



011
Agriculture-O/AID/REP
LIBRARY

UN PROGRAMMES FOR AFGHANISTAN

A report on the state of funding, policies and planning for 1991 and the implications for non-governmental agencies

by
Felicity Lawrence

Commissioned by
the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR)

1 November 1990
Peshawar, Pakistan



FOREWORD

Cross-border aid to Afghanistan and refugee programmes are under threat as "donor fatigue" begins to bite. 1991 will undoubtedly be a critical year in this respect. Will donors hold funding at a bare minimum, pending a political solution for Afghanistan? Will repatriation of the world's largest refugee population become a precondition for the release of development funds? Or will the "pull" factor of reconstruction in the countryside be more important than the "push" factor of waning interest? Most importantly, who decides?

Felicity Lawrence's report deals with only one part of the equation - the United Nations and its partners. The picture is not encouraging: uncertainty over future levels of funding; absence of effective planning; lack of coordination. It would be unfair to lay such complaints solely at the doorstep of the UN. NGOs hardly have an untarnished record! But in so far as the UN takes a lead in matters of coordination and countrywide planning, it is essential to examine its record in this respect.

Purely negative criticism would be unhelpful and damaging. ACBAR commissioned this report to highlight where and how difficulties have occurred. Crucially, though, the report should clear the air for more fruitful discussions and collaboration in the future. The UN will remain the key policy maker for future aid to Afghanistan; to recognise this is also to recognise the pivotal role of NGOs as implementing partners.

The report itself does not necessarily represent the views of ACBAR or any of its constituent members. In our view, however, it is an honest summary of views expressed not by the author, but by UN, government and NGO personnel contacted.

If the report and the ACBAR Donors Conference in November provide the impetus for more concerted planning between UN bodies and NGOs, it will have been more than worthwhile.

Jon Bennett
Executive Director
ACBAR

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
Scope of the report	
Methods	
A changing picture	
KEY ISSUES	3
1. Political Uncertainty	3
2. Uncertainty over Funding	4
3. How Great is the Need?	4
4. Lack of Forward Planning and Delays in Decision Making	5
5. Lack of Flexibility in Funding	5
6. Lack of Coordination	6
i Overall Priorities	
ii Division of Responsibilities	
iii Channels of Funding	
7. Attitudes to NGOs	7
AGENCY POSITIONS	8
1. UNOCA	8
2. UNDP	11
3. UNFDAC	14
4. UNICEF	15
5. WHO	18
6. FAO	20
7. WFP	20
8. UNHCR	22

ACRONYMS

APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION

Scope of the report

This report was commissioned to look at the state of funding, policy and planning for 1991 in UN agencies which support non-governmental organisations.

How UN agencies have performed in the past and what multilateral donors think will happen politically obviously affect the availability of funds for next year. It is not within the scope of this report to judge UN performance, nor has there been time to consult all donor governments, but the views of representatives of the major donors have been included where possible.

Methods

Interviews were conducted with staff at both junior and senior level in the UN agencies which fund Peshawar-based NGOs, with ACBAR members, and with senior representatives of donor governments. Most interviews were conducted in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but where appropriate, interviews were recorded with staff at UN agency headquarters.

Interviews were conducted both formally and informally. Many people preferred to speak on an unattributable basis or, where they had been frank, were worried subsequently that they had said too much. Unattributable allegations are easy to make, easy to deny, and hard to refute. Nevertheless, anxieties were expressed privately by UN executives and donors at the most senior level and with such consistency that they cannot be ignored. For this reason, many unattributed quotes have been included.

Some UN staff members were vitriolic about their sister organisations. All operations of any size suffer their share of internal politics; details of wrangles have been included only in so far as they have serious implications for partners. Much of what is published here has been common knowledge among the aid community for some time. There is clearly still a great reluctance to discuss these issues openly, but the impact of interagency squabbling on the effectiveness and funding of Afghan programmes is significant.

Most NGOs interviewed were Peshawar-based, and were equally worried about talking on the record. Some were very slow to come up with information for this report. Most NGOs in Quetta are covered by SWABAC rather than ACBAR; there has not been time to conduct an extensive survey of Quetta-based organisations, but interviews were held with some agencies and are quoted where they are relevant.

A changing picture

This report has been prepared for presentation at the ACBAR Donors Conference on November 11. Information available up until October 31 only could be included, but the first two weeks of November will see a great deal of activity: the Pledging Conference for UN Development Activities takes place in New York between November 1 and 2; key UN agencies are holding policy meetings in the first two weeks of November; negotiations with government donors are being conducted now. The position of agencies is changing by the day.

UNOCA's third consolidated report has been due "any day now" for over two weeks, and has been available to some UN executives and representatives of bilateral donors in Peshawar, even though UNOCA staff said they had not seen it. It is unfortunate that it was not available for this report, since the answer to many of the questions asked in interviews with UNOCA were said to be contained within it. UNOCA were unable to supply most of the figures requested on funding.

The picture presented in this report will undoubtedly change in the next few weeks. However, the underlying problems are unlikely to change unless they are addressed.

I KEY ISSUES

NGOs have expressed concern at the uncertainty surrounding their programmes in 1991 and beyond.

Some of the uncertainty, particularly that caused by lack of information, could be quite easily removed. Some of it is the inevitable consequence of working with a country still at war. Other uncertainties are created by the failure of all parties - bilateral, UN and NGO - to agree on key issues of aid policy.

1. Political Uncertainty

"Donors made their pledges in 1988 on the assumption that there would be a unitary government within six months and that we could rebuild Afghanistan. That has not happened and it has not been possible to rebuild the country," (Gerety, UNHCR, Islamabad).

UNOCA are doing no more than stating the obvious when they say: "Funding for next year will depend to an unusually enormous extent on developments in the political situation. I have been saying since January that there will be funding problems if there is no substantial return or political breakthrough by the autumn. We haven't had either of those things, so funding will be very difficult," (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

Some major donors have tied their money to repatriation. Most notably, the Government of Japan still has approximately \$45 million (their own estimate) placed on reserve in UNOCA's Emergency Trust Fund. The main condition for releasing these funds is that substantial numbers of refugees should return to Afghanistan (see UNOCA below). Monitoring levels of return is extremely difficult. "Large numbers of refugees from Baluchistan have gone back, but we can't prove it," (Wanroy, UNHCR, Islamabad).

However, it is generally acknowledged that the requirement is not just for repatriation but for a political solution which leads to repatriation. So long as the political uncertainty remains, the extent of funding will also be unclear.

Ironically, there are in fact substantial UN funds available for Afghanistan which are not being used because they are committed to the recognised government in Kabul (see UNDP below). UN offices in Kabul have limited implementing capacity, and most have not worked outside the capital for several years. Cross-line assistance is dangerous and restricted, and many NGOs are unable or unwilling to cope with the political implications of accepting money from Kabul.

