Indian teachers will teach in Kabul University and other schools. A plethora of scholarships have been offered to Afghan students at all levels, as well as support for the new national archives and various archaeological projects. At Bamiyan, Indian archaeologists have given new life to one of the great wonders of the ancient world. They have repaired the Little Buddha, and are now at work on the Big Buddha (53 meters high). While repairing the Little Buddha, the Indians discovered that its height is 38, not 35, meters as previously reported. In addition the Indian team cleaned most of the darkened, smoke-plastered caves and cells, uncovering many new startlingly beautiful paintings of the Buddhist period. The Indians will also repair the 16th century Khwaja Parsa mosque in Balkh, and begin new excavations at the site of Bagram near Kapisa, north of Kabul.

Indian efforts in Afghanistan will probably increase in direct proportion to the heat generated in Indo-Pakistani confrontations. India might eventually
even replace the USSR as Afghanistan's most important neighbor. Since the coup, Afghanistan has already sent a number of military officers to India for advanced training, and Indian officers familiar with covert warfare have worked in Afghanistan.

At first, it appeared that the Hilmand Water Treaty with Iran might become a casualty of the coup, even though Iran was one of the first nations to recognize the new Republic. As soon as the Shah of Iran realized that the Russians had not been behind the coup, relations warmed immediately. The two neighbors signed a development agreement on June 24, 1974 envisioning the following projects: completion of the Yakchal-Desho road in the southwest, which will ultimately link with the new port of Bandar Abbas; a railroad from Kabul to Islam Qala via Kandahar and Herat; the construction of sugar factories, cement plants, wool processing plants, textile factories and a paper mill; strengthen the Afghan export promotion bank; establish experimental livestock breeding and fattening farms. More important, the two countries agreed to develop jointly the water resources of the lower Hilmand valley, which removed the single important bone of contention between them, and revived the previous treaty. The Iranians allotted $10 million for feasibility surveys, and eventually total grants and loans may reach between $1-2 billion. Iran (along with India) will also sell Afghanistan buses, and Iran will continue to supply 40% of Afghanistan's petroleum product requirements at favored-nation low prices. Most of the rest of Afghanistan's petroleum needs are met by the USSR, also at low prices.

Two potential threats to peace continue to haunt Afghanistan and its neighbors: "Pushtunistan" and the Warm Water War.

This paper is not the place to go into the details of the "Pushtunistan" issue and a vast literature, both official and non-official exists. (24) Both sides (Afghanistan and Pakistan) hold fairly straightforward political positions. The Afghans claim the Durand Line of 1893 was never intended to be an international boundary, but a line to delineate zones of influence for the maintenance of law-and-order. The Pakistanis claim they inherited the position of the British in 1947, when Pakistan became independent. The British position, officially, was that the Line constituted an international boundary, a position not totally agreed with by several British authorities. (25)

Ultimately, however, the Afghans demanded the right of the Pushtun to vote for a government of their choice in a free election. Pakistan held free elections in 1970-71, and the Afghans were mollified by the results, which were, unfortunately, nullified by Pakistani government actions in 1973, before the coup in Kabul. "Pushtunistan exists," said the Afghans, "no matter what you call it. The people, in a free election, have spoken." (Incidentally, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, as president of Pakistan after the Bangladesh debacle, stated, in early 1972, that he had no objection if the North-West Frontier Province changed its name to "Pushtunistan." No such change was suggested by the ruling party, the National Awami Party (NAP) of N-WFP, which governed in an uneasy coalition with the Islamic-oriented Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islami (JUI). NAP, led by Khan Abdul Wali Khan (son of the Frontier Gandhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) is considered socialist-oriented, and has strength only in N-WFP and Baluchistan; NAP triumphed, though narrowly, in both. (26)

Responding to Mr. Bhutto's charisma, all Pakistani political parties agreed to approve the new constitution in April 1973, which recognized the principle of regional autonomy for the four provinces: Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province. Under the constitution, President Bhutto became Prime Minister Bhutto.
Even before the approval of the constitution, however, several events occurred which threatened Pakistan's internal stability. Haunted by memories of Bangladesh and alarmed at what appeared to be growing attempts by the Baluchistan and N-WFP Provincial Assemblies to overstep allowable prerogatives under the Interim Constitution, Bhutto Sahib dismissed the Baluchistan provincial cabinet, arrested influential NAP leaders, who also happened to be leaders of the Marri, Mengal and Bizenjo Baluch tribal elements. That was in February 1973, and the arrested NAP leaders are still in jail.

The NAP-JUI coalition government in the N-WFP resigned in protest, as it had threatened to do. Again selective arrests of N-WFP NAP leaders and staggered bye-elections eventually gave the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Bhutto a majority in the provincial assembly. Because the opposition often boycotted the sessions, the PPP easily had its own way.

Judiciously handled bye-elections gave the PPP a shaky majority in Baluchistan. Since the PPP held substantial majorities in the Punjab and Sind Provincial Assemblies, some in the opposition accused Bhutto of wanting to establish a one-party state as a prelude to one-man rule.

