TRAINING TASKFORCE

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I. INTRODUCTION

The project proposal: Coordination of Management Training for Afghans (COMTA), was submitted by ACBAR/GTZ, to UNOCA on 27th September 1990. The project has since been accepted. Funds amounting to some DM 1,000,000 are now available at UNOCA for the implementation of the project.

The main activities of the COMTA project consisted of the implementation of different types of training courses for senior level management. The proposed implementation partners were IRC, ISRA and SCF-UK. However, due to a change of training priorities IRC and SCF-UK no longer wish to become actively involved in the implementation of COMTA. This means that the COMTA project, as it was originally planned, cannot be implemented.

In an attempt to find suggestions for an alternative project for management training of Afghans, which might allow the funds at UNOCA to be used constructively, a meeting of all those interested in senior and middle level management training was held at ACBAR on 13th March. At this meeting it was decided that a Training Taskforce should be formed to make recommendations on an acceptable proposal for a new project.

The taskforce was told to report back to the training group on 24th April 1991. However, since the meeting of 13th March at ACBAR, UNOCA has invited GTZ to act as implementor of the COMTA project. GTZ, who are still looking for a coordinated effort among NGOs towards a senior/middle level management training project, have suggested that, using COMTA funds, a consultant is hired to produce a revised proposal for management training. These new developments have an impact on the work of the taskforce. As a result the taskforce has decided to report back early with its recommendations.

The taskforce consisted of seven individuals: Selina Forman (ACBAR); Olwen Herbison (AVICEN); M Obaidi (DAI); Cornie Huizenga (GTZ); Eng Aziz (IRC); Seddiq M Ali (ISRA); Paul Emes (SCF-UK).

During the course of the taskforce a number of agencies with training experience were interviewed, and asked to give their opinions on management training for Afghans.
II. TERMS OF REFERENCE

The terms of reference originally set out for the taskforce were as follows -

1. Study Previous History
2. Define Management Levels
3. Look at Management in an Afghan Context
4. Assess Training Needs
5. Study Different Types of Management Training
6. Make Recommendations

It was felt by the taskforce members that over the past two years all the points in the terms of reference have already been analysed in detail.

Given that the taskforce itself was only to be active for one month, it was generally agreed that to attempt to give a more in-depth analysis on these issues - over and above the research already provided - would be unrealistic. In addition to this, present initiatives with regard to management training of Afghans are running ahead rapidly and in many ways these terms of reference have become redundant as you will see in Section III. of this document.

However, for the benefit of those who have not been involved in training developments in the past, a brief summary of the previous research done in this area is given below.

1. Previous History

After the signing of the Geneva Accords and the possibility of a return to Afghanistan there was growing concern among NGOs here about the role of Afghan nationals in the planning, decision-making and implementation of projects aimed at supporting the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Decisions made in NGOs have implications for the future of Afghanistan, therefore it seems appropriate that Afghans themselves should make them.

However, for the Afghans to be able to successfully and independently manage NGOs and major programmes a number of senior managers are needed to replace expatriate positions and 'Afghanise' international NGOs. The most senior Afghan decision makers also need senior managers to back them up. Many directors of NGOs complain that there are not enough senior level Afghan managers available.

In order to further tackle this problem ACBAR/GTZ organised a workshop entitled: Afghan Management Development Programmes for NGOs, in November 1989. It dealt with a
wide range of issues regarding the present and future role of Afghans in NGOs. The workshop came up with seven recommendations (see Appendix 1).

After the workshop ACBAR/GTZ arranged for a feasibility study to be carried out to further assess the recommendations made by the workshop participants. The study: A Discussion of Afghan Involvement in Reconstruction and Relief Programmes, was completed in April 1990. The consultants who carried out the study were not asked to analyse in detail all the recommendations of the workshop. Consequently some workshop participants felt that the recommendation for an Afghan Management Institute needed further investigation. There is an obvious lack of locally available senior management training. Some members of the NGO community think that senior level management training is a high priority if expatriates are to be replaced by Afghan managers.

In an attempt to fill this need ACBAR/GTZ produced the COMTA Proposal for Afghan management. Aimed at providing high quality training to senior level managers, this project was to be implemented by IRC, ISRA, SCF-UK. However, as previously explained due to a change in priorities, IRC and SCF-UK no longer wish to act as implementing partners for the COMTA project. Senior level management training is undoubtedly needed, but to provide it is a major undertaking likely to dominate the future work of a training agency.