2. Uncertainty over Funding

Most UN agencies assume that funds will be cut for next year. "The funds are drying up," (WHO). "The money's gone," (UNDP). "There is definite donor fatigue," (UNICEF). "Next year will be bleak," (UNHCR).

What no one knows is just how great the cuts will be. Donors will be asked to make pledges at conferences taking place in November, but even then there can be no certainty that these pledges will be fulfilled. Nor can UN agencies always predict what conditions may be imposed by a donor government, or how aid priorities may shift in the coming year. In 1990 new demands for money for the Gulf and Eastern Europe have coincided with a growing frustration over lack of progress in Afghanistan.

Representatives of the Government of USA and of the EC in fact thought it quite likely that contributions would be sustained at the same level in 1991. But many donor governments will be reluctant to make new pledges until 1990's pledges to the UNOCA Emergency Trust Fund have been fulfilled. How much is outstanding in unpaid pledges in cash is a figure UNOCA could not give for this report, although they said it would be in their third consolidated report.

3. How Great is the Need?

The fanfare which accompanied the UN appeal for \$1.16 billion for Afghanistan in 1988 created enormous expectations. In fact the sums actually spent by the UN have never been more than a fraction of the pledges made. And of the total budget of ACBAR members of \$108 million in 1990, only about 20% came from UN funds (see appendix). By comparison, in 1990 USAID spent approximately \$100 million on projects for Afghanistan, in addition to US money channelled through the UN.

It is not possible to put a figure on the effect cuts in UN funding will have on NGOs in 1991: where money could not be guaranteed, some NGOs have switched to other sources, or not put forward new proposals; only a few have been unable to find alternative funding or have had to close existing projects.

It may be, therefore, that a drop in UN funding will not have any great impact on programmes, but the assumption is that any cut in funding is a disaster for agencies and for the people of Afghanistan.

UNOCA's Plans of Action have, by their own admission, not been plans so much as fund-raising documents. Their success will be measured to some extent in terms of their ability to produce funds for next year, and they are inevitably under pressure to adopt the same approach again: "Some colleagues say that since the situation is confused we should design a "holding approach" plan because the donors will be negative. I don't think that is the correct approach. We must design a programme based on a relatively optimistic assessment. The donors will be the final judge [of whether work can usefully continue or not], but we must give them the option by presenting them with a programme," (Barber,

UNOCA, Islamabad). NGOs find it equally difficult to question the need for funds or to reduce programmes which they have been encouraged to expand.

There are of course many who argue that investment now is essential if refugees are to be encouraged to return. Some have argued that services to refugees need to be cut if they are to go back. But the danger, as some NGOs have pointed out privately, is that the basic questions - how much work in Afghanistan can be effective at present and how much support should refugees continue to get - are lost in the fight for funds.

"We should all be radically reassessing what we are doing," (Eaton, UNDP, Peshawar). "A cut in funds might not be such a bad thing," (McDonnell, WHO, Quetta). "If there is less money, we'll all have to focus our thoughts a bit harder, and frankly, some NGOs should go to the wall," (large-scale NGO, Peshawar; a view echoed by three other NGOs).

4. Lack of Forward Planning and Delays in Decision Making

Some UN agencies - UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP - have still not defined their policies for next year. Yet many NGOs who depend on them for funding are having to make plans now.

UNICEF contracts for 1990 were only signed in March and April. Contracts for 1991 are unlikely to materialise before NGOs have spent their budget for the first quarter. Projects which are due for renewal at the end of the year are only now being evaluated in a process which in some cases will not be complete before February.

WHO is unable to tell NGOs how much money it will have next year and does not expect to be able to consider anything before February.

While the head of UNDP in New York and the coordinator of UNOCA in Geneva try to settle an argument by November 10 over who should fund a crop protection project in northern Afghanistan, the season for action is almost coming to an end. What sort of future UNDP's office in Peshawar will have remains unknown.

NGOs complain that it is very difficult to plan efficiently under these circumstances.

5. Lack of Flexibility in Funding

WHO, FAO and WFP have all, at one stage or another, had problems covering their management costs. Donors have been reluctant to fund administration, and agencies have found themselves tied to plans which may have been produced in the first flush of fund-raising activity after the Geneva Accords, before any real assessment of needs could be conducted. FAO, for example, have money for rehabilitation work in areas which are no longer their top priority, because they are being covered by other organisations; however, they cannot switch the funds to their inputs programme, which is universally acknowledged to be highly successful but will run out of funds in May or June.

UNOCA have repeatedly said that without unearmarked cash donations they cannot operate with the flexibility required to cope with the complexities of the Afghan situation.

6. Lack of Coordination

It is the general perception among UN agencies and NGOs that UNOCA have not been able to coordinate funding policy and practice effectively.

It is acknowledged that UNOCA have provided legitimacy for UN agencies to work in unorthodox situations; enabled Soviet pledges in kind to be used for the first time; and established cross-line networks from its Kabul office with considerable success. "It has given us a licence to operate and has played the politics," (Fitzherbert, FAO, Islamabad).

They have not, as comments from their partners make clear, established a consensus on priorities for funding, on division of responsibility between agencies, or on how different channels of funds for Afghanistan should be controlled (see UNOCA below).

Whatever the reasons for this, the lack of consensus is creating uncertainties among UN agencies and NGOs in planning for next year and contributes to a malaise among donor governments which will affect funding.

i Overall Priorities

Agreed priorities covering the whole of Afghanistan have still not been established.

There is dispute over which geographical areas deserve most attention among both UN agencies and NGOs. Work within areas is sometimes ill-coordinated and NGOs have contributed to this (see ACBAR/UN Paktika Report).

There are still disagreements between different UN offices about cross-line and cross-border work and the extent to which the former should prevail over the latter (see UNICEF, UNDP below).

ii Division of Responsibilities

Disputes between UN agencies impede effective coordination. Currently the main dispute is between UNOCA and UNDP, who have clashed over funds and over who should coordinate programmes. Because there is no clear agreement on division of responsibilities, NGOs have found their funding so delayed as to jeopardise their projects (see UNOCA and UNDP below).

There have been previous clashes, notably between UNHCR and UNOCA. These disputes are a symptom of the inability of the coordinating body to command UN fiefdoms. They affect everybody and prevent the setting of clearly agreed priorities. "What is happening to UNDP worries us all," (Jamieson, UNHCR, Geneva). "How the conflict between UNDP and UNOCA is resolved will have serious implications for us all," (Richter, WHO, Geneva).

iii Channels of Funding

A substantial part of the money available for Afghanistan has not come under the coordinator's control. This applies specifically to funds controlled by UN offices and government in Kabul (see UNDP below). Agencies with country offices in Kabul admit that they do not have the implementing capacity to make use of substantial funds at present but are either unwilling or unable to release that money through other channels.

