Developing a role of the Counter Narcotics Ministry in monitoring the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy

A report
to the Counter Narcotics Ministry, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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For the United National Office on Drugs and Crime

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# Contents Page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Executive Summary</td>
<td>iv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>vii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Terms</td>
<td>viii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Background Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Key Arguments and Challenges: the case for</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developing an effective M&amp;E for the NDCS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding the Afghanistan Opium Poppy</td>
<td>13 – 15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy and drawing from comparative experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Drug Control Strategy</td>
<td>16 – 24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstreaming</td>
<td>24 – 27</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Issues in relation to Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>28 – 33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Developing an approach to Monitoring and Evaluation for the National Drug Control Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: What to monitor and why?</td>
<td>35 – 36</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input Monitoring</td>
<td>37 – 38</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Outputs and Implementation Processes</td>
<td>39 – 41</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Outcomes and Impacts</td>
<td>42 – 45</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: How to obtain relevant and useful information</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input Monitoring</td>
<td>47 – 48</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate level process monitoring</td>
<td>49 – 51</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Outcomes and Impacts</td>
<td>52 – 55</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Who is to use the information and for what purpose?</td>
<td>56– 58</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Who to monitor and why?</td>
<td>59 – 60</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Next Steps</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What should the role of the Counter Narcotics Ministry be in</td>
<td>62 – 70</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring the National Counter Narcotics Strategy?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing the Role of the Counter Narcotics Ministry in Monitoring</td>
<td>71 – 78</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role for UNODC in supporting the Development of the Counter</td>
<td>79 – 82</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcotics Ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 1: Terms of Reference</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 2: Itinerary</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 3: Briefing to UN Heads of Mission</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 4: M&amp;E Workshop Outline</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 5: Briefing Note to Alternative Livelihoods Working Group</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 6: A possible programme structure for Alternative Livelihoods</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

The Counter Narcotics Ministry (CNM) has the mandate for oversight of the monitoring of implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). In addition it has a key function of policy and strategy development.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is not just a technical issue. While it assumes a logical connection between means and ends as a desirable goal, it must be recognised that policy making in the real world does not follow a model of evidence based-policy processes. It involves political choices at all levels and no more so than in the NDCS. A key function of the technical monitoring process around the NDCS must be to build linkages to the political processes and bring the weight of evidence to the table to inform political judgements. Critical to this process must be the building of the CNM as an effective actor to lead on the national debate but also to establish its weight and authority in dealing with external interests.

This proposal proceeds from a position that responses to the Opium Poppy Economy (OPE) and policy processes have a better chance of working if they are based in national processes of policy dialogue and accountability, are comprehensive and broad based and coordinate both national and international resources and resource allocation practices are linked to performance and outcomes.

The very scale of the OPE in Afghanistan and its spread makes it unique, and comparative experience offers few lessons except the knowledge that change is a long term process and that the tyranny of urgency should not blind us to that fact. What is cause and what is effect in relation to the existence of the OPE and a fragile state is a matter for debate but this paper proceeds from the position that the more coherent argument is that opium poppy area and production should be regarded more as a symptom of underlying development failure. This is consistent with the agenda of mainstreaming responses to the OPE.

The NDCS was developed in 2003 and elaborates an overall strategy which establishes an overall goal of eliminating all aspects of the OPE within a specified time period. Unfortunately it does not provide a basis for establishing a monitoring framework. This is largely due to the fact that the strategy lacks discussion on priorities and choices and argumentation in relation to possible cause-effect relations both within the pillars and across the pillars in their linkage to the overall strategy objectives. The relation between proposed activities and the purpose for which they have been carried out has not been established. Current objectives and goals of the individual pillars are not consistent with the overall strategy. The development of a coherent monitoring system around the NDCS will require a re-examination of aspects of the existing strategy.

The mainstreaming initiative is an important and necessary step in the response to the OPE. It raises particular questions as to how that process will be monitored and how the mainstreaming outcomes will link through to counter-narcotic objectives. Mainstreaming the National Development Programmes will be a particular priority. More importantly the mainstreaming initiative invites direct comparison with PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) processes and the linking of the monitoring of the NDCS with that of the PRSP, and drawing lessons from comparative experience.
in this area. A key lesson is the building of participatory processes right down to the field level.

An approach to developing a monitoring system is structured around a set of four questions with a common theme of the levels at which monitoring should take place.

What to monitor?

- **Input monitoring** through budget formulation and assessment of scale and timeliness of disbursements and delivery differentiated by pillar and location.
- **Intermediate output & process** monitoring but based on clear strategic analysis around probable causal relations and where leverage of change might happen; critical issues will be a rapid feedback of information for learning;
- **Final outcome and impact** but at the pillar level; opium poppy area should be treated as an indicator of development ‘health’ and not a target.

How to obtain relevant and useful information?

- **Input monitoring** through financial management and specific tracking surveys plus approaches to participatory public expenditure management
- **Intermediate output & process** through routine administrative systems but realism as to incentives, capacities to deliver information and demand for it, is required. Different approaches to supplement information must be sought through community/provider linked systems, qualitative participatory monitoring systems, commissioned studies and special surveys;
- **Final outcome and impacts** through surveys, participatory assessments, theory based evaluations, probable cause and contribution analysis

Who will use the information and for what purpose? (a critical issue of building demand for information and incentives to use it at all levels).

- **Input monitoring** – linking evidence from all three levels to feed back into budgetary processes; the CNM will have a key analytical role;
- **Intermediate outputs and processes** – Line Ministries should lead but in partnership with the CNM;
- **Final Outcomes and Impacts**; The CNM will drawing from commissioned studies

Who to monitor?

- **Input monitoring** – The Ministry of Finance with the CNM as a client;
- **Intermediate outputs & processes** – Line Ministries with support from CNM & communities
- **Final Outcomes and Impact** – CNM & Communities

The above framework argues for CNM’s role in monitoring to be situated as follows:

- Primarily at the pillar and cross pillar level in relation to lessons learnt and feedback into policy and strategy development;
- Focussing in the early stages on input monitoring across the pillars
• Monitoring of the Mainstreaming Process
• Working with line Ministries to develop relevant, useful and reliable indicators at the Intermediate outputs & process level;
• Commissioning independent evaluations and studies in relation to Intermediate and Final level assessments;

It is recommended that the CNM should not be directly involved directly in the monitoring of compliance (e.g. the verification of eradication); an M&E unit within the Ministry of Interior should undertake this task.

Key short-term tasks for CNM in the development of the monitoring system of the NDCS are seen to be as follows:

• Development of a comprehensive database of CN activities, projects and programmes;
• Working with the Ministry of Finance to develop procedures for identifying budgetary allocation to CN activities;
• Working with key line Ministries to develop indicators in relation to monitoring of implementation;
• Working with key Ministries to develop indicators for mainstreaming processes and the implications of these for budgetary processes;
• Commissioning evaluative studies particularly in relation to the impacts of eradication and provincial based implementation practices
• The publication of an annual report which reviews strategy implementation and monitoring lessons;
Acknowledgements

It is a pleasure to record the assistance and support provided through the Kabul UNODC Kabul Office. In particular the discussions with Consuelo Casarotto (Project Coordinator) and Doris Buddenburg (Country Director, UNODC) are gratefully acknowledged.

The meetings and discussions held with Eng. Habibullah Qaderi, Minister of Counter Narcotics and senior members of the Counter Narcotics Ministry contributed greatly to the shaping of the ideas and proposals in this report.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Directorate</td>
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<td>CNM</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Ministry</td>
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<td>Dfid</td>
<td>Department for International Development, UK</td>
</tr>
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<td>MRRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development; now the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD)</td>
</tr>
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<td>NDCS</td>
<td>National Drug Control Strategy</td>
</tr>
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<td>OPE</td>
<td>Opium Poppy Economy</td>
</tr>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I Background Issues

Introduction

1. The new Counter Narcotics Ministry of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (hereafter the CNM), upgraded from the previous Counter Narcotics Directorate, has been charged with the responsibility of overseeing the monitoring of the implementation of the 2003 National Drug Control Strategy (hereafter the NDCS). In addition it has a key function of policy development. As it is presently constituted the CNM has essentially no mandate or staff for direct implementation in relation to the NDCS.

2. The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) under its Capacity Building project AFG/G24 (Capacity Building for Drug Control) has contracted this three week consultancy study and report as part of a process of building monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity, systems and mechanisms within the CNM.

3. The key aspects of the terms of reference (see Annex 1) relate to:

- building understanding and raising awareness of the relevance of M&E within CNM and relevant line ministries;
- providing assistance to the development of basic M&E strategies and work plans in relation to the NDCS;
- helping support processes of establishing mechanisms for sharing of information across key actors;
- the running of a workshop to introduce some of the basic principles of M&E; and
- developing a strategy paper on M&E for the CNM along with a proposal for a one year phased programme to support the CNM build its mandate and capacity in relation to M&E.

