Islam and Ethnicity: The Northern Afghanistan Perspective

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The forced migration of Uzbek- and Tajik-speaking peoples from their "homeland" in Soviet Central Asia during the 19th and 20th centuries intensified hostility to Russia. Their subsequent experience in Afghanistan also led to hostility toward the Pashtuns, an ethnic group perceived as politically and economically dominant there. Recent political developments in Afghanistan, particularly the 1979 Soviet invasion, are likely to occasion further hostility from the Uzbeks and Tajiks. The form such hostility is likely to take can, however, be understood only if the nature of the complex network of responses to past repression is first established.

This paper will explore the historical background of the Uzbek-Tajik experience to demonstrate a long and continuing tradition of resistance toward dominant groups in both ideological, specifically religious, and ethnic terms. The analysis proceeds from a consideration of the historical response to the Russo/Soviets in Central Asia to the recent native interpretation of that response and modern attitudes toward the Soviet Union. The Uzbek-Tajik response to the Pashtuns is similarly approached for the light it sheds on the sharply focused response that is evident currently. Data for the interpretation developed here, including ethnohistoric and sociological materials, were collected during 1976-77 in Kunduz, a provincial capital in northern Afghanistan.

The population under study was primarily of Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan origin. Most were settled in the Afghan towns of Imam Sahib, Khanabad, Kunduz, Baghlan, and Kabul, the Afghan capital. As Slobin (1976:12) has noted, these emigrants are known as muhajerin, a term sometimes translated as "refugees". My informants generally agreed that it was technically correct to call some Turkmen, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Arabs, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, muhajerin, since all these groups included some who had come into Afghanistan in the past 35-100 years. However, the consensus was that except for a
particular Uzbek-Tajik sub-group, other groups should be called by their appropriate ethnic names. This analysis, while restricted to the Uzbek-Tajik sub-group, is nevertheless likely to be relevant to other immigrant populations.

HISTORICAL RESPONSE TO THE RUSSO/SOVIETS

The autonomous Central Asian state of Kokand surrendered to the Russians in 1876. That khanate, which included the Fergana Valley, was abolished and renamed Russian Turkestan. Russian Turkestan was constituted a governate-general and placed under military administration. Beginning in 1885, the local population expressed hostility for their conquerors through sporadic uprisings. Usually led by religious leaders, the revolts were couched in the idiom of “holy war” against the “infidels” (Carrere d'Encause, 1967: 163).

The American traveller Schuyler's visit to a sufi meeting in Samarkand indicates the millenarian and messianic role these religious orders played in native uprisings against the Russians. At that time sufis were forbidden to give public sermons.

When I was about to go the chief addressed me a petition saying that this establishment of dervishes had been founded long ago for pious uses; that it was devoted to the reception of the poor, the sick and the blind, and of persons who had no other refuge and that the only means they had to support it was by taking contributions from the faithful throughout the city. They begged me therefore to represent to the authorities the religious and charitable objects they had in view and to request that they might be allowed as before to recite their prayers and to preach their sermons in public . . . I told the prefect afterwards of the request . . . which he was not at all astonished to hear; but he said, that however they might deny it, instances of their treasonable language were only too well proved because officers, frequently in passing by unobserved, had heard parts of their sermons which usually consist of the narration of some old legend where the people were enslaved by the infidel on account of their irreligious life and practices; and end with an appeal to repentances saying that thus the infidel may be driven away . . . (Schuyler, 1877, 1:258).

While the prefect complains about the use of religious ideology for political purposes, thus separating the two, the content of the sermon he reports indicates that for the sufis and their followers, there is no such division. Religious activism is political activism.

The connection between religion and nationalism remained firmly
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established as the report of Kukhovsky, governor-general of Russian Turkestan after the 1898 Andijan revolt, shows:

I am forced to the conclusion that this area is far from peaceful; that the embers of religious and national hatred for their conquerors, skillfully concealed by gratitude for the material benefits brought into the area, were ready at the first opportunity to burst into flames... Our widespread lack of interest in Islam which is a very stable and certainly hostile force should be considered harmful to Russian interests... (in Wheeler, 1964:89).

Islam is thus explicitly linked with politics—“national hatred”—in the hostility toward the Russians and their policies.