There is a considerable gulf between the attitudes of UN staff based in Kabul and those based in Pakistan. On both sides there are those who feel that the other side is politically compromised.

The Afghan Programme Offices are unorthodox operations for most UN agencies and some would feel more comfortable working with traditional country programmes based in Kabul. This year, however, the "pressure to move to Kabul" feared by many NGOs seems to be a major factor only in UNICEF and UNDP planning (see below).

The question of "Kabul money" is seldom openly discussed. When it is, the issues tend to get buried in interagency disputes, but they remain the same: how can UN funds allocated to Kabul be released in such a way as to enable their full, effective and coordinated use, without compromising any of the government, UN or NGO parties involved?

UN agencies would prefer to tackle these questions proposal by proposal and fear that any set answers would prevent the imaginative and innovative approach needed to overcome the political sensitivities involved. Some NGOs refuse even to contemplate contact with Kabul; some are prepared to work through the problem on an ad hoc basis; but many more are discouraged from pursuing the possibility precisely because there is no clear procedure to follow. In particular, they need to know how reporting structures would work, given that UN offices in Kabul (with the exception of UNOCA) have formal protocols with the government.

7. Attitudes to NGOs

Whether the UN will continue to value NGOs as implementing partners has been called into question by some agencies. The view expressed by UNHCR: "To the extent that the UN moves in to Afghanistan, it will not be able to sell foreign NGOs to shuras," (Gerety, UNHCR, Islamabad) is also held by UNOCA. UNOCA plans for some provinces talk of bypassing foreign NGOs and working only through local structures.

Other agencies have said that they cannot implement their programmes without help from foreign NGOs.

What UN agencies think the role of NGOs should be in the next year needs clarification.

II AGENCY POSITIONS

1. UNOCA

i Mandate

UNOCA's mandate expires on December 31. "Of course we are worried about what our position is going to be next year. It is hardly satisfactory to be told what your position is only two months before you cease to exist, but that is a fact of life," (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

The lack of a longer-term mandate has led to much damaging speculation. Here is a sample of comments from senior UN executives:

"What will UNOCA's role be next year. Will they be here next year?" (Mountain, UNDP, Kabul).

"UNOCA's role in our opinion is to close down" (Rosenhall, UNICEF, Peshawar).

"UNOCA is not seen to be performing its role. We have to find a better formula," (Jamieson, UNHCR, Geneva).

"The feedback from donors is that they are by and large very disappointed and unhappy to continue funding through UNOCA," (Richter, WHO, Geneva).

And the following comments were made unattributably by senior staff of two UN agencies:

"It doesn't make any difference whether UNOCA is there or not; we will have to go to the donors direct."

"UNOCA has been flexing its muscles recently but it's a death spasm."

ii Funding

For this report, UNOCA were asked how much money they have in cash, how much was outstanding in cash pledges not yet received, and how much has been allocated in cash to proposals or agencies at UNOCA's discretion. It is not possible to determine the answer to these questions from UNOCA's previous consolidated reports, and although the third consolidated report was said to contain the information, it was not available at the time of writing.

Representatives of donor governments complained about the lack of clear financial reporting from UNOCA: "Their transparency is terrible," (Nishibayashi, Japanese Mission to UN, Geneva; a view echoed by four other senior representatives of donor governments).

The key to UNOCA's funding next year will be releasing pledges which have already been made and cash which has been placed on reserve by donors. There is still approximately \$45 million from the Government of Japan frozen in UNOCA's Emergency Trust Fund. "The

blocked Japanese money is an important psychological barrier among donors. If the coordinator cannot persuade the Japanese to unblock that money, they will say why should we commit more," (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

The Government of Japan say they will consider releasing funds "little by little". They have asked UNOCA to submit an internal report and discussions will take place this month in Tokyo. "There are two factors: repatriation and reporting; the main one is repatriation," (Nishibayashi, Geneva).

How much money will come from other donors, and what conditions will be attached to it, is not clear.

Other UN agencies have expressed anxiety about UNOCA's capacity to fund-raise for next year (UNHCR, WHO) and have said they will have to make direct approaches to donors (UNHCR, WHO, FAO, UNICEF).

Many UN agencies also feel that information about what funds are available is inadequate:

"UNOCA are always saying they have no money, but there seems to be money immediately for certain sorts of projects," (FAO).

"Proposals go through pretty quickly if the UNOCA name is on it," (UNFDAC).

"They could give us our money if they wanted to," (UNDP).

UNOCA's cash flow remains a serious problem both for their own operation and for NGOs. Staff at UNOCA sub-offices have complained of not having money to pay for basic needs. The representative in Kabul (the seventh in less than two years) has made imaginative use of donations in kind: "I've never had a budget. I never know when money is going to come. I inherited a debt, so I started selling off Russian sugar and petrol to make money," (von der Schulenberg, UNOCA, Kabul). Instalments of money owed to the Mines Awareness Programme were consistently late, and in one case up to six months behind schedule. The implications of such cash flow problems for newly created Afghan NGOs which have only one source of funding are serious.

iii Coordination

In terms of UNOCA's policy for next year: "the big shift I would like to see is towards provincial or district based plans. Donors won't accept health programmes for the whole of Afghanistan. We are trying now to develop provincial programmes with clearly defined strategies province by province and we will be asking other agencies to do that. They will be based on areas where we have had SMUs, on proposals from NGOs, and in some areas on Afghan implementing capacity. It will broadly mean that the Kabul, Herat and Mazar offices plan for the north, while the Peshawar offices plan for the south," (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

*is all funds to
PDPA Dec-04 through
inter mediating*

But there is no consensus among UN agencies on how priorities should be established. The following are comments made by senior executives from five different UN agencies:

"UNOCA's pet projects are irrelevant to us."

"They are declaring foolish zones of tranquillity."

"UNOCA and UNDP clash on priorities... on the use of Afghan NGOs... on geographical regions... and on UNDP staffing," (senior UNOCA executive).

"They have been obstructive about proposals without reason."

"We will have to establish direct links with other UN agencies to formulate policy if UNOCA can't."

"Each UN agency will say that it has its own mandate and that they don't take instructions from anyone. But we have to make clear that the coordinator is the coordinator," (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

There are also disagreements about the mechanisms for coordination. Proposals from Pakistan-based projects go through an interagency steering committee chaired by UNOCA. While some agencies see this as a useful process for sharing information, there is no consensus on the authority of the steering committee.

"If I like a proposal but the steering committee does not, I can still send it to HQ and get the money," (head of one APO in Peshawar). UNICEF, FAO, and WHO say they have no written agreements to work through the steering committee. Agencies feel that the scarcer funds become, the greater the problem this presents.