2. Management Levels

The taskforce was asked to define management levels. However, as the taskforce has not produced a concrete training proposal no definitions have been made. It was felt that to create an independent set of definitions for management levels would be pointless as opinions vary so widely. Having said this, definitions should clearly be made for individual proposals to avoid confusion over target groups.

A clear account of the difficulties of defining management levels was given by Olwen Herbison in the feasibility study: A Discussion of Afghan Involvement in Reconstruction and Relief Programmes. For the purpose of the study Olwen provides a brief definition of levels. The taskforce during their discussions used these definitions. The relevant section from the study is quoted overleaf.

1 Copies of the feasibility study: A Discussion of Afghan Involvement in Reconstruction and Relief Programmes, are available from ACBAR Resource and Information Centre (ARIC).
"It was suggested that one of the tasks of this consultants team should be to consider the quality and level of Afghan managers and to categorise them into senior, middle and lower levels. The idea was analysed and for many reasons it was decided that this would be a meaningless task and the results of a survey would be of little use to anyone. For example, some organisations give certain staff the title of 'Director' and consider them 'senior management' but in reality these 'Directors' may have no more authority or managerial responsibility than Team Leaders in another organisation who are considered mid-level managers. Some people argue that there are no senior Afghan Managers in Peshawar while others believe that they have five or six employed in their own organisation. Job titles are totally misleading and therefore could not be used in this study. Another problem arises regarding criteria that could be used to assess the skills of a manager. Some people may consider a good manager someone who places importance on developing the staff under him, others feel that if someone works more efficiently then he is successful irrespective of how he achieves this. Examples such as these indicate how it would not be valid for the consultants to categorise Afghan managers by quality or level since the results would essentially be subjective on the part of the consultants.

For the purposes of this report, the following will be used as definitions of levels of Afghan managers -

**Senior managers** - Those managers involved in decision-making at high level within the organisation. Their duties would include budgetary control, proposal writing, reports and donor-relationships. They would direct control over several other middle and lower level managers and would be responsible for their hiring and firing.

**Middle managers** - Those managers responsible for a particular section of a project, with 10-20 staff. They would manage the budget of their own section and make decisions on day-to-day business concerning staff, expenditure, planning and implementation. They would be advised by the Director and senior managers.

**Junior managers** - Those managers with responsibility for up to five members of staff, no budgetary control and limited decision making power except on a day-to-day basis within their own section of the project. They would be directly responsible to a middle/senior level manager."

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2 A Discussion of Afghan Involvement in Reconstruction & Relief Programmes: Management - Problems of Definition, page 74-75
3. Looking at Management in an Afghan Context

During the November 1989 ACBAR/GTZ workshop the concept of Specific Afghan Management (SAM), was discussed with regard to future training of Afghan managers (see Appendix 2). Steve Holtzman, a consultant working on the feasibility study dealt succinctly with this concept.

"A culturally specific management style, if such a thing exists, must grow up organically, not be artificially created. It was concluded very early in the study that management concepts appropriate to Afghanistan were things which had to evolve out of a situation and could not be researched, defined or outlined by the conscious effort of a small group of people, expatriate or Afghan. Many conclusions and recommendations point to the fact that 'Afghan' styles of management can only come about gradually over time. The best aid that outsiders can offer to such a process is to support systems where Afghan decision makers are allowed the autonomy and flexibility to adapt their own styles of management without the necessity of constant reaction to expatriate colleagues."

During interviews conducted by the taskforce both expatriate and Afghan managers with experience of training were asked what they thought of SAM. Generally the feeling was that management principals were basically the same for Afghans and westerners. Modifications should be made to training curriculums to fit into the Afghanistan context, however most trainers thought that to develop a whole different style of management training for Afghans would be artificial and unrealistic, as well as being unnecessary.