4. Key activities undertaken during the consultancy included meeting a wide range of actors across agencies in relation to the NDCS, extensive discussions within the CNM and UNODC (see Annex 2), contributing to a briefing of UN Heads of Agency on the opium poppy economy and issues of mainstreaming and monitoring (see Annex 3), running a three day workshop for key staff from CNM and counterpart ministries (see Annex 4) and a short briefing of the Alternative Livelihoods Working Group meeting in MRRD (see Annex 5).

5. There is a view, reflected in the assumptions made within the NDCS, that monitoring is essentially a technical activity to be built around a rationalist model of an evidence-based policy process (defined as the process of policy formulation and its subsequent implementation). Even for something that is not as highly charged as the NDCS, a more realistic view of real policy making is required.

6. M&E, rather than being seen as simply a technical issue, must be recognised for what it is – a fundamentally political activity with technical dimensions. While monitoring must assume an overall rationality of means and ends as a desirable goal, it must also recognise that the real world does not necessarily operate that
way. And it must be abundantly clear to any observer with respect to the development and implementation of the NDCS\(^1\) and its implementation that there are a multitude of vested interests each with distinctive political agendas. The real world in relation to policy development and implementation of responses to the opium poppy economy (OPE) in Afghanistan is highly political and this has to be addressed.

7. A key function then of the technical monitoring process must be to build linkages to the political processes around the NDCS and to bring the weight of evidence to the table to inform political judgements. Critical to this process must be the building of the CNM as an effective actor to lead on the national debate but also to establish its weight and authority in dealing with external interests.

8. Accordingly this report, while addressing some of the broad technical issues around M&E, seeks to relate these to the broad policy realities and to link M&E strategies to these. In that sense it is more of a ‘scoping’ study than a manual of what is to be done and how. It proceeds from a position that responses to the OPE and policy processes have a better chance of working if:

- Responses to the OPE are based in national processes of policy dialogue and accountability;
- Responses to the OPE are comprehensive and broad based and coordinate both national and international resources;
- Resource allocation practices are linked to performance and outcomes

9. It is worth stressing at this point the general role and purpose of M&E. For many in Afghanistan the central role of monitoring and evaluation as experienced has been one of accountability and of essentially ‘policing’. Rather less has it been thought of or used in terms of performance management and building programme improvement through on a continuous process of monitoring. The deliberate use of M&E as a tool for learning and communication is rare but this is the central role that it must play in relation to the NDCS and will be required for CNM to fulfil its role in policy development and advocacy.

10. We also need to be clear about terminology. For the purposes of this report a set of terms are used which are described in Box 1.

11. The rest of the report is divided into three main sections. Section II outlines a set of key arguments and challenges in relation to developing M&E of the NDCS. Section III develops a set of proposals around what an M&E approach for the NDCS might look like structured around four key questions:

- what to monitor and why?
- how to monitor?
- who to monitor?
- who will use the information and for what purpose?

\(^1\) Moreover the NDCS is not the only Anti-Narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan in existence. See for example Plan Afghanistan announced by the United States Government.
The final section (Section IV) identifies a set of possible next steps both with respect to developing the role of CNM in monitoring and the opportunities that might exist for UNODC to support this process.

**Box 1 Key Terms**

**Activities** are things that are undertaken (e.g. a training activity in relation to drug awareness) which require inputs of manpower and money;

**Results** (or outputs) are what are achieved as a direct consequence of the activity undertaken (e.g. increased awareness by participants in a training course of the harm associated with use of drugs). Accordingly there should be a close cause and effect relation between the activity and the result.

**Purposes** (or Objectives or Outcomes) are the hoped for changes in behaviour or actions arising from the delivery of the result (e.g. participants in the training course either change their behaviour in relation to drug use or inform/ educate others about its harmful effects). It follows that the cause-effect relation between the Result and Outcome is not as strong as that between the Activity and Result;

**Goals** (or aim) are the general objective to which the programme/project aims to contribute through achievement of the Purpose (e.g. reduction in demand for drugs) but there are many other factors outside the control of the programme/project that will determine whether or not the goal is achieved. It follows that there is a weak cause-effect relation between the achievement of the Purpose and the attainment of the Goal

With respect to monitoring and evaluation we can examine:

The **Efficiency** which is the relation between the resources allocated to the activity and the results achieved;

The **Effect** which is the relation between the delivery of the results and the achievement of the purpose;

The **Impact** which is the relation between the purpose and the goal;

One should be aware that the terms ‘outcome’ and ‘impact’ have different meanings in different contexts. There is also a tendency to associate the word ‘impact’ in relation to the evaluation process, regarding it as a measurable that can be linked to a specific intervention. We must be particularly careful to avoid this trap in relation to the NDCS and the use of area of opium poppy as an impact assessment..

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**II. Key Arguments and Challenges: the case for developing an effective M&E for the NDCS.**

**Introduction**

12. This section of the report examines a key set of challenges and issues that make the case for developing an effective M&E for the NDCS. These include consideration of the nature of the OPE in Afghanistan; an analysis of the NDCS itself and the inter-linkages between policy, pillars and programmes; arguments for the mainstreaming of responses to the OPE and broader comparative issues of M&E from Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).
Understanding the Afghanistan OPE and drawing from comparative experience

13. While this is not the place to explore the arguments and evidence in relation to explaining why the OPE in Afghanistan has developed, it needs to be recognised that there are a number of different interpretations. There is, for example, a debate to be had over whether the existence of the OPE is simply to be seen as a cause of a weak or fragile state or a symptom of it, raising questions as to what are causes and what are effects. More specifically there is a spectrum of opinion with respect to the reasons for the growth of the OPE. At one end it is seen as simply a growth of a criminal economy to which the only response is robust military like intervention; at the other there is a view that it is more a consequence of development and state failure. These two positions argue for rather different intervention responses with assumptions and arguments as to what types of intervention will lead to what sorts of impact and change. On the one hand direct technical interventions (eradication, interdiction, law enforcement) will be seen to have direct measurable effects in terms of reduction of poppy area, amount of opium in circulation and arrest of criminals. On the other if it is broad development that is required which will allow the rural population to transition from a set of locked-in dependent client-based relationships to independent citizens in a secure and certain institutional environment, impacts in relation to incentives not to cultivate poppy will only be achieved indirectly and over the long term.

14. This is of course to simplify and in reality policy and proposed intervention responses encompass this spectrum raising potentially conflicting views and assessment of effects and impact. The key point for our purposes is that there is much that we do not understand about the OPE and we cannot be sure that the interventions that are proposed will necessarily lead either directly or indirectly to the changes or impacts that we might want or expect. In that sense the causal relations between interventions and consequences in terms of the OPE are largely unknown. This is itself a strong argument for building effective monitoring systems as a basis for learning not only what works and where, but also why and how.

15. One might hope that comparative experience of dealing with drug economies elsewhere would offer strong guidance as to how to proceed and what effects might be expected. There are two reasons why this is not the case. First the extent of the OPE in Afghanistan with respect to area, location and spread is unprecedented\(^2\). The very scale of the OPE in Afghanistan and its pervasiveness makes it a unique phenomenon within recent history. There is nothing with which to directly compare it although the key lesson from Thailand, for example, that it was a 30 year development process to reduce the area from 12000 to 300 hectares is one that might usefully be drawn. Second documentation and analysis from the implementation of counter narcotic strategies elsewhere is very limited and unsystematic. There is limited material that can specifically inform the NDCS for

\(^2\) Compare the estimated 130,000 ha of cultivation and 4,200 mt production of opium poppy in Afghanistan in 2004 with the maximum area of 18,000 ha and 145 mt production recorded in Thailand in 1965/66.
Afghanistan. Again this argues for the importance of developing a monitoring system that emphasises learning in relation to implementation processes.

The National Drug Control Strategy.

16. In May 2003 a National Drug Control Strategy was approved, establishing the mandate for the then Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) to implement and coordinate the policy. The CND has since December 2004 been upgraded to a Ministry (CNM). The NDCS consists of an overall policy to be implemented through seven pillars\(^3\), the details of which are summarised in Table 1. This table also identifies the key agencies and interests that relate to the pillars and the current structure of the CNM in relation to these.

17. Within the NDCS strategy the mandate for the CNM with respect to monitoring is established and this is quoted in full (p19)

> "The overall mechanism for monitoring progress with implementation of the strategy will be managed by the Counter Narcotics Directorate.

Specific targets, benchmarks, indicators and time-frames will be set to guide and monitor implementation plans in consultation with the working groups of line ministries. Monitoring will need to take account of the impact of interventions on the lives and livelihoods of primary stakeholders, as well as drug control indicators, if results are to prove sustainable”

18. While the NDCS document argued that the pillars ‘set the institutional and technical framework necessary for the design of specific annual policies and programmes’ (Annex p.i.) what the document does not establish is a framework for the inter-linkages between the pillars and their potential contribution to the overall policy. More seriously in its broad based listing of implementation issues, it does not identify the critical changes that need to take place for the proposed actions to produce the desired results. In that sense the strategy lacks discussion of choices, priorities and funding issues. There is an unfinished debate about strategy although the NDCS is an important step in the right direction.