Some agencies have also expressed concern that proposals are approved or rejected on the basis of technical questions which are outside UNOCA's area of competence.

iv Confidence

The issue of confidence in UNOCA has been raised by their UN sister agencies. To a large extent, it is they who have to answer the further questions:

- Can UNOCA build a coalition for next year which will be effective in coordinating policy and raising funds?
- Do those UN agencies whose senior executives have expressed a lack of confidence in UNOCA feel that the functions UNOCA have performed - providing the licence for UN agencies to work outside their normal mandates, establishing cross-line networks, "playing the politics" - are no longer necessary or that some other agency can take them on?

2. UNDP

How far UNDP's office for Afghan projects in Peshawar will be able to function independently next year is not clear. Disputes between UNOCA and UNDP over funding and policy have left the APO without money, and policy has not yet been thrashed out.

i UNDP Structure

Under normal circumstances, UNDP is the official UN body which coordinates the activities of UN agencies in a country. The UNDP resident representative deals with a country's foreign ministry on behalf of other agencies acting as implementers of programmes. Each country is allocated funds by the UN on the basis of an Indicative Planning Figure (IPF), which is calculated from criteria such as GNP per capita.

Because of the war, Afghanistan has an accumulation of IPF funds which have not been used. For twelve years until last year, UNDP had not operated outside Kabul. The current 5 year IPF plan has a carry-over of \$78 million, of which only \$20 million will have been spent by the end of this year. In 1992, when a new plan comes into effect, a further \$70 million is due.

UNDP's resident representatives act officially not as decision-makers but as advisers to the recognised government of the country, and any IPF money must be signed off by both parties. Najibullah's regime is of course the recognised government of Afghanistan at the UN.

Again under normal circumstances, masterplans for various fields of activity, such as health, agriculture, education, would be drawn up in consultation with the relevant ministry in the government, and UN implementing agencies would report back on their programmes to the same ministries. Because of these close links with government, many NGOs working cross-border feel unable to work through UN offices based in Kabul.

Traditionally UNDP has acted as a funding agency, not an implementing one. But by the laws of UN chemistry, a UNDP implementing body, the Office of Project Services (OPS), was formed in reaction to the bureaucratic failings and 15% surcharges of its implementing partners.

ii UNDP/UNOCA Relations

In April 1989, in anticipation of the Kabul Government's imminent demise, UNDP, along with other UN agencies, set up its Peshawar office known as UNDP/OPS APO to implement programmes cross-border. UNOCA signed an agreement to give the APO \$10.1 million, while the Kabul government and UNDP also signed off IPF funds for the programme. It was clearly understood that the APO would be at arm's length from the Kabul office. To keep the political lines clear the IPF money was used to set up the office

and cover salaries, while the first tranche of the money from UNOCA, \$4.4 million, was allocated to proposals. The second tranche from UNOCA, of \$5.7 million, was due on June 1, 1990.

In May, UNOCA informed UNDP that it would not be transferring the money. UNDP's headquarters in New York then issued instructions to the APO not to consider any new proposals from NGOs. There is money to honour all current contracts with NGOs. Staff contracts run until the end of December and the office could be kept running with a skeleton staff until May with present funds. But NGOs whose proposals were in the process of being approved by UNDP/OPS APO, notably SCF(US), whose proposal for \$210,000 as part of an agricultural project had been on the table since February, were told there was no money. A question mark hangs over the veterinary projects funded by APO which will need \$2 million next spring if they are to continue.

UNOCA's explanation for reneging on the UNDP contract is that the APO allocation was part of the Japanese contribution to the Emergency Trust Fund which has been frozen until substantial repatriation takes place. They also argue that "one of the problems with the UNDP/OPS's NGO support project is that its objectives are too vague. It is basically a reactive programme which waits for NGOs to come with proposals, and donors are no longer willing to go along with this formula," (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

iii Dispute over New Projects

Part of UNDP's "reactive" programme with "vague objectives" is a proposal from the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), acting as an umbrella organisation for several NGOs, for a sunn pest and locust control project in the north, which would run both cross-border from Peshawar and cross-line. The proposal was presented in two phases: a training phase to be financed by UNDP, and an implementation phase for which UNOCA would procure and deliver supplies cross-line. Technical assistance is provided by an FAO consultant.

Since UNDP's APO no longer has any funds, negotiations to finance the first phase from IPF funds have been conducted with UNDP's Kabul office and are well advanced. Meanwhile, UNOCA contacted SCA urgently and said they would like to fund the whole programme. They said they had persuaded the Swiss Government to release about \$600,000 to cover the cash requirement of the project. "The reason we are able to secure the money is that this is a precise and detailed programme," (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

Why, if UNOCA cannot pay UNDP/OPS the money it owes, is it so anxious to fund a proposal which UNDP wants to fund from its IPF resources? "We are strongly in favour of IPF funds being used for rehabilitation in Afghanistan. But this particular programme is very complicated already. UNDP does not have staff in any of the key areas and we don't feel that they are equipped to manage the programme. The extension workers were funded last year by UNOCA through UNDP/OPS, so up till now the whole programme has come under the coordinator's programme and through the Trust Fund. What we are asking is why is UNDP thinking of funding it, when they haven't in the past..." (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

The UNOCA office in Kabul presents a different argument. It feels that the cross-line networks it has established are successful because UNOCA's mandate enables it to operate freely cross-line without reporting to the Kabul regime. It is worried that UNDP's close links with the regime will compromise its neutrality (von der Schulenberg, UNOCA, Kabul).

iv UNDP Kabul

UNDP's resident representative in Kabul disagrees. He argues that the government recognises UNDP as a neutral party and allows them to spend money in areas outside their control. "We don't report on a regular basis to the government, though obviously we give them information. I know the sensitivities but people have to realise we are not reporting to the Party, we are not intelligence gathering," (Mountain, UNDP, Kabul).

UNDP Kabul also argue that a more integrated approach to rehabilitation is needed, and that traditionally has been UNDP's role: "UNOCA's focus has been emergency work which is by definition short-term. There has been no overall plan and no framework for reconstruction. We wrote a plan in 1988 with the Government's former minister of planning which was used by UNOCA in its consolidated report. We have been here for 38 years. We need to set things up now in a way that enables whoever takes over to sustain development. If we don't have integrated programmes we will contribute to further fragmentation and disintegration," (Mountain, UNDP, Kabul).

UNOCA did not wish to comment on what has been described as a power struggle by other UN agencies, except to say: "Our view is that so long as UNOCA exists (and if it is abolished tomorrow, fine) it has a function firmly acknowledged in UNDP's published documents which say that the secretary general has appointed a coordinator responsible for all humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, and all programmes must be coordinated by the coordinator and not by someone else. Why should UNDP Kabul take on responsibility for coordination and jump in where they have not been specifically invited by the coordinator?" (Barber, UNOCA, Islamabad).

v Policy for Funds

UNDP Kabul would like to see more NGOs working from the capital. "It is very much our formal policy to shift to Kabul. The name of the country is Afghanistan. The agencies created for the political jihad will run away, but other NGOs will have to face the transition. We want to bring IPF money back through Kabul," (Mountain, UNDP, Kabul).