In spite of the above steps, the Afghans did not immediately step up their anti-Pakistan propaganda even after the coup, although Daoud did refer to "Pushtunistan" as the only problem with a neighboring country.

This situation drastically changed after the Lahore Summit Conference of Islamic States in February 1974, when A.R. Pazhwak (Afghan Ambassador to India, and Special Envoy to the Conference) made reference to the "Pushtunistan" problem. Bhutto, in the Chair, shrewdly let President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and President Houari Boumediene of Algeria publicly rebuke Pazhwak for bringing up differences between Islamic states when the purpose of the conference was to consider Arab-Israeli problems. After the conference, Mohammad Naim as (Special Envoy) and Deputy Foreign Minister Waheed Abdullah presented the Afghan case quite effectively to Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, relating the entire "Pushtunistan" problem to the unsolved boundary legacies of British imperialism.

In the meantime, intraparty squabbles continued in Punjab and Sind, many called for new elections, which might have muted Afghan demands for "a peaceful solution to the problem through self-determination." But Bhutto Sahib stated he would serve out his term.

An armed revolt, which grew out of the February 1973 dismissals and arrests, intensified in Baluchistan, and was followed by a campaign of terrorism in the North-West Frontier Province. The Pakistanis insist the Afghans have established camps to train saboteurs, and the Afghans stepped up retaliatory propaganda over Radio Afghanistan. Radio Pakistan escalated its propaganda.

Prime Minister Bhutto made several trips to Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province, and mingled freely with Pushtun and Baluch tribesmen. His themes seldom varied: We are your friends; you are Pakistanis first; your government will help you develop; the sadari - or tribal - system is bad and must go; the Afghans are behind all our troubles on the frontier; if they don't stop, we shall take appropriate action. Bhutto Sahib declared several times that that peace existed in the N-WFP and Baluchistan, and, at the same time, asked Marri and Mengal "pockets" of resistance to come down from the hills or else. He pointed out that he could travel safely among his tribal friends whereas Daoud
could not safely leave Kabul. In fact, however, Bhutto Sahib could walk from Chitral to Baluchistan in safety for two reasons: in the tribal areas, he would be a guest and no one would (without being disgraced) violate the code of the hills by killing a guest; secondly, if Bhutto were assassinated, the tribal khans know the army and air force would wipe them out.

Bhutto may go to the frontier, but the frontier comes to Daoud, who had intimate relations with the frontier tribes since he was military governor in the eastern provinces over 40 years ago. Even as prime minister from 1953-63, Daoud seldom left Kabul. Now he receives khans almost daily from both sides of the Durand Line, some of whom had been cheering for Bhutto on the Pakistan side.

One theme of Bhutto's did strike at a sensitive Afghan nerve: the problem of regionalism and tribalism in Afghanistan. Bhutto had witnessed (and must bear some of the responsibility for) the devastating effects of thwarted desires for regional autonomy (i.e., the creation of Bangladesh), and he also viewed the recent demands for regional autonomy (not independence) in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province as simply preludes to breakaway movements and, as such, threats to national unity. In his speeches along the frontier, Bhutto pointed out that the Afghans have an even more complex ethnolinguistic picture than Pakistan, and issued veiled (and not so veiled) threats that two could play the game of stirring up trouble among minority groups.

Because of this, the Afghan government began a campaign to play down the existence of such minorities in Afghanistan. Everyone in the country, so the policy insists, are Afghans, and no such groups as Tajik, Uzbak, Hazara, Aimaq, Turkoman, Baluch, Kirghiz, Nuristani, Qizilbash, etc.) exist. These non-Pushtun groups collectively constitute about one-half of Afghanistan's population, and to them (mainly rural and non-literate), a Pushtun is an Afghan and vice-versa.

In my opinion, the Afghan attempt to foster nationalism through denying the existence - or at least the importance - of separate ethnolinguistic units is a step in the wrong direction. Ethnolinguistic, regional, tribal - whatever one wishes to call them - units are positive institutions, often misinterpreted by Westerners and Western-educated Afghans. They function with delicate networks of reciprocal social, economic, and political rights and obligations, which the central government cannot replace. It could, however, link horizontally into these regional systems as they continue to function vertically, and gradually foster integration with the nation-state. Demands for regional autonomy are not necessarily steps toward demands for independence, unless central governments try to suppress them totally by using military force, as happened in Bangladesh.(28) To most peoples, regional autonomy means the acceptance by others of their linguistic and cultural identities - not economic and political independence. Pakistan is currently trying to find a formula to solve such problems - though not successfully as of this writing.

Afghanistan may have a new republican regime but it still operates with the same old medieval administrative system. Twenty-six provinces dot the landscape, instead of the pre-coup 28: Kunar has been absorbed by Ningrahahr; "Kapiša by Parwan.