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\(^3\) In the NDCS five key elements were listed (the term pillar as not used) but more recent documentation refers to seven elements which have now been termed as pillars.
Table 1 NDS Pillars, CNM Units and Key Stakeholders (Lead Ministries underlined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Drug Strategy Pillars</th>
<th>Ministry of Counter Narcotics Technical Units Public Relations &amp; Information Unit</th>
<th>Key Afghan Stakeholders</th>
<th>Key International Stakeholders</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Information Campaign*</td>
<td>Ministry of Health; Ministry of Information &amp; Culture; Ministry of Haji; Ministry of Education &amp; Higher Education; Ministry of Women’s Affairs; Ministry of Finance Afghan Radio; Local Press</td>
<td>BBC World Service; ISAF/Coalition IRAN Radio Inter-News Agency UK US UNODC GTZ UNODC; FAO; UNDP; World Bank Asian Development Bank; European Union UK, US, Iran Japan, INGOs UK; Germany Italy; UNODC US; Iran EC; France UNODC Italy UK</td>
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<td>2. Alternative Livelihoods*</td>
<td>Alternative Livelihoods Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation &amp; Development; Ministry of Agriculture &amp; Animal Husbandry; Ministry of Light Food and Industry; Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources &amp; Environment; Afghan NGOs</td>
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<td>3. Interdiction &amp; Law Enforcement*</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Ministry of Justice Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>4. Criminal Justice</td>
<td>Legal Affairs Ministry of Justice Attorney General’s Office Supreme Court Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>5. Eradication</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>6. Building Institutions</td>
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<td>7. Demand Reduction &amp; Treatment of Addicts*</td>
<td>Drug Demand Ministry of Health; Ministry of Education &amp; Higher Education; Ministry of Information &amp; Culture; Ministry of Women’s Affairs; Ministry of Justice</td>
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* Supported by Co-ordinating Working Groups. Note that the Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice Working group has four sub-groups: 1. Criminal Justice System: Chair Justice; 2. Drugs Legislation: Chair Justice; 3. Counter Narcotics Police: Chair Interior; 4. Eradication: Chair Interior; Lead Deps – Agriculture, MRRD & CND

19. The monitoring design cannot fill these gaps in the strategy although it can facilitate the strategy debate. It might also seek to challenge and perhaps displace some of the performance indicators that have already been established. However in limiting the monitoring simply to targets, benchmarks, indicators and time-frames within specific implementation plans the vision of the role of monitoring is distinctly narrow and provides little guidance to the CNM as to where and how it should locate its energies. As will be argued key first steps may relate more to the monitoring of inputs (financial) and focussing on intermediate processes and
outcomes that can provide rapid feedback supporting both accountability and learning. Thinking through the set of issues in relation to monitoring may require some rethinking of aspects of the NDCS but monitoring cannot substitute for the unresolved issues about basic strategy in relation to the NDCS.

20. The following analysis sets out to develop a framework for the existing NDCS and its component pillars as a basis for an analysis of the overall strategy and the role that monitoring might play within it. It is concerned to explore what goals and purpose can be established for the pillars and their component sub-programmes. The argument is structured around the general principles of logical frameworks and particularly the nesting of broad programmes within an overall policy framework⁴. Table 2 proposes a specific way by which projects, sub-programmes and pillars can be seen to be interrelated and can contribute to the overall policy. The key point to note is that the goals of the individual pillars should be seen to contribute to the overall purpose of the policy. In turn the goals of the sub-programmes of each of the pillars should contribute towards the goal of the pillar.

**Table 2.** The relation between Policy, Pillars, Sub-Programmes and Projects and the Intervention Logic (Goal, Purpose and Results) for the National Drug Control Strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Pillars / Programmes</th>
<th>Sub – Programmes</th>
<th>Projects</th>
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<tr>
<td>National Drug Control Strategy</td>
<td>Information Campaign; Alternative Livelihoods Interdiction &amp; Law Enforcement; Criminal Justice; Eradication; Building Institutions Demand Reduction &amp; Treatment of addicts;</td>
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<td>Purpose</td>
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<td>Results</td>
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21. Table 3, drawn from the NDCS document, summarises the logic of the policy. One significant change has been made. The purpose level statement in table 3 in fact is stated in the NDCS as its goal. We would argue that it is more appropriate to place this at the purpose level since the whole purpose of the NDCS is to contribute towards a broader goal, namely of building a secure and prosperous Afghanistan. What can be noted is that the envisaged results that will be delivered through the policy largely relate entirely to technical delivery on eradication and use of opium poppy. These are not entirely consistent with what could be argued are the goals of the individual pillars.

Table 3. The intervention logic for the National Drug Control Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To contribute towards the building of a secure and prosperous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production, Consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs into,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within and from Afghanistan will have been eliminated by 1391</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Opium cultivation eradicated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Trafficking, processing and distribution of narcotic &amp;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psychotropic substances within and across Afghanistan borders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eliminated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Drug generated assets forfeited and money laundering checked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Problematic Use of legal and illegal substances reduced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Enhanced regional and international cooperation to facilitate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the elimination of illegal drug production &amp; trafficking and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reduction of drug abuse.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: National Drug Control Strategy.

22. Table 4 proposes\(^5\) for the individual pillars a set of goals and purpose statements and juxtaposes these against the existing NDCS policy stated Purpose and Results Outlines for what the goals and purpose for the sub-programmes of the Alternative Livelihoods and Drug Control pillars are contained in Annex 6. Not only does this serve to pinpoint certain inconsistencies between pillar goals and purposes and the Policy logic (for example there is not a clear linkage between the Pillar purposes and the NDCS results), which will need to be addressed, but it also seeks to focus on the potential effects (at the purpose level) that might be expected from each of the pillars. It particularly seeks to emphasise the fact that while there may indeed be a supra-purpose of “Production, Consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs into, within and from Afghanistan will have been eliminated by 1391”, many of the goals of the policy pillars can only contribute to this. They cannot achieve this on their own. Accordingly targets, assessment of impacts and judgement on

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\(^5\) These are drawn from existing informal documentation and workplans for the NDCS; these should be read as indicative statements rather than authoritative assertions of what the goals should be.
progress on the individual pillars have to be seen within the context of their individual logic and not that of the overall policy.

Table 4. Possible Linkages between Pillar Goals and Purpose and the NDCS Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NDCS</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Production, Consumption &amp; trafficking of illicit drugs, within and from Afghanistan will have been eliminated by 1391</td>
<td>1. Opium cultivation eradicated 2. Trafficking, processing and distribution of narcotic &amp; psychotropic substances within and across Afghanistan borders eliminated 3. Drug generated assets forfeited and money laundering checked 4. Problematic Use of legal and illegal substances reduced 5. Enhanced regional and international cooperation to facilitate the elimination of illegal drug production &amp; trafficking and reduction of drug abuse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Information Campaign</td>
<td>To contribute to the reduction of production of opium poppy</td>
<td>Increased perception of the risk of opium poppy cultivation through effective media campaigns, and support of key influencers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Alternative Livelihoods</td>
<td>To contribute to the reduction of production of opium poppy</td>
<td>Viable alternative livelihoods to OPE are adopted by rural households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3: Interdiction and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>To contribute to the reduction in the trafficking of illicit drugs into, within and from Afghanistan</td>
<td>The Law is enforced and traffickers are interdicted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: Criminal Justice</td>
<td>To contribute to the reduction in trafficking of illicit drugs, within and from Afghanistan</td>
<td>Drug traffickers are successfully prosecuted through the development of a fast-track procedure and improved law and held in secure court and prison facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5: Eradication</td>
<td>To contribute to the reduction of production of opium poppy</td>
<td>Effective targeted eradication campaigns and capacity have evaluated impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6: Building Institutions</td>
<td>To contribute to the reduction, consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan</td>
<td>National institutional capacity in relation to counter narcotics improved at central and provincial level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7: Demand Reduction &amp; Treatment of Addicts</td>
<td>To contribute to the reduction in consumption of illicit drugs in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Increased awareness of harm caused by drugs and effective procedures and practice developed to support drug treatment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Two points need to be made here. First and as noted by the World Bank, the hard time bound quantitative target set within the NDCS policy statement (‘elimination by 1391’) is not supported by the logic of the individual pillars and may well not be realistic. It should not therefore be used to drive monitoring or evaluation of the individual pillars. There is the danger that targets in relation to area and production will bring about perverse incentives in order to gain their attainment and thereby undermine the purpose and logic of the other pillars. Second there is a case to be made that outright victory (e.g. complete opium poppy elimination) is not the war to be fought for (to continue the military metaphor) but significant
gains in key areas may be a more realistic objective and an acceptable compromise.

Mainstreaming.

