U.S. Base Mania in Central Asia
by Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, Ph.D.

Abstract
Before the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the Defense Department had no military bases in Central Asia. Half a year later it has over a dozen. Why? According to Bush Administration spokesmen, the Armed Forces need these bases to support the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. Yet their successful (so far) Afghan counterterrorism effort has been waged from either the decks of four aircraft carriers in nearby waters, from the British Indian Ocean base at Diego Garcia, or from bases in Afghanistan itself. The lust for land-based aircraft is understandable for a demand for recreational facilities, pizza parlors, and coffee houses! This paper explains why ‘base-mania’ is the wrong way to fight terrorists.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, a key consideration dominates American military strategy. Should the United States obtain Central Asian military bases? Does the United States need such bases in Central Asia to protect itself from terrorist attacks, or to influence the region? The evidence suggests it should not and needs not. But foreign real estate attractions American defense planners the way that Nimitz-class aircraft carriers attract admirals, B2 stealth bombers and heavy Abrams tanks generals. In other words, they can never have enough. With the campaign in Afghanistan only phase one of a longer struggle against terrorism, the lust for land-based has taken the United States back to a Cold War mindset. From approximately 1947 to 1989 the United States tried, with some success, to ring the Soviet Union with bases from northern Norway to the Korean peninsula, an arc of containment that swept down from Western Europe through the Middle East, all the way up to Northeast Asia.

With the extended demise of the Soviet Union, which recommenced in 1989 and concluded in 1992, the logic for these containing-bases collapsed

Base Closings in the U.S., Europe, and Asia

Faced with this reality and declining budgets, the Defense Department ‘hit the bullet’ and admitted in the early 1990s that it needed fewer bases, both at home and abroad. Congressional delegations screamed when one of ‘their’ bases went on the block, but a complicated formula forced the closures. California alone, a state that in the nineteenth century looked like a military reservation, lost heavily when the U.S. Navy abandoned all its facilities in the San Francisco Bay Area and the U.S. Army relinquished the jewel of its West Coast properties, the Presidio of San Francisco. Internationally, American base closures impacted mainly Europe. Interestingly, several Western European, where U.S. military townships especially foreign, where U.S. military townships especially German, where U.S. military townsships ended up along the border of Nuremberg. Germany suffered economic earthquakes around Nuremberg. Germany suffered economic earthquakes as payrolls and tax-rolls declined. Civilian contractors and local merchants took the hit.

More than any other great power, the United States replicated itself on overseas bases. Throughout NATO Europe, U.S. military bases turned into American towns. Grade and high schools sprang up, large family housing projects like Pattonville near Stuttgart appeared on the landscape, along with military shopping malls (dry cleaners, beauty parlors, movie theatres, bowling lanes, commissaries with food flown in from the U.S., base/post exchanges similar to department stores, auto-mechanic garages, and even ski resorts with hotels in Garmisch and Berchtesgaden. Similar replication happened with Asian allies. Outside the city of Taejon, South Korea, the U.S. base at Camp Ames had paved roads and permanent cinderblock buildings long before the nearby village had electricity or running water.

American defense downsizing did not impact Asia as much as it did Europe. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines asked the United States to leave Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base, while the Nixon Administration’s ‘Vietnamization’ program gave the American military what it hoped was a chance to withdraw from bases in South Vietnam. But most Northeast Asian facilities remained relics of the Cold War. (The U.S. gave Camp Ames and other bases back to South Korea, consolidating American defense activities closer to the hub cities of Seoul and Busan). The number of U.S. bases in Japan declined, mainly because of their cost. But some resurfaced in tiny Okinawa, which now hosts thirty-eight U.S. bases. Okinawa is now faced with yet another American base, this one to be built in the ecologically sensitive bay at Nago.

Base Openings in the Balkans, Persian Gulf, and Central Asia

In Kosovo, where former President Clinton committed the nation for no more than a six-month sojourn to enforce peace, his administration built a permanent base. Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, which started as little more than a temporary tent site, has become a small, self-supporting town of wooden barracks and command centers, helicopter maintenance buildings, a water treatment plant, a movie theatre, a gymnasium and a hospital. Why not let the European Rapid Reaction Forces enforce peace on this Euro-zone periphery? (To borrow a Russian term, the Balkans are Europe’s ‘near abroad.’) Perhaps because officials like former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spent much of the 1990s urging NATO to expand toward the Russian border. This reckless and regretful policy hobbled Eastern Europe, which needs economic membership in a dynamic European Union, not military memberships in a mission-less alliance. It also wasted Western European military assets. As Kenneth Waltz wrote: "Rather than learning from history, the United States repeats past errors by expanding NATO eastward and extending its influence over what used to be the province of the vanquished. This alienates Russia and pushes it toward China." Thus did the U.S. divert its European allies from their real task of putting out border brushfires on their own, a backyard defense well within the capabilities of a rich West Europe.