Although Russian Turkestan, the homeland of the population under study, had few Russian settlers, it was still liable to economic exploitation as a colonial territory. A monocrop economy in cotton was set up. The area under cotton cultivation grew from 13,200 hectares in 1886 to 597,200 hectares in 1914 (Rywkin, 1963:29), with disastrous results for other types of agricultural production. Russian Turkestan then had to import grain from other parts of Russia. In 1916 the Tsarist government decided to draft Muslims into labour units to aid the World War I effort. However, a revolt flared in Kazakhstan and spread quickly to the area around Samarkand and to the Fergana Valley, the heaviest cotton-growing area. Evidently, the uprisings were seriously disrupting the economy, and following a conference held by Kuropatkin, governor-general of Russian Turkestan, natives who were taking part in the revolt were expelled and their lands opened to immediate Russian settlement. Although the number of refugees who came to Afghanistan will never be known, substantial migration had begun.

Similarly patterned local guerilla uprisings in Central Asia continued after the downfall of the Tsarist government and during the period of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. The Russians called the native participants Basmachis, which meant bandits or brigands. This word, supposedly from the Turkic verb basmak, to raid, was said to be used in the area (Rywkin, 1963:51).² However, the Basmachis were more than a bandit organization; they were, in modern terms, a movement of national liberation. The struggle took on even broader significance with the use of a pan-Turkic and sometimes pan-Islamic idiom.

In East Bukhara where the former Emir and his Basmachis supporters gathered, the situation was dramatically heightened by the arrival of Enver Pasha (still remembered in northern Afghanistan as Anwar Pasha, the Central Asian form of his name). Enver had
been the leading figure in the Young Turk triumvirate in Turkey. Condemned to death by the government of Kemal Ataturk, he escaped to Germany, and in 1920 went to Moscow hoping the Bolsheviks would prove allies in a personal campaign against British imperialism. The Bolsheviks hoped to use Enver's prestige in the Islamic world to win over Central Asian Muslims. A closer acquaintance with the Bolsheviks, including the Soviet treaty with Ataturk in March 1921, made Enver switch allegiance to the Basmachis. Early in August, with a group of 25 men, he came upon a Russian force of 300. After hand-to-hand combat, he was killed by a machine gun bullet fired by a Russian from a rock above the gorge. It is reported that 15-20,000 people gathered at his funeral (Caroe, 1967:125). Enver's alliance with the Basmachis indicates that a local uprising had begun to take on wider political importance. However, the pan-Turkic alliance died with Enver.

By 1922, Soviet authorities understood that military measures were most effective when connected to political and economic concessions. In the Fergana Valley, Soviet forces prevented contact between town and countryside. Food was imported into the towns, but the Basmachis and the peasants suffered famine. The Basmachis were forced to extort food from the peasantry, thereby, losing one of their strongest weapons, the support of the local population. Many of the local Basmachi leaders together with small groups of followers fled across the Afghan border. From Afghanistan they periodically continued to raid Soviet territory. Stories about these groups, including the legendary Ibrahim bek who had been captured in 1931, were still told in the late 1970s.

During the period of the Basmachi movements, Bolshevik authorities sought to introduce a number of major economic and social programmes which would have fundamentally altered traditional Central Asian society. Because of the chaotic situation that prevailed until the late 1920s, collectivization of agriculture, educational and legal reform, and anti-religious agitation were postponed. The period 1928-38 marked the resurgence of these activities.

A two-stage process of sovietization of Central Asia emerges from the preceding discussion. Stage one, from 1917-28, is basically a continuation of Russian colonial rule and native reaction to it. Although there was economic chaos because of guerilla warfare, Muslim society as a whole had not yet been disrupted. Stage two, the period of rapid change, complete collectivization, secularization of education and the courts, the increasing pressure against Islam, and finally, the liquidation of all remaining pre-revolutionary Turkestanian intellectuals, began in the late 1920s and ended with World War II.

Corresponding to this two-stage sovietization process, people
who fled across the Soviet borders may be divided into two groups. In the earlier period, Basmachi sympathizers, dispossessed peasants, and victims of famine formed the majority of those seeking refuge in Afghanistan and Chinese Turkestan. Some of these people returned to the Soviet Union when the war-related disruption was over. Although Soviet sources do not acknowledge the existence of groups that stayed behind in Afghanistan, some obviously did stay. They generally founded new villages or joined old ones, becoming agriculturists as they had been before. They retained tribal names by which they identified themselves, generally not using the term muhajerin.