24. Since the NDCS was issued a strong case has been made by a number of agencies\(^6\) for moving beyond a project and sector approach to the opium poppy economy. The grounds for doing this relate to the centrality of opium to the macro-economy, poverty, security and governance. The arguments for mainstreaming\(^7\) are made on the basis that specific ‘drug control’ projects will fail to address the scale and reach of the problem and that responses to the opium poppy economy should be central to national development. The modalities and arguments of how to mainstream do not concern us here (although thought might be given to how meaningful the concept of ‘alternative livelihoods’ becomes under such an approach) but there are two issues that do matter.

25. First the arguments for mainstreaming loosen the assumed linkages between some of the existing pillars of the NDCS and its overall purpose. Grounds enough for reconsideration of the NDCS. In that sense the building of alternative livelihoods should not just be seen with respect to its potential effects on the overall area of opium but be judged as much with respect to the way in which interventions designed to build institutional certainty (and thus reduce risk) in the rural economy achieve this aim and thus indirectly contribute towards building a state–citizen relationship. This will have feedback effects on the opium economy.

26. From a monitoring perspective it is clear that if targets and objectives are defined only in terms of opium poppy area they may not only fail to pick up significant changes taking place elsewhere which can potentially contribute in the longer term to the overall NDCS purpose but they may also be too influential in driving an overall counter narcotics strategy. Equally those interventions that are of a more technical nature such as eradication will have to be monitored not only in terms of their direct effects (the reduction in poppy area) but also their potential negative effects in undermining the building of state-citizen relationships. The more instrumental aspects of the NDCS thus have to be mainstreamed as well in relation to broader development objectives.

27. Second if there is to be a process of mainstreaming it is clear that this has direct relevance to M&E issues. Not only would there be issues of monitoring the process of mainstreaming and assessing the extent to which it was or was not taking place but there would also be issues of evaluating whether and if so how these mainstreaming process were contributing (either positively or negatively) to the overall NDCS. The CNM would have an important role in this.

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\(^6\) from UNODC, World Bank and DfID
\(^7\) The incorporation of counter narcotic objectives and analysis into development policies, strategies, programming and operations’ (Outcomes of the ALTWG Meeting on Counter Narcotics Mainstreaming and Conditionality, 23-24 June, 2004. Kabul).
Comparative Issues in relation to M&E.

28. The mainstreaming of the counter-narcotics dimension into overall national policy invites comparison with other mainstreaming initiatives. In this regard there are number of useful lessons⁸ that can be drawn from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and issues arising from the development and application of PRSP monitoring systems.

Box 1. Key Lessons in relation to PRSP Monitoring Systems.

- PRSPs are leading to a major increase in final poverty-outcome measurements with household surveys and in many cases plans for participatory poverty assessments. This is important for diagnosing poverty problems and formulating long-term objectives;
- There is much less evidence of interest in measuring the intermediate processes and achievements that will be necessary to produce the desired final outcomes. This is a serious deficiency, as rapid feedback on this level of change is what matters most for accountability and learning. PRSPs are to be reviewed annually, requiring attention to variables that move relatively quickly and provide evidence of real achievements;
- A blind eye is being turned to the poor quality of the administrative data reporting systems on which much of the relevant data depend. The documents also pay little attention to the possibility of using shortcut and alternative methods to compensate for the unreliability of routine information systems;
- Input monitoring is being relatively neglected as a component of PRSP monitoring
- The documents are also saying little about how stakeholders will be incorporated into PRSP monitoring arrangements, and generally about how information will be used to improve policy and implementation;
- The approach to selection of indicators is at present not very purposeful. This reflects the weaknesses in the PRSPS themselves, which typically have a ‘missing middle’ – they do not discuss why the proposed actions are likely to work better than comparable actions in the past and what are the critical things that need to happen.

Adapted from Booth & Lucas (2002) p v.

29. The key lessons that can be drawn from the experience of monitoring PRSPs relate to the importance of giving attention not only to the (a) final poverty impacts within the monitoring but also to (b) the intermediate outputs, outcomes and implementation strategies and (c) the delivery of key inputs (largely financial).

30. Particular note should be made of the point concerning existing administrative data reporting systems. There has to be extreme realism about the capacity of existing data management systems within line Afghanistan Ministries to deliver data that is both timely and of sufficient quality. It is understood that even the monitoring system of the existing National Development Programmes (NDPs) are struggling even to keep up with tracking of delivery of the programmes. Under conditions of poor quality data there will be a real issue to make the distinction between change or improvement in data quality from data on improvement or changes. A fundamental issue is the lack of demand for information and

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incentives to use the information that is provided. Ways have to be found to change this.

31. In addition there are important lessons of accountability. These matter at two levels. The first is a domestic or national issue. As Booth and Lucas put it (p6):

"Policy is likely to improve and/or become more outcome oriented only if new incentives come into play. This will happen only to the extent that accountability of public servants to each other and to other stakeholders is enhanced. Accountability can be strengthened by greater production of and access to relevant and timely information. But information will work in this way only if it is demanded and capable of being used by stakeholders with some clout, so that those responsible for policy are held to account in a new way"

32. Second there is an issue of accountability and donors. While there might be some debate as to the extent that well-organised donors are able to bring about significant structural changes in contrast with powerful domestic stakeholders, there is no doubt that donors can do a lot to undermine the influence of national stakeholders on central processes. This is achieved by constructing parallel structures and funding official bodies to undertake activities off-budget.

33. It is a fact that at present much of the anti-narcotics funding in Afghanistan is at present off-budget. Many of activities being implemented are not even being funded through official bodies but are being directly implemented through external agencies. Policy processes are taking place in parallel to government. These can only serve to undermine national processes of policy dialogue and accountability and to severely constrain not only the implementation of the NDCS but also more generally the development effort and for the anti-narcotics strategy to be embedded within it.

III Developing an approach to M&E of the NDCS

Introduction

34. This section develops a set of arguments in relation to how an M&E strategy for the NDCS could be developed. It is structured around a set of four questions. Common to all of these is the issue of the different levels at which monitoring should take place e.g. at the input level, the intermediate outputs and outcomes level and the final purpose / impact level. The four questions to be considered are as follows:

- What to monitor and why?
- How to obtain relevant and useful information?
- Who is to use the information and for what purpose?
- Who to monitor and why?

A: What to monitor and why?

35. As noted above monitoring needs to be thought about at three levels (input, intermediate output/outcome and final purpose/impact). There might be an inclination to start with and focus primarily on the final purpose/impact level at
the policy level and to take for example area of opium poppy and its production as the key impact indicator. There are good reasons why this should not be the approach. For one the causal link between interventions within any of the pillars and changes in opium poppy area are weak and indirect and may have a significant time lag. Even for those interventions that might be argued to have a more direct effect (e.g. eradication) there is a question of whether reduction of area would necessarily reflect a decrease in other dimensions of the opium economy given eradication likely effects on prices. While a long term decline in opium poppy area will be some indication of change (and needs to be tracked), what matters more it is argued will be changes in key indicators related to the pillars of the policy. In this sense it is argued that the opium area statistics should be treated as a symptom and not a cause. It is the changes in the causal elements that the monitoring should focus on.

36. Given the significant time lag there will between development efforts and long term impacts, combined with a realism about existing data management systems within Ministries it is argued that the development of monitoring system will have to be incremental and slowly build up. Its starting point must be to focus at the input level and the allocation of resources (financial and non-financial).

Input Monitoring

37. A starting point of the monitoring of the NDCS is to investigate the extent to which the policy is translated into expenditure, not just overall, but in its distribution across the pillars of the policy. A critical assumption is that all expenditure related to the NDCS is brought on to the budget. The extent to which expenditure tracking can take place will depend on the way budget lines are defined and how the budget system works. Critical will be a budget process that orients allocations in terms of programmes and plans to overall public goals within a medium-term fiscal framework.

38. However there is also a need to focus not just on the budget formulation side but also the execution of the budget with respect to the scale and timeliness of disbursements to line ministries and programmes (public expenditure tracking). The final aspect to be followed is the actual delivery of funds to their ultimate destination (e.g. the setting up of rural credit system). While there will be questions of ‘what is the anti-narcotic component’ of a project into which anti-narcotic objectives have been mainstreamed, if effective indicators have been identified with respect to mainstreaming objectives, it should be possible to identify some budgetary allocation.

Intermediate Outputs and Implementation Processes.

39. Between inputs and final impacts lie the substance of programmes – activities, their achievement of results and the outcomes that they achieve. These are the aspects of intervention in which one might expect to see changes over the short to medium term and which would provide the basis for regular monitoring and feedback. However at present the NDCS lacks any clear linkage and strategic analysis between the proposed objectives and identified activities. Issues of which are likely to be the most effective activities in terms of the proposed purposes and
goal level statements have not been considered. There is a need to think in a much more joined-up way of the causal connections that might exist between inputs and outputs not at just some particular point of the chain but all along it. There is a need to elaborate a set of arguments or propositions as to what the process of change that might be leveraged by specific interventions would be and how this would link to the overall purpose and goal level statements.