4. Training Needs

Several training needs surveys have been done over the past few years by different NGOs.

i ACBAR - Technical Support Survey
ii ARC - Training Needs Assessment
iii Afghanaid - Training Needs Assessment
iv IRC - Training Needs Report

It was felt that in the short period this taskforce is in existence it could not add to the work that has been done already in this area. However, it should be mentioned that

A Discussion of Afghan Involvement in Reconstruction & Relief Programmes: 3. A Re-evaluation of the Swat Workshop Recommendations, page 66
during taskforce interviews there was a considerable interest from agencies in the possibility of senior management training being available locally. All agencies agreed that if the courses were well taught and not too disruptive to work schedules, they would send their senior/middle level managers for training.

5. Study Different Types of Management Training

Different types of management training have previously been studied by Olwen Herbison in the feasibility study: A Discussion of Afghan Involvement in Reconstruction and Relief Programmes (see Appendix 3 for details).

III. TASKFORCE SUGGESTIONS

1. Central Training Fund

The aim of the taskforce was to make recommendations on how the DM 1,000,000 originally allocated for the COMTA project, could constructively be spent on training. It was agreed that it would be difficult for one agency to absorb such a large amount of training funds.

During the course of the taskforce meetings it was suggested that perhaps a proposal for a general training fund, which could be accessed by any NGO with a training initiative, may be a more realistic approach. SCF-UK produced a brief one-page proposal outlining the idea for a Central Training Fund to be held under the trusteeship of ACBAR (see Appendix 4). The fund would be available to support new and existing initiatives in management training. A board of trustees would be set up to consider applications to access the fund, and to monitor and evaluate projects funded.

If such a proposal was acceptable it could possibly fund a full-time Technical Services and Training Coordination Manager at ACBAR. This manager would be responsible for carrying out the activities outlines in the ACBAR 1991 Plan and together with the Board of Trustees would ensure more efficient information sharing among trainers and less duplication of training activities.

It was agreed that the advantages of this proposal would be the ability of NGOs to retain their own training priorities, while at the same time the Board of Trustees would be able to maintain quality control and prevent duplication of work.

At the same time some members of the taskforce were concerned that this type of funding of NGOs may not lead to
a significant improvement in training standards in the aid community. There may also be difficulties in agreeing to the selection and mandate of a Board of Trustees at ACBAR with the power to release and withhold funds.

Training NGOs asked about such a fund have been positive. However, a couple of agencies say they have difficulty in spending their existing training budget and that they have not the staff to increase training activities and retain the quality of training they require. To qualify this I should also say that agencies were enthusiastic about good senior level management training being available in Peshawar, although they themselves cannot envisage providing it.

2. Senior/Middle Level Management Training Proposal

GTZ are still interested in implementing a senior/middle level management training proposal, which would involve a coordinated effort among trainers in Peshawar and aim to significantly improve training at middle/senior level to aid in the process of 'Afghanisation.'

GTZ is looking to see a significant improvement in the quality of training here. For senior level management training this would mean employing expatriate consultants to develop high quality curriculums for senior/middle management training.

GTZ are interested in promoting two types of courses -

- Tailor-made courses taught both in the classroom and on-the-job at regular intervals over a set period of time.

- Theme courses of general interest to everyone. These courses would last approximately 2-3 weeks.

The training would be aimed at senior and middle level management already employed within NGOs. Using pay scales as a guide to the level of manager being targeted, this would be managers on Pakistani basic pay scale 17 and upwards, or Afghan pay scale 3 to out-of-grade. All training would be focused towards work in Afghanistan. GTZ believe that management training at senior/middle level is a priority, as these managers are responsible for the successful implementation of major projects for Afghanistan.

The taskforce could however foresee certain problems in this type of proposal -

a. Implementation: GTZ would like to see a coordinated effort among NGOs to implement any future project. However, from past experience those present felt that
this was being unrealistic. NGOs do not want to be involved in a project that they are not fully in control of. It was felt that a senior/middle level management project such as COMTA, should be implemented by GTZ alone. However, GTZ are still looking for joint implementors of such a project. ISRA is still interested in acting as an implementor.

b. Time-Limit: It was felt by some members of the taskforce that any efforts to get senior management training underway would take at least 18 months, by which time the general funding situation in Peshawar, would be critical. It was pointed out that by the end of 1992 major new initiatives in training in Peshawar may not be appropriate.

c. Shortage of Trainers: It was felt that for senior level training, a very high calibre of trainer would be needed. Those present pointed out that there simply were not enough good trainers available in Peshawar. They were concerned that a project set up by GTZ for DM 1,000,000 would mean that their own top trainers would be poached. To train up new trainers would take too much time. GTZ argued that there would be a high level of expatriates at first, who would have counterparts to continue their work.

d. Cross-Border: Some members of the taskforce thought it doubtful that senior/middle level management trainers would, at this stage, want to work cross-border.