After 1928, those who crossed the Afghan border were usually of urban origin. They moved to the Afghan towns near the border, but they say they did not seek to become landowners in Afghanistan. One informant expressed the failure to acquire land as the result of conscious decisionmaking. “We did not want to buy land; why take the risk.” The implication that the land might have to be abandoned again points to continuing remembrance of forced removal from the “homeland”. It is also post-1928 arrivals in Afghanistan who generally use the term muhajerin in referring to themselves.

While the collectivization campaign in Central Asia may have played some role in convincing these people to leave, their own perception is that they left for the sake of maintaining their religious traditions. One old man said, “As a boy one day the police stopped me on the way to the mosque, and took me to the station. Finally, I couldn’t stand the life there anymore.” In fact, the Soviet war against Islam began in the late 1920s (Bennigsen, 1967: 165), reinforcing the increasing role religious-based ideology played in decisions to leave Soviet Central Asia. The story of Turcologist G. Jarring’s informant Ahmad Jan is relevant here. Ahmad Jan was from the village of Qilich near Kasan in the Fergana Valley. In 1934 at age 20 he ran away from his village, spent some time in Afghanistan, and then made his way to Kashmir where Jarring met him. Though a peasant himself, his father was a mullah who, according to Jarring, five years earlier “had left his native country owing to the persecution of the Mohammedan clergy by the anti-religious leagues” (1937b: 5). Thus, the anti-religious policy of the Soviets increased the number of emigrants.

In examining social forces that work toward success or failure of particular social movements, the indigenous response in Central Asia offers a complex yet illuminating example of partial success and ultimate failure. Eisenstadt, in dealing with social reform movements in regard to Islamic groups throughout the world, notes that they are most often successful when operating as political minorities working
against a colonial oppressor (Eisenstadt, 1967:446). There is no question that the focus on a particular oppressor group gave the Basmachi movement much of its strength. Chokaev, the leader of the short-lived Kokand autonomous government in Russian Turkestan states, “For the Soviet Power appeared at first in Turkestan as a Power whose ‘colonial’ severity was exceptional, and in fact, unprecedented in history . . . In this . . . (is) the only and undisputed cause of the birth of the Basmachi movement among the Muslims” (1928:275). In addition, this analysis has shown that the response to Russian policies in the Tsarist and Soviet periods was expressed in religious as well as nationalistic terms.

In the late 1970s, there were many who remembered the life in the Central Asian “homeland”. Their experiences were known to all ethnic groups across northern Afghanistan, and resistance to the Russian presence in Central Asia was widely celebrated in sayings and tales.

The response to the Russians by each Central Asian ethnic group involved some variation on the pattern of local revolt and escape across national or geographical boundaries. The response should be viewed as an adaptive pattern carefully attuned to the changing economic, social, and ideological circumstances of individuals and groups. Social change emanating from Russo/Soviet policy and practice was perceived as a threat to traditional lifestyles. Response to this threat developed from traditional population movements and traditional raiding/guerilla tactics.

MODERN RESPONSES TO THE SOVIET UNION

When asked about their history, informants gave two different types of responses. Younger Afghan-born men would speak of the Basmachis as heroes, citing a few old men in the community who had actually been with the Basmachis and even Enver Pasha. Conversely, older informants sometime referred to the Basmachis as bad Muslims who did not repent of their behaviour and rely on God’s will. There may well be two different ethno-historic interpretations of the collective past, split, at least partially, along generational lines. (For discussion of the transformation of the muhajerin religious identity to a political and ethnic identity, see Shalinsky 1979a).

Clearly, at least a portion of the Uzbek-Tajik immigrant group had engaged in some kind of anti-Russian or anti-Soviet activity before coming to Afghanistan. Direct participation in armed conflict was not the only response perceived as anti-Russian. Particularly in the 1930s, continued religious observance, mosque attendance and prayer were also perceived as political acts. In fact, these immigrants
believe their fellow ethnics who remained in the Soviet Union even today continue to make this type of response to Soviet authority.