To achieve integration without destroying ethnolinguistic group pride, one might divide Afghanistan into about seven units, based on geography, ecology, culture - with a bias toward river systems. Naturally, the zones could not

Each of the provinces would have a minister (not a governor appointed by the Ministry of Interior) appointed by the Prime Minister. All provincial ministries would be flown to Kabul for the weekly cabinet meetings. They would hold cabinet rank, directly under a Deputy Minister for Development. Back in their capitals the provincial ministers would begin implementing decisions still warm from the cabinet meeting. The Deputy Minister for Development would remain in Kabul to protect his provincial ministers from the Deputy Minister for Administration and regular cabinet. Such a system would create competition - and development may result. Naturally, practical adjustments would have to be made as such a system of dyarchy began to function, but an alternative to the present perpetuative bureaucracy is needed - and soon.

To bring about such an administrative revolution, many of the old-line technocrats and intelligentsia, put to pasture by the present regime, would have to be reactivated. Most want to work for the regime, but few have been permitted to do so. They are a valuable resource which the Republic should not ignore. A marriage between the young revolutionaries and the technocrats does not seem impossible, particularly after the president feels he has paid off his political debts to those who actively participated in the coup - or he feels strong enough (i.e., full control of the armed services) to replace those not in tune with the Republic he has in mind.

In February 1975, the assassination of Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, Senior Minister in the North-West Frontier Province cabinet and close friend of Prime Minister Bhutto, brought back quick action from Bhutto. He dissolved the NAP, arrested NAP's leaders, seized the party's assets, and accused NAP of plotting with a "foreign power", i.e. Afghanistan. The legality of Bhutto's move is now being debated before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, a body known for its scrupulous impartiality.

The Warm Water War, an extension of the USA-USSR great power confrontations into the Indian Ocean, involves all the nations which touch the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. The American move into the area was prompted by the Soviet bases (or at least facilities) in east Africa and southern Arabia, and the maintenance of a permanent sizeable Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean. The Americans plan to build a major naval air base on the island of Diego Garcia, a British possession. Iran is rapidly developing the region's most potent arsenal of modern, sophisticated weapons systems, ground, naval and air. Indications are that Iran may be becoming simply an American staging area, to enable US forces to strike either east or west if the energy crisis proves unsolvable by peaceful means. In addition, the new American agreement to assist the Pakistanis militarily has upset the Afghans (and Indians), although both Afghans and Indians have been primarily armed by the Soviets for two decades without letup. Iraq has also been the recipient of Soviet weaponry in large quantities.

The possible alignments take on intriguing aspects. Turkey, because of its disenchantment with the West (especially the USA), has been looking toward the east and Iran. The Iranians, miffed by Bhutto's invitation to Colonel M. Gaddafi of Libya to attend the Lahore Conference as his personal guest and Pakistan's wooing of Persian Gulf Emirates, have embraced the new Afghan
Republic in close friendship. India is becoming more friendly with Iran and finds itself, like the British in the 19th century, drawn toward Central Asia. How the Russians view this backyard encroachment by a friendly nation remains to be seen.

Another potential, although more remote, alignment would be possible if Pakistan and Afghanistan could agree on the "Pushtunistan" issue, creating a corridor with the Indus River as its nexus, and serving as a counter to powerful Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean potential rivals, Iran and India. But the status of the tribes on either side of the Durand Line of 1893 remains an unsettled and explosive issue. The main problem at this point in time, however, lies in Islamabad, not Kabul.

The current scene reminds one of the Indian Moghul-Persian Safavid rivalry in the 17th-18th centuries, when the zone between Kandahar and Kabul was the major bone of contention, or the 19th century when the British, poised on the Indus River, looked toward Central Asia. Now, most eyes focus on the Indian Ocean, and regional and local conflicts from Turkey to India will ultimately relate to the development of the Warm Water War. All the great powers have a stake in the game, and Afghanistan, a strategic linchpin many times in the past, once again finds itself an unenviable middleman.

FOOT NOTES

1. The author wishes to thank the American Universities Field Staff for permission to utilize material from his: A Note on Afghanistan, AUFs Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, vol. 18, no. 8, September 1974.

2. Louis Dupree is AUFs Associate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and an Adjunct Professor of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University.


15. For details, see L. Dupree, footnote 1. The account is my interpretation garnered from official and non-official sources. Only the future will reveal actually what happened - inshallah! I alone am responsible for the facts and fantasies in the paper.


18. Two volumes have been published by the Ministry of Information and Culture.


26. **Official election results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Coalition</th>
<th>North-West Frontier</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan People's Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Council)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML (Convention)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML (Qayyum Group)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP (Wali Khan Group)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI (Hazarvi Group)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama'at Islami</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP (Pukhtunkhwa)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan United Front</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. Speech by Pazhwak left out of Report on Islamic Summit, 1974, Pakistan, Lahore, February 22-24, 1974, Ministry of Information, Broadcasting, Auqaf and Haj, Government of Pakistan. However, a photo of Prime Minister Bhutto with Pazhwak is included (p.240); on p. 255, several quotes from The Kabul Times favorable to the conference appear.