In the original COMTA proposal it was recommended that before the start of the project a consultant be hired to formulate a detailed plan of operations. UNOCA has now arranged with BMZ and GTZ for this consultant to be hired. In view of the inability to carry out the original COMTA proposal it will be the job of this consultant to come up with a revised/acceptable proposal for senior/middle level management training. In other words, this consultant will be asked to carry out the work that was originally planned for the taskforce. It would be pointless to duplicate the work the consultant will be carrying out. The taskforce suggests therefore that they be disbanded. It was decided that the Training Coordination Meetings that already take place regularly at ACBAR should act as a sounding board for the consultant. As many members of the taskforce also attend these meetings, the consultant will be assured of getting a broad base of experienced opinion. ICC and UNOCA will also be invited to attend.

To help GTZ in the hiring of the consultant the taskforce have discussed at length what the his/her qualifications, terms of reference and liaison role should be. They have come up with a number of suggestions -
1. Qualifications:
- Diplomatic
- Familiar with Afghanistan
- Knowledge of management and management training
- Experience of training trainers
- Experience in organisational development/project planning
- Ability to write a clear project proposal

ii. Terms of Reference:

a) To produce a management training project proposal which has a broad base of approval.

b) To provide an organisational structure of who will implement the project. (If more than one NGO is involved to give details of their position and role in the project).

c) Project objective: middle/senior level? Pakistan/Afghanistan orientated training?

d) Time-frame: The overall goal of the project. Outline the details of phase one of the project.

e) Training concepts/methodologies to be utilised in the project. Outline types of training.

f) Inventorise potential risks for successful project implementation and how to overcome them. (Involvement of UN bodies in project implementation).

g) Draw up a detailed budget

h) Project organisation: Internal structure

i) Develop monitoring and evaluation outline.

IV. TASKFORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The consultant hired by GTZ should be asked to produce an acceptable training proposal which has wide approval among agencies here.

2. The ACBAR Training Coordination Forum should take an active role in discussing any future management training proposal with the GTZ consultant. Together they will review previous work done in this area and assess past recommendations on this issue. The consultant will be asked to attend all
ACBAR Training Coordination Meetings (together with a representative of UNOCA and ICC), to share his/her research with the group and to keep the group up-to-date on the formulation of any project proposal for management training.

3. As the taskforce has no wish to duplicate the work of the GTZ consultant it recommends that it be disbanded. Any additional work which needs to be carried out with regard to the formation of a revised proposal for management training will be done by the ACBAR Training Coordination group in conjunction with the GTZ consultant.
WORKSHOP FOR AFGHAN MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR NGOs
November 1989

Workshop Results/Recommendations -

1. Establishment of forum for regular meetings between Afghans and expatriates, both inter-NGOs and within NGOs, in order to share information on Afghan programmes and increase mutual trust and understanding.

2. Policy decisions are made by Afghan-expatriate management teams.

3. Existing Afghan NGOs stabilized and all existing expatriate NGOs contacted to assess desirability, willingness and feasibility of transforming into Afghan NGOs.