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Engagement in Kosovo came after the Clinton Administration ceded much of Bosnia to Bosnian Serbs and strengthened two puesqueak dictators, Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman and Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic. The U.S. intervened in Kosovo only belatedly and moved the forward headquarters of the 5th U.S. Corps from Heidelberg, Germany to the Hungarian-Croatian border. From there it created Camp Bondsteel.

Another case of base mania occurred following Operation Desert Storm. In 1991 the Pentagon decided it needed to stay in Kuwait and turned two small warehouses into the present 500-acre complex known as Camp Doha. Kuwait, headquarters for U.S. Army Central Command-Kuwait (ARENC-KU). Here the Pentagon rotates battalion-sized task forces nearly continuously, flying one unit in from the U.S. while it takes another back. The U.S. Army conducts joint ‘Intrinsinc Action’ training with Kuwaiti elements; the U.S. Marine Corps calls theirs ‘Eagle Mace’; while Special Operations Forces, the sneak and peek troops, cover their joint activities under name ‘Iris Gold’. Not far from Camp Doha sits Ahmed al-Jabat Air Base, Kuwait, a home-away-from home for U.S. Air Force aircraft. And King Hamad of Bahrain allowed the U.S. Fifth Fleet to build its headquarters on this strategic Persian Gulf island.

Will Camp Bondsteel and Camp Doha act as models for woebegone Afghanistan and its wounded neighbors? “That’s an unfounded question,” the military say and the New York Times reports. Several locations have won approval: in Afghanistan the Bagram Air Base north of Kabul and Kandahar Airport are now home to the 101st U.S. Airborne Division, formerly of Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, when asked why U.S. troops at Bagram “cannot enjoy pizza and cappuccino, as their comrades do at Camp Bondsteel”, the general replied that “when you start creating a Bondsteel there’s an impression, rightly or wrongly, that you’re going to be there for an extended period of time.”

Outside of, but near to, Afghanistan there is Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan, and a new air base going up outside Bishkek, capital of Kyrgyzstan, as a “transportation hub to house as many as 3,000 troops and accommodate warplanes and support aircraft.” Also to be located at Bishkek’s Manas International Airport will be a U.S. military surgical ward, gym, and a military exchange (i.e., shopping center). This base is only three hundred miles from the Chinese border. (The State Department has signed a one-year Status of Forces Agreement with the Kyrgyz government to legalize this expanded Pentagon footprint in Asia’s Wild West.) To mask the appearance of unilateral military expansion, the U.S. has invited France to station six Mirage 2000s in Bishkek “for combat air operations in northern Afghanistan.” Another agreement has been concluded with Tajikistan’s government for a base near Tashkent while talks continue with Kazakhstan for U.S. use of an airfield there. Add to this the February 9, 2002, agreement between the U.S. and Pakistan in which Islamabad’s military government agreed to allow the U.S “to use Pakistani facilities for joint exercises, training, deployments and other military operations.” (This Texas roundup of Stans—Peshawar for place—rivals Alexander the Great’s incursion over two thousand years ago.)

Moreover, what will Russian and Chinese elites think of their new backdoor neighbors, the U.S. military? President Vladimir Putin’s surprise decision following September 11 to side with Washington caught many Russian specialists off guard. The U.S. should build upon Russia’s support, not ignore it, nor allow it to wither because of base mania behind the Hindu Kush. Many of the bases the U.S. wants were former Soviet bases in what Russians call their ‘near abroad.’ As for China, President Jiang Zemin and his likely successor, Hu Jintao, can hardly brush aside the case of American bases astride arteries of the ancient Silk Road. Chinese elites, unlike their American counterparts, remember history. Ming dynasty China sent envoys to Herat—a former imperial capital now within Afghanistan—before Columbus failed to find a western route to China. Why antagonize these two great powers, which, along with India, have vital interests in the region?

Rationale for Bases: War on Terrorism

The ostensible reason given for requiring Central Asian bases is the U.S. desire to destroy the al-Qaeda as a functioning terrorist organization. A mainly pan-Arab grouping, the al-Qaeda’s hijacking of a non-Arab government, the Taliban, which had itself hijacked one of the world’s greatest religions, Islam, has certainly demonstrated that their operatives know their business. But are American bases in Central Asia and Arab countries the appropriate response?

With the World Towers inferno the al-Qaeda made themselves targets. To evade destruction, they went back underground. Where did they hunker down? The best guess is not Afghanistan where many Afghans would sell them for the price of a rug. Nor Cairo and Riyadh, which tend to execute dissidents on the spot. More likely places are the European cities of the Islamic Diaspora. For example, Islam has emerged as the fastest-growing religion in Britain with numbers ranging from 1.5 million to 2.5 million. (With over 5 million, France has the largest Muslim population in Western Europe. Parisistan versus Londonistan.) The British rap sheet of ‘Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid, who terrorized American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami, is instructive. He had a Black Jamaican immigrant grandfather and a father who married a white British woman, the daughter of an accountant and magistrate. Both father and son did time in British jails, where they converted to Islam. British scholars like Ziauddin Sardar suggest that “Islam is a sort of natural religion for underdogs and that’s one reason why Afro-Caribbean people have found its message very attractive.”