40. Solutions to these issue cannot easily be conjured out of the mind of one person and require a collective process of learning and critical debate. This has to be built out of debate about issues and evidence.

41. A related issue which matters at this level is the question of coverage or reach of programmes and it is possible that this may be as significant and the quantity and quality of outputs that are achieved

**Final Outcomes and Impacts.**

42. As is clear from Table 3 there are multiple and interlinked goals in relation to the NDCS. As noted earlier the policy purpose (poppy eradication) does not provide a good impact assessment of the achievement of the goals of the pillars. Indeed it could be argued that it has a better role as an indicator in relation to the pillar goals.

43. In this regard it could be argued that no one outcome/impact indicator is sufficient and attention needs to be given in assessing overall impact of the NDCS to the achievement of the purpose level statements across all the pillars. This reflects that fact that sustainable reduction in opium poppy cultivation will not be achieved unless all the pillars achieve their goals. Impact therefore is multi-dimensional and will require a number of different measures to evaluate it, and not just one.

44. If as is argued the opium poppy area (for which there is an annual survey) is treated as an overall indicator of progress, it must be recognised that it does not provide an explanatory power as to why changes have taken place – simply recording the fact that it has. Field based assessment of changes at the purpose level will be required but it must be recognised that such changes will take time both to achieve (a minimum of a 2 – 3 year time horizon) and that data collection and analysis will also take time to collect and report on. Identifying trends or patterns of change will also be more difficult.

45. Nevertheless monitoring and evaluation at this level is of particular significance to policy learning in finding out what sorts of interventions have brought about what sorts of change and are crucial for feedback into policy development.
B: How to obtain relevant and useful information?

Introduction

46. This section reviews the question of method in relation to what to monitor and focuses on the how question in relation to obtaining valid relevant and reliable information at the different levels of monitoring.

Input Monitoring.

47. Financial monitoring as discussed in paras 37-38 has relatively well established methods which needs not be covered here. However the institutional and technical qualities of the financial management system will be a key influence on the ability to track budget execution. There may be a case for specific surveys of ‘tracking studies’ to be undertaken to trace financial flows from source through to final expenditure points to deepen understanding and monitoring of financial delivery systems.

48. Note should be made though of the possibilities of drawing on international experience in relation to participatory public expenditure management⁹. This has been used in other countries in relation to the PRSP process to undertake budget analysis, budget making, budget tracking and public service report cards.

Intermediate level process monitoring.

49. The case for focussing on the development of monitoring around the ‘middle’ (as opposed to the beginning and end) has been made, on the grounds that it is information at this level that identifies what changes are taking place in the short term. Not only does this require more analytical insight in terms of determining what to measure but the question of how is also particularly tricky.

50. In principle much of the key information should come through routine data collection in administrative systems. One must be extremely realistic as to the extent this will be possible at the present. Although there are longer term issues of building information management systems within ministries and associated staff training programmes, there is also a need to address the fact that many of the basic collection takes place at the field level by poorly paid and low level field staff who have little motivation to collect reliable and timely data. The building of incentives to collect and manage information in key ministries will require time and attention.

51. It follows that the monitoring of the implementation of the key pillars in relation to the NDCS will need to think beyond formal government systems and establish innovatory ways of process monitoring if it is to keep track of what changes are coming about. There is not space to explore in detail other routes but PRSP experience indicates that there are a number of different approaches that could be considered. These include:

• Community based monitoring systems linked to providers
• Qualitative participatory monitoring systems
• Commissioned studies;
• Special surveys

**Final Outcomes and Impacts.**

52. Within PRSP practice there are a range of different instruments for assessing final poverty outcomes including household consumption surveys and participatory poverty assessments. Experience suggests that the different approaches do not always tell the same story and while the surveys may answer the "what has changed?" question it does not answer the how or why question. Issues of the context in which the information is collected is also important and there are also significant concerns over differential changes in poverty between different segments of the population structured by economic status and location or geography.

53. All these issues are relevant to impact assessment in the case of the NDCS. But we must also remind ourselves that the whole purpose of an impact assessment particularly in relation to the NDCS is not just to ask about what change has taken place but why and how. They must be used to build understanding and learning. For this reason two additional approaches to final outcome impact assessment deserve consideration.

54. The first is the use of theory-based evaluation when the complexities of interventions need more than outcome focused assessments. The case for theory-based evaluations lies in investigating "the explicit or implicit theories about how and why the programme will work. evaluations should surface those theories and lay them out in as fine detail as possible, identifying all the assumptions and sub-assumptions built into the programme" (Weiss, 1998). While such an approach might be difficult to apply at a strategy level for the less tangible areas of intervention within the CNDS including the institutional building side, there may well be a case for the use of such an approach but this is more likely to be a longer term instrument.

55. What does however deserve consideration is a more approximate method, which has been called 'Contribution Analysis' which examines evidence and cases for change and then attempts to build a credible story of attribution with the available evidence. This is in a sense working backwards from the field trying to explain what might have happened and why. It requires a clear presentation of the programme and its general aims, outlining a case for the programme aims, arguing the case for (or against) as to why and how the programme interventions could be associated with the outcomes observed and looking for alternative explanations and other factors that might account for the observed changes. Such an approach

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10 Forms of this have been applied in relation to evaluating Humanitarian interventions and some of the extravagant claims that have been associated with them e.g. "Millions of lives were saved because of the quick response of the international community in Southern Africa"
could well be taken for exploring the reasons behind significant changes in opium poppy area at district or provincial level

C: Who is to use the information and for what purpose?

56. The supply side of information needs to be driven by demand and this needs to be given as much attention. Part of the issue is around building incentives to use information and this can be addressed in a number of ways.

57. The first is using information to influence budgetary decisions and the allocation of resources in relation the NDCS. If activities are shown to perform and deliver effects this provides the basis for building on and increasing budgetary allocations. Equally the absence of information to support activity and programme effects could lead to a reduction in budgetary support. Clearly budgetary processes that send the right signals and incentives for performance based information are a prerequisite for demand processes to be built and to signal to key ministries the necessity of building effective information delivery systems.

58. While this will take time there is also the case for building demand from the field and beneficiary level and this takes us back to building in participatory processes in relation to programme delivery and impact assessment. Comparative experience from PRSP processes illustrate that there can be a role for the media in supporting this as well utilising the skills and capacities of advocacy focussed NGOs to act as intermediary voices. The dearth of such NGOs on Afghanistan’s NGO landscape is a particular cause for regret.

D: Who to monitor and why?

59. The final question remains as to who should be engaged in the monitoring. A fundamental principle of all effective monitoring systems that deliver quality and timely information is that there are demands and incentives within the system for utilising that information for performance management and learning. It follows that Ministries are unlikely to buy into a monitoring system and deliver what is required unless there are incentives for them to use the information themselves. This brings us back to the demand issue and bringing to bear the appropriate incentives.

60. It follows that the CNM cannot impose monitoring systems but can build demand for information and help Ministries build processes that deliver it. This will require negotiation with Ministries around key issues of indicators and what is to be monitored and understanding of how this will serve both Ministry as well as CNM interests. But this brings us to defining the role of the CNM with respect to monitoring.
IV Next Steps.

Introduction

61. This final section develops a number of proposals with respect to what the role of CNM should be in relation to monitoring and developing that role and suggests a number of steps that could be taken as part of that process. There is no doubt that there is potential for UNODC to support it in this process and a number of opportunities are identified to which UNODC could make a significant contribution.

What should the Role of the Counter Narcotics Ministry be in monitoring the CNDS?

62. The first issue that has to be addressed is the question of where the CNM is going to position itself in relation to the overall monitoring. There are choices to be made over the balance between engaged in monitoring the details of implementation and results through the line ministries or taking a more strategic view in relation to the overall policy implementation process. It could of course try to do both. At a time when the exact role and mandate of the CNM is still a matter for finalisation it is worth making the case as to why CNM should focus on the broad strategic issues and monitoring around this and leave the details of monitoring implementation to the ministries.

63. From a strategic point of view CNM must look to where it can add value to the whole process. It will be the key government agency that has to engage in policy dialogue both with cabinet and external agencies with respect to strategy, investment and implementation strategies and have an overview of progress. It must have the overview of the progress and contribution of the different pillars and be in a position to argue for changes in resource allocation according to key needs and effects both between and within the pillars of implementation. Equally it needs to address and develop a position in relation to the strategy of implementation – e.g. does it make sense to go for the core opium poppy provinces first or not – and what have been the effects of doing this? In summary it is believed that there is a strong case for the CNM to see its primary role with respect to advocacy, arguing from an evidence-based position for policy development and implementation strategies as well as developing and representing the government position in relation to external actors. This will require a keen and focussed analytical capacity based on strategic learning and critical thinking drawn from evidence in relation to implementation and its effects.