4. New Afghan NGOs established in areas defined on need basis: 1 year - 3 new Afghan NGOs. 5 years - 8 new Afghan NGOs.

5. Specific Afghan Management (SAM) concept is developed and applied to NGOs.

6. Afghan Management Development Institute is established.

7. Training courses for Afghan managers are developed and implemented.
Afghan Management Development Programmes for NGOs - Specific Afghan Management (SAM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADITIONAL AFGHAN MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>SPECIFIC AFGHAN MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>WESTERN MANAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. More work/research needed on key concepts.</td>
<td><strong>1. Specific Afghan management concepts can not be fully developed in this working group. Can only recommend preliminary basic guidelines.</strong></td>
<td><strong>1. Fits western context.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hiring is mostly not based on qualifications.</td>
<td><strong>2. New Afghan management concept should be inspired by Islamic teaching and Afghan values.</strong></td>
<td><strong>2. Consultation is necessary in management process/decisions.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Communication poor.</td>
<td><strong>3. Consultation at all levels is essential in developing S.A.M.</strong></td>
<td><strong>3. Time allocated for task fulfillment (time management).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Reluctant to take responsibility belonging to power.</td>
<td><strong>5. Appropriate mechanization is desirable.</strong></td>
<td><strong>5. Less human quality.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. No fixed standards.</td>
<td><strong>6. 'Consultative autocracy'.</strong></td>
<td><strong>6. Motivation more or less dependent money (materialistic).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lack of controls and low incomes resulted in corruption.</td>
<td><strong>7. Moral and material motivations should be used equally.</strong></td>
<td><strong>7. Promotion depends on job performance.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Less realistic.</td>
<td><strong>8. Procedural project planning, implementation, follow-up and evaluation.</strong></td>
<td><strong>8. Time consuming.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. More bureaucratic.</td>
<td><strong>10. Accountability.</strong></td>
<td><strong>10. Responsible, less fear.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Time frames are less vital.</td>
<td><strong>11. Authority and responsibility should balance to each other.</strong></td>
<td><strong>11. 'Objective' methods of staff selection/hiring.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Group decision plays large role.</td>
<td><strong>12. Selection should have a balance between qualification and reliability.</strong></td>
<td><strong>12. Western management is increasingly less affected by religious values.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Concept of traditional Afghan management is not well documented.</td>
<td><strong>13. Male and female managers should be encouraged where appropriate.</strong></td>
<td><strong>13. Communications techniques.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFPENDIX 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>15. Tools to assist in decision making are available.</strong></td>
<td><strong>15. Team work/building is encouraged.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Consultation is necessary in management process/decisions.</td>
<td><strong>16. Western management system is better organized.</strong></td>
<td><strong>16. Western management is better organized.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Time allocated for task fulfillment (time management).</td>
<td><strong>17. Male/female managers.</strong></td>
<td><strong>17. Male/female managers.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Morality and material motivations should be used equally.</td>
<td><strong>18. Social activities - - wine, dance, mixing of sexes.</strong></td>
<td><strong>18. Social activities - wine, dance, mixing of sexes.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Minimize of bureaucracy.</td>
<td><strong>20. Priority of objective accomplishment over &quot;people's&quot; happiness.</strong></td>
<td><strong>20. Priority of objective accomplishment over &quot;people's&quot; happiness.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. DIFFERENT APPROACHED TO TRAINING

1. Intensive one or two week courses

These short courses provided as part of in-service training are popular for several reasons. Generally, it is possible for staff to be absent from their normal duties for one or two weeks without too many problems and Directors feel that it is not such a major decision because of the low cost involved. If the course is appropriate, the participant should be able to put his skills into practice immediately and he should find the follow-up (if there is any) beneficial. However, it is sometimes felt that one week is too short for any in-depth training to take place and students generally feel that they would need more time. Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of such courses, it may be found that they are the most appropriate in the circumstances.

2. Full-time courses of 6 months plus

There are a lot of advantages in training of this type and subjects can be covered in some depth. However, certain problems may arise depending on the target group. If trainees are unemployed, do they receive a stipend to attend and is there any way to have a firm commitment that the trainee will complete the course? After completion of the course is there any guarantee that the graduates will find jobs? If participants are employed, often it is difficult for them to attend such courses. These problems become more significant as the duration of courses increase.

3. Part-time courses

Some courses are being offered at present, throughout the day and are open to employed and unemployed Afghans. Depending on the objective of the training, this approach may be advantageous. However, it can be an extremely difficult job for the trainer to work with people who have just finished a day's work and to cope with participants who arrive late back from the field. Attendance on these courses is generally poor so motivation of the trainer decreases. For skills training, for example, typing, such courses may be the most suitable by in other subjects, participants may benefit more from a short, intensive course.
4. ‘On-the-job’ training

This type of training can be very effective depending on the circumstances. A counterpart system can be considered ‘on-the-job’ training and sometimes the activities can be so informal, that it can hardly be called ‘training’. There are many advantages in that the training will be totally practical, applicable and relevant to the job being done. Follow-up is a continuous process and a good relationship can be built up between the trainer and the trainee.