Assuming that Europe now contains vital remnants of al-Qaeda, central Asian military bases will not help find them, nor will military forces. Instead, it rests with police agencies, intelligence services, and financial institutions.

A Better Solution

If recent history suggests anything about long-term hospitality in the Islamic world, the U.S. will probably get invited out soon after it settles in. Saudi Arabia is a perfect case in point. The almost 4,500 strong military force that the
has tried to placate disaffected Congressional members who feel betrayed by the desert kingdom.

Betrayal has nothing to do with it. The Saudis have bought over $30 billion in weapons over the past decade. With a population of 23 million they can defend their country.

And Abdullah knows well the military politics of his region. Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak has hosted joint U.S.-Egyptian military exercises in the land of the pharaohs. Almost simultaneous with the start of bombings in Afghanistan, 23,759 U.S. troops joined 43,350 Egyptian troops in land, sea, and air combat maneuvers. Eight other nations participated, each contributing an average of about 564 personnel. Code named ‘Bright Star’, Cairo and Washington have conducted these biennial, autumn war games for the last twenty years. At their terminus, the Americans terminate—they go away. Abdullah likes the going away part and apparently has no plan for yearly returns in any possible Saudi scenario. Skeptics should not sell this crown prince short. He holds the spigot to the kingdom’s much needed oil, and he proposed a striking solution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict that threatens sure-death for the region. But rather than bring the Saudi-based troops home, the Pentagon sees a replacement for its Arabian base just over the border in Qatar with its vast hangars and 15,000 foot runways at Al Udeid Air Base.

**Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups to the Rescue**

The Saudi bases were a mistake from the beginning. The U.S. should have remained over-the-horizon, its fleet patrolling nearby waters. That is what carrier battle groups do superbly. They patrol in international waters and function as floating bases that the Pentagon can move about the world’s oceans. Four of these blue-water behemoths were deployed into harm’s way after September 11: the U.S.S. Enterprise Battle Group in the Arabian Sea, the U.S.S. Carl Vinson Battle Group in the Persian Gulf, the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group in the eastern Mediterranean, and the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk in the Indian Ocean. (The Roosevelt’s Battle Group had just arrived from its home port in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Kitty Hawk’s Group had to dash down from its overhaul in Yokosuka, Japan.)

In the recent past, the U.S. Navy has paid short-term rents for pier space for such carriers in Singapore, one of the few places that can take these giant warships. Note the verb ‘rent’, the adjective ‘short-term’. Moreover, American naval battle groups can and do use the British Indian Ocean base at Diego Garcia, which also offered U.S. Air Force B-52s runways from which to lumber north to drop their payloads on Afghanistan. And stealth bombers flew round trip from the U.S. to strike at Afghan targets. None of the above operations required permanent Central Asian bases.

The above combination will not always work. While the celebrated historian Paul Kennedy seems overawed by the size and power of U.S. aircraft carriers, he fails to see their weaknesses. They make excellent targets for Russian manufactured Moskit anti-ship cruise missiles, called Sunburns (SSN-22) by the Chinese who bought 48 in 2000 and have stockpiled more ever since. With a range of 80 miles, a speed of Mach 2.34, its high-explosive warhead can sink most
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U.S. ships. And the warhead can go nuclear, up to 200-kiloton, six-times as powerful as Hiroshima.

Beijing bought two Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers from Moscow to go with these Russian anti-ship weapons. Indicators point to their willingness to buy more, particularly upgraded versions. Professor Kennedy may want to correct his use of decrepit to describe the Russian military—apparently their version of the military-industrial-education nexus still delivers complex weapons systems that work when tested, the first thing that the Chinese did before paying. Seen from Washington this equipment is offensive: from Beijing defensive.25 But it and other developments mean that the traditional carrier faces a future mainly in low-tech environments.