64. There are also questions of tactics. It has been argued that one needs to look at information not only from a supply side but also in relation to demand. A key role for the CNM is not only to create that demand for quality information but also to show how that demand is justified through the use of the information in strategy development. Rather than seeking to intervene through the supply side of information within Ministries, it should through strategic evaluations and input monitoring be able to develop and ask critical questions of implementing ministries which will help these ministries focus on developing their information delivery systems to respond to this demand.
65. One also needs to be strategic about building relations between CNM and other line ministries. The image and practice that CNM must seek to avoid at all costs is one of being seen as an agency that is trying to monitor the activities of other line Ministries. It requires an approach that focuses on building partnerships where the CNM is recognised for what it can contribute to Ministry monitoring and learning processes and not for seeking to direct them.

66. Finally realism is required with respect to what CNM can do. It has at present a limited professional staff complement. Even if this grows CNM will have little capability to be involved in the detail of implementation. This requires that it should focus its energies to where it can contribute best. While some within the Ministry may regret that the CNM does not have implementation capacities, this may well turn out to be a strength as it seeks to develop its role in strategic thinking and advocacy in relation to the opium poppy economy.

67. Table 5 summarises the potential role that CNM should play with respect to the monitoring of the CNM in relation to the key questions of “Who will Use the Information?” and “Who will monitor” and the levels of monitoring that were identified in section III.

68. Note needs to be made of the particular role of that CNM will play in evaluative studies. It is critical that CNM establishes a neutral position in this regard and it is strongly recommended that CNM’s role should be that of commissioning independent evaluations and studies where its role will be in defining the scope, terms of reference and management of the evaluations. It may however wish to be more engaged in research studies as part of a process of capacity building.

**Table 5 Identifying the potential role for the Counter Narcotics Ministry in Monitoring**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who to monitor?</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
<th>CNM Role</th>
<th>Key Partnerships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Input monitoring</td>
<td>MO Finance</td>
<td>Client</td>
<td>Line Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Outputs</td>
<td>Line Ministries</td>
<td>Client</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Outcomes</td>
<td>CNM</td>
<td>Commissioned Studies</td>
<td>Line Ministries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who will use the information?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Input Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Outputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Outcomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
69. In summary CNMs role in relation to monitoring of the CNMS are seen to be as follows:

- Primarily in at the pillar and cross pillar level in relation to lessons learnt and feedback into policy and strategy development;
- Focussing in the early stages on input monitoring across the pillars
- Monitoring of the Mainstreaming Process
- Working with line Ministries to develop relevant, useful and reliable indicators at the Intermediate outputs & process level;
- Commissioning independent evaluations and studies in relation to Intermediate and Final level assessments;

70. A final comment needs to be made with respect to the issue of monitoring compliance. This is not seen as something which CNM should be directly involved in since it will send mixed messages as to its role. If necessary this may be something that it could contract out to an independent agency but for preference this should be a role played by an M&E unit within the key implementation ministry.

**Developing the Role of CNM in monitoring**

71. The monitoring role of CNM needs to be built over time, reflecting realities over existing competencies and capacities within the CNM and other lines ministries. A set of proposed activities (these are more indicative than exhaustive) have been developed around a set of key tasks that need to be undertaken, the time frame within which this should happen (short = one year; medium term = upto three years; long term = within five years) and the outputs that should be generated from these activities. These are summarised in Table 6

72. These tasks are seen to be cumulative and part of a joined-up process of building up capacity and delivering in relation to strategic monitoring. This task list should not be read as a blue-print but should be constantly developed. A number of points are worth making in relation to the proposed tasks within the short-term time framework.

73. First the development of a database is seen to be critical. Unless CNM has a grasp of what is happening where it will have no oversight of implementation. While there are clearly issues of building complementarities with the Ministry of Finance budgetary systems, a CNM owned and managed database will fulfil a much wider function and should be seen as part of developing an analytical tool. In its development thought must first be put to the analytical purpose that it will be used for and the field structure and data collection processes built around this. There will be important questions of activity definition e.g. what exactly constitutes an alternative livelihood activity, and criteria will have to be collaboratively developed with line ministries. There will be good practice of disseminating this information, not least in encouraging (and in some cases shaming) donors and others to provide relevant and comprehensive information. In other words disseminating before monitoring. This implies the establishment of a data management unit within CNM.
Table 6. Developing the Monitoring Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Tasks</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short Term</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development of a database of CN activities/ projects/ programmes</td>
<td>Analytical report on CN activities, activity content, distribution by pillars, geography and issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work with Ministry of Finance to develop procedures for identifying budgetary allocations to CN activities by Ministry, Pillar etc</td>
<td>Analytical report on budgetary allocation and issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work with key line ministries to develop Indicators in relation monitoring of implementation (Intermediate Outputs)</td>
<td>Analytical report on Indicators and challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work with key Ministries/ Agencies to develop indicators for mainstreaming processes and implications for budgetary practice</td>
<td>Analytical report and development of budgetary practices in relation to tracking CN related investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commission of evaluative studies in:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Impacts of eradication</td>
<td>Evaluative / Research reports that feedback into implementation strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provincial based implementation practices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Annual Report</td>
<td>Review of Strategy Implementation, Monitoring lessons, issues and activities and future strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium Term</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continuation &amp; Development of Year 1 Tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development of Financial Tracking Systems in specific areas</td>
<td>Analytical report on financial allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Revision of NDCS Strategy</td>
<td>Revised strategy based on key lessons, implementation issues etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development of Intermediate Output and Process monitoring in selected pillars / sub-programmes</td>
<td>Reports that analyses implementation and short term changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commissioning evaluative studies in:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Causes and consequences of significant changes in opium area at district / provincial level</td>
<td>Evaluative / Research reports that feedback into implementation strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National Strategy of Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long Term</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continuation &amp; Development of Short &amp; Medium Term tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bringing to scale of Intermediate Output and Process Monitoring</td>
<td>Analytical reports on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commissioning evaluative studies in:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pillar level effects and impacts</td>
<td>Evaluative / Research reports that feedback into implementation strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Geographical level effects and impacts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74. The second task of building input monitoring will clearly require building close relations with the Ministry of Finance and the building of complementarities between the Ministry of Finance and CNM data management systems. The task of
bringing CN activities on budget will be that of the Ministry of Finance and CNM needs to establish itself as an interested customer for this information, working with the MOF to establish the key criteria that it is interested in. This will require some capacity within CNM for financial analysis and monitoring.

75. The third proposed task of building monitoring indicators has two objectives. The first is that of building relations between the CNM and the line Ministries and the development and agreement of key indicators that the line Ministries will monitor in relation to the implementation of activities. This will require building of capacity both CNM and other ministries of Indicator development. This should probably proceed on an incremental basis and possibly working with MRRD on monitoring in relation to Alternative Livelihoods may be the point to start (and being selective even within this pillar). The second objective of this development of monitoring which relates to the understanding of the Intermediate Output and Processes is that it will contribute towards the development of the NDCS, which it has been argued it weak with respect to causal analysis. The development of indicators will require a robust analysis of the planned interventions and causal links as a basis of indicator development. This will contribute towards building a revision of the NDCS policy (and thereby a participatory process) from the line Ministries upwards. The development of the strategy is proposed as a Medium Term task.

76. The fourth activity is related to the third and that is building indicators in relation to the mainstreaming process, and linking this in particular to the input monitoring that will be needed.

77. The fifth activity is that commissioning evaluative studies in relation to some of the immediate practices of implementation. Two initial areas are provisionally identified. The first is a critical look at the impacts of eradication in areas where eradication campaigns have been carried out. The second is to look closely at Provincial level implementation practices and lessons being learnt from these.

78. The final task that is proposed might seem surprising but if the CNM is to lead by example there is a strong case for the production of an annual report. The primary purpose of this annual report should not be to report on what the CNM did but to focus primarily on what it has learnt in relation to the implementation of the NDCS. This will provide not only feedback and accountability of the CNM to partner Ministries but it will help the CNM set the agenda in relation to monitoring practice and building demand for quality information.

The Role for UNODC in supporting the development of the CNM.

79. There is no doubt that the CN arena has a multitude of interested external actors and the question arises as to where UNODC can contribute best given its competencies and mandate. While the British Government as lead agency in relation to Anti-Narcotics has a key engagement with the CNM and will be implementing an Institutional Support project with CNM, as the lead UN agency UNODC clearly has a role in relation to the building of CNM capacity and leveraging UNODC’s extensive field experience and capacity to support CNM.
80. The development of a database is an area in which UNODC already has made some steps but this activity now needs to be given much greater investment and priority and developed in partnership with CNM. Particular attention will need to be given to thinking through the analytical purpose for which this database will be used and ensuring that this is reflected in both the database design and the ways in which information on projects and programmes are collected. It will be important to establish, for example, criteria to assess whether and how projects defined as ‘Alternative Livelihoods’ actually meet these objectives. Equally the database must be linked to GIS systems so that activities can be accurately mapped.

81. The capacity and competency building processes around the budgetary, indicator and other monitoring activities are areas in which UNODC should be able to provide direct support, possibly through a mentoring process.