However, the situation is never ideal and more often than not there are problems which prevent really successful training taking place. If the trainer is not qualified or experienced he may quickly become impatient in this one-to-one situation. Also time is a very important factor because in informal training of this type other duties can seem more urgent and the training is put off until another time. Perhaps not a lot of thought or planning is put into the training sessions if it is seen as a minor part of the day’s work. Also, peer learning is absent in this type of training and because the training is very specific to the job in hand, the trainee may learn skills which may not be so useful in the future in another job. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage in this type of training is the limited number who can be trained at any given time.

5. ‘Tailor-made’ courses

As mentioned earlier in this report, ‘tailor-made’ courses have become popular as Directors realise the need for their staff to have specific skills to work effectively in the organisation. The short-term advantages are obvious; the Director can have a lot of input, the newly acquired skills can be used immediately and peer-learning will take place during and after the course.

It could be argued that this type of training is more likely to be practical and related to real-life problems.

However, from a longer-term perspective, this type of training is not very effective. Unless the courses are designed firstly to teach general skills and secondly to teach the specific skills trainees may find it difficult to apply their knowledge and skills in another situation in the future.

6. Scholarships abroad

There are differing opinions regarding this type of training. Depending on the particular circumstances, long-term scholarships may be appropriate but unfortunately, not enough attention is given to the preparation, organisation and follow-up of such courses. It is difficult for an Afghan to refuse a scholarship to the west but this is no excuse for the providing
organisation to take the decision lightly. Well-travelled westerners often forget the difficulties encountered by an Afghan who has never left his own country except to come to Pakistan as a refugee.

From interviews held as part of this study, it became obvious that being in the west for at least a year had different effects on different people. Firstly, there were the people who really had a bad experience, missed their families, found it difficult to get used to the food and had problems with the language and culture. Secondly, there were the ones who really enjoyed the experience and were unhappy to return to Pakistan. Their only wish was to return to the west. Thirdly there were those who returned after a rewarding experience, having had no real problems and were happy to return to Pakistan. However, these were usually the people who had travelled before and knew what to expect. Unfortunately, there is a fourth group of people; these are the graduates who never returned. A general problem which may be encountered by any of the returnees is the difficulty in readapting to the life style in Pakistan/Afghanistan where every-day inefficiencies may cause frustrations never realised before.

One must weigh up all these factors and consider the psychological problems which may result before deciding to offer scholarships abroad.

Another question needs to be asked regarding the appropriateness of the training. Existing training programmes in Peshawar have found it difficult to provide suitably adapted material for training Afghans. Surely this problem will be even greater if the training takes place in the west. Considering the cost for each single person, would it not be more economical to provide appropriate training in Pakistan for a group of Afghans.

One argument is that it would not be so easy to change the utilisation of funding in this way since often the aid provided is not transferrable after it has been allocated for a particular use.

One must also consider the harmful effects on a project when a scholarship is offered to a member of staff. Usually it is the highly educated, experienced Afghans who hold key positions in the NGOs who are awarded scholarships and little thought is given to how the organisation will replace this person.
Selina Forman, ACHAR

: Management Training Taskforce members

Proposal from Paul Emes SCF(UK)

Copy to Matthew Bullard ( SCF, UK Project Director )

21.3.91

In order to begin discussions on positive new initiatives in management training, I would like to propose the following:

1 - That the money from BMZ should be made available to support new and existing initiatives in senior and mid-level management training with a view to the Afghanisation of expatriate posts where appropriate, and the upgrading of Afghan management skills.

2 - That a fund should be set up under the trusteeship of ACHAR using the BMZ money.

3 - That a board of trustees be set up, consisting of the current taskforce members and others as agreed.

4 - That this board should meet monthly to consider applications from agencies including their own, to spend parts of the fund.

5 - That this board should also be able to propose new training or staff development initiatives to be carried out by agencies, and commission research and reports using fund money.

6 - That ACHAR and the board consider the necessity of a full or part-time officer to administer and coordinate the board and the fund.

Initiatives in training might include

- overseas courses support
- locally-based course support
- support for staff development / counterparting
- advisory / consultancy support
- support for self-study
- support for travel bursaries / structured project visits.
- support for the development of new training materials and curricula.
- other initiatives as agreed.

I would like to add, for the record, that SCF (UK) remains committed both to training and the coordination of training. SCF (UK) will become involved within the constraints of overall policy goals, budgets, and its ability to work effectively and appropriately.