Many older informants were reluctant to talk about their own pasts. Perhaps increased fear of strangers and governments arose during the years of World War II when there was a final attempt to regain the lost homeland. Allegedly financed by the Germans, a network of couriers was set up from Andkhoi to Badakhshan through which people passed information and were prepared to invade the Soviet Union. The plan was that with the aid of a huge potential fifth column of relatives, friends, and fellow ethnics, the homeland could be retaken. The Germans promised arms, which were not delivered. The *muhajerin* were deeply involved in the planning and operation of this movement. High level leaders of this underground were imprisoned by the Afghan government after the war, because, they believe, of pressure from the Soviet Union. No source contains any mention of these events apart from a cryptic statement by Caroe, "There was talk on the Peshawar border of the continuance of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941" (1967:101).

Families in Afghanistan had very little contact with relatives in the Soviet Union until the early 1970s. Since that time, letters have been exchanged and visits also have taken place. The few honored visitors who have come from the Soviet Union to see relatives in Afghanistan have been elderly though they were accompanied by younger middle-aged kin. They were lavishly entertained by the community and received numerous gifts including prayer cloths and Saudi Arabian wall hangings, a prestigious item. Some Afghan-born men, including one man selected as a scholarship student to an engineering institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, had the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union. The visits by these young men were deprecated by elders in the community who pronounced the return to the Soviet Union a sin.

The young men brought back records, tapes, and books in the Uzbek language. They spoke of the material progress in Uzbekistan mentioning hospitals, schools, and universities, but the major topics of conversation dealt with the similarities and differences of Uzbek customs north and south of the Amu. It seems that the visits by young men to the Soviet Union fostered Uzbek nationalism rather than Soviet politicization. Still, the elders were not convinced that the visits were good for the individuals or the community. The mother of the engineering student asked for help in attempting to dissuade her other son, who wanted to visit his brother and gain materials for his radio repair shop.

Later this man obtained permission to visit his brother in Tashkent,
and one day the Tashkent brother returned to his room to find him murdered. No one in the emigrant community believed he was killed by a thief. The feeling was that, for some reason, the Russians murdered him. This inexplicable incident deepened the fear and hatred felt towards the Soviet government. Approximately nine months after this event, the Soviet-backed Khalq revolution took place.

In spite of the immigrant generation’s reluctance to speak of the past and their view that returning to the Soviet Union is a sin, their attachment to their watan, or homeland, remained strong. When asked about qawm, or ethnic identity, muhajer individuals of the immigrant generation identified with relatively small groups such as Namanganis, Kokandis, Andijanis, after towns of origin in the Soviet Union. These town labels were attached to the personal name as an identifying feature. Members of the first Afghan-born generation did not differ from their parents in their use of Central Asian towns as personal names. Never did anyone indicate that he was to be called after an Afghan town. Occasionally, a young person, usually under 20 years of age, would vehemently insist that Afghanistan was the watan. But their parents would correct them and say that the watan was Shurawi, the Soviet Union. Sometimes, the reference made was to Tajikistan which is used to mean all Soviet Central Asia (Slobin, 1976:9). The most common response given when identity questions were asked the muhajerin was the simple explanation “from the other side” which refers to the other side of the Amu river.

The above examples indicate that attachment to the “homeland” in the Soviet Union remained strong as did feelings for fellow ethnics and relatives who remained behind. However, it was wrong to return, because the Soviets themselves were still usurpers and the Soviet government was hated and feared for its actions past and present.

**HISTORIC REACTION TO THE PASHRUNS**

The muhajerin, and perhaps, the pan-northern, attitude to the Pashtuns is based on two different factors; the movement of the Pashtuns to the north part of Afghanistan and their local-dwelling descendants, and the perceived Pashtun dominance of Afghanistan’s national culture. These two factors are fused by informants who lump all Pashtuns into one category at the ideological level.

In the second half of the 19th century, Amir Dost Mohammed firmly established Kabul’s control of the area to the north of the Hindu Kush Mountains. Simultaneous with the influx of muhajerin in the 1920s, the province of Kataghan, including the modern provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan and Takhor, entered a period of great
economic development based on cotton production. In 1925, a young Pashtun, Abdul Aziz, discovered that the Soviet Union needed cotton. Realizing that Kataghan had a similar climate to the cotton lands in Soviet Central Asia, he bought land in the Kunduz area which he cleared, drained and planted with cotton. The conversion of swampland to one of the most agriculturally productive areas in Afghanistan was aided by Nadir Shah who took the Afghan throne in 1929 and discovered an empty treasury. He induced many Pashtun landlords to buy land in the Kunduz area at about a dollar an acre (N. Dupree, 1966:101-2). The governor of Kataghan, Shir Khan Nashir, even decided to move his capital from Khanabad to Kunduz.