IPF funds will not be signed off to the Pakistan offices in a block as they were before, and UNOCA shows no signs of paying the money it owes. The APO is now submitting new projects for cross-border work to UNDP Kabul for funding "proposal by proposal, with the NGO's permission," (Eaton, UNDP, Peshawar).

How the practical details of proposals for IPF funds, whether cross-line or cross-border, will

be worked out is not yet clear. "We can't do this a priori. SCA will make no reports to the regime, only to UNDP. It could be that it will vary from ministry to ministry. It could be that as the Kabul regime gains strength, they will get tougher. The goal posts will be moving all over the field. This is a time of change. We can't deal in certainties," (Eaton, UNDP, Peshawar).

Salaries in line with those in government-held areas, and local recruitment, are certainly likely to be conditions attached to any IPF funds allocated to NGOs.

Using IPF money will be easier for some NGOs than others. The Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan originally wanted to join the SCA crop protection proposal but have decided that they cannot accept supplies from Kabul because local commanders have rejected the idea. The Dutch Committee for Afghanistan whose veterinary programme was funded by UNDP/OPS APO last year have agreed to submit a new proposal to UNDP for 1991 but are worried about the conditions which will be attached to it. "We expect them to raise the issue of salaries; we don't know whether our Peshawar staff will be allowed to train in Afghanistan, and there is the whole problem of reporting. Our staff reacted very badly when an adviser of ours worked through Kabul before."

Afghanaid do not foresee major problems: "We can't report direct to the Kabul government, and we would rather report to the UN here in Peshawar than in Kabul, but the links between the government and mujahideen areas are so great that the government can find out what we are doing whether we report to them or not."

The range of projects UNDP Kabul would like to consider for next year covers housing, road repair, water supply, and crop protection. The budget being proposed for next year is around \$10 million, "although delivery is another matter", (Mountain). In practice, lack of implementation capacity and security will both be major problems.

It is not clear how far UNDP Kabul is prepared to fund proposals for cross-border work, even if NGOs feel happy submitting them. But any UNDP funding for such projects will be drastically reduced, as the Peshawar APO admits: "Everybody knows there are serious limitations on work in Afghanistan. You can't work beyond the level of the power structures in a country. We will have to work on a small scale and with NGOs," (Eaton, UNDP, Peshawar).

3. UNFDAC

UNFDAC is in the unique position of having money and not having enough proposals to spend it on. The Afghan Programme Office was set up in April 1989 and UNFDAC signed an agreement to work with UNOCA while operating here, as elsewhere in the world, through UNDP for purely administrative purposes. \$1.3 million was pledged direct to UNFDAC for its Afghanistan programme, with Australia and Norway being the largest

donors. So far \$400,000 has been committed, and if the right sort of proposals are put forward, in theory the rest of the money could be available for 1991.

So far the limitation has been finding effective proposals which fit with the UNFDAC mandate for drug control. The organisation has funded NGOs to run small-scale programmes covering awareness-raising, detoxification and training. Crop substitution programmes cross-border have run into considerable difficulties and many in the UN and NGO community remain sceptical of their value.

A proposal from SCF (US) for a crop substitution project involving establishing fish ponds in Nangarhar was recently blocked at the UN steering committee chaired by UNOCA - the extent to which this committee has the authority or technical ability to approve and reject proposals from individual UN agencies is a bone of contention (see above) - and will be resubmitted by UNFDAC. But a \$140,000 Afghanaid proposal for agricultural work in Badakhshan put forward jointly by UNOCA and UNFDAC (although the money and control will both be UNFDAC's) has been approved for 1991.

UNFDAC policy is to operate not only in areas where opium is being grown now, but also in regions where opium used to be grown, since these are areas liable to revert to poppy cultivation. The range of activities they will fund is wider than many NGOs realise: proposals covering irrigation, water supply, education, reforestation, income-generating related to tree cultivation, and rehabilitation will all be considered. Their geographical priorities are Badakhshan, Kunar, and Nangarhar.

UNFDAC have no project office in Kabul but do have "a project presence". The regime in Kabul "sees the drugs issue as a way of re-entering into a dialogue with the international community" and is keen to encourage drugs programmes. UNFDAC's activities in Kabul will remain small, and will concentrate on drugs awareness campaigns. UNFDAC has also worked cross-line through UNOCA's field offices in the north.

4. UNICEF

UNICEF is facing a shortfall in funding of \$1 million for the contracts it has signed with implementing partners in 1990. The Afghanistan Programme was originally financed out of special funding rather than from UNICEF's general resources. In December 1989, UNICEF's APO in Peshawar drew up a Plan of Action for 1990 based on a budget of \$6.5 million. They signed agreements worth \$3.5 million with 25 implementing partners, but only received \$2.5 million. "We cannot say that all contracts will be honoured; we have to go through them contract by contract, but we will try," (Birerdinc, UNICEF, New York).

i Planning Procedures

This system of planning on the basis of hope rather than informed expectation is likely to cause problems for NGOs again in 1991. Fund-raising activities only start once a plan of action has been prepared for the following year.

There is also no clear indication of what policies and priorities will be for next year, except in the most general terms. "We don't start our project by looking at money; we look at the programme first. We can't even say that we will plan expecting a cut. We have been looked upon as a funding agency, but we don't want to look at it that way. The priorities will be EPI and control of diarrhoeal diseases. But the way we run it depends on our internal work," (Birerdinc, UNICEF, New York).

The thrust of this "internal work" at present is a major review of what the programme has achieved, with serious questions being asked about whether it has provided value for money and how a sustainable programme integrated with the Kabul office can be devised.

The review follows a policy meeting in late October, and headquarters staff expect to return in November to look at the programme. NGOs working with UNICEF have been told that all projects are to be evaluated over a three month period. Since evaluations starting in November will not be finished until February, it seems unlikely that decisions on funding will be made before March, i.e. a full quarter into NGOs' programmes for next year. NGOs have expressed concern that any criticisms emerging from evaluations will be used as an excuse for cuts which have already been decided.

ii Level of funding

In practice staff are assuming there will be substantial cuts, and it is clear that differences between the Kabul and Peshawar offices have not yet been ironed out. "For 1991 I'm not going to plan a big dream plan like 1990's; I will go much smaller and will dismiss people from the office and bring it all down to a realistic level. I may be able to squeeze \$2 million from general resources, but there may be no donations at all, so I'll plan on a basis of \$2 million for 1991," (Rosenhall, UNICEF, Peshawar).