82. Equally given UNODC experience through the strategic studies it should be in a position to support through advice on design, for etc and possibly contribution to implementation the key evaluative studies that are proposed. As noted in table 6 evaluative studies will be needed with respect to the impacts of eradication and provincial based planning and implementation during the current year. These studies would contribute to the proposed CNM annual report.
Annex 1. Terms of Reference.

Developing M&E Capacity, System and Mechanism in CND

Background

Drug control, crime and terrorism have figured on the top of the political agenda of all international forums related to the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction process of Afghanistan.

The National Drug Control Strategy, adopted in May 2003 is the culmination of various international and national debates and discussions that called for a coordinated framework for action. The Strategy sets out its goals, objectives and five primary components: institution building, judicial reform, law enforcement, alternative livelihoods, and demand reduction.

The Counter Narcotics Directorate was established within the National Security Council to coordinate, facilitate and monitor all counter narcotics activities of the Government and to take lead responsibility in seeing that the Strategy is implemented in a coherent manner by all relevant ministries and international partners.

Specifically, the Strategy states: “the overall mechanism for monitoring progress with implementation of the strategy will be managed by the Counter Narcotics Directorate. Specific targets, benchmarks, indicators and time-frames will be set to guide and monitor implementation plans in consultation with the working groups of line ministries. Monitoring will need to take account of the impact of interventions on the lives and livelihoods of primary stakeholders, as well as drug control indicators, if results are to prove sustainable”.

It should be noted, planning and coordination towards implementation of the Strategy has just started to take hold, with difficulties in complying with the Strategy’s own prescriptions. Concrete drug control Action Plans are just starting being implemented, including a few, scattered “alternative livelihoods” projects in some provinces, several demand reduction initiatives, law enforcement (interdiction and eradication), and the first phase of a counter narcotics public awareness campaign. Counter narcotics dimension, objectives and targets are yet to be mainstreamed into Line Ministries’ implementation plans and Afghanistan’s overall National Development Framework.

Implementation will be monitored by CND, annual operational plans will be done by each ministry. The strategy will be reviewed and updated annually by CND which reports to the National Security Council directly to the President recommendations on drug control policy and program developments. Building a M&E system and capacity within CND will ultimately allow development of well informed policies and evidence-based policies and operational plans that can have greater impact on counter narcotics objectives.

Objective
To strengthen the Counter Narcotics Directorate capacity as key Government Agency responsible for monitoring and evaluation of all drug control activities in Afghanistan, and developing a M&E strategy and system to be managed by CND.

Terms of Reference

Under the supervision of the Project Coordinator of AFG/G24, the Consultant will be responsible to undertake the following activities:

- **Provision of basic training on M&E to key CND staff, selected representatives from cross-cutting institutions and UNODC regional Coordinators** (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, Rehabilitation and Rural Development, Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Education).

- **Facilitating relationship building/raising awareness of relevance of M&E between CND and key line ministries:** These line ministries implement National Development Programmes (NDPs), Sub-Programmes and projects (e.g. NSP, NEEP, EQUIP, etc.) that rarely take into account the specifics of the opium economy and their interface with program objectives and activities. In fact, NDPs rarely take potential impacts on the opium economy into account in their design and evaluation, although they are not neutral in terms of such impacts. This activity will therefore aim to increase understanding amongst these ministries for: (a) mainstreaming counter-narcotics as a cross-cutting issue; (b) CND broad role in monitoring and evaluating line ministries’ implementation plans in terms of their impact and contribution to the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy; (c) the long-term need to coordinate information sharing, lessons learned, and M & E efforts; and (d) the importance of M&E as a learning tool for policy/programme development which is founded on proven practice.

- **Assisting CND and key line ministries in establishing mechanisms for sharing information:** This activity will foster goodwill and work arrangements between all key stakeholders. It will institutionalize regular meetings between key stakeholders to share information and lessons learned on key NDPs (sub-programs and project), as a prerequisite for developing a M & E mechanism that would allow CND to assess progress of interventions by NDPs against agreed to objectives and indicators of success, for each drug control thematic area (Alternative Livelihoods, Law Enforcement & Judicial Reform, Demand Reduction and Public Awareness). At this early stage, this activity will begin with a review of key NDPs and their existing M&E mechanisms and operations.

- **Facilitating CND and relevant line ministries identify and map key NDPs’ Sub-programs and projects that could participate in the mainstreaming process - for inclusion of the counter narcotics dimension - and assist in the practical development of an M&E strategy and work plan (per thematic sector).** Together with a group of experts, including the World Bank and DFID mainstreaming experts, work with CND and key staff across line ministries to map key National Development Sub-programs in terms of their possible contribution to counter narcotic mainstreaming. Specifically, prepare a Work Plan for developing (for each thematic sector and/or NDP) selected counter narcotics objectives, targets
and indicators of success that can be applied within NDPs to assess impact of interventions against counter narcotics objectives.

- **Provide orientation to CND and key staff across line ministries and assist them in developing basic monitoring and evaluation strategies and work plans** in support of key counter narcotics objectives and indicators of success for each drug control thematic sector. Agree M & E priorities and identify key resources (financial and personnel). Establish the link between collecting M & E data and using it to influence policy decisions to control drugs in Afghanistan.

- Advise and assist CND/UNODC regional offices coordinate and follow-up on CND M&E strategy and Work Plan, from the Provinces.

- Propose and design a Strategy Paper on M&E for CN, and a one-year phased training program, that will help build knowledge and skills and contribute to the implementation of CND M&E Strategy.

**Key Outputs**

- Acceptance of CND’s role as key Government Agency responsible for M&E of Drug Control Strategy. Improved relations and reporting mechanism with line ministries.

- Increased understanding of basic principles and techniques of M&E.

- CND individual Sections will have developed a M&E strategy/system and Work. Plan.

- Inputs to the M&E Section of the Operational Manual on Mainstreaming.
Annex 2. Itinerary.

2005
15/01 Arrival; Briefing Meeting with Consuelo C
16/01 Reading of Documents & Strategy
   Meeting with Head of CNM Units
   Meeting with Minister, CNM
17/01 Meeting with Heads of CNM Units
18/01 Meeting with Bill Byrd, World Bank
   Briefing Meeting with Doris Buddenburg, Head, UNODC
   Review of Documentation
   Meeting with UNODC Regional Officers
19/01 Meeting Chris Grose, IMA/ MRRD
   Review of Documentation (Mainstreaming)
20/01 Review of Documentation / Analysis
21/01 Preparation Workshop
22/01 Document Analysis
   Meeting with David Radcliffe, Dfid, UK
23/01 Preparation for Workshop
24/01 Preparation for Workshop
   Briefing to UN Heads of Mission
   Meeting with CNM Minister
   Meeting with Michael Alexander, European Commission
25/01 M&E Workshop
26/01 M&E Workshop
27/01 M&E Workshop
28/01 Drafting of Final Report
29/01 Drafting of Final Report
30/01 Drafting of Final Report
   Meeting with Internews
31/01 Drafting of Final Report
   Meeting with CNM Minister
01/02 Drafting of Final Report
   Meeting Richard Ivers, British Embassy
02/02 Drafting of Final Report
   Meeting David Mansfield
   Meeting Madeleine ??, UNODC, Database
03/02 Debriefing Meeting with Doris Buddenburg, Head, UNODC Country Office
   Presentation to Alternative Livelihoods Working Group, MRRD
   Meeting with Bill Byrd, World Bank
   Drafting of Final Report
04/02 Drafting of Final Report
Annex 3. Briefing to UN Heads of Agencies

Thinking through monitoring issues in relation to the National Drug Control Strategy:

Abstract.

Responding to the opium poppy economy will require not only direct action (in law enforcement, interdiction etc) but also indirect action. This will require that National Development Programmes and other development activities are attentive to the positive and potentially negative effects (through mainstreaming processes to which UN agencies can make a major contribution) that they can make to the NDCS. The Ministry of Counter-Narcotics is charged with the overall responsibility of monitoring the implementation and impact of the NDCS. The presentation will outline an approach to building a collaborative monitoring framework that emphasizes learning as much as accountability between the Ministry and other key line Ministries and Agencies.

1. The Opium Poppy Economy - & M&E
   - What is cause and effect?
   - Development failure or military issue?
   - Uniqueness
   - Comparative experience?

2. The National Drug Strategy (Table 1)
   - Components
   - Actors
   - Ghettoising or mainstreaming?

3. The Mandate of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.
   - Policy
   - Monitoring
   - Role – advocacy / co-ordination, not implementation

4. The Role of Monitoring.
   - Accountability
   - Performance management
   - Learning
   - Communication

5. Challenges & Complexities in relation to M&E of the NDCS
   - Targets and perverse incentives
   - Causal relations (technical v communication interventions,
   - Compromise versus outright victory
   - Complexity of strategies
   - Limited accumulation of knowledge
   - A conflictual process
   
   • Who and what is M&E for?
   • How can it be participatory with stakeholders at all levels (AL)?
   • How can gender issues be fully taken into account?
   • How can it be a basis for organisational learning?