The growth of the new Kunduz attracted many of the muhajerin from Khanabad. They bought shops in the new bazaar and were able to get prime locations. The central circle in the bazaar mentioned by Jarring (1937a), contains the chapan-s-selling shops, and all but three of these 25-plus shops are still owned by a muhajer. At first, many lived on bandar-i Khanabad, the section of town along the route to Khanabad. While at that location, three from the town of Kasan in the Fergana Valley decided to form their own mahalla or neighbourhood.

The initial local conflict with the Pashtuns arose from the desire to buy land. Surveying the grassland surrounding new Kunduz, the Kasanis decided on a particular portion near a canal owned by a kinsman of Shir Khan. Reluctant to sell his pasture, this man dismissed the Kasanis with the offer to sell at one thousand afghanis a jerib (a jerib = approximately half an acre). According to informants, the price asked was about five times the going rate, but to the man’s surprise, the Kasanis eventually agreed to the first price and bought 14 jeribs for their mahalla. The official land deed is still held by the Kasani founders of the neighbourhood.

This action might seem to contradict the previously cited opinion that muhajerin generally did not seek to own land. However, the financial difficulty arising from this small purchase may simply supply the event that led to later rationalization in ideological terms. Furthermore, informants cited land disputes between Pashtuns and Uzbek villagers which included pitched battles.

MODERN REACTION TO THE PASHTUNS

Among the younger male segment of the muhajer community, the response to the perceived Pashtun dominance has been the development of Uzbek nationalistic feeling. Muhajer informants who used the Uzbek label when asked their qawm were Afghan-born men frequently with a high school education. The broader experience in
interaction with outsiders led to a heightened political consciousness in many cases. It was these men who formed study groups and literary groups for Uzbek language work. They purchased records and tapes of classical Central Asian music, originally obtained in the Soviet Union. Probably only these men had significant knowledge of the Khalq-Parcham parties before the 1978 revolution.

One of the men who identified himself as an Uzbek told me that during the period he attended Kabul University, 1967-71, he and other Northerners would never openly state that they were Uzbeks. However, in 1971-77 he did so. As a high school teacher, he made the point of speaking to his Uzbek and Turkmen students informally in the Uzbek language after class when these students came for help. He said that the Pashtun students did not like this practice, but he felt he could make an open point about linguistic discrimination.

Once in the used clothing bazaar, this man was asked his ethnic group by a Pashtun shopkeeper. The shopkeeper was confused because the man was dressed in western-style clothes, with a foreign woman, and yet was speaking fluent Pashto. Responding to the shopkeeper's question, he replied simply, “I am an Uzbek.” In this situation, the identity response, Uzbek, indicates pride in minority status in a direct confrontation.

The native Afghan versus immigrant distinction has significant political implications which are readily commented on by informants. Discrimination in property disputes and other difficulties in dealing with government bureaucrats were laid at the door of Pashtun indifference and/or hostility to non-natives. However, this response comes from native Tajiks and Uzbeks as well as immigrant Uzbeks and Tajiks. The native/non-native distinction has been fused with the Pashtun/non-Pashtun distinction by most politically aware men. The fusion of the two distinctions is strengthened by the fact that to the overwhelming majority of all ethnic groups in Afghanistan including Pashtuns, Afghan means Pashtun. As one muhajer succinctly put it, the very name of this country Afghanistan (land of the Afghans), is an insult to us.

Since their arrival in Kataghan, the Pashtuns have dominated local government. By the 1960s, there was general opposition to continued Pashtun political dominance. Certain men of the immigrant community became political leaders of the anti-Pashtun coalition of various local Uzbek and Tajik groups. The most prominent was the mawlawi of one of the two muhajer mosques in Kunduz. This man gained political influence by serving as advisor to local non-immigrant Uzbek groups in land settlement disputes. Eventually, he was the elected representative to the national assembly during the constitutional period. Leaders of the Uzbek, Tajik and muhajer communities
requested that he run. His major opponent was a young Pashtun. Trucks were hired and sent to bring village Uzbeks and Tajiks to vote. The voters were housed in the immigrant community mosques and households.