\$10 million has in fact been allocated from UNICEF's general resources to the Afghan programme over two years. (That covers all offices in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran as well as expenses in New York.) "Of the \$5 million for 1990, the Peshawar office was allocated \$1 million. There may still be some reserve funding to help honour our contracts," (Rosenhall, UNICEF, Peshawar).

iii Priorities

A plan of \$2 million for 1991 represents a cut of nearly 50% on 1990. "If I have to cut, EPI will be the priority and the other programmes would go first, but I can't say who would be cut at this stage," (Rosenhall, UNICEF, Peshawar).

It is not known whether the refugee programme or work in Afghanistan would bear the brunt of any cuts, nor is it clear where the priorities lie between cross-border and cross-line work, except that the Kabul office appears to be more favoured. "There has been a shift... it has been easier over the last 12 months to get funds for Kabul than for Peshawar," (Carter, UNICEF, Kabul).

"If I could buy shares in the Afghan package, I would not buy a single share in Pakistan, all my money would be in Kabul. The long-term scenario is for me to move across and out of Pakistan and into Kabul. The push is not immediate. 1991 will be a transition year. But if nothing happens in 1991, it will kill the whole programme here in my view. There is very clear donor fatigue," (Rosenhall, UNICEF, Peshawar).

A further contributory factor to donor fatigue appears to be the lack of clear financial reporting from UNICEF, with representatives of the Japanese Government in both Geneva and Islamabad expressing dissatisfaction. Proposals worth about \$2 million are being prepared for the Japanese Government but, in the absence of satisfactory reporting, funding remains uncertain.

iv Cross-border v. Cross-line

Efforts have already been made to coordinate the EPI programmes from both offices, but "there are huge problems matching cross-border programmes with Kabul ones; for example there are wide discrepancies in salaries," (Carter, UNICEF, Kabul). Both offices would like to see an increase in supplies coming from Kabul. "The days of transporting large numbers of vaccines from Peshawar are coming to an end, though the role of Peshawar may be as a supply centre for border areas," (Carter, UNICEF, Kabul).

The Kabul office recognises that delivering supplies cross-line is one thing, delivering services another. Kabul's capacity to implement is also extremely limited at present: "We need NGOs. The smaller organisations which came into being solely to support the mujahideen will have trouble, but the bigger international ones will manage. We do have a protocol with the Government, but it is acknowledged that we should work in areas outside their control," (Carter, UNICEF, Kabul).

Dividing areas of responsibility has presented difficulties: "We have been supplying 29 areas from Peshawar. But the thinking in June was that Kabul would work cross-line in the north and Peshawar would do the south with Bamyan/Wardak as the merging point. But during the summer, fighting has broken out in the south which has destroyed most of my area. I would look ridiculous if I only had a \$0.5 million project, so I have to stay doing the whole country," (Rosenhall, UNICEF, Peshawar). "There will not be a geographical division; there is one country and it is called Afghanistan," (Birerdinc, UNICEF, New York).

5. WHO

WHO's policy towards NGOs for 1991 was put succinctly by the Peshawar field coordinator, Dr Rudi Coninx: "We love you, but we've got no money."

The Afghanistan Programme Offices in Peshawar and Quetta have been instructed not to look at any new proposals for 1991. "We made clear that we were offering funding only for one year," (Coninx, WHO, Peshawar).

i Funding

All WHO's funds for the Afghan programme are now fully committed. Of the \$11.2 million received through UNOCA, \$2.3 million has been allocated to the Kabul office for drug procurement and a small orthopaedic programme, and \$5.6 million has been allocated to programmes implemented through NGOs based in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1989 and 1990. Some projects will continue into 1991 and funds are available to meet WHO's obligations.

The WHO Afghan Programme Offices in Pakistan report direct to Geneva and a special unit which has been created recently to enable the organisation to work more flexibly in unorthodox situations. All their funding is "extra-budgetary", i.e. is pledged as a result of special appeals. In 1989 the vast majority of their money came through UNOCA's Trust Fund; in 1990 approximately 50% was given direct by donors or earmarked specifically for WHO. For 1991, WHO expects "next to nothing from UNOCA, on the fundraising side it will be very much up to us," (Richter, WHO, Geneva).

ii Policy

Traditionally WHO is not so much a funding agency as a technical one, providing advice to government on the development of health policy and services. In the absence of a government partner WHO started funding NGOs, but the organisation is not comfortable with the necessarily piecemeal approach adopted in Afghanistan. In particular, its main interest is in the long-term building of health service structures, whereas NGOs have had to focus largely on relatively short-term service provision in limited areas.

As a compromise, WHO has looked to support projects which have the potential to become part of a national structure in the long term (e.g. referral hospitals) while at the same time promoting standardisation of health policies and staff training among all agencies involved in this sector inside Afghanistan.

The uncertainty about funding for next year is forcing a reappraisal of activities and achievements. "I'd like to see a little less money going in. There has been more health money for Afghanistan than ever, yet health services are no better. The dumping of money in the last two years hasn't made much difference," (McDonnell, WHO, Quetta).

They are also sanguine about the fate of NGOs: "Some NGOs may fail because of the cut in funding. There are some I'll be very sad to see go, but some of them I wouldn't even fund if I had the money. If they fail, it's Darwinian," (McDonnell, WHO, Quetta).

Nevertheless, the APOs have funds to cover their administrative costs for another full year, and privately they hope to sustain programmes at the same level as last year. "WHO could certainly implement up to \$10 million in 1991... I am optimistic that we can get the money from donors," (Richter, WHO, Geneva); "it's important to have good NGO proposals in the drawer because when the money comes it tends to come quickly," (McDonnell, WHO, Quetta). Plans for a laboratory training project are being prepared with MSF Belgium-Holland on the assumption that money will be found.

The problems this creates for planning are fully acknowledged by WHO executives, who are equally frustrated at the uncertainty.

iii Priorities

Priorities for any money that is available are still being discussed. There might be more effort to monitor and supply projects cross-line in the north. Whether such projects would then report through the WHO Kabul office (which operates in the traditional way as adviser to the Kabul Ministry of Health, and reports to the WHO regional office in Alexandria) or through Pakistan APOs has not been decided.

"The time has come to stop taking sides. I personally wouldn't mind more cross-line work. For the NGOs set up for political reasons that will be very difficult, but people are already working with both sides, and the commanders I discussed it with in Badakhshan said they would accept it," (Coninx, WHO, Peshawar). APO staff are however sensitive to the difficulties that reporting through Kabul presents to some NGOs, and would like NGOs to continue reporting through the Pakistan offices.