7. Key strategies.
   
   • Set clear and realistic objectives
   • Involve key beneficiaries in setting objectives
   • Seek clarity on long-term goals
   • Incorporate different dimensions of success (process monitoring)
   • Don’t forget the external context (AL and the issue of risk & uncertainty)

8. The Logic of the NDCS – Policy, Programmes and Sub-Programmes
   (Tables 2-4)
   
   • The intervention logic of the NDCS;
   • The intervention logic of Pillar 2: Alternative Livelihoods
   • Critical questions of indicators – process, proximate and outcome

9. The Role of the MCN in monitoring
   
   • Policy & pillar level
   • Looking for significant change at ground level (Context)
   • Multi-level – annual judgement by partners of impact, peer reviews, independent evaluations, infrequent long-term impact research
Annex 4 Workshop Outline.

Workshop Outline. (January 25-27th, 2005)

Objective

- To introduce key staff of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and focal points in partner Ministries to the basic principles of monitoring and evaluation;

- To apply these principles to the development of a framework for monitoring the National Counter Narcotics Strategy implementation

Workshop Schedule

Each morning two sessions:

Note: Day 1: Registration 08.15.

Session 1: 08.30 – 10.30

Tea Break: 10.30 – 11.00

Session 2: 11.00 – 13.00

Lunch: 13.00

Workshop Methods

- Presentation of Key concepts and issues
- Workshop Discussion
- Group Work and presentations
- Roles and Responsibilities

Day 1. (January 25th, 2005)

08.15 Registration and Tea

Key Topics

- What is monitoring and evaluation?
- Why monitor and evaluate
- Different approaches to monitoring and evaluation
• Basic Principles of Monitoring and Evaluation
• Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation
• The Programme & Project Cycle
• Review of the Morning

Day 2. (January 26th, 2005)

Key Topics

• Levels of Monitoring & Evaluation: efficiency, effects and impact
• The Logical Framework: activities, results, objectives and goals
• Applying the Logical Framework to the National Counter-Narcotics Strategy;
• Review of the Morning

Day 3. (January 27th, 2005)

Key Topics

• Principles of managing data
• Data selection and indicators;
• Data collection
• Data analysis
• Data use
• General Observations
• Review of the Workshop
Annex 5 Briefing to the Alternative Livelihoods Working Group Meeting.

Developing a Monitoring Framework for the National Drug Control Strategy.
A Briefing Note

Background Issues

1. The Counter Narcotics Ministry (CNM) has the mandate for oversight of the monitoring of implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). In addition it has a key function of policy and strategy development.

2. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is not just a technical issue. While it assumes an overall rationality of means and ends as a desirable goal, it must be recognised that policy making in the real world does not follow the rationalist model of an evidence based-policy process (policy formulation and its subsequent implementation). It involves political choices at all levels and no more so than in the NDCS.

3. A key function then of the technical monitoring process must be to build linkages to the political processes around the NDCS and bring the weight of evidence to the table to inform political judgements. Critical to this process must be the building of the CNM as an effective actor to lead on the national debate but also to establish its weight and authority in dealing with external interests.

4. This proposal proceeds from a position that responses to the Opium Poppy Economy (OPE) and policy processes have a better chance of working if they are based in National processes of policy dialogue and accountability, are comprehensive and broad based and coordinate both national and international resources and resource allocation practices are linked to performance and outcomes.

5. The very scale of the OPE in Afghanistan and its pervasiveness makes it unique, and comparative experience offers few lessons except the knowledge that change is a long term process and that the tyranny of urgency should not blind us to that fact. What is cause and what is effect in relation to the existence of the OPE and a fragile state is a matter for debate but this paper proceeds from the position that the more coherent argument is that opium poppy area and production should be regarded more as a symptom of underlying development failure. This is consistent with the agenda of mainstreaming responses to the OPE.

6. The NDCS was developed in 2003 and elaborates an overall strategy which establishes an overall goal of eliminating all aspects of the OPE within a specified time period. Supporting this strategy is a number of themes (pillars) in relation to alternative livelihoods, the extension of drug law enforcement, the implementation of drug control legislation, the establishment of effective institutions and demand reduction.

7. Unfortunately the NDCS does not provide a basis for establishing a monitoring framework. This is largely due to the fact that the strategy lacks discussion on priorities and choices and argumentation in relation to possible cause-effect
relations both within the pillars and across the pillars in their linkage to the overall strategy objectives. The relation between proposed activities and purposes have not been established. Current objectives and goals of the individual pillars are not consistent with the overall strategy. Thinking through a set of issues in relation to monitoring may require some revisiting of aspects of the strategy.

8. The mainstreaming initiative is an important and necessary step in the response to the OPE. It raises particular questions as to how that process will be monitored and how the mainstreaming outcomes will link through to counter-narcotic objectives. Mainstreaming the National Development Programmes will be a particular priority. More importantly the mainstreaming initiative invites direct comparison with PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) processes and the linking of the monitoring of the NDCS with that of the PRSP, and drawing lessons from comparative experience in this area. A key lesson is the building of participatory processes right down to the field level.

Developing an Approach to M&E of the NDCS

9. The approach is structured around a set of four questions with a common theme of the levels at which monitoring should take place.

10. What to monitor and why?:

- **Input monitoring** through budget formulation, scale and timeliness of disbursements, delivery differentiated by pillar and location.
- **Intermediate output and implementation** process monitoring but this requires clear strategic analysis around probable causal relations and where leverage of change might happen; critical issues will be a rapid feedback of information for learning;
- **Final outcome and impact** but at the pillar level; opium poppy area should be treated as an indicator of health and not a target.

11. How to obtain relevant and useful information?

- **Input monitoring** through financial management and specific tracking surveys plus approaches to participatory public expenditure management
- **Intermediate output & process** through routine administrative systems but realism as to incentives, capacities and demands for information. The case for different approaches to supplement through community/provider linked systems, qualitative participatory monitoring systems, commissioned studies and special surveys;
- **Final outcome and impacts** through surveys, participatory assessments, theory based evaluations and probable cause analysis

12. Who will use the information and for what purpose?: a critical issue of building demand for information and incentives to use it at all levels.

- **Input monitoring** – linking evidence from all three levels to feed back into budgetary processes; CNM / Line Ministries/ Ministry of Finance
- **Intermediate outputs and processes** – Line Ministries / Communities/ CNM

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11 A critical issue will be bringing all expenditure in relation to anti-narcotics on budget
• Final Outcomes and Impacts: CNM in relation to policy / Communities

13. Who to monitor and why?

• Input monitoring – CNM/ Ministry of Finance & Line Ministries, & communities
• Intermediate outputs & processes – Line Ministries with CNM & communities
• Final Outcomes and Impact – CNM & Communities

The role for CNM in Monitoring

14. The role for CNM within the overall monitoring is seen to be as follows:
• Primarily in at the pillar and cross pillar level in relation to lessons learnt and feedback into policy and strategy development;
• Focussing in the early stages on input monitoring across the pillars
• Monitoring of the Mainstreaming Process
• Working with line Ministries to develop relevant, useful and reliable indicators at the Intermediate outputs & process level;
• Commissioning independent evaluations and studies in relation to Intermediate and Final level assessments;

And a final question:

• Should it be involved in monitoring compliance?
Annex 6. The intervention logic for Pillar 2: Alternative Livelihoods of the National Drug Control Strategy

Programme
Alternative Livelihoods

SP-1
NDPs

SP-2
Enabling Environment

SP-3
Coordination

SP-4
Alternative Livelihood Options

SP-5
Reduced Vulnerability

SP-6
Capacity to Deliver Services

SP-7
Infrastructure

SP-8
Support Services

Goal
To contribute to reduction of production of OP

Purpose
Viable alternative livelihoods to OPE adopted by rural Ihlids

Goal
To contribute towards the adoption by rural households currently engaged in the opium poppy economy of alternative livelihood options

Results
1. Sustainable licit livelihoods developed especially for the most-vulnerable groups including female & child-headed Ihlids

Purpose
(a) NDPS are resourced & effective in key OP districts

(b) CN objectives are mainstreamed into NDPS

2. Reduced dependence of communities on opium poppy cultivation

Purpose
(a) Agriculture & private sector development supported by policies & regulative environment

(b) Democratically elected gvmnt bodies at community, district & province level effective

3. Effective rural credit systems established

Purpose
(a) A diversity of income generating opportunities available to and adopted by rural households

(b) Effective safety nets in place and available for those unable to work

4. Labour intensive employment opportunities available for rural labour.

Purpose
(a) Capacity for coordination between key rural development ministries improved

(b) Capacity of NGOs to coordinate with key ministries and effectively deliver services improved

5. Appropriate infrastructure developed at village and district level

Purpose
(a) Village level small scale infrastructure developed

(b) Access to appropriate credit to reduce opium based debt & encourage licit investment improved

Property of

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(d) Access to business development services improved

(c) Access to agricultural support services improved

(d) Terms of trade for Afghan producers of licit products improved

(c) Land and water rights clarified