Thus, in the 1960s, the political fortunes of the immigrants in Afghanistan appeared to be improving. Informants proudly recalled the visit of the former king to Kunduz as further evidence the situation was changing. While in town, the king visited the larger of the two immigrant mosques and commented positively on the surrounding neighbourhood. Several informants felt that this visit was a symbol that Pashtuns would no longer be so favoured in the political arena. However, the regime of Daud did not fulfill their hopes.

Informants also cited the short-lived radio Kabul programs of Uzbek and Turkmen music which began in 1972. Both local Uzbek and Transoxanian Uzbek-style music were played (Slobin, 1976:104). This programming was taken as a sign particularly by the educated intelligentsia that Northerners were to be a recognized part of the Afghan nation-state. This programming ended in 1974 and thus was seen as another unfulfilled promise.

From the time of their arrival in Afghanistan to the present, the muhajer community have not been integrated into the Afghan nation. In their view, the Pashtuns at the local and national levels have kept them in a subordinate position. They have reacted by stressing their own ethnic background particularly their experiences in resisting the Russian advance (Shalinsky, 1979a and b). However, indications that at least part of the muhajer community has been developing links with other local non-Pashtun ethnic groups lead to the supposition that a regional-based ethnicity is developing.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to analyse the ideology that is likely to govern the reaction of Uzbek-Tajik-speaking immigrants to the new Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. The pivotal issue for the muhajerin is their conviction that the abandoned land in Soviet Central Asia has remained the homeland. The emigrants entered Afghanistan with a profound resentment of the Soviet government, especially its anti-Islamic policies. Additionally, even the Afghan-born generation has denied allegiance to that country because of the perceived Pashtun dominance. Thus, the past experiences in the Soviet Union and the more recent experiences in Afghanistan have led to the development of an ideology with its roots in Islam and ethnic consciousness. It is from this perspective that the muhajerin in Afghanistan view their current situation and make it likely that
resistance to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will be conducted independent of, rather than in collaboration with, Pashtun resistance.

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NOTES

1. Soviet Central Asia is a fairly arid region lying between the Caspian Sea and the Chinese frontier: to the north is Siberia, to the south, Iran and Afghanistan. The region has long been characterized by ethnic diversity. Through linguistic criteria, the population may be classified into two language families, groups speaking Turkic languages and those speaking Iranian languages. The major Turkic speaking groups are Turkman, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz, whose traditional lifestyle involved some kind of pastoralism; and Uzbeks, primarily an agricultural and urban group. Persian-speaking groups included Tajiks, villagers and town dwellers like the Uzbeks, and Arabs, a pastoralist group.

2. As Shahrani (1979:39) points out, the term “basmachi” and its associated meaning, bandit, was the name given to the rebels by the Russians. The native peoples refer to this uprising as Beklar din Qozghaleshi, the Beks’ Revolt.

3. Results of the sustained warfare were devastating. The population of the Fergana Valley city of Kokand which was 120,000 before the Revolution was only 69,300 in 1926 (Pipes 1964:176).

4. For a similar formulation of the historical and ethnohistorical data presented here, see Shalinsky 1979b.

5. Lorimer, who relied on Soviet accounts for his study of Soviet demography, states that the population who fled across the border from 1914–26 either perished or returned to Soviet territory (1946:40). This is inaccurate.

6. Chapans are silk or cotton striped cloaks worn by men of all ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan.

7. Two of these exceptions were actually *muhajerin* also — two brothers and the son-in-law of one of the brothers. The brothers settled in a Badakhshani village after leaving Soviet Central Asia. They lost contact with the *muhajerin* community and were thus considered village Tajiks by the community.
8. Shahrani (1981: personal communication) has indicated that for many Northerners, open avowal of non-Pashtun identity began some years before the time stated by this informant.

9. For an earlier formulation of these concepts, see Shalinsky 1979a where a complete analysis of mukhafarin identity labelling is given.

10. Maulawi refers to a religious official and teacher who has completed the highest level of Muslim religious education.

11. In July 1973, Mohammad Daud Khan, first cousin and brother-in-law of King Mohammad Zahir, declared Afghanistan a republic. His Central Committee in turn named him founder, president and prime minister of Afghanistan. Daud was then overthrown in the Revolution of April 1978.

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