The recently opened Quetta office not surprisingly feels that south west Afghanistan has been neglected and should be a priority. The bombing of the hospital in Urgan, built with WHO money, shortly after it was completed has also helped focus thoughts: "Small development projects cross-border, training, and the provision of technical assistance will be the important things," (McDonnell, WHO, Quetta).

Priorities will be clearer after the head of the REL Unit in Geneva, Dr Tarantola, and the fund-raiser for Afghanistan, have visited the area in early November. How much money there will be will only become clear in the next few months.

6. FAO

FAO, like WHO, is traditionally more of a technical agency than a funding one. FAO's Afghanistan programme covers agricultural inputs and rehabilitation, and is unusual in being operational. Its funding came through UNOCA, with approximately \$10 million being earmarked for the agency by the Government of Japan.

Under FAO's original proposals, \$6.5 million was allocated to agricultural inputs; \$1.37 million to rehabilitation in Kunar; \$1.52 million to rehabilitation in Paktika; and \$628,520 to management support. The original allocation for management money runs out at the end of December 1990. After some months' uncertainty, it has now been agreed that additional funds will be found from within the programme so that the office based in Pakistan can continue to operate for a further twelve months.

Agricultural inputs will be exhausted by May or June 1991, and FAO are trying to find funding for a further round of seed and fertiliser.

They have tried to change the designation of the rehabilitation money: "The most useful thing now would be the continuation of the seed inputs," (Fitzherbert, FAO, Islamabad), but so far without success. It is still possible that approval will be given by the donors to switch the money assigned to Paktika to another area but it will probably remain tied to irrigation repair.

FAO are currently consulting NGOs to establish what is needed in Kunar and the money for repairing canals will be disbursed there over the coming year.

7. WFP

WFP's funding for its repatriation programme comes not through its normal biannual pledging system, but through Operation Salam. Although it says that its supply of wheat will be greater than demand in 1991, it has no cash left to run its Afghan Relief and Rehabilitation Office (ARRO), its cash for UNHCR is running out, and \$18 million allocated to it by the Government of Japan has been frozen until substantial repatriation can be shown to have taken place.

As in 1990, WFP is unlikely to get all the wheat needed to meet the full requirements of the refugees in Pakistan, and rations are to be reduced.

i Refugee Programme

The range of rations given to refugees in Pakistan has been reduced steadily in the last few years. About 400,000 tonnes of food aid wheat, i.e. approximately \$80 million at last year's prices, have been allocated for use in the refugee camps in 1990. Every November WFP makes an estimate of needs for the following year, and this November it will ask for 486,000

tonnes; it expects to get approximately 400,000 tonnes again, i.e. just as in 1990, "we will not be able to meet the total requirements of the refugee population," (Jones, WFP, Islamabad).

From January 1, 1991, the daily ration of wheat to refugees will be reduced from 500 grams to 400 grams. Supplies of edible oil are expected to be the same as in 1990. "The sense is that donors are losing interest. What happens to the Pakistan Government will also be important, because we are seen to be supporting Pakistan," (Jones, WFP, Islamabad).

ii Repatriation Programme

In 1989, WFP established the Afghan Relief and Rehabilitation Office to run food aid activities in Afghanistan. It had also, with UNHCR, established UNILOG as a logistics and transport operation to move resources into Afghanistan quickly when necessary.

Approximately 102,000 tonnes of wheat and \$5 million cash were allocated to the programme in Afghanistan, with the wheat providing working capital for any projects which could aid rehabilitation. Most of the funding came through UNOCA and in kind. The cash has now run out, and WFP is bartering to keep deliveries going into Afghanistan. WFP have asked UNOCA for \$1.5 million to cover ARRO's running costs in Kabul, Islamabad and Teheran in 1991. \$18 million earmarked for WFP from the Government of Japan has been placed on reserve and is frozen until there is evidence of large scale repatriation. A trip by the head of WFP to Tokyo to free the money was unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, of the 102,000 tonnes, 20,000 has been delivered, and 34,000 is to be handed back to the Government of Pakistan at the request of the EC because it was intended for returning refugees who have remained in Pakistan. That leaves 48,000 tonnes for next year. As a reserve, that is enough food for one million refugees for three months. WFP can continue bartering some of it to finance its NGO projects, but it cannot afford to deplete its stocks too much in case substantial repatriation does take place. A further 40,000 tonnes is available for northern areas through WFP Kabul.

In practice, "NGO projects will go ahead. We can provide wheat for any foreseeable requests for next year. We are keen to use food in Afghanistan, but there is not that much demand at the moment because of security. Our last "zone of tranquillity" went this morning (October 7)," (Jones, WFP, Islamabad).

Cash for UNILOG is more of a problem. "I can't barter with them. But by drawing on our resources and selling our wheat, we can keep ourselves going."

The WFP office in Kabul was closed during the war but reopened in late 1989. It reported at first through the Islamabad office, but now reports direct to Rome and Geneva. And "it is inevitable that our operation will be more and more centred on Kabul. The shift is as inevitable as the political process, but that may be a very slow one," (Jones, WFP, Islamabad). Some proposals from NGOs, particularly long-term ones, are already being put through the Kabul office.

8. UNHCR

UNHCR's policy for 1991 is still being formulated. An evaluation officer from headquarters was looking at costs and staffing at the time of writing and the final results of the programme for encashment of rations are not yet known. Clearer priorities are expected to emerge from a regional meeting being held on November 15, and after the pledging conference in November in New York, but meanwhile the picture is one of uncertainty and some confusion.

i Refugee Programme

The refugee programme, financed from HCR's general programme funds, has already sustained considerable cuts: it has been reduced from approximately \$54 million in 1987 to \$33 million in 1990.

Income-generating projects (for example the quilt and bag making projects run by the Salvation Army and Ockenden Venture, the DACAAR sewing project) have either been cut dramatically already or told to cut for next year. Any vocational training that remains will be vulnerable (Gerety, UNHCR, Islamabad), as will improvements to basic facilities in the camps such as access roads: "We should not be investing in infrastructure in camps at this stage," (Jamieson, UNHCR, Geneva). Veterinary services will also be cut (van Rooyen, UNHCR, Islamabad).

Other NGOs have been encouraged to find alternative sources of money (for example SCF UK has switched funding from UNHCR to EC for 1990; Sandy Gall Appeal is hoping to do the same for 1991).

There have not been enough pledges in 1990 to cover HCR's worldwide programme, and its much publicised internal wrangles made this year a particularly difficult one. Senior executives are currently looking at staff cuts in Peshawar as elsewhere, and say funding for next year looks "very bleak".

"The Afghan conflict is no longer a popular cause. I personally feel that the time has not arrived for a return. There is still a proxy war, regional interests are playing a major role, and internal problems are even greater than before. A refugee should think twice before exposing his family to the dangers there. But that is not the way others look at it. There is a growing consensus among donors that this problem should now be over," (van Rooyen, UNHCR, Islamabad).