The Afghanistan conflict has proved the continued usefulness of carriers as floating bases in minimum intensity combat. Paul Kennedy correctly notes that in this conflict the U.S. pulled its forces from international bases it shared before September 11, 2001. Yet, as of March 2002 the U.S. has “a ring of new and expanded military bases established in thirteen locations in nine countries near Afghanistan since September 11.”26 Unfortunately, that is not a recipe for catching terrorists and more security but for a continuing cycle of violence ignited at the U.S. Exasperated by this base mania, Senator Robert Byrd, D-WV, who chairs the Senate Appropriations Committee, grilled Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz about the war’s costs and how “the Pentagon seems to be looking for opportunities to stay longer and expand our presence in the region.”27

The United States has made a case that it is fighting a just war in Afghanistan.28 The Bush team must not let that war turn unjust by expanding it. Timothy Garton Ash, a British admiral of the U.S., warned his American friends of “the peril of too much power.”29 There is also peril in wasting power on extraneous bases and weapons. Prize-winning journalists like Thomas Friedman might want to reconsider the next time they congratulate the U.S. on its immense military power. Yes, the U.S. Air Force does fly airplanes that can land in the dark, a feat that amazes Friedman.30 But as these military transport aircraft began to go into service, U.S. civilians began to lose their passenger train service. As the U.S. began to build high-tech M.A.S.H. facilities across Central Asia, it has not begun a national health care program at home. This does not bode well for America’s future.

If Pentagon history helps, in the 1960s two whiz kids, led by the economist Charles Hitch, came to their Defense Department jobs prepared to ask a tough question—How much is enough?31 If asked today about Central Asian military bases for the U.S., the number given should not rise above zero.

ENDNOTES


4. Chalmers Johnson, ed., Okinawa: Cold War Island (Cardiff, California, Japanese Policy Research Institute, 1999). Following the Korean War in the early 1950s, the number of U.S. bases in Japan declined from almost two hundred to nearly ninety, depending on how you count small service installations. The remaining ninety were mainly gigantic naval and air bases. "South Korea: U.S. To Close Bases", New York Times International, March 30, 2002, A4. In the Korean case it is consolidation, not closure per se. The current number of American troops, 37,000, would remain the same, backing up 600,000 South Korean troops.


9. General Hagenbeck, U.S. Army, is the commander of land operations in Afghanistan.


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Washington Post writer John Pomfret reported that President Jiang Zemin and his followers chose to sticked with the U.S. after September 11. "As a result, Chinese intelligence cooperation with the United States has resumed after being nearly dormant since the end of the Cold War... Western sources say that the Chinese, in two publicized meetings and subsequent undisclosed ones, have handed over useful material on Islamic radicals," John Pomfret, "September 11 Attacks Made Friends of U.S. China," San Francisco Chronicle, February 8, 2002, H5.


The Economist, January 26, 2002, 43.


21. William German, "Enigma on the Nile," San Francisco Chronicle, January 18, 2002, A22. "Bright Star" grew out of the Camp David Accords which Egypt signed in 1978. Small at first (ground forces), operations have expanded since 1985 (air forces) and 1987 (special forces and naval elements), and 1996 (forces other than U.S.-Egyptian invited to join).


23. In fairness, some local governments made ground areas available to the U.S. military on an ad hoc basis for which the U.S. apparently paid. If Washington now wants to offer more assistance, it should funnel financial aid to international organizations that work on poor countries’ transportation infrastructures—road, rail, air-and-sea ports.

24. The Yale University historian Paul Kennedy apparently fell victim to a naval recruiting baiting his February 5, 2002, article published in the Financial Times. Titled "The Eagle Has Landed," It had Kennedy waving the U.S. flag as heartily as Prime Minister Tony Blair. A little navy history would correct Kennedy’s error. The ‘flat top’ carrier was the critical naval weapon of World War II just as the battlewagon was of World War I. During the Cold War the submarine replaced both. It remains the warship that can hide. The last time when carriers hid successfully was when the Japanese Imperial Navy hid part of its fleet before Pearl Harbor. Technology now makes it impossible to repeat that Japanese success. For example, when launched the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan will stand 22 stories tall from keel to masthead and be longer than the Empire State Building is high (1,200 feet). In its galleys cooks will serve 18,000 meals every fourteen-hours to its six thousand passengers. Michael Fabey, “It’s Time to Toast Carrier Reagan Special Reagan Christening Edition,” Daily Press of Newport News, Newport News, Virginia, March 4, 2001, 3


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Currently at work on his fourth book, America’s Korean Odyssey, Hatcher is also the author of North Atlantic Civilization at War (M.E. Sharpe, 1999) and Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists in Vietnam (Stanford, 1990) as well as numerous articles and other writings. He helped narrate the film “Napoleon and Wellington” and is often seen on KRON-TV (NBC) in the Bay Area as a national security specialist.

Patrick Hatcher received his Ph.D. in history from the University of California at Berkeley. Prior to embarking on an academic career, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army. From 1996 to 1999 Hatcher served as a judge for the Kriyama Pacific Rim Book Prize and in 1999 he chaired the panel of nonfiction judges. He has taught at other Bay Area institutions, including St. Mary’s College, UC Davis, and Golden Gate University. Hatcher has led educational tours for the Library of Congress, the Art Institute of Chicago, the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, and the University of California Alumni Association’s Bear Treks travel program.