At the same time, however, senior staff argue that the refugee programme is now very lean, and that it will probably be sustained at roughly the same level in 1991 as 1990. Cuts in local staff will help remove dead wood and tighten up the organisation. A budget for approximately \$32 million for 1991 was presented to HCR's executive committee in early October and approved. In the past the Pakistan programme has received enough earmarked pledges to cover most of its costs - approximately \$28 million was earmarked by donors to the Care and Maintenance Programme in 1990.

"The refugee programme has always managed to get funds. The shortage of funds is overplayed. The downward spiral has been the result of our own thinking as much as anything... At the executive committee meeting the High Commissioner reiterated his 1989 statement of a three year time scale for winding up our activities in Pakistan," (Jamieson, UNHCR, Geneva).

The Government of Pakistan will be asked to cut up to 30% of its staffing in the coming year. Meanwhile "most NGOs working on the annual programme in Pakistan can count on approximately the same level of funding for 1991," (van Rooyen, UNHCR, Islamabad), but "there is always the clause: subject to the availability of funds." And staff in the Peshawar office have been asked "as an exercise" to look at how a 30-40% cut would affect the Care and Maintenance Programme for refugees.

"We cannot dispel the uncertainty," (Gerety, UNHCR, Islamabad).

ii Repatriation Programme

UNHCR cross-border programmes began in September 1988. As part of the programme for repatriation, HCR "started cross-border operations in areas where we have very little competence, but we did it because we had some money and because other [UN] agencies were very slow to get moving," (van Rooyen, UNHCR, Islamabad). They were all implemented through NGOs and were "a bit of a hotch potch with not much planning. We tended to choose the areas we knew large numbers of refugees had come from, but there was no master plan for each area."

By the end of 1989, UNHCR felt it was time to reconsider and "question what our specific role is". It would appear that they are still trying to find the answers.

HCR's "repatriation" programme depends on special funds. Between 1988 and 1990, \$47.8 million was raised either directly from donors or through joint HCR/UNOCA appeals. Of that HCR has obligated \$46.6 million, and actually spent \$31.8 million. Approximately \$9 million has been allocated to cross-border projects implemented by NGOs, most of which are now completed; a few will run through into 1991. Approximately \$10 million has gone on "prepositioning" for repatriation. Of the \$14 million budgeted for the encashment programme to buy back refugee ration cards, approximately \$6.6 million has been spent to date. Commitments for 1991 can be met but there is very little money for new proposals.

No one at HCR is optimistic about getting any further funding for cross-border work. "The future is bleak" (van Rooyen, UNHCR, Islamabad). "We are almost broke. Donors say there is no more money until there is repatriation. We say there is repatriation but we can't monitor it. We are trapped. We can't do cross-border work, and we can't encourage or monitor repatriation," (Wanroy, UNHCR, Islamabad).

Those interviewed at the beginning of October said that no new cross-border projects would be considered. NGOs had been given the same line (ARC, for example, have implemented crop production projects with HCR funds since 1989, but have been told not to submit any new proposals for crop production in 1991).

Since then, however, some senior executives have talked about a change of heart. "We thought that we shouldn't consider any cross-border activities. But the field officers have changed my view. We want some activity the other side. What we do depends on what other agencies are doing or not doing... Shelter is a sector no other agency is covering," (Jamieson, UNHCR, Geneva). "We have to have rehabilitation if we want repatriation. We should be soliciting proposals from NGOs, especially if they can show proposals are returnee-impacted. There will be very few funds around but we do want to think positively," (Mitchell, UNHCR, Peshawar).

So where will the money come from? "Our policy will depend on what happens to UNOCA, and that will become clearer in the next three months. We will get key donors together ourselves in Geneva," (Jamieson, UNHCR, Islamabad). Meanwhile, HCR are negotiating directly with the Japanese Government to release some of the Japanese reserve in the Emergency Trust Fund, and are "optimistic".

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
APO	Afghan Programme Office
ARRO	Afghan Relief and Rehabilitation Office
EPI	Extended Programme of Immunisation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OPS	UNDP Office for Project Services
SMU	Salam Mobile Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFDAC	United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIOLOG	United Nations Logistical and Transport Operation
UNOCA	Office of the Coordinator for United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

APPENDIX

NGOs receiving funds from UN agencies in 1990:

Information taken from the ACBAR/SWABAC Database published May 1990.

NAME OF NGO	UN FUNDING AGENCY	% UN FUNDS
Action International	WHO	N/A
Afghan Aid Association	UNHCR, WHO, UNDP	100
Afghan Medical Aid	UNHCR, UNICEF	8.5
Afghan Relief Foundation	UNICEF	15
Afghanaid	UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNFDAC	17
AVICEN	UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR	30
AHSAO	UNICEF, WFP, FAO	25
AFRANE	UNDP, UNHCR	20
Austrian Relief Committee	UNHCR, UNDP	25-30
Catholic Relief Services	UNHCR	N/A
Comite Afghan de Solidarite	WFP	37
Council for International Development	WFP	5-10
DACAAR	UNHCR	45
Dental Clinic for Afghan Refugees	WHO	1
Domestic Energy Saving Project	UNHCR	14
Dutch Committee for Afghanistan	UNDP, FAO	40
Engineering Services for Afghanistan	UNDP, UNHCR	100
Experiment in International Living	UNHCR	N/A
German Afghanistan Foundation	UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF	75
Handicap International	UNHCR, WHO	N/A
Human Concern International	UNHCR, UNDP, WFP	40
International Medical Corps	WHO, UNICEF	25
International Rescue Committee	UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNOCA	15
Islamic Relief Agency	UNDP, UNHCR	29
MADERA	FAO	5
Management Sciences for Health	UNICEF	<5
Medecins Sans Frontieres Bel/Hol	UNHCR, WHO	13
Medecins Sans Frontieres France	WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR	27-33
Mercy Corps International	UNHCR, WFP, WHO, UNDP	N/A
Mine Clearance Planning Agency	UNOCA	100
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	UNICEF, UNHCR	30
Norwegian Refugee Council	UNHCR	27
Ockenden Venture	UNHCR	70
Sandy Gall Afghanistan Appeal	UNHCR, WHO, UNOCA	71
Save the Children Fund (US)	UNDP, UNICEF, WFP	60
Save the Children Fund (UK)	UNICEF, UNHCR	25
SERVE	UNHCR	6.7
Shelter Now International	UNHCR, UNDP, WFP	N/A
Solidarite Afghanistan Guilde Du Raid	UNDP, WFP	N/A
SOS/PG Belgium	UNHCR	55
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan	UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO	15-20
Veterinaires Sans Frontieres	UNDP	30
World Vision	UNDP	24
ACBAR	UNDP	10



~ = 1830 A10/Raf